影子银行业务发展与商业银行经营效率提升——基于中国商业银行微观数据的实证检验

本文基于2008～2017年我国30家商业银行的面板数据,从资金运用方的视角探究了影子银行业务发展对银行经营效率的影响。研究发现:考察期内商业银行的成本效率始终高于利润效率,商业银行为成本控制所做的工作比利润创造更加有效;从全样本回归结果看,银行发展影子银行业务对成本效率和利润效率的提高都有促进作用,凭借对杠杆的灵活运用,同业资产等影子银行业务的扩张促使商业银行以较低成本创造了较高收益;从分类型回归结果看,影子银行业务的发展显著促进了大型商业银行和股份制商业银行成本效率的提高,但对城市商业银行成本效率几乎无显著影响。影子银行业务的发展对大型商业银行、股份制商业银行和城市商业银行利润效率的改进均产生了显著促进作用。对比影子银行业务对大型商业银行和股份制商业银行经营效率影响的差异,发现影子银行业务参与度更高的大型商业银行,其影子银行业务的发展对成本效率和利润效率的正向作用也更为明显。     

中国商业银行的风险承担与效率——货币政策视角

本文利用无效率项非单调变化且存在异方差的随机前沿模型测算了我国商业银行1994-2013年的效率,并从货币政策的角度,分析了我国银行风险承担与效率的关系。如果把没有扣除不良贷款的总贷款作为产出,会系统性高估成本效率、低估利润效率;如果不考虑资本投入,成本效率和利润效率均会被高估;年均成本效率和利润效率的走势基本一致,且与我国银行制度改革、宏观经济周期波动较为吻合。我国不仅存在银行风险承担渠道,而且具有连续性和顺周期性;货币政策不仅直接影响银行风险承担与效率,而且通过风险承担渠道间接影响效率。我国银行风险承担对效率的影响并非单调,而是存在倒u型关系,从提升银行效率的角度来看,存在最优的风险承担。风险承担的增加有利于利润效率的提升,同时利润效率的提升反过来促使银行承担更多的风险。     

影子银行业务与中小商业银行风险承担:传导机制与实证研究北大核心

近年来,我国银行业的影子银行业务规模持续膨胀,在商业银行业务结构中的比例持续上升,但从微观视角对影子银行风险效应及其作用机理的研究尚有空白。本文采用全国125家中小商业银行2011年至2016年经营情况的面板数据,将同业投资纳入影子银行测算范围,在理论分析的基础上实证检验了影子银行业务对商业银行风险承担的影响。研究结果表明,影子银行业务发展显著提高了商业银行风险承担水平。进一步分析发现,影子银行业务的发展使得商业银行资产配置更多投向高风险资产,最终使得资产质量下滑、不良贷款增加,即影子银行主要通过信用风险传导机制影响商业银行经营风险。因此,应加强对影子银行业务和商业银行的监管,扎实整治金融乱象,约束商业银行的过度风险承担行为。     

影子银行对商业银行流动性创造的影响分析——基于我国73家商业银行的实证研究

本文对我国影子银行规模进行测算,并利用73家上市及非上市商业银行2013—2017年的面板数据,实证检验了影子银行对流动性创造的影响。研究发现,我国银行影子业务对商业银行全样本数据流动性创造的负向影响效果明显;随着银行影子业务规模的扩大,流动性创造能力下降的幅度增大;不同类型商业银行受到的影响存在显著差异,影子银行促进了5家国有大型商业银行和8家股份制商业银行的流动性创造,削弱了地方性商业银行的流动性创造。综合来看,监管部门对不同类型银行的影子银行业务制定差异化监管政策时,要在风险可控范围内鼓励其开展影子业务,促进金融创新,同时对于规模较小的地方性商业银行而言,应严格控制其内部影子银行业务的规模,防范流动性危机的发生。     

商业银行影子银行业务风险监管研究

美国金融危机的爆发,使影子银行成为国际社会关注的焦点。由于我国稳健货币政策的实施,使得商业银行传统信贷业务被进一步压缩,一些商业银行纷纷通过业务创新来寻找新的利润增长点。我国商业银行在进行金融创新的同时,影子银行业务也得到不断发展。但是,这些影子银行业务将传统的表内资产转到表外,具有监管套利的性质,给影子银行的运行带来较大的潜在风险,同时也加大了政府宏观调控的难度。本文结合当前国内商业银行影子银行业务发展现状,对商业银行影子银行业务的风险监管进行了研究,并提出相关监管对策。     

金融科技与影子银行业务——基于商业银行理财产品的实证检验

本文基于2010-2020年中国上市商业银行的微观数据,以非保本理财产品作为影子银行业务的代理变量分析金融科技发展对影子银行业务的影响。研究发现,金融科技的发展与影子银行业务具有正相关性;异质性分析发现,金融科技对不同规模银行影子银行业务的影响程度存在差异,对大型银行影响不明显,对其他银行作用明显;银行金融科技水平的提高虽然一定程度上通过影子银行业务使得表内信息的风险评价指标得到改善,却也可能增加了银行整体风险承担水平。     

影子银行与银行体系稳定性——基于类信贷影子银行业务视角的实证分析北大核心

中国影子银行以商业银行为中心,本质上是商业银行为进行监管套利主动发起或主导的类信贷业务.影子银行不仅使商业银行资产负债之间的关联更加复杂,也增加了商业银行与同业金融机构之间的关联,存在系统性风险隐患.本文使用2007-2020年16家上市商业银行的季度非平衡面板数据,实证分析影子银行业务对银行体系稳定性的影响.研究发现,少量适度的影子银行业务规模有助于增强银行体系稳定性,影子银行业务规模超过一定阈值后才会降低银行体系稳定性.因此,本文认为应中性看待影子银行发展,维持金融创新和金融监管的适度平衡,防范高风险影子银行业务死灰复燃,引导低风险影子银行资金流入实体经济.     

我国影子银行对商业银行体系盈利能力的影响研究

随着我国金融市场自由化程度的不断提高,影子银行近年来如雨后春笋版迅猛增长,一方面影子银行业务拓宽了商业银行的融资渠道,帮助商业银行金融创新,提升了盈利能力;另一方面,影子银行抢占了有限的金融市场,给商业银行造成经营压力,且通过交叉业务将自身风险传递给商业银行,降低商业银行整体盈利能力。本文在剖析影子银行运作机制的基础上,研究其对我国商业银行盈利能力的影响,结合影子银行的特点提出针对性建议措施,帮助商业银行更好的利用影子银行业务提升盈利能力。     

直销银行对我国商业银行效率的影响 ——基于DEA方法

本文运用DEA方法,把固定资产总额、业务及管理费、直销银行综合评分作为投入要素,银行税前总利润、贷款总额、存款总额、手续费及佣金净收入作为产出要素,对比分析直销银行产生前后我国商业银行运营效率的变化,从而确定直销银行对商业银行运营效率的影响.结果表明,由于规模原因直销银行对我国商业银行总体效率有轻微抑制作用,对股份制商业银行的总体效率有促进作用.     

影子银行与银行风险承担

本文使用2007-2020年中国120家商业银行的非平衡面板数据，实证分析商业银行主动发起或主导的类信贷影子银行业务对自身风险承担的影响。结果发现：（1）影子银行业务增大银行风险承担，表现在影子银行业务参与度越高，银行总体稳定性越低、资产收益率的波动性越大、银行流动性风险越大；（2）影子银行业务对银行风险承担的影响呈现银行类型异质性，对于非五大国有银行增大银行风险承担，对于五大国有银行并未形成显著影响；（3）影子银行业务通过增加银行表内收益的波动性增大银行风险承担，开展影子银行业务是商业银行在严格资本和拨备监管下的被迫选择。因此，应对影子银行实施差异化监管，重点监管非国有银行主导的高风险影子银行业务，继续积极稳妥化解重大金融风险，但也应允许适度有益的影子银行创新存在，以弥补正规金融体系的不足。     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Efficiency in Turkish banking: post-restructuring evidence

Turkish banking sector went through a significant restructuring process in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000–2001. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of banking performance using a novel approach due to Ray [(2007). “Shadow Profit Maximization and a Measure of Overall Inefficiency.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 27, 231–236]. We derive ‘shadow unrealized profit scores’ as well as ‘shadow input–output prices’ for each year and bank in the sector from 2002 to 2011. We argue these scores operationalize the Hicksian concept of ‘monopolistic quiet life’. We provide some evidence the sector came closer to the ‘zero profit condition’ as well as displaying a closer approximation to the ‘law of one price’ over time. We show the variability of these ‘shadow prices’ essentially coincides with that of corresponding actual prices. We utilize shadow price information to show that business models and competitive choices of banks differ across ownership types with foreign banks competing on the broadest front compared to state-owned and privately owned Turkish banks.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

对外开放是否导致银行业的风险上升？——基于外资持股比例与海外资产占比的实证检验

对外开放是否导致商业银行的风险上升,以往学者的研究结论并不统一。本文基于中国392家商业银行的微观数据,检验了“引进来”(用外资持股比例作为替代指标)与“走出去”(用海外资产占比作为替代指标)对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。结果显示,对外开放与商业银行的风险之间呈现非线性曲线特征并存在临界点;对中小型商业银行而言,过高的外资持股比例与过低的境外投资规模会带来风险;对大型商业银行而言,境外投资规模存在一个阈值区间,在阈值区间内,可能导致银行风险上升。政策建议是:外资参股中小型商业银行的比例可能不宜过高,鼓励中小型商业银行加大境外投资力度,大型商业银行可以根据特定时期的目标来调整对外开放策略,同时应强化风险预警与防范手段,在坚持与扩大银行业对外开放的背景下,实施宏观审慎原则,维护我国金融体系的整体稳定。     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

竞争与效率——基于我国区域性商业银行的实证研究

针对文献中有关银行业竞争与效率之间关系的争论,本文采用我国区域性城市商业银行和农村商业银行的数据做了进一步的探索。文章采用随机前沿分析法计算银行效率水平,并利用银保监会发布的银行分支许可证信息构建区域竞争指数,从而考察区域银行业竞争程度对银行经营效率的影响。研究印证了竞争程度的增加可以提高区域性商业银行的效率,但竞争度对农村商业银行效率的影响更大。结果表明,我国区域性商业银行中的竞争与效率之间存在非线性关系,过度的竞争会对区域性商业银行的效率造成负面影响。通过对区域性银行跨区经营行为的进一步分析,发现竞争会影响区域性银行跨区经营决策,进而改变其经营效率。具体来讲,当区域性商业银行在银行竞争程度更高的地区设立异地分支机构时,银行效率提高的更多。本文结果对相关文献提供了重要的补充,并为我国区域银行业的发展规划提供了实证依据。     

金融科技布局、银行信贷风险与经营绩效——来自商业银行与科技企业战略合作的证据

商业银行通过布局金融科技进行的金融服务创新,已成为深化金融供给侧结构性改革的重要举措。本文通过手工搜集2005—2019年323家商业银行与科技企业战略合作的数据,研究银行布局金融科技如何影响其信贷风险与经营绩效。结果表明:(1)银行布局金融科技战略能降低银行信贷风险,提高银行经营绩效;(2)银行布局金融科技通过提高其自身创新能力与竞争力从而降低银行的信贷风险水平;(3)银行布局金融科技,通过降低信贷风险、提升普惠金融服务、提高运营管理能力与拓展中间业务这四个渠道提高了银行经营绩效;(4)全国性银行发展金融科技使其信贷风险水平得到降低,资本充足率低的银行通过布局金融科技降低信贷风险的效果更强。同时,信用贷款比重越高的银行通过发展金融科技降低信贷风险、提高经营绩效的效果更加明显。本文研究有助于理解商业银行顺势而为所进行的金融科技布局的微观经济后果,也为进一步完善金融服务实体经济相关政策提供参考。     

The impacts of risk-taking behaviour and competition on technical efficiency: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry

This paper tests the impact of risk and competition on efficiency in the Chinese banking industry over the period 2003–2013. Comprehensive types of risk-taking behaviour are considered including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and insolvency risk. Competition is measured by the Lerner index. The results are cross-checked using an alternative econometric technique as well as an alternative competition indicator. The findings show that the technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks are significantly and negatively affected by liquidity risk. They further show that greater competition precedes declines in technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks. The results suggest that Chinese bank efficiency is significantly affected by bank diversification, banking sector development, stock market development, inflation and GDP growth rate. The findings also indicate that, compared to state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks have lower technical and pure technical efficiencies.     

Inside debt and shadow banking

This study examines the effect of inside debt arising from CEO compensation deferral policies on shadow banking. We construct a parsimonious model that shows that increased bank inside debt leads to increased shadow banking. Using a CEO compensation deferral policy imposed on the Chinese banking industry in 2010, we empirically test our theoretical prediction on the effect of inside debt on shadow banking proxied by non-principal-guaranteed wealth management products. We find that banks that adopt the CEO compensation deferral policy exhibit higher levels of shadow banking than their counterparts and that this result is not contingent on bank size or the extent of government control. Moreover, the effect of inside debt on shadow banking is stronger in banks with higher loan-to-deposit and non-performing-loan ratios and in banks with CEO turnover, suggesting that the compensation deferral policy induces CEOs, especially newly appointed CEOs, to do more shadow banking to circumvent regulations regarding the balance-sheet risk and to boost performance.     

Schumpeterian competition and efficiency among commercial banks

In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the banking literature by quantifying the impact that the Schumpeterian competition mode – i.e. competition through the launch of new products (or new varieties of products) – has on the cost and profit efficiency of a sample of commercial banks based in the United Kingdom. We estimate both a cost and an alternative profit frontier on an unbalanced panel of UK commercial banks over the period 2001–2012. The intensity of competition through product innovation is proxied by the trademark intensity (i.e. the ratio between the number of trademarks registered in a given year by all the commercial banks – net of the trademarks registered by the bank under observation – and the employment in the sector) in the commercial banking sector. Our results show that the (lagged) trademark intensity in the commercial banking sector does affect negatively the mean cost and profit efficiency in the sector but there is evidence that as trademark intensity increases in the sector, commercial banks react by improving their cost and profit efficiency.