Overseas listing as a policy tool: Evidence from China’s H-shares

We investigate why the Chinese government chooses to perform share issue privatization (SIP) of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Hong Kong, despite the benefit of facilitating the domestic stock market development if performing SIP in China (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) and the higher cost to list in Hong Kong. We address this issue by arguing that the positive effect of SIPs on the development of the domestic market may have limitations, especially when the domestic market is not well developed and cannot absorb rapid and large-scale SIP activities. To maintain domestic market order, it may be optimal to carry out SIP in overseas markets. Furthermore, by listing shares in developed overseas markets, SOEs from the less developed countries could leverage on the overseas markets’ better accounting, governance, and legal standards. By examining a sample of 92 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and the relevant control samples of purely domestically listed Chinese firms during the period of 1993–2006, we find supporting evidence for both arguments.     

Stock exchange demutualization,self-listing and performance: The case of the Australian Stock Exchange

This paper examines the effects of the recent spate of financial exchange mutual-to-stock conversion phenomenon on the performance of listed exchanges and the quality of the stock market using the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as a case study. We find that the ASX stock significantly outperformed the stock index and the control group on a market-adjusted return basis. The stock market performance is driven by strong operating performance. The profitability ratios of the ASX have significantly improved in the five years following the demutualization and self-listing. The performance improvements remain significant even after controlling for growth in the Australian economy. From a market quality perspective, we document evidence of increased trading activity by foreign investors after ASX’s demutualization and self-listing. Interestingly, we also find that bid-ask spreads of the stock market have narrowed in the post-conversion period. In particular, small-cap firms have become more liquid. The results show that stock exchange conversion from mutual to publicly traded exchange is not only value enhancing for the exchange and its shareholders, but it is also beneficial for the stock market as a whole.     

Buyback behavior of initial public offering firms

We examine the motives behind the share repurchase decisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms by studying the stock and operating performance after the IPO date. We find that IPO firms that announce repurchases within 3 years of IPO dates exhibit poorer long-run abnormal operating performance than other IPO firms. These IPO firms also experience poorer stock return performance and downward analyst forecast revisions. Moreover, these firms show intensive insider selling transactions after the IPO date. These results for IPO announcing repurchase firms are consistent with the misleading hypothesis, which suggests that these IPO firms mislead investors by announcing repurchases as false signals.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Regulations,earnings management,and post-IPO performance: The Chinese evidence

In this study, we examine whether government regulatory initiatives in China involving IPO by SOEs may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors by the issuer. We focus on two sets of IPO regulations issued between January 1, 1996 and February 11, 1999: pricing regulations, which stipulate that IPO prices be a function of accounting performance, and penalty regulations, which penalize IPO firms for overly optimistic forecasts. We find that IPO firms that report better pricing-period accounting performance have larger declines in post-IPO profitability, lower first-day stock returns and worse long-run post-IPO stock performance. Furthermore, IPO firms that make overoptimistic forecasts also have lower first-day returns and worse post-IPO stock performance. Using non-core earnings as the proxy for earnings management, we document some evidence that IPO firms that report higher pricing-period accounting performance have engaged in more income-increasing earnings management. Hence, pricing regulations may have induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-period earnings and affect the post-IPO performance negatively. On the other hand, penalty regulations have deterred IPO firms from making overoptimistic earnings forecast and therefore have a positive impact on the behavior of IPO firms.     

An empirical investigation of Yankee stock offerings

This paper examines the operating and investment performance of 100 foreign firms that conduct their initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. (Yankee stock offerings). The uniqueness of these firms is that the U.S. IPOs are their first public equity issue in any market, including the home market. We find significant improvement in the operating performance subsequent to these U.S. IPO events and firms from countries with poor investor protection benefit more. Compared to various benchmarks, unlike the significant underperformance of IPOs documented in many countries, these firms show no significant abnormal long-run stock market performance after 1, 3, or 5 years of seasoning. The findings are consistent with signaling and selective entry hypotheses.     

Legal Institutions,Ownership Concentration,and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking?

One of the central puzzles of signaling theory is how to assess signal quality, in particular the potential for signal mimicking. Our study provides evidence of signal mimicking in the context of stock repurchases. Employing an ex-ante proxy for the likelihood of mimicking stock repurchases and data on open market stock repurchases from 30 countries, we find that long-term operating and market performance following stock repurchases improve less for suspected mimicking firms. This finding contradicts the conventional characterization that managers use stock repurchases to signal undervaluation and enhanced future performance. We find that mimicking firms have smaller capital investments, need greater external financing, buy back fewer shares, and issue more new shares (and/or resell more treasury shares) in the year of the repurchase. Our analysis further shows that mimicking is more likely in countries with weak investor protections and in firms with higher ownership concentration. Further, mimicking associated with concentrated ownership is mitigated in countries with stronger investor protections and by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Altogether, our findings provide evidence of signal mimicking in stock repurchases in international data that is influenced by market, ownership, legal, and financial reporting characteristics of countries.     

Why newly listed firms become acquisition targets

We study the operating, financial, and ownership structure characteristics of newly listed firms which become acquisition targets shortly after their initial public offerings. We examine whether such firms get acquired because of their successful performance or as an alternative to delisting. We find that firms, which do relatively well in terms of operating as well as stock performance and attract institutional investor interest, draw the attention of acquirers. Furthermore, we observe that investments made by newly listed target firms do not destroy shareholder value and have comparable profitability to investments made by newly listed firms which grow by acquisitions. Overall, firms acquired shortly after listing are on a growth trajectory similar to that of surviving firms.     

Stock return volatility,operating performance and stock returns: International evidence on drivers of the ‘low volatility’ anomaly

This study highlights the link between stock return volatility, operating performance, and stock returns. Prior studies suggest that there is a ‘low volatility’ anomaly, where firms with a low stock return volatility out-perform firms with a high stock return volatility. This paper confirms that low volatility stocks earn higher returns than high volatility stocks in emerging markets and developed markets outside of North America. We also show that low volatility stocks have higher operating returns and this might explain why low volatility stocks earn higher stock returns. These results provide a partial explanation for the ‘low volatility effect’ that is independent from the existence of market anomalies or per se inefficiencies that might otherwise drive a low volatility effect. We emphasize the importance of controlling for stock return volatility when analyzing operating performance and stock performance.     

The long-term performance of acquiring firms: A re-examination of an anomaly

In this paper, we investigate the long-term stock return performance of Canadian acquiring firms in the post-event period by using 1300 M&A events in the 1993–2002 period. We use both event-time and calendar-time approaches and conduct robustness tests for benchmarks, methodological choices, statistical techniques and other related factors such as payment methods. We also assess the role of governance variables. Contrary to stylized facts reported in US studies, neither do we find negative abnormal long-term abnormal stock market returns once we account for methodological discrepancies nor do we find negative long-term operating performance in the post-acquisition periods for the acquirer following an acquisition event. We also find that the Canadian market reacts positively to acquisition announcements but corrects for this reaction within a short period of time. Overall we find that Canadian acquisitions do not show value destruction or overpayment.     

The effect of the split share structure reform on working capital management of Chinese companies

Before the introduction of the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) of 2005, a dual stock system characterized Chinese-listed firms. The states owned non-tradable shares and private owners held tradable shares. The dual system generated agency problems because state owners enjoyed all the rights reserved for tradable shares but escaped the stock market risk faced by non-state shareholders. Because executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received rewards based on the book value of assets rather than the market price of shares, they had no incentive to maximize the share price. The SSSR led to the conversion of non-tradable shares to tradable shares, with two major implications: (1) the interests of government and private owners are now more closely aligned and (2) government agents of SOEs are now rewarded and punished based on a firm's market performance. Thus, the expectation is that government agents turn their attention to improving a firm's market performance rather than its book value during the post-reform era. We examine the impact of the SSSR on Chinese firms' investments in working capital. Based on 511 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that the SSSR is associated with significant reductions in working capital investments during the post-reform period. The reduced investment in working capital is associated with improved market performance of these firms.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

Stock Returns and Operating Performance of Securities Issuers

We examine long‐run stock returns and operating performance around firms’ offerings of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt from 1985 to 1990. We find that pre‐issue abnormal returns are positive and significant for stock issuers, but not for convertible and straight debt issuers. The post‐issue mean returns show that common stock and convertible debt issuers experience underperformance during the post‐issue periods, but straight debt issuers do not. Consistent with these results, common stock issuers experience the best pre‐issue operating performance among all three types of issuers, and operating performance declines during the post‐issue periods for common stock and convertible debt issuers. Using a new approach in linear model estimations to correct heteroskedasticity and to adjust for finite sample, we find a positive relation between post‐issue operating performance and issue‐period stock price reactions. The results suggest that future operating performance is anticipated at the issue and that securities issues provide information on issuers’ future performance.     

The spillover effect of financial information in mergers and acquisitions

In this study we investigate whether and how a firm's investment activities are affected by the financial information of peer firms on merger and acquisition (M&A) efficiency. Using changes in M&A accounting performance to measure efficiency, we find a positive association between the post-M&A accounting performance of an acquiring firm and that of previous peer acquirers. We show that this spillover effect is derived from peer firms with improved rather than poorer post-M&A accounting performance. We also find that the spillover effect varies with the characteristics of both the acquiring and the peer firms. The effect is stronger when the peer firms are larger, are non-SOEs (vs. SOEs), have improved accounting performance after M&As and undertake M&As with unrelated (vs. related) entities, and when the acquiring firms are smaller, non-SOEs (vs. SOEs) and have poorer accounting performance before M&As.     

Resilience of Environmental and Social Stocks under Stress: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic

This paper examines whether environmental and social (ES) activities affect the resiliency of firms during the COVID-19 crisis. We study a sample of 330 firms operating in five developed countries: Canada, France, Japan, the UK and the US. Our analysis shows that US firms with a high ES ranking experienced a significantly lower stock price range volatility during the Covid stock market rundown of February-March 2020. Such findings also hold for Japanese firms but only later on after the introduction of government support. In terms of returns, compared to their peers with a low ES ranking, Japanese and UK stock prices with a high ES ranking suffered more during and after the market rundown. For other countries, we do not find significant differences in stock price behavior based on ES ratings. Our findings suggest that engaging with ES activities is not associated with a better or worse performance during crisis times, which has important implications for investors and managers.     

Managerial ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China's privatizations

We examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance for a sample of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized over the period 1992-2000. The results indicate that managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. Although return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) decline post-privatization, firms with high managerial ownership and, specially, high CEO ownership, exhibit a smaller performance decline. The difference is highly significant, with or without controlling for residual state ownership and changes in the firm's operating environment. We also find that the influence on firm performance becomes less significant at higher levels of CEO ownership. In contrast, performance continues to increase with managerial ownership. This finding suggests that, beyond a certain point, the distribution of shares would be more effective if extended to the whole management team instead of being limited to the chief executive.     

State ownership and abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms: Evidence from China

We examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ abnormal accruals during a period of high valuation. We find the magnitude of abnormal accruals first increases for up to three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. We also find that managers turn to using abnormal real transactions after four consecutive years of high valuation. Next, we examine whether the degree of abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms differs between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-NSOEs. Supporting the view that SOE managers have less incentive to sustain high stock prices, we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower levels of abnormal accruals than highly-valued NSOEs during the period of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices and their accounting choices in firms with different ownership structures.     

Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations

We investigate Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) finding that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. If the relation between poor governance and poor returns is causal, we expect that the market is negatively surprised by the poor operating performance of weak governance firms. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant operating underperformance. However, analysts' forecast errors and earnings announcement returns show no evidence that this underperformance surprises the market. Our results are robust to controls for takeover activity. Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns.