The effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on investment in home equity

Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios toward home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996–2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger and less healthy households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy. These results suggest that homestead exemptions have an important bearing on the portfolio allocations of US households and the extent to which they insure against bad shocks.     

Corporate taxes,strategic default,and the cost of debt

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.     

Fresh Start or Head Start? The Effects of Filing for Personal Bankruptcy on Work Effort

The key feature of the modern US personal bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a financial fresh start through debt discharge. It has long been believed that the primary goal of the discharge policy is to preserve human capital by maintaining incentives to work. We provide the first test of this fresh start argument by estimating the effect of personal bankruptcy filing on work effort using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our econometric approach controls for the endogenous self-selection of bankruptcy filing. We find that filing for bankruptcy does not have a positive impact on annual work hours for bankrupt households, a result mainly due to the wealth effects of debt discharge.      

Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection

There exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across U.S. states. This paper exploits cross-state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self-insurance against bad shocks to earnings. The generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth. The gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints, so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small. A more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle. In addition, the optimal level of exemption is positive but low.     

Internet,consumer spending,and credit card balance: Evidence from US consumers

Utilizing the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances data, the present study aims to examine the role of the Internet in carrying a credit card balance among US households. The central question of this study is whether or not households with Internet access have more favorable attitudes toward incurring more credit card balance. This study further investigates whether education, income, gender, age, race, etc., make any differences in carrying credit card debt when households have access to the Internet. Our results with the Tobit model show that having access to the Internet increases the probability of carrying a positive credit card balance by 4% to 5% compared to those who do not have access to the Internet. This result does not apply to older Americans. Our results further indicate that education decreases the probability of carrying a positive credit balance for households that have access to the Internet, while income and liquid assets may have little positive effect on that probability. The results suggest that Internet leads to more debt, but education could alleviate that debt.     

Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm

We present a theory of capital investment and debt and equity financing in a real-options model of a public corporation. The theory assumes that managers maximize the present value of their future compensation (managerial rents), subject to constraints imposed by outside shareholders’ property rights to the firm's assets. Absent bankruptcy costs, managers follow an optimal debt policy that generates efficient investment and disinvestment. We show how bankruptcy costs can distort both investment and disinvestment. We also show how managers’ personal wealth constraints can lead to delayed investment and increased reliance on debt financing. Changes in cash flow can cause changes in investment by tightening or loosening the wealth constraints. Firms with weaker investor protection adopt higher debt levels.     

Does debtor protection really protect debtors? Evidence from the small business credit market

This paper analyzes how different levels of debtor protection across US states affect small firms’ access to credit, as well as the price and non-price terms of their loans. We use an individual-specific measure of debtor protection that has its maximum value when the borrower’s home equity is lower than the state homestead exemption (the debtor’s home equity is fully protected), and is decreasing in the difference between the home equity and the homestead exemption (the amount that the creditor can seize). We find that unlimited liability small businesses have lower access to credit in states with more debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws. In addition, these businesses face tighter loan terms - they are more likely to pledge business collateral, have shorter maturities, and borrow smaller amounts. For limited liability small businesses, we also find a reduction in credit availability, but of smaller magnitude, together with an increase in the loan rate.     

Hurdles to debt relief for “no income no assets” debtors in Germany: A case study of failed consumer bankruptcy law reforms

Given that many overindebted households have low or no assets and income, governments have increasingly tried to adapt their consumer bankruptcy regimes to the needs and capacities of these NINA (“no income, no assets”) debtors. Most notably, since the mid‐2000s, some countries from the Anglosphere have created low‐cost, means‐tested, and administrative (i.e., nonjudicial) debt relief procedures as alternative to traditional bankruptcy for NINA debtors. By contrast, in some European countries such as Germany, legislators have tried—but until today failed—to create efficient debt relief measures for NINA debtors. This contribution aims to make English‐speaking readers familiar with the history of consumer insolvency law in Germany, with a focus on legislative developments regarding NINA debtors, and to identify actors, institutions, and ideas that have contributed—especially during the 2000s—to the failure of consumer bankruptcy reforms addressing the main problems of NINA cases in Germany (i.e., high hurdles to relief for debtors, high administrative efforts for trustees and courts, high costs for the public purse, and yet very few payments to creditors). The German case is relevant not only because it is a striking case of failure to adapt a debt relief regime to NINA debtors but also because German consumer bankruptcy law—despite its shortcomings—continues to serve as a template for insolvency law reforms in European and other countries.     

The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a “contract substitution” effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. If managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms.     

Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy

The dramatic increase in U.S. personal bankruptcy filings of the last fifteen years has focused attention on the wide disparities between different states' personal bankruptcy exemptions. These differences have been criticized both on the grounds of equity and also because they provide an incentive to move to a state with a higher exemption before declaring bankruptcy, that is to forum-shop. This paper focuses on the latter of these objections. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimate a Nested Logit model of the household migration decision. Our econometric approach specifically avoids the problem of endogenously induced bankruptcy filings by examining the effect of filing propensity, rather than the actual event of filing, on the tendency to migrate to a higher exemption state. We conclude that while there is indeed evidence that considerations of bankruptcy laws do influence interstate migration, the actual effect is relatively modest. We estimate that, in any given year, roughly one percent of moves to higher-exemption states are motivated by considerations of differences in bankruptcy laws; by way of comparison, this is roughly comparable to the magnitude of recent estimates of welfare-induced migration. This suggests that the emphasis on differences in exemptions which has been a feature of recent attempts to reform the bankruptcy code is somewhat exaggerated.     

Personal Bankruptcy Law and New Business Formation

Using a panel of all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia from 1990 to 1999, we report a nonlinear relation between state bankruptcy exemptions and new business formation. The rate of new business formation first increases as exemptions increase, but it then decreases. This result reflects the fact that bankruptcy exemptions tend to affect both demand for and supply of external financing to potential entrepreneurs.     

Risk-based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans

By focusing on observable default risk's role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior, this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk-based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid-1990s. It tests three resulting predictions: First, the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period. Second, debt levels should have reacted accordingly. Third, fewer high-risk households should have been denied credit, further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest- and lowest-risk borrowers.For people obtaining loans, the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid-1990s. For example, for a 0.01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy, the corresponding interest-rate increase tripled for first mortgages, doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six-fold for second mortgages. Additionally, changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices, particularly for secured debt. Borrowing increased most for the low-risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall. Furthermore, while very high-risk households gained expanded access to credit, the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or, sometimes, fell.     

Variable Rate Debt Instruments and Corporate Debt Policy

Sustained high rate of inflation has led to the creation of debt instruments with variable interest rate. The availability of these debt instruments presents management with the problem of the choice of the optimal debt portfolio. This paper deals with this problem assuming a given, and optimal, debt to equity ratio. Given expected monetary value maximization, an efficient frontier is derived in terms of the expected net income and probability of bankruptcy, where net income is defined as operating income minus debt repayment. This efficient frontier is shown to be also mean-variance efficient. It is also shown that in most cases the optimal debt portfolio includes more than one debt instrument. In other words, the firm will avoid the policy of minimizing the expected cost of its debt repayments or the policy of minimizing the costs of bankruptcy. The optimal solution itself is affected by market variables like the relative expected cost of different debt instruments and by firm specific variables like the variability of its operating income stream, and the covariance between the operating income and the debt repayments.     

The Debt‐Payment‐to‐Income Ratio as an Indicator of Borrowing Constraints: Evidence from Two Household Surveys

Liquidity constraints have been proposed as an important explanation for deviations from the rational expectations/permanent income hypothesis. This paper introduces to the liquidity constraint literature the ratio of a household's debt payments to its disposable personal income, the debt service ratio (DSR). We find that a household with a high DSR is significantly more likely to be turned down for credit than other households. Also, the consumption growth of likely constrained households, identified using the DSR along with the liquid‐asset‐to‐income ratio, is significantly more sensitive to past income than that of other households, confirming the DSR's value in identifying constrained households.     

Employee well-being,firm leverage,and bankruptcy risk

Employees of liquidating firms are likely to lose income and non-pecuniary benefits of working for the firm, which makes bankruptcy costly for employees. This paper examines whether firms take these costs into account when deciding on the optimal amount of leverage. We find that firms with leading track records in employee well-being significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios. Moreover, we observe that firms with better employee track records have better credit ratings, even when we control for differences in firm leverage.     

Was audit quality of Laventhol and Horwath poor?

Laventhol and Horwath (L&H), the then seventh largest accounting firm in the US, declared bankruptcy in November 1990. The firm claimed that its bankruptcy was due to the perception of it being a deep pocket rather than inherent deficiencies in its performance. In this study, we examine whether the audit quality of L&H was lower than other auditors. Results do not show that L&H is associated with lower quality audits either in terms of lower likelihood of issuing modified audit opinion, higher levels of discretionary accruals for its clients, or lower predictability of discretionary accruals for future non-discretionary net income for its clients than for clients of other auditors. Results of additional tests also do not suggest that auditors that take up clients of L&H report differently from L&H. This evidence does not support the proposition that L&H’s audit quality was less than audit quality of other audit firms during the period leading up to the bankruptcy.     

Irreversible investment,managerial discretion and optimal capital structure

We explore the significance of employee compensation and alternative (reservation) income on investment timing, endogenous default, yield spreads and capital structure. In a real-options setting, a manager’s incentive to under(over)invest in a project is associated to labor income he has to forego in order to work on the project, the manager’s salary, his stake on the project’s equity capital and his subsequent income, should he decide to terminate operations. We find that the optimal level of coupon payments decreases with managerial salary and ownership stake while it is increasing in the manager’s reservation income. Yield spreads (optimal leverage ratios) are increasing (decreasing) in the manager’s salary and ownership stake, while they are decreasing (increasing) in the manager’s reservation income. Exploring agency costs of debt as deviations from a value-maximizing investment policy, we document a U-shaped relationship between agency costs of debt and the managerial compensation parameters: the manager’s reservation income, salary and ownership share.     

Paulson's gift

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of $21–$44 billion with a net benefit between $86 and $109 bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.     

Management quality and the cost of debt: Does management matter to lenders?

This paper investigates the effect of organizational capital, typified by various management practices within a firm, on the cost of external debt financing. Using a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, we find that better management practices enhance a firm’s external financing capacity by lowering the firm’s cost of bank loans. We do not find any evidence that the lower loan cost of a high-quality-management firm is associated with more restrictive non-price contract terms such as greater collateral requirements and stricter covenants. These results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from poor management practices when pricing and designing debt contracts.