Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence

There have been a number of previous studies that examined the effects of yield- or revenue-based crop insurance products on input use of farmers. However, no study has specifically investigated the input use impacts of a cost-of-production (COP) crop insurance policy, even though this type of crop insurance is the predominant one used in several other countries outside of the United States (such as the Philippines and China). This article aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effect of a COP crop insurance product on farmers’ chemical input use. Our theoretical model suggests that the effect of COP insurance on input use can either be positive or negative, with the resulting impact depending on the strengths of (a) the traditional moral hazard effect of insurance (i.e., an input use decreasing effect); versus (b) the marginal incentives to apply more inputs due to input levels being the main determinant for expected indemnity amounts in this type of insurance (i.e., an input use increasing effect). A survey data set from corn farmers in the Philippines is then used to empirically illustrate how a particular COP insurance product influences input use in a real-life context. In this case, we find that COP insurance increases the use of chemical inputs (e.g., fertilizers and total chemical expenditure), implying that the positive marginal incentive to apply more inputs dominates the negative moral hazard effect.     

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

How crop insurance influences agrochemical input use: Evidence from cotton farmers in China

Crop insurance is critical in risk management in global agricultural production (e.g. by helping stabilise farmers' incomes in the long term and reducing risk-bearing costs). In this paper, using field survey data on cotton farmers in Xinjiang, China, we examine the influence of crop insurance on farmers' behaviours regarding agrochemical inputs and aim to investigate the synergy between crop insurance and reductions in fertiliser and pesticide usage. We find evidence that crop insurance significantly negatively affects farmers' use of fertilisers and pesticides, as well as significantly positively affects their adoption of green agricultural technologies (GAT) that can replace or complement traditional fertilisers and pesticides. Moreover, our results reveal that compared with small-scale farmers, crop insurance has a stronger effect on large-scale farmers' use of agrochemicals. Finally, when the insured amount is higher or the relative deductible is lower, farmers are more likely to reduce fertiliser and pesticide usage and adopt GAT. Overall, this paper scientifically identifies crop insurance can improve farmers' agrochemical input behaviour, by reducing farmers' use of traditional agrochemical inputs and increasing their adoption of GAT, which is of great significance for ensuring the safety of the agricultural ecological environment.     

我国森林保险发展缓慢的深层次原因及对策分析

从经济学角度分析了我国森林保险发展缓慢的原因与森林保险发展过程中信息不对称问题,逆向选择和道德风险现象突出使得保险公司保险产品供给不足,林农投保需求减少,投保积极性不高,导致森林保险发展缓慢。通过对森林保险中的主体行为博弈分析,指出建立以政府为主导的政策性森林保险,更适合当前林业发展的需要,并给出相应的对策。     

MALLEE WHEAT FARMERS' DEMAND FOR CROP AND RAINFALL INSURANCE

Producers' demand for a crop insurance program with indemnities based on their actual yields and a rainfall insurance program with indemnities based on area rainfall is analysed. Actuarial costs of these hypothetical programs are estimated. Tobit procedures are used to analyse factors influencing the amount which farmers would be willing to pay for the alternative insurance programs. Factors related to the absolute size of risk and capacity to bear risk, as well as personal characteristics and risk attitudes of producers, have effects on the demand for insurance as hypothesised. Problems of adverse selection are associated with the area yield-based program, while both crop and rainfall insurance programs may involve some moral hazard. Producer participation in either program would be limited.     

Coping with systemic risk in index‐based crop insurance

The implementation of index‐based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses. We assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk: regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe (CAT) bonds. The analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined. We also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents. The model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast China. If yields in two regions are positively correlated, we find that enlarging the insured area leads to higher insurance premiums. Unless capital market investors are very risk averse, a CAT bond written on an area yield index outperforms regional diversification in terms of certainty equivalents of both farmers and insurers.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

Determinants of Health Costs due to Farmers’ Exposure to Pesticides: An Empirical Analysis

Pesticide spraying by farmers has an adverse impact on their health. However, in studies to date examining farmers’ exposure to pesticides, the costs of ill health and their determinants have been based on information provided by farmers themselves. Some doubt has therefore been cast on the reliability of these estimates. In this study, we address this by conducting surveys among two groups of farmers who use pesticides on a regular basis. The first group is made up of farmers who perceive that their ill health is due to exposure to pesticides and have obtained at least some form of treatment (described in this article as the ‘general farmer group’). The second group is composed of farmers whose ill health has been diagnosed by doctors and who have been treated in hospital for exposure to pesticides (described here as the ‘hospitalised farmer group’). Cost comparisons are made between the two groups of farmers. Regression analysis of the determinants of health costs show that the most important determinants of medical costs for both samples are the defensive expenditure, the quantity of pesticides used per acre per month, frequency of pesticide use and number of pesticides used per hour per day. The results have important policy implications.     

The effectiveness of weather index insurance in managing mariculture production risk

Mariculture is a high-risk industry that is susceptible to weather disasters. However, due to moral hazard, adverse selection and high transaction costs, traditional indemnity insurance policies are not available. An emerging alternative is the development of weather index mariculture insurance. This research assesses the effectiveness of weather index mariculture insurance by using the swimming crab precipitation index insurance as an example. The theoretical and empirical results suggest that weather index mariculture insurance is not always effective. It cannot be guaranteed to promote the welfare of mariculturists and reduce the tail risk of income, especially in the case of gross rates. However, in the case of low basis risk, it could be a viable option for the government because of the low subsidy cost required.     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Farmer Participation,Entry and Exit Decisions in the Italian Crop Insurance Programme

The factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance in the USA have been extensively studied over the last two decades. However, the determinants of a farm's entry and exit decisions in the insurance market have received relatively little attention. Turnover in the insurance book of business is an important issue in most private and public crop insurance plans. Moreover, insurance markets in the EU are still largely under‐investigated. We investigate empirically the determinants of crop insurance participation in Italy. We show that the participation rate is high for large firms and that it is negatively correlated with crop diversification, which is itself a form of insurance. High premiums tend to inhibit both entry and exit from the insurance market. Larger and wealthier farms are more likely to adopt insurance and renew coverage over time. We discuss implications of our results for public intervention and the private industry. In particular, we demonstrate that the decision to drop coverage by an insured grower may differ significantly from the corresponding decision to enroll in an insurance programme by an uninsured farmer. To the extent that policymakers want to encourage participation in subsidized crop insurance programmes, education and outreach efforts toward uninsured farmers may differ substantially from those directed toward keeping insured farmers enrolled in the programme. We investigate these differences.     

Spatial Spillovers on Input‐specific Inefficiency of Dutch Arable Farms

Traditional benchmarking implicitly assumes that decision making units operate in isolation from their peers. For arable production systems in particular, this assumption is unlikely to hold in reality. This paper quantifies spatial spillovers on input‐specific inefficiency using data envelopment analysis and a second‐stage bootstrap truncated regression model. The bootstrap algorithm is extended to allow for the estimation of the parameter of the spatial weight matrix, which captures the proximity between producers. The empirical application concerns Dutch arable farms for which latitudes and longitudes are available. The average inefficiency across years was 3.87% for productive inputs and 2.98% for damage abatement inputs under variable returns to scale. For productive inputs technical inefficiency, statistically significant spillover effects from neighbours’ age and their degree of specialisation depended on the type of the spatial weight matrix used (inverse distance or k‐nearest neighbours). Statistically significant spillover effects of subsidy payments were adverse while statistically significant spillover effects from insurance payments were beneficial. For damage abatement inputs technical inefficiency, statistically significant adverse effects were found for neighbours’ age and subsidy payments and beneficial effects from neighbours’ insurance payments and their degree of specialisation.     

Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection

Averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves the government and individual livestock producers. Producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak ( ex ante moral hazard), and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected ( ex post adverse selection). We investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government in the presence of asymmetric information. We compare the relative magnitude of the first- and second-best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to demonstrate the tradeoff between risk sharing and efficiency, and we discuss the implications for status quo U.S. policy.     

Moral hazard: the effect of insurance on risk and efficiency

While there is a large body of literature investigating the effect of crop and livestock insurance on input and yield, limited attention has been paid to the effect of insurance on efficiency. This article investigates how insurance affects technical efficiency and whether insurance alters the utilized input quantity to a riskier bundle using the Norwegian salmon farming industry as a case. The results illustrate that insurance has an enhancing effect on production and efficiency and changes the utilized input mix—a well‐insured farmer uses more feed and less capital and labor than a less‐insured farmer. When linking this to each input's risk profile, the results indicate that insurance will induce the use of the risk‐increasing factor (feed) and reduce the use of the risk‐decreasing factors (labor and capital)—thereby increasing production risk and indicating moral hazard.     

Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Assessing effects of federal crop insurance supply on acreage and yield of specialty crops

Crop insurance may affect harvested acreage and yield by influencing producers’ behavior such as land allocation and input use. Although specialty crops are a major source of farm income, especially on the U.S. west coast, they have not received as much attention as field crops in previous empirical studies. This paper assesses the effect of moral hazard and adverse selection associated with the federal crop insurance program (FCIP) on the acreage and yield of major specialty crops in California. An econometric method that expands the switching regression model is developed to assess the effect. Results suggest that federal crop insurance can change specialty crop growers’ production responses to climate and soil conditions. The moral hazard effect tends to increase the acreage and yield of the specialty crops, whereas the adverse selection effect tends to have the opposite effect. The overall effect of the FCIP on acreage and yield of specialty crops is found to be moderate.     

The influence of direct payments on farmers’ hail insurance decisions

We analyze determinants of hail insurance use of Swiss farmers, using FADN panel data covering the period 1990–2009. Mixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to identify the most important farm and farmer characteristics that trigger insurance use. In addition, information on local hail risk is taken into account in these models. It shows that larger farms, with specialization in crop production, and with larger local hail risks are more likely to adopt the hail insurance. Moreover, insurance users are usually older and better educated. Since the early 1990s, Swiss agricultural policy has reduced price support and introduced general and ecological direct payments. This has led to a much higher importance of direct payments for farmers’ incomes. Our analysis shows that this development has contributed to decreasing hail insurance adoption rates in Switzerland over the period considered. Our results indicate that the larger the share of direct payments for total farm revenue, the less attractive is insurance as a risk management strategy for farmers. This interdependency should be explicitly considered by agricultural policy in the design of support mechanisms.     

Investigating the performance of different estimation techniques for crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications

We investigate the performance of the ordinary least squares (OLS)‐, M‐, MM‐, and the Theil–Sen (TS)‐estimator for crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications using Monte Carlo simulations. More specifically, the performance is assessed with respect to trend estimation, prediction of future yield levels, and the estimation of expected indemnity payments. In agreement with earlier findings, other estimators are found to be superior to OLS in simple regression problems if yield distributions are outlier contaminated and heteroscedastic. While this conclusion is also valid for subsequent applications such as yield prediction and the estimation of expected indemnity payments, the difference between the considered estimators becomes less distinct. For these applications, we find particularly the M‐estimator to be a good compromise between high‐breakdown (very robust) estimators and the very efficient OLS‐estimator. Because no regression technique dominates all others in all applications and scenarios for error term distributions, our results underline that the choice of the estimation technique should be dependent on the purpose of the crop yield data analysis. However, alternative estimators such as M‐, MM‐, and TS‐estimator can reduce (and bound) the risk of unreliable or inefficient crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications.     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).