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1.
We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established
eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots—batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities
(also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay
was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers
with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’
willingness-to-pay.
JEL Classification D82 · L14 · Z13 相似文献
2.
In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical
model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model,
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight
modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored
stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash
network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment
is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation
situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1.
JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81 相似文献
3.
Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider
problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits
of voluntary punishment.
In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing
second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.
JEL Classification C91 · C73 · C41 · D71 相似文献
4.
There is evidence that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior monetary gains and losses. When endowed with house money,
people become more risk taking. This paper is the first to report a house money effect in a dynamic, financial setting. Using
an experimental method, we compare market outcomes across sessions that differ in the level of cash endowment (low and high).
Our experimental results provide support for a house money effect. Traders’ bids, price predictions, and market prices are
influenced by the amount of money that is provided prior to trading. However, dynamic behavior is difficult to interpret due
to conflicting influences.
JEL Classification C91 · C92 · D80
The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the
Federal Reserve System. 相似文献
5.
Ritwik Banerjee 《Experimental Economics》2016,19(1):240-267
Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games. 相似文献
6.
“Si él lo necesita” (if he really needs it) was the most common argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero offer in the ultimatum
game (strategy method) during experiments conducted among illiterate (adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the
acceptance of the zero offer was not a rare case but, in contrast, was the modal value. This is even more remarkable if we
consider that the 97% of the subjects proposed the equal split.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9126-0.
JEL Classification D63 · D64 · C93 · J15 相似文献
7.
Most studies that compare individual and group behavior neglect the in-group decision making process. This paper explores
the decision making process within groups in a strategic setting: a two player power-to-take experiment. Discussions preceding
group decisions are video taped and analyzed. We find the following: (1) no impact of the group setting as such on individual
behavior; (2) heterogeneity of individual types; (3) perceptions of fairness are hardly discussed and are prone to the self-serving
bias; (4) groups ignore the decision rule of other groups and typically view them as if they were single agents. (5) We also
show that to explain group outcomes two factors have to be taken into account that are often neglected: the distribution of
individual types over groups and the decision rules that groups use to arrive at their decision.
JEL Classification A12 · C72 · C91 · C92 相似文献
8.
This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential
election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible,
and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the
observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates.
(iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round
votes.
JEL Classification C93, D70, D72 相似文献
9.
House money effects in public good experiments: Comment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Glenn W. Harrison 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(4):429-437
We reconsider evidence from experiments that claim to show that using “house money” in standard public goods experiments has
no effect on behavior. We show that it does have an effect when one examines the data using appropriate statistical methods
that consider individual-level responses and account for the error structure of the panel data.
JEL Classification D7 · C92
I am grateful for comments from two referees and an editor. All data and statistical code are available for public access
at the ExLab Digital Library located at http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu. 相似文献
10.
We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her
demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover
can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second
mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly
known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands
adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower
(higher) the lower the probability of information transmission.
JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92 相似文献
11.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services. 相似文献
12.
Jens Rommel Daniel Hermann Malte Müller Oliver Mußhoff 《Applied economics letters》2017,24(9):627-634
Economic experiments are increasingly conducted with field populations for whom comprehension of instructions may be more difficult to achieve. We investigate how framing experimental instructions in a familiar context and incentivizing the experimental task may affect comprehension. Based on an experiment with 146 German farmers, we compare four different versions of a Holt-and-Laury multiple price list. We find that incentives have a small positive effect on comprehension, as measured by the probability of making inconsistent choices and subjects’ self-assessment. In the absence of incentives, framing negatively affects comprehension. Comprehension is enhanced for farmers who score high on a numeracy test. We conclude that contextual framing might confuse subjects, whereas incentives can help to facilitate comprehension of experimental instructions. 相似文献
13.
14.
This paper studies bribery between a firm and a supervisor who monitors the firm for regulatory compliance. Bribery occurs preemptively, that is before the supervisor exerts costly effort to discover the firm's level of noncompliance and collect evidence for successful prosecution. In contrast to previous papers, preemptive bribery is modeled as a Bayesian signaling game because the supervisor is uninformed about the firm's level of noncompliance. We show that under normal informational assumptions, some (possibly all) firms always engage in preemptive bribery. However, if knowledge of the firm's level of noncompliance has implications for the supervisor's ability to collect evidence and prosecute (prior knowledge), preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated. Results which apply to preemptive bribery under complete information do not apply here. 相似文献
15.
Recent studies find that women are less competitive than men. This gender difference in competitiveness has been suggested
as one possible explanation for why men occupy the majority of top positions in many sectors. In this study we explore competitiveness
in children, with the premise that both context and gendered stereotypes regarding the task at hand may influence competitive
behavior. A related field experiment on Israeli children shows that only boys react to competition by running faster when
competing in a race. We here test if there is a gender gap in running among 7–10 year old Swedish children. We also introduce
two female sports, skipping rope and dancing, to see if competitiveness is task dependent. We find no gender difference in
reaction to competition in any task; boys and girls compete equally. Studies in different environments with different types
of tasks are thus important in order to make generalizable claims about gender differences in competitiveness. 相似文献
16.
17.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
18.
Walid Hichri 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):185-186
The work undertook is located between Public Economic Theory and Experimental Economics. The object of the thesis consists
in analysing the aggregate behavior and the individual heterogeneity in a voluntary contribution game. The thesis defended
here is that overcontribution in comparison to the Nash equilibrium of the game, can not be explained neither by judgement
errors, nor by the information on the individual behaviour of the members in a one given group. The level of contribution
observed remains nevertheless inferior to the one simulated using the E.W.A. learning model.
The dissertation is composed of three parts and six chapters. The first chapter expresses the various theoretical mechanisms
of production of a public good, while the second one presents an overview of the experimental literature using voluntary contribution
mechanisms.
The second part carries on the introduction of an interior solution in a public good game in order to distinguish an explanation
of overcontribution in terms of mistakes or strategies. While chapter three presents the most important works in literature
that use an interior solution, the fourth chapter constitutes a personal contribution consisting in an experiment with an
interior optimum. Our main result is that individuals contribute a constant part of their social optimum and that overcontribution
is not explained by error. We test then the simple learning model R.L. using the observed data on the aggregate level. This
model predicts well the observed behaviour.
The third part is composed of two experiments where the environment of players is modified. We introduce in chapter five promises
as cheap talk and find that they increase contributions at the aggregate level. In chapter six, various conditions of information
on individual contributions are tested. The parameter tested is the level of information on “neighbours” contributions given
to players. One of the treatments presents full information about individual contributions of the members of the group, while
this information is incomplete in the other treatments. Our results show that information has no effect on the level of contribution.
We simulate then the EWA learning model both at the aggregate and the individual levels and compare the simulated data to
the experimental one. These simulations predict a level of contribution that is higher that the one observed in the experiment.
JEL Classification C91, C92, H41
Dissertation Committee:
Alan Kirman (Ph.D. Advisor), Université d’Aix-Marseille III
Marie-Claire Villeval (Chair), GATE, Lyon, France
Jordi Brandts, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, Spain
Charles Noussair, Emory University, Alanta, GA, U.S.A.
Sylvie Thoron, GREQAM & Université du Var, France
Marc Willinger, Université de Montpellier I, France 相似文献
19.
We explore the effects of the provision of an information-processing instrument—payoff tables—on behavior in experimental oligopolies. In one experimental setting, subjects have access to payoff tables whereas in the other setting they have not. It turns out that this minor variation in presentation has non-negligible effects on participants’ behavior, particularly in the initial phase of the experiment. In the presence of payoff tables, subjects tend to be more cooperative. As a consequence, collusive behavior is more likely and quickly to occur. 相似文献
20.
Sushobhan Mahata Rohan Kanti Khan Ranjanendra Narayan Nag Sharmi Sen 《Review of Development Economics》2023,27(4):2183-2213
The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with. 相似文献