Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

我国银行间市场资金面影响因素的探讨——兼对当前市场流动性状况的分析与展望

梳理银行间市场资金面的影响因素,对于分析市场资金面的供求关系,央行评估货币政策执行效果,以及金融机构进行资产组合配置都有积极作用。文章从货币政策、商业银行存贷款增量、央行外汇占款、税收因素等多个角度,梳理了影响我国银行间市场资金面的八项因素,并在此基础上分析了今年5月份以来银行间市场资金面快速趋紧的成因。三季度,受CPI冲高回落、重申人民币汇改以及大型商业银行流动性状况好转等因素影响,银行间市场资金面紧张的格局将逐步改善。     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

Balancing liquidity and returns through interbank markets: Endogenous interest rates and network structures

In this article, we develop a model of interbank lending based on liquidity and return on equity considerations of homogeneous banks. We derive the reservation prices of interbank lending and its properties before exploring how, because of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, banks engage in bilateral lending to form an interbank network. We establish that the resulting networks exhibit realistic properties, including a core-periphery structure. Banks in the core and the periphery of this network differ not only in the amounts of interbank lending and borrowing but also in the interest rates applied to their transactions.     

Stressed,Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis

We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role than does liquidity hoarding: the day after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, loan terms become more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, poorly performing large banks see an increase in spreads of 25 basis points, but are borrowing 1% less, on average. Worse performing banks do not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem to expand to meet latent demand.     

货币政策对银行间市场流动性影响效应的实证研究及启示

银行间货币市场是央行实施货币政策的重要平台，研究货币政策对银行间市场流动性的影响对于完善商业银行日常流动性管理具有重要意义。文章在设定银行间市场流动性测度指标与梳理货币政策工具对市场流动性的影响机制的基础上，分别使用事件分析法和时间序列模型对不同政策工具的影响效应进行实证分析，得出相关分析结论，并总结其对于完善商业银行日常流动性管理的启示。     

On the efficiency of bilateral interbank insurance

This paper studies banks’ incentives to engage in liquidity cross-insurance. In contrast to previous literature we view interbank insurance as the outcome of bilateral (and non-exclusive) contracting between pairs of banks and ask whether this outcome is socially efficient. Using a simple model of interbank insurance we find that this is indeed the case when insurance takes place through pure transfers. This is even though liquidity support among banks sometimes breaks down, as observed in the crisis of 2007–2008. However, when insurance is provided against some form of repayment (such as is the case, for example, with credit lines), banks have a tendency to insure each other less than the socially efficient amount. We show that efficiency can be restored by introducing seniority clauses for interbank claims or through subsidies that resemble government interbank lending guarantees.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

Liquidity Risk,Bank Networks,and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.     

Optimal liquidity management and bail-out policy in the banking industry

We characterize the profit-maximizing reserves of a commercial bank, and the generated probability of a liquidity crisis, as a function of the penalty imposed by the Central Bank, the probability of depositors' liquidity needs, and the return on outside investment opportunities. We demonstrate that banks do not fully internalize the social cost associated with the bail-out policy if the liquidity needs of individuals are correlated, and that competitive interbank markets will induce banks to raise their reserves under reasonable conditions. The marginal benefits from an interbank market decrease as the correlation between the liquidity shocks of banks increases.     

Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area

This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008–2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011–2013).     

Using Interest Rate Derivative Prices to Estimate LIBOR-OIS Spread Dynamics and Systemic Funding Liquidity Shock Probabilities

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, there were severe disruptions in international money markets and banks reportedly faced severe liquidity shocks in particular US dollar funding shortages, prompting central banks around the world to adopt unprecedented policy measures to supply funds to the banks. A better understanding of the forward-looking information content about funding liquidity risk in interest rate derivative prices is therefore necessary to gauge pressures building surrounding systemic liquidity. Using the market prices of the US dollar LIBOR-overnight index swap spread, we estimate the probability of the systemic funding liquidity shock during the crisis period, which deviated from zero on 17 September 2008 to a significant level. This provided an early warning signal of the systemic liquidity shock on 29 September 2008 when the interbank market was totally paralysed.     

The role of the reference rate in an interbank market with imperfect information

This study investigates the potential role of the reference rate in an interbank market where individual banks cannot fully identify the nature of underlying shocks affecting their interbank transactions. We find that the reference rate does not always mitigate the market distortion arising from imperfect information. When the number of sample transactions is smaller than a certain threshold, the reference rate magnifies the distortion even if the reference rate is not affected by any reporting noise. The threshold depends on the relative size of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Noise in the reported interest rates, which is potentially increased by banks' manipulations, distorts individual banks' inferences about the underlying shocks, and thereby raises the threshold. When noise is highly correlated among multiple sample transactions, perhaps owing to collusive manipulations, it is possible that increasing the number of sample transactions may never mitigate the market distortion.     

Market liquidity, asset prices, and welfare

This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.     

Banks’ interconnections and peer effects: Evidence from Chile

In this paper, we identify and quantify the importance of endogenous peer effects in the interbank market, allowing for varying degrees of intensity of these peer effects. We base our analysis on a unique dataset that includes all interbank loans that have taken place between 15 banks in the Chilean interbank market representing more than 95% of the market between 2009 and 2016. This approach contrasts sharply with the geographical definition of peers used by most of the literature. As an application of our model, we examine an episode of liquidity shortage experienced by one Chilean bank in the interbank market, with the lenses of our model. We show evidence consistent with a herding behavior of the lender banks which, according to our model, were peers of the stressed bank.     

Network reactions to banking regulations

Optimal regulatory restrictions on banks have to solve a delicate balance. Tighter regulations reduce the likelihood of banks’ distress. Looser regulations foster the allocation of funds toward productive investments. With multiple banks, optimal regulation becomes even more challenging. Banks form partnerships in the interbank lending market in order to face liquidity needs and to meet investment possibilities. We show that the interbank network can suddenly collapse when regulations are pushed beyond a critical level, with a discontinuous increase in systemic risk as the cross-insurance of banks collapses.