Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.     

Interest group politics in a federation

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.     

潮涌现象与发展中国家宏观经济理论的重新构建

现有宏观经济学理论以产业升级时国民经济中每个企业对于下一个有前景的产业存在何处没有共识为暗含前提,但是,由于后发优势的存在,发展中国家的企业很容易对下一个有前景的产业产生共识,投资上出现“潮涌现象”,并伴随此现象出现产能过剩和相关的一系列问题。所以,有必要放松现有的暗含前提,重新构建一套新的宏观经济理论体系,探讨投资的“潮涌现象”对发展中国家的物价、就业、经济增长和周期波动的影响,作为政府制定财政、货币、金融、外贸、产业发展等宏观经济管理政策的参考。     

Plant location and strategic environmental policy with inter-sectoral linkages

In recent debates on trade liberalisation the concern has often been expressed that with more competitive international trade governments will be worried that by setting tougher environmental policies than their trading rivals they will put domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage, and in the extreme case this could lead to firms relocating production in other countries. The response by governments to such concerns will be to weaken environmental policies (‘eco-dumping’). In competitive markets such concerns are ill founded, but there is a small amount of literature which has analysed whether governments will indeed have incentives for eco-dumping in the more relevant case of markets where there are significant scale economies; even here there is no presumption that the outcome will involve eco-dumping.In this paper we extend the analysis of strategic environmental policy and plant location decisions by analysing the location decision of firms in different sectors which are linked through an input-output structure of intermediate production. The reason why we introduce inter-sectoral linkages between firms is that they introduce an additional factor, relative to those already analysed in the literature, in the plant location decision, which is the incentive for firms in different sectors to agglomerate in a single location. This has a number of important effects. First, there is now the possibility of multiple equilibria in location decisions of firms. Following from this there is the possibility of catastrophic effects where a small increase in an environmental tax can trigger the collapse of an industrial base in a country; however there is also the possibility that a country which raises its environmental tax could attract more firms to locate in that country, because of the way the tax affects incentives for agglomeration. Finally, and again related to the previous effects, there is the possibility of a hysteresis effect where raising an environmental tax in one country can cause firms to relocate to another country, but subsequently lowering that tax will not induce firms to relocate back into the original country.We consider a simple model with two countries, two industries, an upstream and a downstream sector, and two firms per industry. The analysis proceeds through a three-stage game: in the first stage the governments of the two countries set their environmental policies; in the second stage the firms in both industries choose how many plants to locate and where; in the third stage firms choose their output levels, with the demand for the upstream firms being determined endogenously by the production decisions of the downstream firms. We assume that there are no limits to production capacity, so that firms do not build more than one plant in any country. However, firms may build plants in different countries because of positive transport costs. Although the model appears very simple, it cannot be solved analytically, so all the conclusions must be drawn from numerical simulations.     

浅析欧债危机对中国外贸的影响及对策

欧盟是我国第一大贸易伙伴和第一大出口市场.随着欧债危机持续恶化,欧债危机已经席卷整个欧元区,由希腊蔓延至西班牙、意大利等国.在这场经济风暴中,我国对欧洲的产品出口也受到严重的影响.通过分析欧债危机的现状和原因,我们发现此次危机对我国对欧贸易的影响主要体现在欧元汇率、欧洲市场需求的萎缩和欧洲市场挤出效应等方面.欧元汇率持续下跌,给以欧元作为结算单位的中国企业带来很大的汇兑风险,许多中小企业出口利润都淹没在汇率风险中.而欧洲市场需求的萎缩和欧洲市场挤出效应使我国的对欧贸易严重受挫.我国外销企业只有及时调整产业结构、不断开拓市场和防范汇率波动风险,才能抵御欧债危机的影响.     

Trade,educational costs,and skill acquisition

A model of heterogeneous agents is built to study the effects of trade and educational costs in shaping individual educational outcomes and their aggregate distribution. In a two‐country model, trade has nonmonotonic impacts on individual education choices and causes education and job polarization for both countries. We use this model to evaluate the effects of reductions in educational costs. A reduction in educational cost has no impact on occupational choice in a closed economy. In the open economy, however, it creates an expanded middle class in the home country, whereas the opposite happens in its trading partner.     

Price discovery and intermediation in linked emissions trading markets: A laboratory study

Many new and proposed emissions trading systems involve multiple countries and regions. The introduction of interregional trading raises questions about how flexible state- or national-level authorities should be in allowing individual firms to trade with firms or authorities in other states or countries. This paper uses laboratory methods to evaluate the efficiency and pricing performance of linking trading across regions at the firm-to-firm level. In one treatment, individual firms trade directly with firms or authorities in other regions. We compare performance in this treatment to an intergovernmental trading treatment, where emissions trading is restricted to occur only between intermediaries. A baseline treatment of autarky, where firms only trade with other firms in their country or region, provides a benchmark to assess the efficiency benefits of allowing linking. Although efficiency and price discovery are both improved by allowing intermediation in linked permit markets, we find that further gains can be realized through direct firm to firm trading. Buyers in high cost regions and sellers in low cost regions benefit the greatest from linking.     

The J-curve: evidence from commodity trade between US and China

In testing the short-run (J-curve effect) and the long-run effects of currency depreciation on the trade balance many researchers have used either trade data between one country and the rest of the world or between one country and another trading partner. Both groups are said to suffer from aggregation bias. To reduce the bias, in this article we consider trade data between one country (the US) and her trading partner (China) disaggregated by commodity. We use imports and exports of 88 industries (2-digit and 3-digit classifications) and cointegration analysis to show that the trade balance of at least 34 of the industries react favourably to real depreciation of the dollar. The J-curve effect is detected in 22 industries. Furthermore, most of these industries that are sensitive to currency depreciation are durable commodity groupings.     

Output‐based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness,leakage and welfare

We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.     

The gains from trade revisited

This paper revisits the issue of whether countries gain more from trading with countries that are similar to themselves, or with countries that are different. A model based on relative endowment and technological differences across countries is developed. The main result is that a country may experience a region of increasing gains from trade as its trading partner becomes more similar to itself in terms of relative endowments. The model also predicts that for countries with sufficiently similar relative endowments, both factors of production may experience gains from trade.     

Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries

Abstract We examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country’s government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country’s dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

INCREASING COSTS IN PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION AND GAINS FROM TRADE*

The purpose of this paper is to extend a monopolistically competitive trade model with symmetric costs to one with asymmetric costs in product diversification. Both the trade pattern and the effects of the opening of trade on welfare are examined. It is shown that: (1)the larger country will be a net importer of differentiated products, which contradicts the result of Krugman (1980); (2)the greater the size of the country, the smaller is the share of the intra-industry trade, and (3)the larger the trading partner of a country, the larger are the gains from trade of the country. Some of these results duplicate those from recent studies. However, our results are based on asymmetric costs. In particular, (3) suggests that the presence of increasing-returns-to-scale technology does not always imply that the large country gains from its large market.     

Export promotion and intra‐industry reallocations

Publicly funded/subsidized export promotion agencies reducing informational barriers to export and thus firm‐level fixed/sunk costs of exporting are present in most countries. This paper develops a two‐country one‐sector heterogeneous firms model with origin‐specific publicly funded export promotion agencies and shows how the public good nature of export‐relevant information and the ability to engage in global public affairs may rationalize the existence of such agencies. A novel finding of the model is that gains from export promotion are shared with the trade partner via intra‐industry reallocations.     

Who Trades with Whom? Exploring the Links between Firms' International Activities,Skills, and Wages

Using firm‐level data on the Italian manufacturing industry, we examine how trade activities are related to workforce composition and wages. We contribute to empirical research on these issues in three ways. First, we provide new evidence that is consistent with multi‐attribute models on firm heterogeneity and trade. We show that even after controlling for various company characteristics, including size and capital intensity, exporters still pay higher wages and employ more skilled workers than nonexporters. Second, we consider engagement in international transactions, either by means of exports, imports, or a combination of the two. We show that failing to control for importing activities may bias upward export premia. Third, we look at how the wage and the employment structures of trading firms change with the country of destination and origin of trade flows. We find that wage and skill premia are influenced by the characteristics of partner countries.     

Horizontal Mergers in a Liberalizing World Economy

This paper is concerned with the effect of horizontal mergers in an open economy environment. It is found that, with the presence of economies of scale and imperfect competition, a domestic merger may bring about an additional gain to the country in that it shifts profit from foreign to domestic firms. Consequently, the condition on the degree of economies of scale for permitting domestic horizontal mergers would be weaker under an open economy than under a closed economy. Furthermore, the analysis shows that such mergers can also raise foreign welfare. Finally, the model is used to discuss the need to coordinate merger policies among trading partners in tandem with trade liberalization.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

Labour‐market institutions and their impact on trade partners: A quantitative analysis

Recent theoretical literature studies how labour market reforms in one country can affect labour market outcomes in other countries, thereby rationalizing widely held policy beliefs and empirical evidence. But what is the quantitative relevance of such spillover effects? This paper combines two recent workhorse models: the canonical search‐and‐matching framework and the heterogeneous firms international trade model. Qualitatively, the framework confirms that labour market reforms in one country benefit its trading partners, replicating the stylized facts. However, when wages are bargained flexibly, the model quantitatively underestimates the correlation of structural unemployment rates across countries. Introducing some degree of real wage rigidity remedies this problem.