董事报酬与公司业绩关系的经验研究

本文选择了 1998年以前上市的 10个行业的 381家公司 1998年— 2 0 0 0年资料作为样本 ,对上市公司董事报酬与公司业绩关系进行经验研究。经验研究结果表明 :最有影响力的董事的持股比例与公司业绩之间存在正相关关系 ;所有董事的现金报酬与公司经营业绩之间存在正相关关系 ;最有影响力的董事是否在公司领薪对经营业绩有显著影响 ,若不在公司领薪则公司业绩下降 ,反之 ,则上升 ;而一般董事不在上市公司领取现金报酬 ,则对经营业绩有正面影响。     

经理人报酬与公司业绩之间的相关性检验

以我国上市公司2000、2001、2002年年报数据为主要分析对象,运用线性回归的方法对经理人报酬与公司资本成本及公司业绩之间的相关性进行实证研究,并得出如下结论:经理人报酬与ROA呈显著的线性相关性,与ROE、△SMVA非线性相关,与SEVA存在较强的线性相关性。通过实证研究,还发现经理人报酬主要激励当前业绩和未来业绩,当期激励效果直接影响下期业绩水平。     

股权结构、报酬激励与公司绩效的相关性

对电子信息业上市公司的实证研究表明,我国大多数企业间高管人员的现金报酬与经营业绩具有正相关性。但受股权结构影响,二者关系尚须进一步理顺。为此,需提高高管人员和控股股东的持股比重,加强对流通股占优企业管理者的监督与激励,适度拉大国有控股企业间高管报酬的差距,增加低报酬非国有控股企业高管人员的报酬,逐步形成企业间高管报酬增长与约束的良性机制。     

经理持股和经营绩效：经理持股激励功能的实证评价

本文通过实证研究发现,经理持股对公司绩效具有显著的积极影响,即使在控制了经理现金报酬、企业规模和行业属性的影响之后,这种显著性仍然存在,并考察了经理现金报酬、企业规模和行业属性对经理持股的影响程度,结果发现经理持股与经理现金报酬间存在着显著的激励互补效应,经理持股表现出显著性较弱的规模递减效应,但没有观察到行业属性对经理持股的普遍效应,只有信息技术产业类公司具有显著较高的经理持股水平.     

基于上市公司业绩的经营者报酬激励机制研究

在委托代理条件下,提高对经营者激励的有效性是一个永恒的话题。业绩评价与报酬激励是同一个问题的两个方面。我国上市公司经营者的报酬激励方案应以企业业绩为基础,构建基本工资、年度奖金、业绩股份和股票期权相结合的综合报酬激励模式     

上市公司高层经理与经营绩效的实证分析

理论上高层经理的持股比例、年度报酬与上市公司经营绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系,但是通过选择样本上市公司进行回归分析,发现两者并不存在显著的正相关关系.主要原因在于高层经理持股是内部职工持股的一个组成部分,是一种福利制度;持股制度僵硬;持股比例偏低,年度报酬过低,再加上旧观念的影响,很多高层经理不敢拿属于自己的那份收入,因此不能产生有效的激励作用.为了提高上市公司的经营绩效,首先逐步改变上市公司高层经理的报酬结构,将以年度会计盈余为基础的短期激励与以公司价值为基础的长期激励结合起来;其次要改进上市公司高层经理的持股制度,逐步推广股票期权计划.     

现金分红、债务政策稳健性与公司业绩

上市公司现金分红和债务决策是资本市场关注的热点问题。文章以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了现金分红与债务政策稳健性及其对企业业绩的影响关系。研究发现上市公司现金分红行为对公司债务政策稳健性有着显著的影响,相对于无现金分红公司而言,现金分红公司有着更高的债务政策稳健性;现金分红公司的业绩水平显著高于无现金分红公司的对应水平,说明上市公司现金分红行为对公司业绩的提升具有促进作用;在现金分红与公司业绩的关系中,债务政策稳健性具有显著的中介效应。上述研究结论对规范我国上市公司现金分红行为、揭示其对债务政策稳健性与公司业绩的影响具有一定的理论和实践意义。     

完善上市公司管理层报酬契约的思考

上市公司管理层报酬契约是对上市公司管理层进行激励的一种重要形式。本文对我国上市公司管理层报酬契约以后的发展提出了自己的看法,希望尽早实行符合我国国情的现代报酬契约制度。     

代理理论与管理报酬契约研究

代理理论的核心问题就是委托人如何设计一个最优激励与约束机制 ,以促使代理人从自身利益出发选择对委托人最有利的行为。最优机制的设计要考虑激励相容约束和个人理性约束 ,同时也需考虑效率问题。最优激励与约束机制体现在签订的管理报酬契约中。管理报酬契约签订的关键在于确定委托代理双方都能观察得到的业绩衡量标准。最理想的报酬契约应将股票价格和净利润共同作为业绩衡量标准。我国上市公司管理报酬契约的设计除了要保证报酬契约方案本身具有激励兼容的功能外 ,加强上市公司内外治理也是不可或缺的 ,同时还需有完善的政策法规。     

公司治理问题与审计需求相关关系研究综述

本文从代理型公司治理问题和剥夺型公司治理问题两个角度,对公司治理问题与审计需求关系的相关研究进行了综述,发现已有研究的一些不足,并对以后的研究方向提出了几点建议。笔者认为,目前我国企业管理者激励的主要方式是现金激励,因此进一步研究我国上市公司管理者现金激励报酬与外部审计的关系很有意义。     

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。     

The sensitivity of compensation to social capital: Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups

This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.     

Disentangling CEO compensation: A simultaneous examination of time,industry, and firm‐level effects

Despite decades of research, how CEO compensation is determined remains an enigma. Drawing on agency, managerial hegemony, and institutional theoretical perspectives, we use hierarchical linear modelling—a multilevel analytic technique—to examine how firm‐, industry‐, and time‐level effects drive CEO compensation in US corporations. Results show that while cash salary is mostly driven by firm‐specific factors, equity‐based compensation responds to time‐level effects with firm‐ and industry‐level effects playing a marginal role. We argue that such evidence is consistent with the institutionalization of the CEO compensation determination process through the widespread adoption of benchmark peer‐group comparisons. Such practices underlie economy‐wide changes in CEO compensation that are increasingly disconnected from other fundamental firm‐ or industry‐specific factors. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

管理者权力视角下高管薪酬契约有效性探究

近年来,高管“天价”薪酬及其与企业绩效不相配比的现象层出不穷,薪酬契约机制的激励效用愈发受到质疑。基于此,本文以2013—2017年我国沪深两市的上市企业为研究对象,运用多元回归公式对高管薪酬的有效性进行分析。实证结果表明:丰厚的高管薪酬能够提升企业的绩效水平,但管理者权利会反向调节两者间的正向关系,且相比非国有企业,这种抑制效果在国有性质的企业中更为显著。     

高管薪酬公平性、薪酬增长与代理成本--来自我国上市公司的证据

本文在高管薪酬契约基础上,运用2005-2012年我国上市公司数据,从薪酬公平性的角度,分析并检验高管薪酬公平性对其薪酬增长及代理成本的影响。研究结果发现,当高管通过薪酬的社会比较,较低薪酬的高管与下一年度高管薪酬增长、资产周转率显著相关,高管薪酬公平性是造成我国上市公司高管薪酬不断增长的原因之一,并倾向性地增加了公司的代理成本,影响了激励效应。本文丰富和拓展了高管薪酬公平性激励效应的研究成果,为完善我国公司薪酬制度提供理论依据和指导。     

Internal Marketing at Continental Airlines: Convincing Employees that Management Knows Best

Maintaining a high level of customer service quality is necessary for success, particularly for firms in service industries, but employees need to be motivated to provide it. Management can provide the motivation through the use of compensation schemes and internal marketing. In this paper we examine profit sharing compensation schemes that reward employees for achieving customer service objectives. We discuss how such schemes should be implemented, and explain why management needs to convince employees through internal marketing programs about the benefits of its scheme. We obtain the optimal amount of profit that the firm should share with employees, and the optimal effort it should spend on internal marketing. Finally, we relate the analysis to a successful scheme implemented by Continental Airlines.     

Corporate governance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley period: Compensation disclosure and analysis (CD&A)

In recent years, the entire fabric of corporate governance, certainly in the United States, has dramatically changed. With the passage of what has colloquially become known as SOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), US-based corporations have operated under stricter governance guidelines than at any previous time, especially as regards the structure of boards of directors and financial oversight of the corporation. A now perennial governance “hot button” issue not addressed by SOX is concern over continually rising executive compensation. Until the 2006 adoption of new compensation disclosure guidelines by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it had been nearly 15 years since federal attention had been devoted to compensation guidelines or regulations. Beginning with 2007 filings, US corporations must now include a Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) section. The intent behind the CD&A is to provide investors access to clear explanations of executive compensation and the philosophy that underlies compensation. As often happens, this good intent is accompanied by several unintended risks that may mitigate the effectiveness of the CD&A.     

Replacing executive stock options with share units: A Canadian study

Are share units a better compensation tool than stock options? This paper studies the impact of a transition within the compensation structures of CEOs of companies listed on the TSX Composite Index. Specifically, we ask whether replacing options with units-based compensation reduces the volatility of these companies' stock prices while promoting better returns. Our findings show that a shift to share units reduces large-cap Canadian companies' total risk through its idiosyncratic component. This transition is also accompanied by an increase in their risk-adjusted accounting and market performance. This suggests that share units are better for compensation contracts.     

Gender diversity on boards for organizational impression management: An empirical study of Japanese firms

The literature on gender diversity on corporate boards is growing, yet firms' motivation for achieving such diversity remains underexplored. This study examines the potential objective behind appointing female directors that could be driven by organizational impression management based on the hypothesis that firms strategically propose to nominate female directors when they need to form a favorable impression to their stakeholders, especially in relation to executive compensation. This study analyzed annual shareholders meeting agendas for 3585 listed Japanese firms between 2011 and 2020 and found that firms placed female director appointments on the meeting agenda when they needed approval for the revision of executive compensation. This tendency was strengthened for firms with more outside directors. This study's approach and findings contribute to the literature on corporate board gender diversity by suggesting organizational impression management as a potential strategic motivation behind the appointment of female directors.