On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

Corporate social responsibility,vertical product differentiation and international competition

Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit‐driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer‐oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm’s profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm’s profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U‐shaped. When firms’ decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and International Competition: A Welfare Analysis

This paper examines the welfare implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in international markets under imperfect competition. Based on a stylized model of an import‐competing duopolistic market, we show the feasibility of moving toward tariff reductions when both domestic and foreign firms launch CSR initiatives in that their payoffs include not only individual profits, but also the benefits of consumers. For the case where the foreign exporter unilaterally adopts the consumer‐oriented CSR as a strategy, there is a rent‐shifting effect because the foreign firm's payoff increases whereas the domestic firm's profit decreases. In response, the importing country's government raises its tariff on the foreign product. If, instead, the domestic firm adopts the CSR strategy unilaterally, the rent‐shifting effect disappears and both the competing firms’ payoffs increase. We further identify the conditions under which the CSR initiatives of the firms constitute the dominant strategy, leading to a Pareto efficient outcome at which the firms’ payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfare are at their maximum levels.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY GAIN IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS*

This paper examines two policy instruments, privatization of the domestic public firm and imposition of a tariff on foreign private firms in an international mixed oligopolistic model with asymmetric costs. It first demonstrates that different orders of moves of firms will imply different government decisions on optimal tariff and on privatization policy. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990 ), this paper then uses an extended game to discuss endogenous roles. It indicates that the efficiency gain that highlights the importance of foreign competition is crucial in determining the welfare improving privatization policy. Moreover, the endogenous equilibria are associated with different government decisions on privatization.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

Is Corporate Environmentalism Good for Domestic Welfare?

Many private firms voluntarily care about the environment and declare that their products and production processes are environmentally friendly. This paper shows that corporate environmentalism may reduce the effectiveness of government policies. A simple third‐market trade model with strategic environmental and trade policy is employed, in which an environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit‐maximizing foreign firm. It is shown that even if emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, corporate environmentalism may reduce domestic welfare when pollution is transboundary. In the realistic situation where export subsidies are prohibited, welfare may fall even if pollution is local.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

Profit tax and tariff under international oligopoly

A simple model of international duopoly is developed to examine the effects of tariff and corporate profit tax. It is shown that in an export-cum-on-site-production regime, a tariff continues to be an effective instrument for shifting net profit away from foreign to domestic firms. A corporate profit tax, on the other hand, could lower the domestic output and employment and decrease the net earnings of both domestic and foreign firms. Thus when the host government's ability to raise tariff is limited, it should seriously consider a corporate tax cut policy to achieve the dual purpose of creating more jobs and increasing corporate earning at home.     

The welfare effect of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign direct investment and rules of origin

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.     

Why exporting countries agree to voluntary export restraints: the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier

This paper studies the impact of VER on an exporting country. It shows that a VER at the free‐trade level favours the concentration of industry, allows firms with an export licence to expand, causes the contraction of the size of the firms producing for the domestic market only, and raises the price mark‐up in the domestic market. The impact on welfare is indeterminate depending upon the effect on global efficiency. If a VER is binding, also the price mark‐up in the foreign market rises and this effect on terms of trade, ceteris paribus, is welfare improving. An applied general equilibrium model for Turkey supports the conjecture that with a VER the increased oligopolistic power of incumbent firms with an export licence, the higher price mark‐up in the domestic market and a possible social welfare gain, are the key elements in understanding the rationale behind VERs. However, if authorities induce firms to engage in unproductive profit‐seeking activities, rent dissipation occurs and the impact on social welfare becomes negative.     

Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析

文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.