Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in fitting complexity. In some environments, bidding may become mutually destructive. Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a threshold problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.     

From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Auction markets for dispatchable power: How to score the bids

Competitive bidding for electric generating capacity is becoming based on economic dispatch rather than the PURPA must-take norm. Incorporating economic dispatch into bidding requires different price scoring procedures. The avoided cost of a dispatchable project is determined by the energy price offered. Price scoring methods based on a percentage of avoided cost approach are uneconomically biased against baseload projects, because they neglect the duration effects of their dispatch. This bias is illustrated in a simple model of economic dispatch. A number of utilities use the percentage of avoided cost method for dispatchable capacity. They can correct the bias by using a net benefits per kW measure of economic value.     

Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective

Neoclassical welfare economics still looms large in the discipline of public choice. Particularly, by constructing analogies of political competition fundamental shortcomings of old neoclassical paradigms found their way into a new theory of political economy. Especially the failure to deal with the problem of limited knowledge and with the role of institutions obscured fundamental differences between political and economic systems of coordination and control. Hence, I propose a non-neoclassical perspective, using Hayekian concepts like competition as a discovery procedure or spontaneous order to develop an alternative agenda for many fields of public choice. I shall first outline a critique of neoclassical equilibrium settings in economics and in similarly constructed models of democracy. Then various properties of economic and political institutions, the competition of ideas and institutional competition among jurisdictions will be discussed in an evolutionary perspective. Not surprisingly, these applications reveal some similarities to central themes of constitutional political economy.     

Nachfragesysteme für österreich

Summary This paper gives an empirical reexamination of the Linear-Expenditure-hypothesis for Austria. It starts with a brief theoretical discussion of the principal properties and restrictions of the Linear-Expenditure-System (LES). To obtain empirical estimates of the parameters of the LES two different estimation procedures are applied, i.e. the original method used byStone and a simplified version of the Systems-Least-Squares-approach (following theMarquardt-algorithm). There are no essential differences between these estimates. They all seem plausible and satisfy the theoretical restrictions.Usually the stability (i.e. time-invariance) of the parameters is accepted without proof. Using the Moving-Window-Regression-technique, however, most of the estimates vary significantly in time. To obtain a direct proof of the time-dependence of the parameters the LES is reestimated now including trend-factors. Especially results considering time-dependent marginal-budget-shares are considerably better than the static-model results.The conclusion of this paper is that the static version of the LES does not explain the consumer behaviour in Austria and that much more effort should be spent on the estimation of dynamic demand systems.     

Spieltheorie: Ein neues Paradigma der Sozialwissenschaft

Ohne ZusammenfassungDeutsche Fassung des Artikels Game Theory: A New Paradigm of Social Science, erschienen in New Methods of Thought and Procedure (Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer, 1967). — Diese Arbeit wurde teilweise über das Econometric Research Program der Princeton University durch das Office of Naval Research unterstützt.     

Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Summary We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the independent private value model. We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same minimum and if this minimum is not a mass point of any of these distributions, then a Nash equilibrium of the first price auction exists. We then modify the first price auction game by adding a closed interval of messages. Every bidder has to send a message with the bid he submits. These messages are used in the resolution of the ties. The winner of the auction is chosen randomly among the highest bidders with the highest value of the message among the highest bidders. In the general case, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this augmented first price auction.I wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko and a referee for their comments on an earlier draft.     

Economics as mechanism: The mind as machine in Hayek's sensory order

InThe Sensory Order, Friedrich A. Hayek describes the human mind as an apparatus of classification that evolves through experience and that reaches decisions by modeling the alternative courses of action that are available to it. Hayek's mechanistic conception of mind argues aginst the possibility of central planning and against the cogency of any rule that denigrates subjective decision making by employers or other economic agents. As implied by Gödel's proof, no brain, human or mechanical, can ever be sufficiently complex to explain itself. There will therefore always be certain knowledge and rules that cannot be articulated to the satisfaction of a central planner or tribunal.     

Alternative Modelle und Hypothesen der Konsum- und Sparentscheidung(1)

Summary For the analysis of the allocation of personal disposable income to the different consumption goods and savings, an indirect-addilog-expenditure-system (IAES) has been constructed. Compared to the linear-expenditure-system (LES) the IAES to far more flexible and is not based upon the idea of minimum-consumption- or minimum-saving-quotas. On the other hand, marginal income shares are not fixed parameters. The IAES allows the derivation of a systematic savings- and consumption-function and supplies consistent income elasticities. But it will be shown that consistent demand systems are only restrictively able to consider all major determinants of the decision-problem consumption or saving. The derived system does not only neglect the effects of wealth on consumption and savings but also the results of real income fluctuations due to the business cycle. Also phenomena like unemployment and uncertainties regarding estimates of the future or inflation are neglected. With the help of an adjustment-procedure a part of these disadvantages has been eliminated. The adjustment with regard to the entire private consumption and savings supplied income elasticities which lead to an almost constant consumption- and savings-share in the period under investigation.     

Inter-industry wage differentials and strategic trade policy

Recent studies suggest that inter-industry wage differentials exist which are neither caused by different endownments of the workers with human capital, nor by different working conditions, nor by institutional rigidities. Higher employment in high-wage sectors due to exports, therefore, raises welfare. According to empirical evidence presented here more likely than not net exports from sectors paying wage premia lead to some extra gains from trade (that cannot be explained by trade policy promoting primary sectors by high amounts of subsidies per employee) for the German economy. A case is made, however, against strategic trade policy in favour of these sectors pointing to uncertainty about the amount of the differentials, their international (dis)similarity, and their sources.

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Zusammenfassung Empirische Untersuchungen deuten darauf hin, daß auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Arbeitskräfte mit gleicher Humankapitalausstattung, die unter gleichen Arbeitsbedingungen in Unternehmen gleicher Größe in einer Region arbeiten, unterschiedlich entlohnt werden, wenn sie in unterschiedlichen Sektoren arbeiten. Bestehen solche Sektorlohndifferentiale, dann hat eine Ausweitung der Beschäftigung in Hochlohnsektoren positive Wohlfahrtseffekte. Es wird daher vielfach gefordert, diese primären Sektoren vor internationaler Konkurrenz zu schützen und sie durch Subventionen zu fördern. Die vorliegende Arbeit präsentiert empirische Evidenz dafür, daß die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Extra-Gewinne aus dem Außenhandel bezieht, weil zwischen der Netto-Exportquote und der Höhe des Sektorlohndifferentials ein positiver Zusammenhang besteht, ohne daß sich die Subventionspolitik an diesen Differentialen orientiert. Gegen eine gezielte Förderung der Hochlohnsektoren im Rahmen einer strategischen Handelspolitik werden dann drei Argumente vorgebracht, die mit Unsicherheiten über Höhe, internationale Ähnlichkeit und Ursachen der Differentiale zusammenhängen.

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Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the international economists' group of the Verein für Socialpolitik at Hohenheim University in May 1991, at the Sixth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Cambridge in September 1991, and at the Universities of Hamburg and Bielefeld. I would like to thank participants at the discussions and four anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Risk Aversion, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change

The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic welfare function in which one parameter measures relative risk-aversion and a distinct parameter measures resistance to intertemporal substitution.We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy responds differently to variations in the two parameters. In particular, we show that higher but lower leads to increase emissions control. We also argue that climate-economy models based on intertemporal expected utility maximization, i.e. models where = , may misinterpret the sensitivity of the climate policy to risk-aversion.     

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

The word coordination has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are emergent). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are spontaneous).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof coordination and spontaneous order. The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.     

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy

In practice one rarely observes pure forms of dictatorship that lack a council, or pure forms of parliament that lack an executive. Generally government policies emerge from organizations that combine an executive branch of government, the king, with a cabinet or parliamentary branch, the council. This paper provides an explanation for this regularity, and also provides an evolutionary model of the emergence of democracy that does not require a revolution. The analysis demonstrates that the bipolar king and council constitutional template has a number of properties that gives it great practical efficiency as a method of information processing and as a very flexible institutional arrangement for making collective decisions.     

Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Summary. We present a new class of rules named augmented serial rules for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) anonymous augmented serial rules by anonymity, and (ii) Moulins serial rule by individual rationality.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 9 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.This paper is a substantial revision of Serial cost sharing with simple games. I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, an associate editor, and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program Microstructure and Mechanism Design in Financial Markets).     

Is Technological Progress Pareto-Improving for a World with Global Public Goods?

This paper investigates the welfare effects of unilateral or multilateral technological progress in a world with global public goods. We focus on the consumption relation between the private and the public good, and then show that technological progress may beself-centered (benefit oneself but harm others), self-sacrificing (harm oneself but benefit others), or self-defeating (harm all) if two goods are substitutable. In addition, any type of technological progress improves every countrys welfare if the private and the public good are close complements.     

Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions

We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a safe haven) that provides agentspecific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter the auction receive independently-drawn private signals that provide unbiased estimates of the common value. The auctioned item is allocated to the high bidder at a price that is equal to the high bid. Thus the market is a first-price sealed-bid common value auction with endogenous determination of market size.     

Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority

The usefulness of the public-choice approach for a better understanding of international organizations can be demonstrated by applying it to the analysis of the structure and functions of a new international organization, the International Sea-Bed Authority, established in 1994, after two decades of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim to control the oceans' mineral resources beyond the limits of national jurisdictions (which have been proclaimed by the U.N. Assembly common heritage of mankind). First, the reasons for establishing this organization, whose basis is the common heritage of mankind nature of ocean resources, are examined under two aspects: 1) definition and protection of property rights; 2) environmental control of sea-bed mining activities. Secondly, the organization's decisionmaking system is presented, including such features as the assembly, council with chamber voting, finance committee with decision by consensus, features that balance the voting power of members and protect those countries that bear the financial responsibility for the budget. Finally, some comments are offered about more general aspects of the theory of international organizations: the bureaucracy (and diplomacy) of these organizations as well as the interdependence among international organizations, which opens the way to forms of international logrolling and makes it advisable for countries not to exit from these organizations, even when they have no primary interest in them.     

Technological paradigms,patterns of learning and development: An introductory roadmap

This paper presents an evolutionary microeconomic theory of innovation and production and discusses its implications for development theory. Using the notions of technological paradigm and trajectory, it develops an alternative view of firm behavior and learning. It is shown then how these are embedded in broader national systems of innovation which account for persistent differences in technological cappacities between countries. Finally, this bottom-up evolutionary analysis is linked with an institutional top-down approach, and the potential fruitfulness of this dialogue is demonstrated.We thank the discussants and participants at the workshop on Technology and Competitiveness in Developing Countries, Venice, 26/11/93, for their useful comments.The research leading to this work has benefited at various stages from the support of the Italian National Research Council (CNR, Progetto Strategico Combiamento Technologico e Crescita Economica) and of the International Institute of Applied System Analysis (IIASA, Austria).     

Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy

Hayek's view of democracy as a process of forming opinion is taken as a starting point for inquiring into issues largely neglected by Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. In an Austrian perspective, fallible individual knowledge, political entrepreneurs and dissenting minorities attain a distinctive role in the process of political competition. Based on the observation that political opinions consist of preferences and theories, the concept of opinion falsification is introduced. It is a spontaneous result of social interaction creating preference falsification - the disguise of true feelings, but also knowledge falsification – the discovery of false beliefs. Democratic constitutions can limit the scope of preference falsification and increase the potential for knowledge falsification, thus supporting Hayek's view that it is in its dynamic, rather than its static, aspects, that the value of democracy proves itself.     

The “Dorfman Steiner” rule

Conclusion When this research was started, it was guessed that the Dorfman-Steiner rule would lose its relevance in an intertemporal setting. This belief has turned out to be false: along the optimal paths ofp (t) ands (t), and must be equal. The only difference with the Dorfman-Steiner result is that they will be different from unity.The author is chargé de cours at the Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons (Belgium). He has greatyl benefited from comments by M. Beuthe and J. J. Lambin.