技术溢出、技术创新和对外贸易——基于一般均衡视角的一个理论分析框架

文章从微观经济主体的最优化行为出发构建模型,分析技术溢出对技术创新等的影响发现:在封闭经济条件下,创新部门对非创新部门技术溢出的变化对实际工资和消费具有正向效应,而对技术创新的影响则取决于产品替代弹性的大小。在开放经济条件下,任一国技术溢出的变化均会对两国的实际工资和消费产生正向效应;外国对本国技术溢出的变化,对两国的技术创新均具有正向效应,一国创新部门对非创新部门技术溢出的变化会对另一国的技术创新具有正向效应,但对其国内技术创新的影响则取决于产品替代弹性的大小;两国经济地位的变化取决于两国技术进步速度对比的变化。     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上，分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时，追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示，补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量，提高本国企业的利润和净福利，甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

论出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利的经济效应

本文从经济学角度分析了出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利和进口国福利的影响,认为补贴措施会降低出口国的总福利并容易遭到进口国的反补贴报复,反补贴税的效果受多种因素影响,具有不确定性,指出我国在实施出口补贴政策时应考虑产品市场的供求弹性,选择合适的补贴类型、数量和形式,以求在达到补贴的预期目的的同时尽量降低补贴的不利影响。     

开放经济条件下财富溢出效应与政府开支

政府作为一国居民集体行动的代表,对外政策的最高目标是改进本国居民的福利,在开放经济条件下,本国政府开支可能用于购买外国的商品,而政府开支是国民消费的挤出,当它用于国外商品的购买时,事实上将这部分市场出让给出国外的生产者,为外国的商品提供市场,促进外国的经济增长,那么,是什么因素影响政府购买国外的产品呢？购买国外的商品能否提高本国的福利水平。     

固定汇率制度下的财政政策:开放经济宏观经济学的拓展

本文主要建立在新开放主义宏观经济学理论上,进一步拓展和分析不同财政政策在固定汇率制度下对国民经济的影响,如消费、产出与汇率等。通过引入迭代模型的基本框架从而打破传统的李嘉图等价假设,我们发现因为有限生命代理人把所购买的国债看作是一种净财富,所以通过发行债券融资而导致的政府支出暂时的增加毫无疑问地将会增加本国居民相对于国外居民的消费水平。而另一方面,由于汇率水平固定不变和短期的价格粘性,政府支出增加的部分将平均分配给本国和外国商品。因此,政府支出暂时的增加将会减少本国的净国外资产头寸。而对于货币政策来说,本国居民相对消费水平的增加将导致本国货币升值压力,本国中央银行为了维系固定汇率水平不得不被动地增加货币供给。     

战略性贸易政策及对外贸易增长方式的转变

近十余年来,国际贸易的政策研究争端四起,讨论的焦点就是名噪-时的"战略性贸易政策".所谓"战略性贸易政策"是指一国政府在不完全竞争和规模经济条件下,可以凭借生产补贴、出口补贴或保护国内市场等政策手段,扶持本国战略性工业的成长,增强其在国际市场上的竞争能力,从而谋取规模经济之类的额外收益,并借机劫掠他人的市场份额和工业利润,即在不完全竞争环境下,实施这一贸易政策的国家不但无损于其经济福利,反而有可能提高自身的福利水平.     

人民币实际汇率变动的宏观经济效应研究

文章在理论探讨实际汇率对宏观经济的影响机制基础上,基于TVP-SV-VAR模型实证检验人民币实际汇率冲击对中国产出、通胀、就业与实际工资的动态影响效应。研究认为:(1)实际汇率在总需求渠道与总供给渠道的共同作用下对产出、物价、就业与实际工资产生不确定性的影响,当本国出口企业远多于进口企业,且居民对本币的心里预期较强时,实际汇率上升会导致产出、物价水平、就业和实际工资下降。(2)人民币升值短期内会抑制经济增长,降低物价水平,不利于就业的提升和实际工资的增长,但中长期内几乎没有影响,随着人民币汇率改革,人民币升值对中国产出增长、物价水平与实际工资呈现出越来越显著的负向冲击。(3)相比于有管理的浮动汇率制度经济繁荣时期和高通胀环境下,人民币实际汇率在固定汇率制度下、经济低迷时期与低通胀环境对产出增长、实际工资和就业的抑制效应更为显著,但对物价水平的传递效应表现出较强的趋同性。     

零利率约束下的货币联盟最优财政政策

文章将零利率约束引入两国新凯恩斯模型来研究货币联盟的最优财政政策。财政政策分承诺规则和相机抉择两种情况,当本国遭受技术冲击时,无论政策是承诺规则还是相机抉择,本国都将增加政府支出和政府债务,外国则是减少政府支出和债务,且零利率约束时的两国财政支出和政府债务均大于无零利率约束时。福利分析表明,承诺规则下的零利率约束恶化了本国福利,但会改善外国福利,整体上恶化货币联盟福利;相机抉择下的零利率约束恶化了本国、外国及货币联盟福利;无论有无零利率约束,承诺规则的货币联盟福利损失均大于相机抉择。     

WTO框架下战略性补贴政策的制约因素与因应策略

本文从影响战略性补贴政策实施效果的微观机制和考虑别国报复时该政策所引发的各国福利变化两个角度,具体分析了WTO框架下战略性补贴政策在一国的应用问题。研究表明:作为战略性出口贸易政策替代品的战略性研发补贴,在提升本国企业竞争力和提高国民福利的应用过程中,其政策效果一方面严重依赖于企业产品成本和产品间替代弹性等微观因素;另一方面也受各国政府反应策略的极大制约。     

排污税与减排补贴的减排效应比较研究

研究排污税、减排补贴对减排的影响机理,并从污染排放控制效果、等量污染排放下的社会福利影响等方面对减排效应进行比较分析,得出以下结论:排污税率、减排补贴率均与污染排放负相关,与社会福利水平的关系均受税率和补贴率的影响;当税率和补贴率等量提高时,排污税效果比减排补贴的效果好;当经济由未采用政策到采用政策而导致等量减排时,就社会福利的增加量而言,减排补贴比排污税的社会福利增加量大。此研究结论从政策的减排效果和福利影响方面,给予政府制定减排政策提供了参考依据。     

WTO框架下政府战略性补贴政策应用研究

本文研究表明：作为战略性出口贸易政策替代品的战略性研发补贴，在提升本国企业竞争力和提高国民福利的应用过程中，其政策效果一方面严重依赖于企业产品成本和产品间替代弹性等微观因素；另一方面也受各国政府反应策略的极大制约。     

Subsidy and entry: the role of licensing

The strategic trade literature has mainly examined the importanceof per-unit subsidies or taxes. Unlike the earlier works, afixed amount of subsidy has been considered in this paper. Thispaper shows that even if this subsidy policy does not affectthe marginal calculations of the firms, this policy can significantlyalter other incentives of the firms. A commitment to the subsidypolicy can encourage the foreign firm to license its technologyto the domestic firm which, in turn, helps to increase the welfareof the domestic country. We find that, in equilibrium, the governmentof the domestic country does not need to provide the subsidy.We have also analyzed the role of the foreign government.     

贸易摩擦背景下关税与货币政策反制策略研究

通过将贸易品美元定价约束、外汇噪声交易和关税反制等特征融入两国DSGE模型，文章对贸易摩擦背景下美国进口关税冲击的传导渠道以及中国的关税反制策略与货币应对政策有效性等问题进行了数值分析。研究发现，关税反制措施能够有效地对冲美国加征进口关税对中国实际产出、消费和净出口的消极影响，并有助于抑制人民币实际汇率贬值。若进一步搭配将出口品关税纳入利率调控框架的积极货币政策，对于经济扩张与保持汇率稳定都更加有效。但从长期社会福利角度看，积极货币政策对美国经济也具有明显的正向溢出作用，关税反制则会产生显著的福利转移效应，不采取任何关税与货币应对政策将使中国遭受最大的福利损失。因此，基于"打击最大化、自损最小化"原则，中国应对美国采取坚决有力的关税反击，同时保持货币政策相对中性、克制，以期实现"以战促和"的战略目标。     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION – AN ALTERNATIVE TO CVDS: A COMMENT

This note is a comment to Wang (2008)'s contribution in the SAJE (Vol. 76 (3)). We show that when firms' strategic variables are prices and not quantities, Wang's findings are largely reversed. In particular, the foreign government levies an export tax on its producer as opposed to an export subsidy. Further, both the “optimal tax” and the domestic welfare are non‐monotonic in the degree of product differentiation.     

破解中国经济高增长与居民低消费并存的困境

我国经济多年保持高速增长,但居民消费水平并没有同步提高。本文认为长期贸易顺差推动了我国经济快速增长和外汇储备的增加,却并未提高国内居民的福利水平。并且,外向型经济增长加剧我国贫富分化,抑制国内需求,不能保持经济长期的高增长率。我国应调整外汇储备策略,将外汇储备内生化为国民经济发展的助推器,并合理推进人民币国际化进程。此外,在促进国际贸易收支基本平衡的同时,扩大国内消费需求,提高居民消费水平。     

CAPITAL FLOWS AND EXPORT EXTERNALITIES: AN EAST ASIAN CURE FOR THE DUTCH DISEASE?*

The analysis so far suggests several conclusions regarding policy under externalities in tradables production. It shows that conventional profit-maximizing solutions lead to too much investment, too much “up front” consumption, high period 1 real exchange rates, and underproduction of tradables. In this setting, it is possible that an improvement in an economy's access to foreign capital will lead to welfare losses. These distortions are most efficiently corrected by a tradables output subsidy, equal to the externality. This subsidy should be increased if the economy's access to foreign capital markets improves. In the absence of such subsidies, however, incentives to reduce investment and postpone consumption may be appropriate second-best policies. These policies, in effect, drive a wedge between rates of return on investment and foreign interest rates. Therefore the optimal policy will also require controls on foreign capital seeking to take advantage of higher interest rates at home than abroad.     

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

Can Import Tariffs Deter Outward FDI?

In this paper we analyze a country's optimal trade policy when its labor market is unionized and firms are footloose. We show that an important objective for governments to use import protection is to prevent their domestic multinationals to go to a non-unionized location abroad and to serve their country from a distance. A domestic government will set a positive tariff to dissuade its multinational from engaging in outward FDI when the additional profits it repatriates, do not compensate for the loss of domestic union rent. To put it differently, we show that when the domestic labor market is unionized, trade liberalisation between countries with similar wage levels is likely to result in domestic welfare losses as a result of outward FDI. Only when wage differences between countries are large enough, can outward FDI improve domestic welfare and optimal tariffs will be zero. JEL Classification Numbers: L13, F23