How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note

Conventional wisdom holds that a conservative central banker reduces equilibrium inflation with no cost in terms of real activity. More recently, this proposition has been turned around in models with inflation averse wage setters who are Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the central bank: In this case a populist central banker with no interest in inflation was shown to lead to the first-best equilibrium. This note demonstrates that the Stackelberg assumption is crucial for this result and that the Nash solution of the same model does not generally support the case for a populist central banker.     

NOMINAL GDP TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK CONSERVATIVENESS

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the ‘inflationary bias’ result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this ‘inflationary bias’. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an ‘inflationary bias’, and there also exists the possibility of a ‘dis‐inflationary bias’.     

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.     

Optimal monetary policy revisited: does considering US real-time data change things?

The primary goal of this article is to investigate whether properly modelling real-time data and optimal real-time decision-making of a monetary planner provides new insights into monetary policy behaviour and outcomes. This article extends a variant of the asymmetric preference model suggested by Ruge-Murcia to investigate the use of real-time data available to policymakers when making their decisions and revised data which more accurately measure economic performance, but is only available much later. In our extended model, the central banker targets a weighted average of revised and real-time inflation together with a weighted average of revised and real-time output. Moreover, we allow for an asymmetric central bank response to real-time data depending on whether the unemployment rate is high or low. Our model identifies several new potential sources of inflation bias due to data revisions. Our empirical results suggest that the Federal Reserve Bank focuses on targeting revised inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weighs heavily real-time inflation during high unemployment periods. The inflation bias due to data revisions is comparable in magnitude to the bias from asymmetric central banker preferences with the bias being somewhat larger during high unemployment.     

Centralised Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker

The paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation-averse monopoly union as a positive mark-up over its market-clearing value. The analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract. The optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society, combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union's degree of inflation-aversion.     

Fiscal and monetary effects on environmental quality,growth, and welfare

This paper examines the effect of fiscal and monetary policies on economic growth, inflation, environmental quality, and welfare. To this end, the horizontal-R&D growth model is extended to include pollution generated in the intermediate-goods production, and the demand for money through cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on intermediate-goods production and R&D investment. Fiscal policy embodied in the taxation of pollution decreases output, profits, inflation, and wages in the intermediate-goods sector, reallocating labor to R&D that is the engine of economic growth. As it reduces pollution, it increases welfare if there are strong preferences for a clean environment. In turn, since the inflation rate is an increasing function of the nominal interest rate, the effects of changes in this monetary policy variable extend to the effects of changes in the inflation rate. An increase in the nominal interest rate penalizes employment, wages and output in the R&D sector relatively more if the respective CIA constraint is more demanding and thus economic growth decreases. As it also reduces pollution since decreases intermediate-goods production, it increases welfare if the preferences for a clean environment are strong enough.     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky wages and sticky prices

We determine the optimal degree of price inflation volatility when nominal wages are sticky and the government uses state-contingent inflation to finance government spending. We address this question in a well-understood Ramsey model of fiscal and monetary policy, in which the benevolent planner has access to labor income taxes, nominally risk-free debt, and money creation. Our main result is that sticky wages alone make price stability optimal in the face of shocks to the government budget, to a degree quantitatively similar as sticky prices alone. Key for our results is an equilibrium restriction between nominal price inflation and nominal wage inflation that holds trivially in a Ramsey model featuring only sticky prices. Our results thus show that when nominal wages are sticky, setting real wages as close as possible to their efficient path is a more important goal of optimal monetary policy than is financing innovations in the government budget via state-contingent inflation. A second important result is that the nominal interest rate can be used to indirectly tax the rents of monopolistic labor suppliers. Taken together, our results uncover features of Ramsey fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of a type of labor market imperfection that is widely-believed to be important.     

The benefits of central bank's political independence

We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare.     

Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy

We analyze the co-determination of monetary policy and the labor contracts chosen by members of the public, who can either fix or index their nominal wages. Fixed nominal wages allow the central bank to offset productivity shocks, while the public fix nominal wages in response to the central bank offsetting shocks; so there is an equilibrium in which, realistically, nominal wages are fixed and shocks offset: a result which holds in single- as well as in multi-period games. In addition, there may be equilibria in which agents index their nominal wages, and the central bank optimally responds by stabilizing price. In contrast to conventional models, the Ramsey rule may be implemented in a finitely repeated game. The central bank does not deviate for fear that agents would change their labor contracts such that the central bank's least favored equilibrium will subsequently be played.     

The U.S. inflation process: Does nominal wage inflation cause price inflation,vice-versa,or neither?

Low unemployment has revived concerns about accelerated inflation. This paper examines the relationship between price and nominal wage inflation. It finds that it varies by business cycle. Prior to the great oil shock of 1973, price and nominal wage inflation were unconnected in a Granger-causal sense. In the 1970s, wage inflation caused price inflation. In the 1980s, the relationship reversed and price inflation caused nominal wage inflation. In the 1990s, the pattern has changed again, and there is some weak evidence of bidirectional causality between wages and PPI inflation. However, wages continue to have no impact on CPI inflation, which is widely viewed as one of the Fed's target variables. This suggests that wage inflation should be de-emphasized as a monetary policy information variable.     

WELFARE COST OF INFALTION IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

We study the welfare cost of inflation in a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Nominal prices and wages are subjected to Taylor‐style adjustments in the benchmark model. We find that the welfare cost of inflation in a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is much higher than its counterpart in a real business cycle model. We also find that the welfare cost of inflation increases linearly with the inflation rate with the introduction of monopolistic competition but rises faster as the inflation rate increases with the introduction of nominal rigidity. Alternative price and wage setting schemes, such as Rotemberg and Calvo‐style adjustments would yield welfare costs of moderate inflation that are 2–10 times higher.     

Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences

How do the preferences of a banking authority affect its decision making in periods of distress and thus financial stability? We study this question in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a monopolistic bank and a time-consistent policy response by a banking authority. We show that limited commitment on the part of the banking authority may induce fragility but the banking authority's incentives are also an important determining factor in the degree of financial stability. In particular, under a simple suspension scheme, delegating a banking authority who places sufficient weight on a banker's welfare acts as a commitment device and prevents runs, in analogy with how a Rogoff (1985) “conservative” central banker helps reduce inflation bias. In contrast, once interventions take the form of payment rescheduling, the scope for the bank's susceptibility to a panic increases should the banking authority put more weight on monopoly rents. Identifying such an aspect of vulnerability suggests that appointing a banking authority whose objective function deviates from that of depositors may have unintended consequences.     

Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias

This paper offers an alternative explanation for the occurrence of an inflation bias with and without an output goal exceeding natural output. A monetary game model is developed from which an inflation bias emerges because the policymaker increases money growth in order to avoid a recession due to a possible negative control error. Whereas higher additive instrument uncertainty increases the inflation bias, higher multiplicative uncertainty decreases it. Delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central banker decreases the inflation bias for all types of control errors.     

Does wage-inflation targeting complement foreign exchange intervention? An evaluation of a multi-target,two-instrument monetary policy framework

We assess the inclusion of wage inflation as an intermediate target of an emerging central bank using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky wages and prices calibrated for the South Korean economy. The model includes wage inflation as an additional target jointly with domestic price inflation and the output gap in a Taylor- type interest rate rule operating with a sterilized foreign exchange (FX) intervention rule. Our results show a complementary relationship between wage inflation targeting and price inflation targeting. That is, by supplementing price inflation targeting with wage inflation targeting, welfare improves for cases with and without sterilized FX intervention. When intervention is in place, wage inflation targeting has the added advantage of reducing the volatilities of nominal exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves thereby promoting a more sustainable conduct of FX intervention.     

Socially optimal monetary policy institutions

Research on the interaction between wage setters and central banks has shown that the classical dichotomy of monetary policy models in the tradition of Barro and Gordon [Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983) 589] does not hold if an inflation motive of wage setters is introduced. In this paper, the conditions for this result are re-examined under different assumptions concerning the exact timing of the strategic game, and the consequences for the socially optimal delegation rules and incentive contracts for central bankers are derived. It is shown that the relationship between central bank conservativeness and macroeconomic performance—and hence the design of optimal monetary policy institutions—is sensitive to the modelling choice. In particular, the case for an ultra-populist central banker is valid only under assumptions that appear to be quite unrealistic.     

The Interaction between the Central Bank and a Single Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Monetary Policy Uncertainty Reduce Nominal Wages?

Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .     

The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.     

Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker

This paper develops a model of monetary policy in which the central banker can acquire costly information about a supply shock. It is shown that, with this assumption, it may be optimal for society to delegate to a "weight-liberal" central banker, a result which contrasts with that of Rogoff (1985). This result points at a limitation of Rogoff's argument. It may also explain why the issue of delegating monetary policy to an independent and "weight-conservative" central banker often is politically controversial.