How does credit risk affect cost management strategies? Evidence on the initiation of credit default swap and sticky cost behavior

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for less liquid, financially distressed, and lower credit quality firms. We also find that CDS firms with a reduction in cost stickiness will exhibit lower future bankruptcy risk than CDS firms without such as reduction in stickiness. Collectively, our findings suggest that the CDS-induced “empty creditor problem” causes reference firms to undertake more conservative cost management practices to alleviate downside risk.     

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.     

Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?

In this article, we show that only distressed firms not identified as distressed by creditors are able to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. Using the number of years to future bankruptcy as a proxy for genuine distress and measures based on observable firm characteristics as proxies for perceived distress, genuinely distressed firms incorrectly perceived as healthy cut payouts to shareholders more slowly and invest more aggressively as uncertainty increases than correctly identified distressed firms. Consistent with the idea that incorrectly identified distressed firms actively hide their troubles, we show that they tend to follow more aggressive accounting policies and often resort to earnings misstatements. We also show that they are often not restricted by covenants and can borrow further debt capital at affordable rates, suggesting that a lack of monitoring by creditors allows them to transfer wealth to shareholders.     

Debt,Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications

We extend here our prior work, which focused on equity decoupling ( Hu and Black, 2006, 2007, 2008 ), by providing a systematic treatment of debt decoupling and an initial exploration of hybrid decoupling. Equity decoupling involves unbundling of economic, voting, and sometimes other rights customarily associated with shares, often in ways that may permit avoidance of disclosure and other obligations. We discuss a new U.S. court decision which will likely curtail the use of equity decoupling strategies to avoid large shareholder disclosure rules. Debt decoupling involving the unbundling of the economic rights, contractual control rights, and legal and other rights normally associated with debt, through credit derivatives and securitisation. Corporations can have empty and hidden creditors, just as they can have empty and hidden shareholders. ‘Hybrid decoupling’ across standard equity and debt categories is also possible. All forms of decoupling appear to be increasingly common. Debt decoupling can pose risks at the firm level for what can be termed ‘debt governance’? the overall relationship between creditor and debtor, including creditors' exercise of contractual and legal rights with respect to firms and other borrowers. Widespread debt decoupling can also involve externalities and therefore create systemic financial risks; we explore those risks.     

Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default

Using a sample of distressed firms with information about suppliers, we document an average fall in the use of trade credit as firms approach bankruptcy compared to a control sample of nonbankrupt firms. However, we uncover a large degree of heterogeneity across suppliers. Suppliers facing high switching costs maintain their business ties with the distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, and provide them more trade credit. Suppliers in concentrated markets provide temporary support to their clients. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that switching costs are fundamental to explain whether suppliers provide liquidity to their distressed clients or not.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

CEO inside debt and internal capital market efficiency

Agency theory argues that managerial equity-based incentives are more effective when firm solvency is likely while debt-based incentives are more effective when firms face a greater likelihood of bankruptcy. We examine the relation between chief executive officers' (CEOs') inside debt holdings and the internal capital market allocation of multi-segment firms. We find that CEO inside debt holdings are associated with conservative capital allocation to firm segments, with the result driven by financially distressed firms. Further analysis indicates that although CEO inside debt, on average, is negatively related to firm value, the relation is positive for financially distressed firms. Our evidence indicates that inside debt holdings align the interests of managers and external creditors, inducing managers to pursue conservative capital allocation strategies that appear to be optimal for firms facing insolvency.     

Secured and unsecured debt in creditor-friendly bankruptcy

This article develops a continuous-time asset pricing model for valuing corporate securities in the presence of both secured and unsecured debt. We consider a framework where creditors dominate the negotiation process. This is consistent with the increasing influence of creditors in bankruptcy. We show that the unsecured creditors are incentivized to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first-best threshold. However, if the firm’s liquidation value is very low, it should complement its secured debt with unsecured debt as a form of insurance to avoid early liquidations. Our results have important implications for the debt structure and the resolution of financial distress of modern firms with substantial intangible assets.     

Stiffing the creditor: Asset verifiability and bankruptcy

Evidence suggests that asset pledgeability, debt complexity, and control rights of dispersed debt influence financial distress resolution. We model how courts’ imperfect verifiability of assets and valuable control of misaligned creditors shape firms’ debt structure and create coordination problems that determine distress outcomes and financing. A key result is that an increase in verifiability allows financially constrained firms to fund projects by pledging more assets to misaligned creditors, making contract renegotiation in distress times more difficult and increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Since equity receives less in the event of distress, constrained firms choose riskier projects with higher returns. Consistent with our model, bankruptcy filings increase after the U.S. Supreme Court decision imposing a “market test” to assess the value of stockholders’ interest in debtor proposals. The effect is stronger for firms with low asset verifiability. These firms also experienced an increase in recovery rates, debt capacity, and risk-taking. Our findings suggest that reforms improving the verifiability of assets substantially impact credit access. However, our results also point out that improving asset verifiability may be insufficient for constrained firms with aligned creditors. Therefore, complementary reforms that facilitate firms’ access to creditors from different market segments may be necessary.     

Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

Evidence on the insurance effect of bankruptcy exemptions

Defaulting on one’s debts when experiencing an adverse event can help insure households against unexpected income risks. But the effect of allowing default on debt levels is ambiguous, not least because lenders may restrict access to credit. Hence the optimal punishment for bankruptcy is unclear. The US states allows householders to keep a variety of assets when filing for bankruptcy – the ‘bankruptcy exemptions’ – and these exemptions change substantially between states and over time. By exploiting these differences this study shows that raising the exemptions (i) marginally decreases the level of unsecured debt that household’s hold; (ii) makes consumption smoother. Thus, despite the effect on debt levels, the generous provisions to debtors in arrears may be helping US households to insure themselves against income risk.     

The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a “contract substitution” effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. If managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of managerial tournament incentives on firm credit risk in credit default swap (CDS) referenced firms. We find that intra‐firm tournament incentives are negatively related to credit risk. Our results suggest that tournament incentives reduce credit risk by alleviating the potential for underinvestment when managers are concerned about exacting empty creditors. Further, we find that tournament incentives decrease credit risk when internal governance is strong or product market competition is intense. Taken together, our results suggest that creditors perceive senior manager tournament incentives (SMTI) as a critical determinant of a firm's credit risk, particularly in settings where managerial risk aversion is high.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Employee well-being,firm leverage,and bankruptcy risk

Employees of liquidating firms are likely to lose income and non-pecuniary benefits of working for the firm, which makes bankruptcy costly for employees. This paper examines whether firms take these costs into account when deciding on the optimal amount of leverage. We find that firms with leading track records in employee well-being significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios. Moreover, we observe that firms with better employee track records have better credit ratings, even when we control for differences in firm leverage.     

Corporate taxes,strategic default,and the cost of debt

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.     

Default, insurance, and debt over the life-cycle

The widespread use of debt and default suggests that unsecured credit markets play an important role in consumption smoothing. In this paper, I address two previously unanswered questions. First, how does policy towards debt default affect the evolution of consumption and net worth over the life-cycle? Second, how does debt default policy interact with social insurance over the life-cycle? The findings are as follows. First, US default policy appears “lax”, in the sense that it creates severe credit constraints, especially for the young. Second, eliminating default will lower consumption inequality among the young, but will increase it among the old. Third, social insurance alters default risk and, in turn, loan pricing, and therefore matters for purely intertemporal smoothing.     

Valuation of the Firm's Liabilities When Equity Holders Are Also Creditors

Abstract:  This paper presents a tractable structural model whereby controlling equity holders are also among the creditors of the firm. As the firm approaches distress, equity holders can drain the assets of the firm and expropriate other creditors by repaying their credit before bankruptcy. The right of the bankruptcy court to revoke such repayment protects arm's length creditors, reduces the cost of borrowing and induces equity holders to anticipate repayment of their credit. Equity holders decide repayment neither too early nor too late, so as to reduce the risk of repayment revocation by the bankruptcy court. Similar conclusions apply to the preferential repayment of bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders. The analysis also suggests that callable bearer bonds may be more valuable to equity holders than to other creditors.