THE USE OF PPP ARRANGEMENTS IN STREET LIGHTING: A WIN‐WIN OPTION?

Street lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States’ first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.     

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‒PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATION

While the contemporary academic discourse regards innovation as an inherent feature of infrastructure public?private partnerships (PPPs), the conceptual link between infrastructure PPPs and innovation is narrowly understood. While most existing studies conceptualize the innovation processes and effects within the context of PPP projects, we argue that the relevance of innovation in infrastructure PPPs goes beyond specific projects. In this conceptual article, we examine why and how infrastructure PPP innovations can shape the evolution of the involved private and public sector organizations – and therefore the respective sectors – more broadly. We show that innovation in the context of PPPs has much broader implications and potential outcomes than as emphasized in the literature so far.     

COMPARING PPP WITH TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF SCHOOLS PROCUREMENT IN IRELAND

Advocates of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) argue that they can deliver public infrastructure more efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an in‐depth, case‐based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in Ireland. Through detailed semi‐structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.     

PPPs in China: Does the Growth in Chinese PPPs Signal a Liberalising Economy?

ABSTRACT

This study provides insight into the nature of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China, a country that has invested more in PPPs than any other over the last two decades. It is puzzling that China, as a state-led economy, has turned to embrace PPPs. Pundits have taken this as evidence of a liberalising Chinese economy. However, our findings suggest that PPPs in China do not reflect a break from earlier, state-centric modes of governance; rather, the state essentially uses such partnerships as a mechanism to strengthen its own hand. We argue that the difference between how PPPs are being implemented in China compared to the West reflects differences in political economic contexts, both materially and ideologically. In both cases, the ambiguity surrounding the PPP model has been used to advance particular interests, serving as a reminder of both the ways in which power shapes the character of such policy tools and the differences in the relative power underpinning state-market relations in each context. By challenging mainstream interpretations of what PPPs are and what their proliferation means, studying the political economy of PPPs in a rising China further exposes the Western-centric nature of prevailing wisdom in political economy scholarship.     

UNPACKING THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ON DISASTER RESILIENCE: A COMPARISON OF EXPERT PERSPECTIVES

Public managers are under increasing pressure to develop and operate physical infrastructure systems that prove resilient in the face of natural disasters. At the same time, fiscal pressures and mounting infrastructure needs are drawing more and more attention to public–private partnerships (PPP) as a mechanism for delivering infrastructure. The research question guiding this study is how can the institutional designs of PPPs influence the potential for improving infrastructure resilience? We examined the perceived relationship between infrastructure resilience and PPPs by conducting and analyzing research interviews with twenty‐four senior infrastructure experts in Washington, DC. The results reflect findings of related privatization research, indicating that market‐based incentives can advance public values such as resilience, but the responsibility for ensuring they do so rests primarily with government. We note key differences in how the infrastructure investment experts and disaster resilience experts view issues in infrastructure management, and provide suggestions for improving public‐private collaboration to improve resilience.     

IS A SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT OF PPP FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY POSSIBLE? LESSONS FROM SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS

Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have emerged in recent years as outcome‐based public‐private partnerships (PPP) for the delivery of welfare services, where the payment to the private operator is linked to the achievement of superior social impact. Since the traditional infrastructure‐based PPP approach seems to have failed to achieve higher level of efficiency and, above all, effectiveness, this paper discusses the extent to which the SIB model can represent a reference point to innovate the PPP model by introducing more focus on outcome achievement and social value generation.     

PPP项目控制权转移机制研究*——基于探索性多案例的分析

提高民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权是激发民营企业创新活力、降低运营成本的重要举措。民营企业参与PPP项目的过程，实质是政府让渡控制权与企业获取控制权的动态博弈过程。本文从合作治理的视角，以同一家民营企业参与的两个城市公用事业PPP项目为研究对象，提炼影响城市公用事业PPP项目控制权转移的关键要素，采用探索性多案例研究方法，挖掘民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权转移机制，发现政府制度能力、企业动态能力、市场竞争强度是影响控制权转移的关键要素，政企关系对上述三类影响路径起到积极的调节作用。相应的，民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权转移存在三条基本路径，即能力转移、关系转移和市场转移。本研究不仅丰富了PPP项目控制权的研究成果，还可以为提高民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权提供指导与借鉴。     

International Trade and Strategic Privatization

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly‐owned firms. In order to analyze this question, we consider two countries and assume that publicly‐owned firms are less efficient than private firms. We obtain that when the marginal cost of the publicly‐owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government wants it to be the government of the other country that privatizes its publicly‐owned firm. In this case, only one government privatizes, and that government obtains lower social welfare and producer surplus than the other.     

政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究

公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。     

EVALUATING THE COSTS,QUALITY, AND VALUE FOR MONEY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Public?private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.     

Capital and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Small Open Economy

The effects of a reform in capital and consumption taxes on private welfare and government tax revenue are examined for a small open, capital‐importing economy. A trade‐off between private welfare and tax revenue is encountered in maximizing social welfare. Nonetheless, lowering capital taxes and raising consumption taxes can increase both private welfare and tax revenue if the initial tax rates are not optimal. In addition, a tax reform by this fashion is a likely response to a rise in the foreign rate of return on capital.     

INFANT INDUSTRY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION

Abstract.  This paper introduces infant-industry considerations in political economy determination of trade protection. I build a model where the government cares about both political contributions and national welfare. A potentially beneficial high-tech industry is not viable in the country whose initial human capital is low. In the political economy equilibrium, we find that the tariff schedule will be V-shaped: it decreases initially to maintain the viability of the industry but increases thereafter as the industry expands and gains political power. We use the model to explain both China's tariff offers in WTO negotiations and GATT/WTO rules regarding developing countries.     

INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT – THE EMERGENT PPP EQUITY MARKET

Increasingly governments are looking to private sector actors to invest in infrastructure projects. An emergent mechanism for such investment is the market in PPP equity. This is an aspect of PPPs that has to date had little empirical attention. This paper reports on the size and scope of the market in PPP equity sales within the UK. In the process, the nature of PPP projects and the existing rationales for the policy are critiqued. The paper concludes by laying out a number of potential research agendas focused on PPP equity sales including a call for reassessing theoretical perspectives.     

经济政策有效性的理论分析* ——以货币政策为例

本文在更一般的不完全信息情形下，以货币政策为例，分析了经济政策的时间不一致问题。结果表明，当私人部门与政府部门存在不对称信息，政府部门具有信息优势时，最优经济政策与私人部门所持有的关于经济状态的信念有关。从福利的角度看，当现实经济状态对经济政策灵敏时，政府部门有公开经济状态信息的激励；反之，政府部门则有隐瞒经济状态信息的激励。因此，在市场经济的顶层设计中，除政府部门需要建立相关经济决策咨询机构外，还要推动独立的民间智库发展，使公众逐步摆脱信息劣势。     

融资激励和融资约束对PPP模式下公共产品提供效率的影响——基于不完全契约理论的一般均衡分析

通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。     

SOE Reform under Oligopolistic Market Structure: The Optimal Choice of State Shares

This paper examines the effect of the change of state shares in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) on the efficiency of the whole society and the payoff of the government. This issue is addressed by setting up a mixed oligopolistic competition model and dividing the analysis into two cases: closed economy and open economy. The basic results are as follows: If the relative production efficiency of an SOE is too low, complete state ownership is not optimal, and privatization will be a necessary step; however, if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is not too low, complete privatization is not optimal both for the government and from the perspective of social welfare. The results can, to a certain extent, provide theoretical support to the governments idea on the SOE reform. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2004, 1 (in Chinese)     

中国信贷歧视的福利成本*

国有企业与民营企业之间的信贷歧视是中国经济转型过程中所特有的现象。本文构建了一个具有信贷歧视的动态随机一般均衡模型,以计算中国信贷歧视的福利成本。计算结果表明,信贷歧视大约会使整体社会的福利损失增加62%,其原因在于信贷歧视加剧了民营企业的产出波动并进而放大了通胀波动。本文进一步对比了不同货币政策下的福利损失,发现信贷歧视均会产生福利成本。据此,本文认为信贷歧视必须予以破除,从而消除信贷歧视带来的福利成本。     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.