AMU Deviation Indicators for Coordinated Exchange Rate Policies in East Asia and their Relationships with Effective Exchange Rates

After the Asian currency crisis in 1997, the monetary authorities of East Asian countries have been strengthening their regional monetary cooperation. In this paper, we propose a deviation measurement for coordinated exchange rate policies in East Asia to enhance the monetary authorities’ surveillance process for their regional monetary cooperation. We calculate an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) as a weighted average of East Asian currencies following the method used to calculate the European Currency Unit (ECU). Also, we calculate AMU Deviation Indicators which show how much each of the East Asian currencies deviates from a hypothetical benchmark rate in terms of the AMU. Furthermore, we investigate relationships between the AMU Deviation Indicators and the effective exchange rates, which mean international price competitiveness in terms of international trade. We found strong relationships between the AMU Deviation Indicators and the effective exchange rates except for some currencies. The results suggest that monitoring the AMU Deviation Indicator will be useful for the monetary authorities’ surveillance in East Asia in order to stabilise their effective exchange rate or price competitiveness among the East Asian countries.     

An Asian Currency Unit: Simulations for Its Effects on East Asia

An Asian currency unit (ACU) is necessary to deepen Asian financial markets and to convert national currencies into a single monetary policy. However, the experiences of the European Currency Unit and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992–93 have indicated the danger of the so‐called gradual approach. This study evaluates the effects of welfare should the ACU indicator become a long‐term constraint of the People's Republic of China and Japan, the big two in East Asia. Our results indicate that the constraints of countries’ own baskets (e.g. real effective exchange rates) are still better before the launch of a true single currency. That is, pegging to an ACU indicator could hardly be sustained in the long‐run if East Asian countries have not reached a consensus about a regional monetary union.     

The Euro's place in the world monetary system

The European Union is striding ahead on schedule towards European monetary union (EMU). Eleven member states will introduce the euro for book-keeping purposes on 1.1.1999, assigning responsibility for monetary policy to the European System of Central Banks. On 1.1.2002, the euro will also be in circulation as notes and coins, and the participating countries will abandon their national currencies by 30.6.2002 at the latest. But what part will the euro play in the world monetary system? And what conclusions do we need to draw?     

Vier Jahre Eurokrise: Wege zu neuem Systemvertrauen

Political gridlock, violations of European law and inconsistent political communication have turned the euro crisis into a crisis of confidence in public policy. To re-establish trust in the system, Europe needs a comprehensive approach consisting of three elements. First, rules can invigorate societies if they provide for cross-border competition in a revived single market and abstain from top-down provisions. Second, new growth perspectives — e.g. by reassigning major parts of the EU budget — can enhance the selfconfidence of societies. And finally, a pan-European debate on common goals and values can help answer the essential question of Europe’s sense and purpose. As the euro can only ever enjoy as much trust as the institutions governing the euro area, the solution of the European confidence crisis is crucial to the fate of the common currency.     

Determinants shaping the international currency system: Where do currencies stand relative to their equilibria?

Using a sample of 27 currencies, we empirically test the role of a large set of determinants potentially underlying currencies' share in the international currency system, providing, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive study of this kind so far. We propose a new global indicator that quantifies the international use of currencies on the basis of three dimensions—medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. From a range of indicators including openness, financial development and institutional development indicators, we uncover several variables that are significant in explaining the international status of currencies, hence contributing to understanding the role of the determinants shaping the international currency system. We also investigate the long-run equilibrium values for currency shares, allowing us to score currencies on the basis of the potential stemming from the determinants. We contribute to the debate on international currencies' prospects, not only by looking at much discussed currencies such as the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi, but also by uncovering potential of emerging currencies. This knowledge is of the utmost importance for the debate on the reform of the international monetary system—from the point of view of academics, policymakers and market practitioners.     

Does Euro or Dollar Pegging Impact the Real Exchange Rate? The Case of Oil and Commodity Currencies

The aim of this paper is to investigate the equilibrium exchange rates for commodity and oil currencies as well as the discrepancies of their observed exchange rates to these equilibriums. To this end, first, we estimate a long‐term relationship between the real effective exchange rate and economic fundamentals, including the commodity terms of trade. The estimation relies on panel cointegration techniques and covers annual data from 1980 to 2007. Our results show that real exchange rates co‐move with commodity prices in the long run and respond to oil price somewhat less than to commodity prices. Second, we assess the degree of misalignment of these currencies, as the gap between their observed exchange rate and the estimated equilibrium exchange rate. We show that these misalignments are not significantly related to the exchange rate regimes adopted by the countries, either pegged or floating. However, for pegged currencies, the size of misalignments significantly depends on the anchor currency, either the euro or the dollar. A comparison of misalignments of pegged commodity and oil currencies across different periods confirms these results: during periods of dollar (euro) overvaluation, currencies pegged to the dollar (euro) tend to be overvalued; the reverse being true when the dollar (euro) is undervalued. Consequently, pegged currencies are often driven away from their equilibria by wild fluctuations in the key currencies, on which they are anchored.     

人民币周边化与东盟国家“货币锚”调整的效应分析

人民币的周边化是一个由计价结算手段生成储备货币的过程,其路径应该是先升值至一个外汇市场上可接受的均衡位置,然后再实行由市场定价的浮动汇率制度。本文对2000年1月1日到2010年8月10日东盟主要国家的货币和国际货币及人民币进行了回归,发现自2005年7月21日人民币升值以来,美元在东盟国家"货币锚"的地位在下降,人民币在东盟确立了强势货币的地位,东盟主要国家的"货币锚"调整为人民币、日元和欧元。东盟国家"货币锚"的多样化,对于应对国际金融危机主要国际货币币值的大幅度波动是有利的。而作为这一过程的另外一个方面,人民币必定会成为东盟国家的储备货币,人民币的国际化进程也会得到加快。     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.     

Can the Euro Survive?

One of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro. For much of 2011, the euro was a key reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. Now, however, the gravity of the crisis is finally dragging down the euro. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters its third uncertain year, the question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the euro can survive given policymakers still have in hand various tools. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.     

The franc zone of West and Central Africa

In the francophone countries of West and Central Africa a currency system has long been in place which was originally based on the French franc and is now based on the euro. A look at how this system has operated over the years may highlight some useful experiences for the countries on the eastern and southern periphery of the euro area that are now considering pegging their national currencies to the euro and could help to clarify the opportunities and risks arising for both these countries and the present participants of European Monetary Union.     

Why price‐level dispersion went up in Europe after the financial crisis

Persistent price differences across euro area countries are an indication of incomplete economic integration. We analyse long‐ and short‐run developments of price‐level dispersion in the euro area and compare the results with price dispersion across US cities. We find that monetary and economic integration in Europe has been successful in establishing a major downward trend in price‐level differences across countries since 1960. After the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, diverging economic conditions across euro area countries led to higher income dispersion, which contributed to a widening of price‐level differences again.     

Finance,growth and crisis — A European perspective

The long-held truism that finance is always good for growth has been called into question by the global financial crisis. This article examines new evidence on the finance-growth nexus from a European perspective. More specifically, it compares the approach of many CESEE countries — i.e. financial deepening and integration via foreign banks — with that of the euro area, namely wholesale financial integration but without any instruments for crisis management.     

Speculative attack against the Hungarian forint

In mid-January 2003 a severe speculative attack was launched against the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint. The attack was very unusual in the history of foreign exchange speculations, since it was aimed at enforcing the appreciation — and not the depreciation — of the currency targeted. The specific nature of this kind of speculation is closely related to Hungary’s accession to the European Union in general and to EMU in particular. Since the other Central and Eastern European acceding countries face similar problems and challenges, the Hungarian experience may involve some instructive lessons on monetary and economic policy for them too.     

International currency exposures,valuation effects and the global financial crisis

We examine the evolution of international currency exposures, with a particular focus on the 2002–12 period. During the run up to the global financial crisis, there was a widespread shift towards positive net foreign currency positions, such that relatively few countries exhibited the archetypal emerging-market “short foreign currency” position on the eve of the global financial crisis. During the crisis, the upheaval in currency markets generated substantial currency-generated valuation effects — much of which were not reversed. There is some evidence that the distribution of valuation effects was stabilizing in the sense of showing a negative covariation pattern with pre-crisis net foreign asset positions.     

Mean reversion of inflation rates in seven Eastern European countries: An application of a fourier quantile unit root test

This paper applies recently developed Fourier quantile unit root test to investigate time-series property of inflation in seven Eastern European countries. This method combines the quantile unit root test with smooth unknown multiple breaks through Fourier function, and has good size and power when the data follows heavy tailed distribution. Our results show that the inflation rates are stationary within each quantile for Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania, while the other four countries contain a unit root within some quantiles. We also find the speed of inflation adjustment towards to its long-run equilibrium for each country is asymmetric. Our results have important policy implications for monetary authorities in these Eastern European countries.     

The “Euro Illusion”: Illusion or Fact?

The changeover to the euro elicited an upsurge of research on the effects of the new currency on consumers’ conversion strategies, price estimates, price evaluations, choices, and purchases. This research includes longitudinal surveys, interviews, and controlled experiments, both natural and in the laboratory. The present article starts with an overview of this research after which it more specifically focuses on research showing an influence of the nominal value, as expressed in different currencies, on price evaluations and consumer choice. For most countries, the transition to the euro led to a lower nominal value currency. A bias known as the “euro illusion” has been documented such that the subjective value of money is influenced in the direction of the nominal value (i.e., in most countries prices and salaries seem smaller when expressed in euros than in the old domestic currency). Although the term was coined in connection with the euro changeover, the nominal representation of a currency has been shown to influence the subjective value of money in unfamiliar currencies other than the euro. Thus, tourists travelling abroad may frequently be subject to such an illusion. Different mechanisms have been proposed to account for the euro illusion. One is the numerosity heuristic and another the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic in conjunction with biased conversion strategies. The size of the euro illusion is influenced by trade-offs between accuracy and effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, task importance, time constraints, familiarity with the conversion strategy, complexity of the conversion strategy, mood, and attitude towards the country or the currency all influence the size of the euro illusion.     

East european trade with the developing world: soviet diplomatic partner or economic self-interest

Prior to the demise of the Communist system in Eastern Europe, the trade of these countries with the developing world was supportive of Soviet diplomatic aims at least in part. In the late 1950s, correspondence between the trade links of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was particularly close. In later periods, the trade of Eastern Europe was less closely aligned with that of the Soviet Union, but there was still evidence that East European trade with the developing world followed upon Soviet goals and initiatives in some instances, indicating the strong possibility of overall Soviet direction. Trade with countries in the Middle East had by far the strongest association for East European trade with that of the Soviet Union.     

Who Can Adjust to the Euro?

This study estimates potential exchange rate variation among 26 European countries during 1992–1998, as a proxy for the potential magnitude of adjustment they face to euro‐block membership, using the instrumental variable (IV) method, applying least squares cross‐section regression analysis based on optimal currency area theory. A currency union among Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia is found to entail a relatively light burden of adjustment for its members. The current membership of other countries in the euro‐block is potentially very demanding on their societies in the long term. This study also compares currency boards and independent central banks as alternative monetary frameworks for disinflation policies. Based on a pooled time‐series, cross‐section dataset of the same countries and years currency boards are found to be more effective in reducing inflation in all countries except Belgium. Balancing EMU's credibility gains against its adjustment costs, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain seem like unstable members of the euro‐block. For all new EU member states except the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia the advice is to stay out of the euro‐block until their economies are liberalised and flexible enough to withstand major adjustments, and their societal interest groups supportive enough of these adjustments.     

Does Monetary Integration Reduce Exchange Rate Pass‐Through?

There are several theoretical arguments for why the adoption of a common currency (either a currency union or a currency board) may reduce the exchange rate pass‐through (ERPT) to domestic consumer prices. This paper examines a broad panel of 101 countries over the period 1976–2006, using two‐stage instrumental‐variable estimation techniques in order to resolve the potential endogeneity problem. The main result is that ERPT indeed tends to decline in countries participating in a common currency arrangement. In particular, there has been a strong reduction in pass‐through in the member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) since the launch of the euro. Currency boards do not appear to be different from currency unions – both reduce the pass‐through from depreciation to inflation. Furthermore, the negative impact of common currencies on ERPT is at work in both high‐income and low‐income countries. Finally, most of the reduction in pass‐through to consumer prices under common currency arrangements happens somewhere along the pricing chain between the border and the supermarket shelf.