Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure

In many fisheries managed by quota systems fishermen are required to keep a logbook containing information about catches. No well functioning enforcement system is set up in connection with the logbooks, since the purpose is to assist biologists in making stock assessments. In this paper we consider a case where three market failures (a stock externality problem, a stock uncertainty problem and problems with measuring individual catches) arise simultaneously. It is shown that a stock tax and a tax on voluntary self-reported catches may solve these three problems. By taxing voluntary self-reported catches we make use of logbook information. It is shown using an analytic model that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report part of their catch voluntarily even without an enforcement policy. In addition, it is shown that the tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches, and empirical simulations show that the tax payment is relatively low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.     

Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure

In many fisheries managed by quota systems fishermen are required to keep a logbook containing information about catches. No well functioning enforcement system is set up in connection with the logbooks, since the purpose is to assist biologists in making stock assessments. In this paper we consider a case where three market failures (a stock externality problem, a stock uncertainty problem and problems with measuring individual catches) arise simultaneously. It is shown that a stock tax and a tax on voluntary self-reported catches may solve these three problems. By taxing voluntary self-reported catches we make use of logbook information. It is shown using an analytic model that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report part of their catch voluntarily even without an enforcement policy. In addition, it is shown that the tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches, and empirical simulations show that the tax payment is relatively low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.     

Transferable quotas,enforcement costs and typical firms: An empirical application to the Norwegian trawler fleet

An alternative to traditional regulations of fisheries to avoid rent dissipation is the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQ _s ) where prices in the quota market provide the necessary information to owners of harvest rights to contract with each other. However, even under such a decentralized regime, information on the underlying technology of the fishing vessels is also necessary. First, since most fisheries consist of many interrelated production processes, in order to avoid rent dissipation by discarding wrong output mix etc., the structure of production in the multispecies fishery must be known to design a proper quota system. Second, an ITQ system may create incentives for misreporting by understating the actual catch. This may especially be the case where the expected degree of self-enforcement is low. The paper proposes a way to reduce the information requirements under regulation with asymmetric information by constructing a typical firm and comparing performance for the other vessels to this firm. Based on the typical firm, and if the industry is relatively homogenous, the performance and hence catch of any other firm in the industry can be predicted within a certain range. Further, the paper applies this idea to the Norwegian trawler fleet to assess the production structure in terms of jointness, input-output separability, and the supply and demand elasticities for the fishing firms. This information characterizes the fishery and thus how the quota system may be designed and how to construct a yardstick in order to reduce the enforcement cost under a decentralized regulation of ITQs.The authors would like to thank Trond Bjørndal, Røgnvaldur Hannesson, Ola Flaaten and two referees for useful comments and suggestions.     

ITQ’s in Chile: Measuring the Economic Benefits of Reform

In 2001 an individual (operationally transferable) quota system was introduced for all the most important industrial fisheries in Chile. This system was put in place after years of declining stocks and over investment. In this paper we describe this reform and estimate related allocative efficiency benefits for the most important industrial fishery in the country, the southern pelagic fishery. Benefits were estimated using a bioeconomic model estimated using data for the 1985–2004 period. The estimated model was then used to generate simulated scenarios of the evolution of this fishery in a 20 year horizon with and without the ITQ system in place. The benefits of the reform can then be estimated by comparing the fishery’s costs in the scenarios with and without ITQs. This approach allows benefits to be estimated using more realistic counterfactual scenarios than just comparing the fishery before and after the reform. Estimated discounted net benefits reach US $166 million in the period 2001–2020. Fleet size fell from 149 active boats in 2000 to 57 in 2004 as a direct consequence of the reform. Among the interesting features of the Chilean experience is the way the political economy of the reform was facilitated by the prior introduction of de facto individual quotas within the framework of fishery experimental activities. When the authorities closed the southern pelagic fishery because of biological problems between 1997 and 2000, they organized ‘experimental’ fishing expeditions in which participant boats were given the right to fish a certain amount of resources per expedition. This pseudo quota system allowed fishermen to experience directly the benefits of individual quotas and that was instrumental to the political agreement leading to the reform. It is important to note that the Chilean southern industrial pelagic fishery has average catches of over 1.4 million tons a year, making it one of the largest fisheries in the world to be regulated by individual quotas.     

Modeling the dynamics of regulated resource systems: a fishery example

In this paper, a discrete-time model of regulated fisheries is developed. This class of models is interesting because most modern real-world fisheries are under some kind of regulation. The regulatory part of the fishery in this paper is partitioned into two stages. In the first stage, which is the main focus, total allowable catch quotas (TACs) based on biological and economic considerations are determined in a way that guarantees the safety of the stock from a conservation viewpoint. In addition, we assume that a target biomass level is set by the management authorities to be achieved over a given time horizon to satisfy an economic objective. Since we assume here that the main goal is to rebuild the stock, we propose a gradual approach to the target biomass level via a simple recursive rule.     

Bioeconomic Analysis and Management

This article discusses bioeconomic analysis and different management strategies in fisheries. It reviews recent developments, which show the need to expand the analysis to multispecies fisheries and management. Significant gains can be made if the interdependencies between species and/or jointness in inputs for many fisheries are identified. Both common property resource management and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be fruitful strategies in different settings. The article suggests that there is scope for the development of a multiple use management approach of marine resources. Besides the aim of an efficient use of fish stocks, equal attention should be given to other values from aquatic ecosystems, like ecological services, biodiversity and recreation possibilities.     

PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CRISES IN WORLD FISHERIES: TURNING THE TIDE?

This paper addresses the crises in the world's fisheries involving dwindling stocks, overcapitalization, and jurisdiction disputes from a property rights perspective. In particular, it examines the causes of the problems fishers face and explores the potential of privatizing the right to catch fish as a means to address the crises. The analysis assesses experiences of private harvesting rights with reference to monitoring and enforcement, allocating rights, economic benefits, adjustments in the fishery, and resource rents. It also examines issues such as fluctuating fish stocks, straddling stocks and high seas fisheries, and the endemic poverty of many artisanal fisheries in the context of current fisheries practice.     

Cost structure and capacity in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries

The parameters of the short-run cost function are estimated for three vessel types taking part in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries: purse seine vessels, trawlers, and coastal vessels. The generalized translog functional form is used. Estimates of returns to scale are calculated and the results indicate that there are substantial economies of scale in all vessel classes. It is further investigated whether excess capacity varies with vessel size and age. The analysis suggests increased quotas per vessel to avoid rent dissipation. With the total allowable catch given, the number of participating vessels must be reduced.     

Optimal Management Under Institutional Constraints: Determining a Total Allowable Catch for Different Fleet Segments in the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery

Many real world fisheries have an individual vessel quota system with restrictions on transferability of quota or entrance of new vessels into the fishery. While the standard economic reasoning is that these institutional constraints lead to welfare losses, the size of those losses and optimal second-best policies are usually unknown. We develop a dynamic bioeconomic model, in which a scientific body provides an optimal TAC given restrictions on (i) transferability between vessel segments and (ii) entrance of new vessels. Further, we also quantify welfare losses arising from not maximizing economic welfare, but physical yield—which is actually the case in many fisheries. We apply the model to the Northeast Arctic cod fishery, and estimate not only the cost and harvesting functions of the various vessel types, but also the parameters of the biological model as well as those of the demand function. This allows us to determine optimal second-best policies and quantify corresponding welfare effects for our case study fishery.     

Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement

We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit system when firms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on self-reporting in the enforcement of standards, we find that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoring—the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others—is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full compliance in the face of permit price fluctuations.     

Using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections

A transferable quota system is analysed in a two-period model with market power. So far, the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods, or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated. In this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions. This opens for a trade-off between distributional and time efficiency, or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency.      

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE DECLINE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

The total number of cases that the Antitrust Division has filed during the past decade has increased, but the number of significant criminal price-fixing cases has declined. Policy changes have had significant effects on other areas of enforcement. This paper argues, however, that the decline in this dimension of antitrust enforcement can be explained by a 1974 act of Congress that increased criminal penalties for price-fixing violations from the misdemeanor level to the felony level. According to this argument, the stiffer penalties' deterrent impact has reduced the supply of antitrust violations. In this respect, the analysis highlights the flaws in measuring the strength of enforcement from the frequency of cases filed. In addition, the paper reports empirical evidence from a multinomial logit model of defendant plea choice indicating that the felony penalties encourage defendants to plead not guilty more frequently. Furthermore, data on the outcomes of criminal antitrust cases reveal that the government has greater difficulty in obtaining convictions when felony penalties apply. From the viewpoint of enforcers, these findings imply that detecting and prosecuting significant price-fixing violations is more difficult. This, in turn, helps explain the reduction in related private enforcement.     

Entry,reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement

We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U‐shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.     

Market power and compliance with output quotas

This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant firm in an output quota market when the firm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output markets. Provided the firm has an initial quota endowment which is strictly positive, under some circumstances the firm may find it profitable to comply or even over-comply in its quota demand, even in the absence of enforcement. The results are compared to those found in the pollution permit literature for a firm with market dominance only in the permit market, to which some additional observations are also added concerning efficiency outcomes under non-compliance.     

Simulating the Effect of Regulatory Systems in a Fishery, An Application to the French Driftnet Albacore Fleet

With a thin economic component, most bio-economic models of fisheries failto assess the effects of the regulation systems on firms. In order to analysethe short term consequences of different management schemes, a simulationmodel is applied to the French driftnet albacore fleet: licence allocation withdriftnet regulation, individual quotas, and individual transferable quotaswithout any input control. Vessel technology is estimated by using the datacollected, and groups of vessels are distinguished according to criteria ofperformance. We present the adjustment within firms and between groupsunder different scenarios (limited entry with and without driftnetregulation, individual quotas and individual transferable quotas allocation),and we compare their results in terms of quasi-rent value and otherindicators such as hake harvests or dolphin by-catches.     

When is fish quota enforcement worth while? A study of the Northeast Arctic cod

Many fish stocks are controlled by fish quotas divided among individual firms. Such quota regimes need an enforcement mechanism in order to be effective. Whether or not quota management regimes are worth while depends on whether the rents generated by such regimes cover their costs. Cost-efficient quota regimes would attain an optimal deterrence through minimal control and high fines, but in practice there are likely to be socially determined limits on how high fines could be set. We analyze these questions for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, using data on enforcement of Norwegian fish quotas.     

Species diversity, fishing induced change in carrying capacity and sustainable fisheries management

It is well established in the fisheries management literature that marine ecosystems are complex and marine species depend on one another. As a result, it is important to account for species diversity to ensure sustainable management. In addition, recent research published in the marine sciences literature has provided unequivocal evidence that fishing activities destroy habitats and inhibit production of planktons. This paper illustrates that if a conventional bioeconomic model is employed, an optimum effort policy as opposed to quota appears to result in sustainable management even if fishing impacts carrying capacity. However, the so-called optimum effort may collapse the stock if species diversity is not accounted for. Conversely, if species diversity and the impact of fishing on carrying capacity are considered, neither the equilibrium quota nor effort may guarantee sustainable yield.     

Firms’ Compliance to Environmental Regulation: Is There Really a Paradox?

It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the pattern seems less paradoxical: enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations, on the other hand, are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment, and such violations are more uncommon. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. We argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the international literature. The claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is generally higher than predicted by standard theory should thus be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established fact.     

Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement

We empirically estimate a penalty function for water quality violations of private firms in Georgia. We find that seriousness of infraction and historical compliance records strongly influence penalty levels, while the intentionality of violations and the method of discovery do not. The size of the polluting company is also an important determinant of financial penalties. Overall the results support the plausibility of modeling assumptions used in much the theoretical enforcement literature but indicate the need for caution in interpreting models that assume penalty amounts are invariant to violation characteristics.     

Enjoying Catch and Fishing Effort: The Effort Effect in Recreational Fisheries

Recreational fishermen derive utility from catch and fishing effort. Building our analysis on the Gordon-Clark model for renewable resources, we show that a lower importance of catch may result in higher catches. While this effect also holds under first-best management, it may destabilize open-access recreational fisheries to the point of stock collapse. Technical progress in recreational fisheries may mask such dynamics as it enables unaltered angler behavior and constant catches during stock declines.