战略行为视角的战略风险形成机理探析

战略的核心是建立企业与环境的匹配关系,而企业与环境的匹配不会自动产生,它是战略行为的结果,是一种主动或被动选择的结果.本文指出企业与环境之间的匹配是一种欲达到的结果状态或目标状态,而导致结果能否出现,主要受战略行为的影响,包括战略的主动行为、被动行为或不作为.战略风险的形成是由于战略行为未能有效保持企业与环境的匹配而使战略目标偏离于预期.战略行为受外部环境和内部条件的影响,未能将战略、资源、能力与环境的匹配失衡降低在组织承受的范围内,使战略目标偏离于预期,影响战略目标的实现,是战略风险形成的内在机理.战略行为包括战略决策行为和战略实施行为,本文重点分析了战略决策行为和战略实施行为中战略决策风险和战略实施风险形成的内在成因.     

企业战略风险影响因素的综合分析框架——基于战略行为视角

企业战略风险问题已成为管理者和学术研究者们的关注焦点之一.基于战略行为展开的分析为战略风险研究提供了一个新的视角.本文首先以整合的观点分析战略行为的基础;其次基于行为要素的分解,构建战略风险影响因素的综合分析框架,从行为主体、行为内容、环境、组织、行为过程特征共计5个维度讨论了可能的战略风险来源及其影响机制.分析表明,行为主体及其认知过程、环境不确定性、组织因素、行为内容特征、决策过程特征以及执行过程特征等因素共同构成可能的风险来源,且因素之问存在的交互影响增加了行为的不确定性及风险的复杂性;最后针对该框架展开了进一步研究设想.     

Herding with collective preferences

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

Asset pricing and institutional investors with disagreements

We develop a dynamic asset pricing model with two institutional investors who have benchmark incentives and who disagree about the underlying economy. We derive semi-closed form expressions for all equilibrium quantities. We find that the benchmark stock price increases and the non-benchmark stock price decreases with the benchmark incentives. Furthermore, each stock price decreases with its own disagreement and increases with the other stock disagreement. We also show that there is a positive relationship between the co-movement of the stocks and the benchmark incentives, but that this co-movement is negative with the disagreements, owing to the endogenous risk-sharing mechanisms. Moreover, we find that, when one stock disagreement increases, the optimistic institutional investor always takes positions on this stock by shorting the other stock and the bond in order to hedge against the risk of market changes, in line with the pessimistic investor's beliefs.     

Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios

We look at two countries that have independent fundamentals, but share the same group of investors. Each country might face a self-fulfilling crisis: Agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will. A crisis in one country reduces agents’ wealth. This makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country, increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments. Consequently, the probability of a crisis there increases. This generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries. Since diversification affects returns in our model, its welfare implications are non-trivial.     

Non-Laplacian beliefs in a global game with noisy signaling

In standard global games, individual behavior is optimal if it constitutes a best response to agnostic—Laplacian—beliefs about the aggregate behavior of other agents. This paper considers a standard binary action global game augmented with noisy signaling by an informed policy-maker and shows that in this game, equilibrium beliefs depart in quite stark ways from the Laplacian benchmark. In the limit as signals become arbitrarily precise, so that all fundamental uncertainty is removed (leaving only strategic uncertainty), the equilibrium beliefs of the marginal individual concerning the aggregate action collapse to a discrete Bernoulli distribution, giving probability mass only to the polar extreme outcomes. By contrast in the underlying standard global game the marginal individual believes the aggregate action has a continuous uniform distribution, giving equal likelihood to all possible outcomes.     

Monitored by your friends,not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.     

企业战略激进度、管理者变更与技术距离

把握战略激进度是企业绩效提升的关键，以往研究未关注战略激进度对企业技术距离的影响。以中国A股制造业上市公司数据为样本，使用系统GMM检验企业战略激进度与技术距离间的关系，以及管理者变更的调节作用。结果发现：企业战略激进度与技术距离之间存在U型关系，即分析型战略有助于技术距离缩小，但进攻型和防御型战略不利于缩小技术距离。在管理者变更频率较高的企业中，战略激进度与技术距离间的U型关系更显著。进一步研究表明，战略激进度与技术距离间的U型关系在竞争程度相对较低的行业中表现更显著。相比于职业经理人，由控股股东继任董事长或总经理，以及在较少继任者两职兼任的情景下，管理者变更的调节作用更显著。     

Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia

The observation that only one out of 14 tons of sulphur compounds immissions in Austria originates from Austrian sources highlights the contribution of transboundary pollution (predominantly from Eastern Europe). Therefore, further abatement in Austria has only a marginal impact but is very costly given the already high Austrian abatement standards. Thus, scientists and politicians conclude that it is in the rich countries' (e.g., Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries) own interest to support environmental protection in the former centrally planned economies that are apparently less concerned about environmental harms and risks. However, the proposed policies lead to a crowding out of the recipient country's own abatement investments. In order to mitigate such strategic behaviour, which is possible due to asymmetric information, we apply the principal-agent theory to derive optimal incentives. These incentives are in stark contrast to actual policy proposals, in particular, no subsidy should be paid if the neighbouring and polluting country does not care sufficiently about environment. Indeed, the empirical application shows that only sufficient environmental concern in Czechoslovakia warrants subsidies from Austria.We acknowledge discussions with Markus Amann and Gary Brennand and in particular, the very constructive comments from three anonymous referees.     

国有银行引进外国战略投资者成效分析

国有银行引进外资作为战略投资者的原因包括:对股份制银行引进外国战略投资者做法的借鉴;在国家控股条件下试图完善银行公司治理和提高绩效的一次新尝试;银行监管部门的大力提倡。财务投资者冒充战略投资者入股国有银行、中外资战略合作没有达到一定深度和国际金融机构陷入财务危机,则是禁售期后战略投资者选择抛售离开的原因。本文认为,外国战略投资者的引进对实现国有银行在境外成功上市起到了积极作用,但改善银行公司治理、引进先进管理经验和技术的初衷并未达到。     

Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks

Strategic communication occurs in virtually all committee decision environments. Theory suggests that small differences in monetary incentives between committee members can leave deception a strategically optimal decision (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Galeotti et al., 2013). At the same time, in natural environments social incentives can also play an important role in determining the way people share or withhold truthful information. Unfortunately, little is known about how monetary and social incentives interact to determine truth-telling. We investigate this issue by first building a novel model and then testing its equilibrium predictions using laboratory data. In the absence of social identity, the model׳s predictions are supported: there is more truthful communication between those who share monetary incentives than those who do not. We find that the effect of identity is asymmetric: sharing the same identity does not promote truth-telling but holding different identities reduces truthfulness. Overall, as compared to environments lacking social identity, committees with both monetary and social incentives exhibit truthful communication substantially less frequently.     

跨界合作行为、外部创新搜寻对创新绩效的影响

平台经济兴起背景下,跨界合作行为是企业迎合时代发展、提高创新水平的重要竞争策略,但关于跨界合作行为与创新绩效间关系的实证研究还不多。整合开放式创新理论和战略管理理论,基于平台经济视角,引入外部创新搜寻作为中介变量,战略柔性作为调节变量,构建跨界合作行为与创新绩效之间的理论模型,并利用结构方程模型进行实证分析。结果表明：跨界合作行为对创新绩效具有显著正向影响;外部创新搜寻在跨界合作行为与创新绩效间具有中介作用;战略柔性在跨界合作行为与创新绩效、外部创新搜寻与创新绩效间均有显著调节作用。     

战略价值的四维透视

战略价值是指战略理论、战略知识、战略思维的存在、属性对于战略学习者和实践者的意义。正确把握世界和中国的发展趋势、增强分析复杂形势的战略思维能力,是领导者与管理者的必修课。登高则可望远,望远而致思深。优秀的战略家不一定是卓越的领导者,但卓越的领导者必须是优秀的战略家。而对于战略价值何在、为何研究战略、为何学习战略知识等问题,却大都莫衷一是。要知道,明确学习意义与目的是学习任何知识的前提,明确战略价值是领导者与管理者学习战略、运用战略的基石。沿用"价值是指客体的存在、属性对于主体的意义"的分析理路,以个体、政党、国家、人类为主体,战略的价值可以概述为:求知明智、获取权力、完善政策、引导历史。     

A simple explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle

We study a simple moral hazard model in which two risk-neutral owners establish incentives for their risk-averse managers to exert effort. Because the probability distributions over output realizations depend on a common aggregate shock, optimal contracts make the compensation of each manager contingent on own performance but also on a performance benchmark—the performance of the other firm. If the marginal return of effort depends on the aggregate state, optimal contracts are not monotonically decreasing in the performance benchmark. This provides a simple explanation of the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) Puzzle—the documented lack of a negative relationship between CEO compensation and comparative performance measures, such as industry or market performance. Our simple model can also explain one-sided RPE—the documented tendency to insulate a CEO's rewards from bad luck, but not from good luck. We clarify that our results are robust in several dimensions and we discuss other applications of our findings.     

人力资本对企业绩效的影响研究——薪酬的中介作用

本研究基于资源基础理论，对企业人力资本进行定量测度的基础上，分析了2615家上市公司在2014年至2017年期间薪酬管理模式在人力资本对企业绩效影响过程中发挥的作用，并使用结构方程模型和多群组分析法对假设进行检验。研究结果表明，薪酬管理在人力资本与企业绩效之间起完全中介效应。高人力资本、高薪酬激励的企业的绩效要高于低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业的绩效；本研究还发现当企业具有高人力资本和低薪酬激励时，企业绩效甚至会低于具有低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业绩效。本研究突破传统薪酬管理的质性研究方法，为打开战略人力资源管理领域的“黑箱”提供了一个新的视角。     

“创新”抑或“关系”？儒家文化视角下社会资本与企业战略研究

在经济社会转型期复杂的外部环境下,中国民营企业如何在激烈的市场竞争中调整经营战略、谋求长期发展,并创造出举世瞩目的经济成就？基于儒家文化视角考察了社会资本对民营企业战略的影响。以7轮私营企业调查（CPES）为研究样本,发现社会资本降低了企业的资源约束,但也“绑架”企业持续进行关系投入,同时促进了民营企业的创新战略和关系战略。儒家文化则规制了这种作用,在一定程度增强了企业的创新战略并削弱了关系战略。进一步研究发现,竞争激烈的环境更容易激发企业的战略变革,但外来文化冲击导致的文化冲突削弱了儒家文化的影响。机制检验发现,社会资本通过缓解融资约束,从而支持了民营企业的战略投入。以上结果经过工具变量回归及一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。上述发现拓展了非正式制度下企业行为的研究,为解释中国情境下民营企业的战略行为提供了经验证据。     

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

战略变革导向的企业战略学习机制研究

基于对系统定义及特征的分析,提出一般系统作用机制模型,然后从战略变革导向的企业战略学习机制的系统本质入手,结合一般系统作用机制模型,从企业战略学习系统环境、企业战略学习系统组成要素和企业战略学习系统愿景3个方面,全面剖析战略变革导向的企业战略学习机制,最后提出战略变革导向的企业战略学习机制模型。     

专利动机演化对商业化决策模式的影响

从“商业化背离”现象入手,通过对人性假设与专利价值之间的关系分析,研究了专利动机保护动机、经济动机与战略动机的内容、类型与特点,并结合“契约人”假设,解释专利动机的形成机理。之后,通过对专利动机演化过程的剖析,指出了战略动机对专利行为的影响,提出了不同专利动机驱动的专利决策模式。研究发现：战略价值已经成为衡量专利价值的重要标准,对战略价值的追求也已成为一些企业实施专利战略的主要目标,战略专利对企业构建基于专利垄断性的竞争优势起着关键作用。