企业审计过程中的博弈分析

本文详细分析了在企业审计过程中利益相关方之间的博弈问题,指出在审计过程中,主要存在投资人与经营管理者之间的博弈,投资人、经营管理者和审计师之间的博弈,大股东、小股东和审计师之间的博弈,试图对上述博弈问题进行全面分析,为将来制定更加合理的审计制度提供一定参考。     

BT模式融资方式对投资人财务结构的影响分析

本文以BT模式融资方式对投资人财务结构的影响为中心,对比国内外BT项目融资方式,结合我国BT融资模式的发展,从BT模式的投资人关键作用以及选取的融资方式进行描述,选择了资产负债率、带息负债余额、带息负债比率、净资产收益率四个主要财务指标对不同融资方式的影响进行对比分析,阐述了BT项目中投资人应基于财务结构和财务指标来合理采取融资方式,优化财务结构、防范债务风险。     

公开市场中的政府投资项目代建采购博弈

我国政府投资项目代建人招标采购是一个公开市场的多方博弈过程,包括政府投资人与项目管理投标人的博弈,以及多个项目管理投标人之间的博弈.本文对以上两类博弈过程进行分析,并得出了各博弈人的最优策略.     

基于博弈论的我国中小企业技术创新模式研究

利用完全信息静态博弈的理论,分别从中小企业与大企业之间的博弈、中小企业之间的博弈、中小企业与政府之间的博弈三个方面对我国中小企业的技术创新模式进行分析．深入探讨了中小企业在不同情况下采取不同的技术创新模式的收益,从而提出针对我国中小企业进行技术创新的一些建议。     

考虑中小企业收益的存货质押融资风险控制北大核心CSSCI

存货质押融资是指融资企业(借款企业)将其所拥有的存货交给银行(贷款企业)指定的物流企业(第三方)保管,然后向银行申请贷款,获得融资的一种新型商业模式。由于信息不对称,中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险客观存在,银行、物流企业、中小企业之间的决策行为存在着多方博弈。在贷款利率市场化条件下,综合考虑中小企业的投资收益率和项目成功率、银行的贷款利率和质押率,以及声誉价值等因素,针对中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险,分别建立银行与中小企业的不完全信息静态博弈和有限理性下的演化博弈模型并求解,结果表明:银行通过设置适当的贷款利率和质押率,可以有效控制中小借款企业的融资风险,促使其投资风险更小和收益更合理的项目,以实现满意的借款履约率;而减少核查成本、加大违约处罚,并且采取声誉价值与诚实奖励相结合的双重激励机制,可以有效防范中小企业道德风险,促使其采取诚实经营策略。     

上市公司股权融资偏好的演化博弈研究

通过运用博弈理论,构建博弈模型来解释企业融资过程中博弈双方的内在关系,研究结果表明:企业的融资能力是企业发展的重要因素,是企业成长性的具体体现;而股权融资与债权融资的进化稳定均衡策略的形成,不但取决于企业自身的因素,而且依赖于其外部政策环境的支持、证券市场条件以及证券定价策略的选择。一方面,企业要根据项目的风险与收益的不同因素,在股权融资与债权融资略中做出正确的选择,使企业的融资效用最大化;另一方面,政府应该建立企业融资的支持机制,在调节股权融资与债权融资的比例方面通过采取宏观政策的措施进行调控,从而使资本市场融资结构合理化,更好的发挥资本市场的融资功能。     

面向小微企业的P2P网络融资风险识别与防范研究

互联网金融的出现,为小微企业提供了一条新的融资渠道。互联网金融模式中,P2P融资模式的市场占有率最高,但存在的风险也较大。通过对小微企业借助P2P平台融资的现状进行分析,并对其融资过程中存在的信用、流动性、技术和法律风险进行识别。从政府、P2P平台、借款人以及投资人角度提出相应的风险防范策略,从而为投资人进行科学的投资决策、众筹平台进行有效的运营以及国家对P2P融资业务进行有效监管提供参考。     

中小企业融资难的银企博弈分析

目前,我国中小企业在融资过程中的主要困扰因素是：受规避风险和注重利益传承的影响,家族性与股权融资之间具有矛盾;银企之间缺乏信任,中小企业通过银行间接融资的门槛太高,银行惧怕融资风险,产生“惜贷”现象等。这种现状严重制约着中小企业的发展。通过构建博弈模型,在完全信息与不完全信息两种情况下对银行和企业的博弈进行了贝叶斯纳什均衡的重点分析,博弈结果表明：信息不对称是中小企业融资难的主要原因。要走出融资难的困境,中小企业应完善公司治理模式,改变“家族式”管理方式;政府应充分发挥宏观调控手段,扩宽中小企业融资渠道,健全中小企业担保体系。同时,建立并发展中小企业与银行之间契约关系也是解决中小企业融资难的有效途径。     

知识产权互联网质押融资机制的博弈分析

针对知识产权互联网质押融资风险大的特点,从分析知识产权质押融资存在的固有风险出发,在系统分析国内外典型知识产权质押融资模式的基础上,建立了基于博弈论的知识产权互联网融资中科技型中小企业与投资人的博弈模型,分析了在科技型中小企业知识产权互联网质押融资中政府、担保机构与互联网融资平台等的作用,为实现知识产权互联网融资平台的良性运营提供科学方法指导。     

PPP项目基金中融资方行为的进化博弈分析

尽管政府与民间资本合作的PPP项目基金在我国公共项目建设中得到大力推广与采纳,但由于政府资本对安全性的高要求,加之基建项目自身固有的长期性、规模性等特点,带来PPP项目基金融资风险和运作的特殊性。鉴于此,将基金进行结构化设计,政府资本作为优先级LP,民间资本作为劣后级LP,并分别构建双方完全理性假设条件下的传统博弈和有限理性假设条件下的进化博弈,通过分析得出,在有限理性条件下,更符合政府和民间资本的博弈现状;在PPP项目基金中,政府虽然作为优先级LP,但其对此基金有更高的筹建需求,同时更多的追求社会效益,促使其去承担比劣后级LP更高的风险来吸引民间资本参与,以促成项目基金的高效融资。     

Concentrating Too Hard? Foreign and Corporate Venture Capital Involvement in Syndicates

We investigate the relationship between investment of corporate venture capital (CVC) and foreign venture capital (FVC), and the concentration of investors involved in a financing round. As forms of venture capital distinct from independent venture capital, CVC and FVC can offer different value to new ventures. However, having FVC or CVC investors in the syndicate can also pose additional risks to other investors. We find that a corporate venture capital or a foreign venture capital affiliation is related to lower concentration of investors. Our results suggest that the investors evaluate not only the venture but also their syndicate partners in determining their relative share of round investment.     

对风险投资中委托代理问题的研究

风险投资的成功与否 ,很大程度上取决于风险资金投资者—风险投资家—风险企业家之间的委托代理关系链的正常运行。从分析美国成功的风险投资运作机制中揭示出风险投资各主体之间有效的激励与约束关系 ,指出风险投资机构是整个投资的中心环节。     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

The role of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies

This paper studies how the presence of cross-border as opposed to domestic venture capital investors is associated with the growth of portfolio companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal research design and track sales, total assets and payroll expenses in 761 European technology companies from the year of initial venture capital investment up to seven years thereafter. Findings demonstrate how companies initially backed by domestic venture capital investors exhibit higher growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. In the medium term, companies initially backed by cross-border venture capital investors exhibit higher growth compared to companies backed by domestic investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border venture capital investors exhibit the highest growth. Overall, this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the role that domestic and cross-border venture capital investors can play as their portfolio companies grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time.     

Risk management in Indian venture capital and private equity firms: A comparative study

Venture capitalists and private equity funds are often considered experts at investing in high‐risk projects and firms. To be successful investors, venture capitalists and private equity funds must therefore manage the many aspects of risk associated with investing in unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises. This study examines how Indian venture capital and private equity firms manage several dimensions of risk. We analyze risk management preferences in Indian venture capital and private equity firms. A comparison between Indian and U.K. funds is presented. The results are discussed in detail. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

风险投资最优融资契约安排模型研究

风险投资中投资者与风险投资家之间的关系是一种委托与代理关系,投资者和风险投资家的目的都是实现收益最大化。融资契约收益的分配直接影响到风险投资家的努力水平,从而影响到最终的投资收益。因此,只有从投资者和风险投资家两个角度分析风险投资中的最优契约安排,才能给出最优契约安排的选择区间。     

Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?

The market for informal venture capital is an elusive and nearly invisible source of financing for entrepreneurial ventures. This market consists of a diverse set of high net worth individuals (business angels) who invest a portion of their assets in high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial ventures. The emerging consensus of the characteristics of the individual investor is that of a well-educated,middle-aged individual with considerable business experience and a substantial net worth. These informal investors appear to prefer investing in the early start-up stage of the venture and, if given a choice, prefer that their investments be located close to home. One consequence of this consensus is the tendency to assume that the traits of these business angels are as tightly clustered around the norm as are the traits of venture capital funds. They are not. In terms of their competence in the many areas of venture investing, these Individual investors range from the successful, cashed-out entrepreneur on the one hand to individuals with little or no experience with venture investing on the other. At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of high net worth individuals who never ventured where angels dare to tread, or about these non-angels' propensity to join the fold. Thus, this study seeks to fill the void by examining the characteristics of high net worth individuals regardless of their investment history or their interest in venture investing.An analysis of the data reveals three groups of high net worth Individuals: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures, interested potential investors with no venture investment history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market, and uninterested potential investors who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part of their investment strategy. Business angels and potential investors (both the interested and non-interested segment) share similar views about the economic significance of the entrepreneur and the difficulty in securing the equity capital for development of the venture. As the issues move from the general to the specific, divergence in investment attitudes takes place among the two groups, but this divergence is in terms of magnitude or intensity, rather than in contrasting or opposing views of the process. The potential investor tends to view investing in entrepreneurial ventures on a smaller scale than the active investor, especially in terms of the dollar amount committed to any one investment. While the business angel is more interested than the potential investor across all stages of financing, the interest for both groups increases as the type of financing progresses from the seed stage to expansion financing. In contrast, the potential investor is more likely to seek diversification as a motivation for venture investing than their angel counterparts.The potential investor pool is segmented into those potential investors who appear willing to take on the role of business angels and those individuals who have no desire to participate in the venture market. For the interested group to increase their interest in providing venture capital, these potential investors want assistance in monitoring the performance of the venture investment, followed by assistance in pricing and structuring. Both of these resources relate more to the technical aspects of venture investing and Indicate that these are the areas where the potential investor is least likely to have expertise. Other resources, such as finding and evaluating the investment opportunity, appear to represent less of a stimulus for the potential investor. In many respects, interested potential investors act like business angels across several dimensions. Both consider the later stages of the development of the venture as the preferred stage to invest. The business angel and interested potential investor prefer investments to be located relatively close to their primary residence and share similar views on the amount of the investment portfolio to allocate to venture investing. Where the interested potential investor and business angel clearly differ is on the scale of the commitment and the motivation for investing. The potential investor will commit a smaller dollar amount to any one venture, is more inclined to participate with other investors, and is more apt to see venture investing as a diversification strategy than is the seasoned business angel.     

风险投资的内涵辨析及其实践意义

风险投资的内在运行机制是“合理预期高收益和合理控制高风险”。由此 ,风险投资的投资对象不是人们一般意义上所理解的“高成长的中小企业”、“高科技企业”或“风险企业” ;国内争论颇多的“创业投资”与“风险投资”并没有本质不同 ,此种译名之争 ,其实强调的是各自不同的侧面 ;为解决风险投资的退出机制 ,以过低的上市标准来设计、推出创业板是一个错误的选择。     

风险投资企业的声誉机制分析

风险投资家在整个风险投资运作体系中起着核心作用,投资者通过显性契约来激励约束风险投资家,然而创业投资的报酬分配机制并不是一种有效的激励机制,因为它未能使投资者的效用达到最大化,为了弥补报酬激励合同的不完备性,有必要通过起着隐性激励作用的声誉机制来发挥作用。     

风险投资对创业企业作用的实证研究

文章从风险投资对创业企业作用的机理分析出发,实证研究风险投资对创业企业创生和企业成长的作用。对企业创生作用的研究表明风险投资活动的发展和增长有助于地区新企业的创生,一方面风险投资为那些无法从传统渠道融资的创业企业提供资金支持,另一方面也刺激地区创新,促使新经济部门、新技术、新产品的出现,为创业者创业活动提供更多机遇。有关风险投资对创业企业成长作用的研究采用倾向得分匹配法,该方法有效剔除了风险投资家“选择作用”对研究结果造成的偏差。研究结果表明风险投资不但有助于企业规模的不断扩大,同时也有助于企业研发创新等各项成长能力的提升,有效促进了企业竞争优势,帮助企业做大做强。