应对金融危机，谨防遭遇反补贴——中国补贴现状分析

近年来反补贴措施已经成为我国贸易摩擦的一个新热点，通过对我国补贴及反补贴现状的分析，对解决国际金融危机形势下如何巧妙利用补贴政策扶持企业渡过难关同时又谨防陷入反补贴泥潭具有极大地指导意义。     

浅谈SCM协议中的专向性标准与应对

近年,贸易摩擦随中国对外贸易增长而涌现,当中不少正是利用补贴专向性的规定而向中国采取的新一轮的贸易保护措施。由此,本文基于对《补贴与反补贴协议》中专向性标准的理解,发掘我国反补贴制度中专向性标准的问题,并提出反补贴法律中的专向性标准的完善建议,以促进我国对外贸易的长远发展。     

新形势下美国对华反补贴原因、影响及对策

由于国际金融危机的影响,国际贸易保护主义出现了新的特征,我国对外贸易摩擦已从以往的微观企业层面向宏观政府层面扩展,反补贴问题已成为我国对外贸易摩擦的新热点。作为世界上最有影响力的发达国家——美国,其对华反补贴案件数量逐年增加。因此,分析美国对华反补贴的原因、影响并针对性地提出应对策略,具有一定的理论和现实意义。     

应对贸易摩擦多发的政府路径选择

入世后,随着我国产品出口竞争力的不断提高和对外贸易的强劲发展,国外针对我国产品的反倾销、反补贴、技术壁垒、知识产权、社会责任标准等贸易摩擦不断增加,制约了我国外贸的持续增长。入世后我国贸易摩擦多发的政府因素包括服务意识淡漠;服务功能缺位;政策行为不规范;政企互动不力等。为减少贸易摩擦,政府要调整中、长期发展战略;加强信息指导,建立高效预警、应对机制;加大WTO知识研究普及力度;加强政府对企业的宏观层面支持;政企配合利用谈判、游说手段解决贸易摩擦。     

反补贴中会计信息作用初探

随着国内反补贴形势越来越严峻，国内会计学术界也开始了对反补贴问题的探讨。本文结合《补贴与反补贴措施》以及我国入世承诺，从补贴理论和反补贴实务两个层面上阐述了会计在应对反补贴中的作用。     

论我国反补贴立法的完善

反补贴措施是世界贸易组织规则允许的维护公平贸易、保护国内产业安全的手段之一。我国相关部门在反补贴立法方面已按照世界贸易组织规则的要求取得长足的进步,但相对西方发达国家而言,我国的反补贴立法存在种种不足。作者参考了欧盟、美国的相关立法,并对照世界贸易组织的《补贴与反补贴措施协定》,对我国的反补贴条例在立法体例、确定补贴的标准等方面提出了修改意见,并建议我国的反补贴条例应增加公共利益及反规避措施的有关内容。     

简述国际贸易摩擦的产生与发展

中外贸易摩擦是中国经济发展中的一个重大问题。中外贸易摩擦不仅会导致中国对外贸易受到限制,同时它也反映中国与有关贸易对象国的贸易政策乃至经济发展模式存在冲突。当然在很多情况下一些国家是将反倾销、反补贴甚至技术法规作为贸易保护主义的工具来使用的。所以,解决贸易摩擦的过程即是中外双方就贸易政策、措施进行对话、交流、协调的过程。积极应对贸易摩擦有助于为中国积极贸易的发展创造一个良好的外部环境。     

广角透视WTO补贴措施

补贴政策固有的隐蔽性和复杂性,以及经济政策、财政政策、贸易政策固有的专业性及其与法律规范研究的隔离性和封闭性等多重因素造成补贴与反补贴制度比WTO的其它措施更加复杂和难于理解.不可否认,补贴与反补贴措施既是经济与贸易问题又是法律问题,因此,本文通过对补贴措施进行经济学和法学分析,结合政治经济学的观点以期能更加全面和深入地认识补贴措施问题.     

广角透视WTO补贴措施

补贴政策固有的隐蔽性和复杂性，以及经济政策、财政政策、贸易政策固有的专业性及其与法律规范研究的隔离性和封闭性等多重因素造成补贴与反补贴制度比WTO的其它措施更加复杂和难于理解。不可否认，补贴与反补贴措施既是经济与贸易问题又是法律问题，因此，本文通过对补贴措施进行经济学和法学分析，结合政治经济学的观点以期能更加全面和深入地认识补贴措施问题。     

出口补贴与反补贴对国民福利影响的经济分析

2008年,在全球性金融危机以后,各国政府为增加就业,先后颁布了很多新的出口刺激计划,补贴与反补贴有所增加。分析了补贴与反补贴对国民经济福利的影响,主要的结论是补贴措施与反补贴措施都会导致国民经济总福利的下降,也从集体行动的角度分析了导致福利水平下降的贸易政策为什么会在民主国家实施的问题。     

中国反补贴立法之不足与完善

反补贴、反倾销和保障措施是WTO允许的维护公平贸易、保护国内产业安全的手段。目前,中国在反倾销领域是遭受调查较多的国家。在不久的将来,中国也将面临大量的反补贴调查的形势。为此,我们应未雨绸缪,尽快建立较为完善的补贴和反补贴立法体系,及早做好应对准备。     

WAGE SUBSIDY AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper seeks to answer if wage subsidy to workers displaced due to trade reform raises welfare in a developing country. We use a general equilibrium model with non‐specific factor inputs and trade liberalization as a policy variable. A combination of wage subsidy and tariff rate obtains the second‐best welfare level. The theoretical result is new, policy‐relevant and important in view of political‐economy aspects of free trade in developing and transition countries.     

Optimal Countervailing Intervention

This paper examines the optimal countervailing measures in response to foreign subsidy. Two alternative objectives are considered: (1) to maintain the domestic producer price, or (2) to maintain the initial import level. Three different instruments are discussed: a tariff, a production subsidy, and a consumption tax. Their rankings in terms of welfare costs are established. One important finding is that, contrary to present convention, the optimal countervailing rate may have to exceed the foreign subsidy rate. [411]     

策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.     

Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization

Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many countries adopt restrictive trade practices. In this paper we investigate this puzzle in a stylized two-country two-good Ricardian model of international trade. Governments can offer protection to domestic industries via industrial subsidy policy in this model. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the two-player game where industries choose the level of specialization. We determine the necessary conditions for complete specialization in (a) the free-trade regime; and (b) the protectionist regime implemented through industrial subsidy policy. Our results show that if the government intends to promote complete specialization, then a high degree of comparative advantage and a large elasticity of substitution between export and import goods are required. Empirical evidence on these two parameters indicate that complete specialization is unlikely to survive in the protectionist regime.     

A Note on Optimal Industrial Policy Towards Bertrand Homogeneous Duopoly

Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies*

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman–Helpman politically‐determined export policy is identical to the rent‐shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically‐determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

R&D policy with layers of economic integration

This paper examines whether the optimal unilateral R&D policy for an open economy is a subsidy or a tax. It constructs a general equilibrium model with three successive layers of international integration: (a) trade in goods, (b) trade in technologies with international R&D spillovers and (c) internationally-coordinated R&D policy. Trade in technologies introduces the possibility that an R&D subsidy will have such strong, negative terms-of-trade effects that it harms domestic welfare. Numerical simulations of the OECD show this is a possibility for the US and Japan. With international R&D spillovers a domestic R&D subsidy may reduce domestic innovation.     

Optimal Trade Policy under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition*

In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re‐examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.