The interaction of investment and financing decisions under moral hazard

This paper examines how debt-induced risk shifting arising in the labor choice contributes to the interaction between investment and financing decisions. Due to equity's limited liability, increased use of debt leads to labor over-utilization compared with all-equity financing. In turn, increasing leverage to finance investment has no effect on the cost but, via labor, influences the expected benefit of marginal investment by affecting the size of shareholders' claim while reducing its likelihood. If the equity claim is reduced, investment and debt are inversely related; otherwise they could be positively related. The linkage between debt and investment exists because both are chosen anticipating the subsequent optimal labor choice, all three decisions are made before price uncertainty is resolved, and equity flotation costs exist.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

Corporate financial soundness and its impact on firm performance: implications for corporate debt restructuring in Slovenia

This article studies the extent of corporate leverage and range of excessive debt of Slovenian firms during the recent financial crisis. Half of all firms (of those with some non-zero debt and at least one employee) are found to face an unsustainable debt-to-EBITDA leverage ratio beyond 4, accounting for almost 80% of total outstanding debt. Moreover, a good quarter of all firms experience debt-to-EBITDA ratios exceeding 10 and hold almost half of total aggregate net debt. We then examine how this financial distress affects firm performance in terms of productivity, employment, exports, investment and survival. We find that, while less important during the good times (pre-recession period), lack of firms’ financial soundness during the period of financial distress becomes a critical factor constraining firm performance. The extent of financial leverage and ability to service the outstanding debt are shown to inhibit firms’ productivity growth as well as the dynamics of exports, employment and investment. Micro and small firms are found to suffer relatively more than larger firms from high leverage in terms of export and employment performance during the recession period.     

Government efficiency,institutions, and the effects of fiscal consolidation on public debt

We study the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981–2008. Our main focus is on debt dynamics during 40 consolidation periods. To define these periods we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, and as such avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. The paper brings new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of fiscal consolidation. First, we confirm that consolidation programs imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio when they rely mainly on spending cuts, except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, however, only contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we find that a given consolidation program will be more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. Third, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. As to other institutions, consolidation policies are more successful when they are accompanied by product market deregulation, and when they are adopted by left-wing governments. By contrast, simultaneous labor market deregulation may be counterproductive during consolidation periods.     

The impact of convertible debt financing on investment timing

We develop a model to examine the timing of investment decisions in relation to the issuance of convertible debt by firms. Our model shows that when the demand shock has higher volatility, the firm finances the investment cost with high-coupon convertible debt. We find that default occurs earlier for firms that finance with convertible debt rather than with straight debt. We also find that firms with high-growth prospection, high volatility, and low capital costs that issue convertible debt tend to defer investments. Furthermore, we examine the investment decisions in which the convertible debt includes a call provision. We show that firms that use callable convertible debt invest earlier than those that use non-callable convertible debt by using suboptimal coupon payments. The opportunity from the forced conversion increases as the volatility increases. These results are consistent with recent empirical evidence.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

PUBLIC DEBT AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL WITH REAL WAGE RIGIDITIES

We present an endogenous growth model with public capital, public debt and real wage rigidities due to labor market imperfections. Assuming that the primary surplus relative to gross domestic produce (GDP) is a positive function of the debt to GDP ratio, we study growth and employment effects of deficit‐financed public investment using simulations as well as how fiscal policy affects stability of the economy. Further, we contrast the growth rate and the unemployment rate in the deficit scenario with that of the balanced budget scenario. Finally, we compare our results with those obtained in case of flexible wages and full employment.     

The impact of debt restructuring on firm investment: Evidence from China

This paper empirically investigates the causal effects of debt restructuring on firm investment using the propensity matching score with difference-in-difference (PSM-DID) method based on the panel data of listed companies in China from 2005 to 2016. The results show that the impact of debt restructuring on firm investment are heterogeneous among different property rights, industry natures, restructuring payment modes and amounts, and debt renegotiation characteristics. Our analyses indicate that debt restructuring has a more significant impact on promoting investment efficiency for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), firms in industries with excess capacity, and debt-restructuring firms that pay off debts with assets. Debt restructuring significantly aggravates overinvestment when the amount of debt restructuring is large. When shareholder bargaining power is higher than that of debtholders in the debt renegotiation, debt restructuring has a significant inhibitory effect on underinvestment. Smaller debt renegotiation frictions exacerbate underinvestment and help mitigate overinvestment. This paper provides a new perspective for understanding the rationality of debt restructuring and has implications for policymakers and corporate decision makers aiming to improve debt governance and investment efficiency.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

What can Islamic financing tell us about macro-prudential policies?

Macro-prudential policies are theoretically effective at mitigating a debt deflation crisis by forcing individuals to internalize their impact on aggregate prices reducing systemic risk caused by pecuniary externalities. To better understand the potential effectiveness of a macro-prudential time varying tax/subsidy on debt/dividends, we empirically estimate the impact of an Islamic financing presence on financial crises. Adherence to Islamic financing principles for a nontrivial portion of a country’s population has similar impacts to a macro-prudential policy in that these limited asset holders are likely to hold less debt or use debt-like instruments rather than conventional debt, driving down their marginal rate of substitution and the price of equity in equilibrium. To empirically estimate the effects of this policy, we interact an Islamic financing variable with debt in an otherwise standard model of financial crises. The results show that this macro-prudential-like policy decreases the likelihood of a banking crisis by 50%. The contribution of the article is twofold. First, we show that an Islamic finance presence encourages precautionary savings like a macro-prudential policy. Second, using an Islamic finance presence to capture macro-prudential potential effects, we find empirically that the likelihood of banking crises are cut roughly by half when such policies are in effect.     

Land collateral and labor market dynamics in France

The value of land in the balance sheet of French firms correlates positively with their hiring and investment flows. To explore the relationship between these variables, we develop a macroeconomic model with firms that are subject to both credit and labor market frictions. The value of collateral is driven by the forward-looking dynamics of the land price, which reacts endogenously to fundamental and non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. We calibrate the model to French data and find that land price shocks give rise to significant amplification and hump-shaped responses of investment, vacancies and unemployment that are in line with the data. We show that both the endogenous movements in the firms׳ discount factor and the sluggish response of the land price are key elements that drive the results.     

产能治理与企业债务结构再平衡—基于商业信用与银行信贷关系视角

我国上市制造业企业的商业信用与银行信贷关系存在长期互补特征,但信号理论对互补强度的演变过程缺乏有效的解释力.为探索信号理论之外的互补机制,反思企业债务结构的信贷偏移效应,文章提出了产能驱动假说,利用面板门限模型,得到了以下结论:(1)商业信用与银行信贷会随产能增长而呈现从"替代"到"互补"的演变特征,且互补强度(单位商业信用上升伴随的信贷上升)会随产能膨胀出现从"弱"到"强"的二次突变特征,即产能扭曲会使企业债务结构快速向银行信贷偏移,这为理解企业信贷依赖的形成路径提供了产能层面的微观解释.(2)企业债务结构再平衡能力具有异质性,高研发投资及低调整成本企业借助产能治理来修正信贷依赖的能力更强,因此降低调整成本、扶植企业创新应成为优化融资结构的重要政策路径.文章在信号理论之外提出了产能驱动假说,解释了我国企业债务结构扭曲的动态特征,并从技术创新与调整成本视角为推动企业实现债务结构再平衡提供了政策参考.     

不同来源金融资本对企业研发投入的影响研究

以中小板上市公司为样本,就不同来源金融资本对企业研发投入的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验。结果发现：①内源融资与企业研发投入正相关,高成长性企业表现尤为显著;②政府补助与企业研发投入正相关,资产负债率与企业研发投入负相关,且资产负债率负向调节政府补助与企业研发投入的正相关关系。企业应适度控制债权融资水平,提高企业研发投入动机,并有效发挥政府补助对研发投入的积极作用;③风险投资、外商直接投资与机构投资者对企业研发投入的影响不显著。     

Fiscal position and the financing of productive government expenditures: an application to Latin America

Government spending on public infrastructure, education, and health care can increase economic growth. However, the appropriate financing depends on a country’s fiscal position. We develop a two-sector endogenous growth model to explore how variations in the composition and financing of government expenditures affect economic growth. We find that, when tax rates are moderate, funding public investment by raising taxes may increase long-run growth. If existing tax rates are high, public investment is only growth enhancing if funded by restructuring the composition of overall public spending. Additionally, public investment that is debt financed can have adverse effects on long-run growth due to the resulting increases in interest rates and debt-servicing costs.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

Public investment,national debt,and economic growth: The role of debt finance under dynamic inefficiency

Public investment is a central issue in the dynamic analyses of fiscal policy and economic growth. Debt financing for public investment and its effects have recently received great attention because interest rates have been low, almost invariably remaining below economic growth rates. This paper presents examination of the effects of debt-financed public investment subject to a simple fiscal rule in an overlapping generations model with public capital. This topic includes capital budgeting and the debt–deficit criterion of the Maastricht treaty. We show herein that debt financing for public investment enhances economic growth if an economy is dynamically inefficient and if public capital has a sufficiently large productivity effect. Moreover, it reduces economic growth rates in a dynamically efficient economy. Debt and growth can have a monotonic or non-monotonic relation, depending on the steady-state interest rate, growth rate, and productivity effect of public investment. The findings indicate that debt–growth relations match with controversial empirical evidence. Furthermore, existing generations choose perfect debt finance if dynamic inefficiency exists. In contrast, a balanced budget is preferred in a dynamically efficient economy with low productivity effects of public capital. However, an economy with high productivity effects of public capital might cho ose debt financing. This paper contributes to the elucidation of currently emphasized issues of public investment.     

Assessing fiscal episodes

In an OCDE panel, for the period 1970–2010, we assess the effects of fiscal consolidation episodes, with four different definitions. Our results reveal that lower final government consumption increases private consumption in three out of the four approaches, when a fiscal consolidation occurs, and the debt ratio is above the cross-country average. The magnitude of these coefficients is higher for countries with lower debt levels, implying more successful consolidations associated with reduced crowding-out effects. There is some evidence of non-Keynesian effects for both private consumption and private investment, and the effects of social transfers on private investment tend to be negative, both in the short and long run. In a financial crisis, such effects are also more prone to happen. Finally, raising long-term interest rates reduces per capita private investment.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

我国政府性债务与金融体系安全的阈值效应--基于2001-2012年数据的实证研究

我国政府性债务无序扩张对金融体系安全产生何种影响是研究的热点问题。文章构建了包括宏观经济内部安全、宏观经济外部安全、金融市场运行安全3个模块,共计15个指标的金融体系安全指数,并引用2001-2012年的数据进行测度,进而采用数据模拟的方法建立政府性债务和金融体系安全指数的非线性模型。结果发现,我国政府性债务与金融体系安全之间存在阈值效应,时间节点在2010年,阈值为64.6960万亿元,自此以后,金融体系安全指数随政府性债务规模扩大呈现超线性上升趋势,我国政府性债务已经成为威胁金融体系安全的重大隐患,亟需建立有效的约束框架维护金融体系安全。     

High growth and low consumption in East Asia: How to improve welfare while avoiding financial failures

This paper analyzes certain policies that are typical of a number of rapidly growing East Asian countries in which a fixed exchange rate, combined with a surplus labor market, has made domestic assets relatively inexpensive, generating high rates of FDI as well as domestic capital formation. This “investment hunger” can lead to unanticipated declines in the returns to investment, and resulting financial insolvencies. Private consumption remains low and there are concerns that high savings rates cannot be sustained.We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model and apply it to a stylized Asian economy, loosely based upon China. We calibrate a benchmark equilibrium, and carry out various counterfactual simulations to analyze alternative policies, in particular tax cuts and exchange rate revaluations, as instruments in increasing private consumption while avoiding bank failures.