Increasing wage dispersion and the changes in relative employment and wages in Mexico's urban informal sector: 1987-1993

This study analyses the role of changes in informal/formal relative employment, wage levels and wage inequality in explaining increasing wage dispersion in Mexico during the 1987–1993 period. From 1987 to 1993, the variance of the log of hourly wages for Mexican workers increased by more than 50 per cent. Using data from the Encuesta nacional de empleo urbano we find that this increase in the overall wage dispersion was mainly driven by increasing wage dispersion in the formal sector coupled with a faster growth in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment. However, compression in the distribution of wages within the informal sector contributed to substantially slowdown the increasing overall wage inequality. About 60 per cent of the 1987–1993 4.65 percentage point reduction in the informal sector share of total employment is explained by changes in the structure that determines sectoral employment; the rest is explained by changes in the composition of the labour force, particularly increases in the sectoral education gap and a change in the regional relative share of sectoral employment. Also, from 1987 to 1993 the sectoral wage ratio increased from 0.59 to 0.63. It seems that a relative improvement in unobserved skills in the informal sector helped to close the wage differential but this effect was partially offset by an increase in the relative prices of both observed and unobserved skills, as well as increases in relative observed skills in the formal sector, particularly education.     

Cross‐Subsidies,and the Elasticity of Informality to Social Expenditures: The Case of Mexico's Seguro Popular

How is the size of the informal sector affected when the distribution of social expenditures across formal and informal workers changes? How is it affected when the tax rate changes along with the generosity of these transfers? In our search model, taxes are levied on formal‐sector workers as a proportion of their wage. Transfers, in contrast, are lump‐sum and are received by both formal and informal workers. This implies that high‐wage formal workers subsidize low‐wage formal workers as well as informal workers. We calibrate the model to Mexico and perform counterfactuals. We find that the size of the informal sector is quite inelastic to changes in taxes and transfers. This is due to the presence of search frictions and to the cross‐subsidy in our model: for low‐wage formal jobs, a tax increase is roughly offset by an increase in benefits, leaving the unemployed approximately indifferent. Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the recent introduction of the “Seguro Popular” healthcare program.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Assessing the distributive effects of minimum wage

This paper analyzes the role of Uruguay's sharp minimum wage increases after 2004 amidst the country's slight wage inequality decrease. We found that the minimum wage increase has contributed to the reduction of wage inequality for formal workers mainly. However, we also found a negative impact on employment outside the capital city, Montevideo, and observed a reduction in working hours. These results raise doubts about the effectiveness of minimum wage as a redistribution instrument in developing countries.     

Are Minimum Wages to Blame for Informality in the Labour Market?

The paper estimates the impact of the minimum wage on formal and informal employment in a developing country combining the use of aggregate time series data with modern time-series methods. The analysis is carried out for the case of Brazil over the period 1982–2002. The hypothesis under investigation is that minimum wage rises price workers out of the formal labour market and into the informal sector. The modelling strategy involves the estimation of the long-run structure as well as the short-term dynamics of employment equations in which the minimum wage enters as an explanatory variable.JEL codes: J23 J51 C32     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Flexible Labor Regulations and Informality in Egypt

Do more flexible labor market regulations reduce informal employment in formal firms? This paper examines the effects of changes in labor regulations on the incidence of formal employment. Using the case of Egypt, we study the effects of the introduction of more flexible labor regulations in 2003 on the probability that non‐contractual workers will be granted a formal employment contract. To identify the effect of the law and control for potential confounding factors, we use a difference‐in‐difference estimator that measures the difference in the pre‐ and post‐law probability of obtaining a formal contract across a treatment group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in formal firms and a comparison group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in informal firms. The latter serve as a useful comparison group since informal firms are unlikely to formalize as a result of the law, so that the only way their workers can become formal is to move to another firm. Our findings show that the passage of the new labor law did in fact increase the probability of transitioning to formal employment for non‐contractual workers employed in formal firms by about 3–3.5 percentage points, or the equivalent of at least a fifth of informal workers in formal firms.     

零工经济如何改变性别工资差距*——基于家庭与市场的双重视角

中国企业生产与性别收入分配的格局正在发生深刻变化。零工就业意味着雇佣的非正式化与收入的不稳定化，女性被大量吸纳进入零工经济的同时，参与劳动力市场和家庭的方式也发生转变，性别工资差距可能随之变化。理论分析表明，在市场领域，非正式雇佣加深了劳动后备军对工资的挤压效应，女性作为劳动力“蓄水池”，收入下降效应更为明显；在家庭领域，不稳定收入加深了劳动者的自我规训，家务劳动时间分配不均使收入差距进一步扩张。在上述两种效应下，零工经济中的性别工资差距将大于非零工经济。基于微观调查数据的经验研究结果验证了上述理论推演。劳动者“灵活性”和“安全性”的综合指标表明，只有建立灵活安全的劳动力市场机制，重视弱势群体的就业保护，才能真正推动零工经济成为“稳就业、保增长”的中坚力量。     

Rural-urban migration,informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis

"A theoretical model of rural-urban migration has been developed with special reference to the informal sector. The wage rate and employment in the informal sector are determined endogenously. The paper shows the simultaneous existence of open unemployment and informal sector in the urban area in migration equilibrium. The effects of alternative subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare of the workers are studied." The model is intended primarily for use in analyzing trends and policies in developing countries.     

Earnings inequality and unemployment in South Africa

Unemployment and earnings inequality have moved together remarkably closely in South Africa in recent years. This article explores the relationship between unemployment and earnings inequality in South Africa, investigating the extent to which changes in unemployment can account for changes in earnings inequality. Static and dynamic decompositions of earnings inequality by employment status reveal the centrality of unemployment in accounting for the both level and trend of earnings inequality. The distribution of employment in the formal and informal sectors is found to be of lesser importance in explaining earnings inequality, as is wage dispersion within each of these categories. The findings point to the central importance of reducing unemployment in South Africa if the extremely high levels of inequality are to be reduced.     

PROTECTION,INVOLUNTARY SELF‐EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

A small open economy operates with a unionized import‐competing sector and an informal “self‐employed” sector. Productivity varies across people in the informal sector. The full‐employment structure accommodates “underemployment or involuntary self‐employment” in the flexible‐wage informal sector. Protection increases the cost of capital and may increase the set of people who are involuntarily employed in the informal sector. Even if one ignores the consumption distortion effect of a tariff, the tariff may fail to be second‐best because it may raise underemployment. Our results on tariff‐reform are consistent with some recent empirical evidence.     

The impact of minimum wages on employment of low‐wage workers

This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of a minimum wage increase on employment of workers in the formal sector who have wages below the minimum level in Vietnam. Using the difference‐in‐differences with propensity score matching and the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys of 2004 and 2006, the article finds that the minimum wage increase in 2005 reduced the proportion of workers having a formal sector job among low‐wage workers. Most workers who lost formal sector jobs became self‐employed.     

Tax Reform,Structural Unemployment and the Environment

The effects of environmental tax reform, i.e., using the proceeds of a higher energy tax rate to lower the labour tax rate, on wage formation, employment and environmental quality are analysed in the context of a small open economy with structural unemployment caused by hiring costs. We find that such a reform may boost employment if it shifts the tax burden away from workers towards those without employment in the formal sector. Environmental tax reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers in the formal sector if higher energy taxes reduce earnings in the informal sector by reducing labour productivity.     

Globalization,labor standards,and women's rights: dilemmas of collective (in)action in an interdependent world

This paper challenges the idea that a “social clause” to enforce global labor standards through international trade agreements serves the interests of women export workers in poor countries. Drawing on fieldwork in Bangladesh and empirical studies, the author argues that exploitative as these jobs appear to Western reformers, for many women workers in the South they represent genuine opportunities. Clearly, these women would wish to better their working conditions; yet having no social safety net, and knowing that jobs in the informal economy, their only alternative, offer far worse prospects, women cannot fight for better conditions. Moreover, global efforts to enforce labor standards through trade sanctions may lead to declining employment or to the transfer of jobs to the informal economy. Lacking measures that also address the conditions of workers in this informal economy, demands for “the social clause” will reinforce, and may exacerbate, social inequalities in the labor market.     

Can minimum wages cause a big push? Evidence from Indonesia

Big Push models suggest that local product demand can create multiple labor market equilibria: one featuring high wages, formalization, and high demand and one with low wages, informality, and low demand. I demonstrate that minimum wages may coordinate development at the high wage equilibrium. Using data from 1990s Indonesia, where minimum wages increased in a varied way, I develop a difference in spatial differences estimator which weakens the common trend assumption of difference in differences. Estimation reveals strong trends in support of a big push: formal employment increases and informal employment decreases in response to the minimum wage. Local product demand also increases, and this formalization occurs only in the non-tradable, industrializable industries suggested by the model (while employment in tradable and non-industrializable industries also conforms to model predictions).     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.     

Labour mobility during transitionEvidence from Georgia1

This article deals with labour mobility in Georgia during economic transition. We use quarterly 1998–99 panel data to examine mobility across six labour market statuses (inactivity, unemployment, formal wage employment, informal wage employment, self‐employment and farming). Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of labour market segmentation. Formal employment is preferred to informal employment. Unemployment is largely a queuing device for individuals with higher education waiting for formal jobs. Some self‐employment is subsistence activities and consistent with a segmented labour market, while other is high risk and potentially high return activities. Age, gender and education are significant determinants of labour mobility. Finally, informal employment serves as a buffer in times of recession – with farming and informal wage employment absorbing labour shed by other statuses during the Russian financial crisis.     

Informal pay gaps in good and bad times: Evidence from Russia

Informal work is traditionally large in Russia and has further increased in the recent years. We explore the implications of this shift in terms of wage dynamics. Our characterization is based on the estimation of informal pay gaps at the mean and along the wage distribution, relying on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 2003–2017. Our approach comprises three original features: we rely on unconditional quantile effects of informality, we incorporate quantile-specific fixed effects using a tractable approach, and we suggest a treatment of the incidental parameter bias. Over the whole period, informal wage penalties are relatively small and do not suggest heavily segmented labor markets, even at low wage levels. Yet, in the past decade, a substantial negative selection into informal employment and self-employment has taken place, on average and especially at low earnings. Economic downturns and labor market policies have likely contributed to the shakeout of less productive workers in the formal sector, making the low-tier informal sector more of a last resort.