Farmers,Middlemen and Exporters: A Model of Market Power,Pricing and Welfare in a Vertical Supply Chain

Markets for cash‐crops in developing countries are typically characterized by a concentration of buyer power at different levels of the supply chain. For instance, small‐scale coffee farmers sell their produce to a middleman, who in turn sells the coffee onward to an exporter, often a foreign multinational, with monopsony power in the hands of the purchasers at both levels. We analyze pricing behavior and welfare with different assumptions regarding market power. In particular, we show that a more powerful exporter is likely to benefit the producers and may even lead to higher welfare for the producer country as a whole.     

Social Interaction Effects in Disability Pension Participation: Evidence from Plant Downsizing*

We estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation among older workers in Norway. The problem of omitted variable bias is addressed using the exposure of an individual's neighbors to plant‐downsizing events as an instrument for the disability entry rate among the individual's previously employed neighbors. Our instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four‐year entry rate of older workers by about 0.4 percentage points. Numerous robustness and specification tests appear to support the validity of the identifying assumption in our IV strategy.     

Taxation and Migration in a Federal System

This paper discusses how taxation may affect migration, economic efficiency and income distribution. The institutional framework is a federal system, in which local authorities are responsible for the supply of public services and the financing of these services, and where the central authorities are in charge of income redistribution. The main conclusion is that a moderate policy of income redistribution is associated with greater centralization of the work force and greater economic inefficiency than is the case with both radical and more limited policies of redistribution.     

“It Pays to be Green” – A Premature Conclusion?

It has been claimed that good environmental performance can improve firms’ economic performance. However, because of e.g. data limitations, the methods applied in most previous quantitative empirical studies on effects of environmental performance on economic performance of firms suffer from several shortcomings. We discuss these shortcomings and conclude that previously applied methods are unsatisfactory as support for a conclusion that it pays for firms to be green. Then we illustrate the consequences of these shortcomings by performing several regression analyses of the effect of environmental performance on economic performance using a panel data set of Norwegian plants. A pooled regression where observable firm characteristics like e.g. size or industry are controlled for, confirms a positive effect of environmental performance on economic performance. However, the estimated positive effect could be due to omitted unobserved variables like management or technology. When the regression model controls for unobserved plant heterogeneity, the effect is generally no longer statistically significant. Hence, although greener plants tend to perform economically better, the analysis provides little support for the claim that it is because they are greener. These empirical findings further indicate that a conclusion that it pays to be green is premature.     

Firms’ Compliance to Environmental Regulation: Is There Really a Paradox?

It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the pattern seems less paradoxical: enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations, on the other hand, are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment, and such violations are more uncommon. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. We argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the international literature. The claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is generally higher than predicted by standard theory should thus be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established fact.     

On the optimal timing of capital taxes

For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.     

Economic integration and the profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

The 1990s was a decade of increased economic integration. The decade also witnessed a sharp increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. From a theoretical perspective, the increase in international mergers in more integrated economies is rather puzzling. It is a well-established result that due to the “business stealing effect”, mergers in integrated markets are not likely to be profitable. A reasonable conjecture would therefore be that closer integration of markets would reduce the attractiveness of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The present paper demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case: Economic integration may trigger cross-border acquisitions by reducing the business stealing effect and by reducing the reservation price of the target firm. The paper thus provides explanations to the observed increase in cross-border mergers in a world of more integrated economies.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

The threat of regulatory environmental inspection: impact on plant performance

The expected costs of violating a regulation would typically increase if the probability of regulatory inspection increases. Thus, changes in the anticipated threat of inspection should affect firm compliance. Like environmental protection agencies in several other countries, the Norwegian agency typically emphasizes compliance with institutional requirements (e.g. firm-internal routines and auditing systems) rather than emission caps. Using a panel dataset of polluting Norwegian plants, we find that the threat of inspection significantly reduces the probability of serious violation. However, emissions are not significantly affected. We point at various reasons for the regulator to emphasize institutional requirements, but we also argue that the lack of effect on emissions encourages the agency to review the pros and cons of the common emphasis on institutional requirements over emissions.