The impact of trading halts on liquidity and price volatility: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange

This study examines market behaviour around trading halts associated with information releases on the Australian Stock Exchange, which operates an open electronic limit order book. Using the Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) pseudo-halt methodology, we find trading halts increase both volume and price volatility. Trading halts also increase bid-ask spreads and reduce market depth at the best-quotes in the immediate post-halt period. The results of this study imply that trading halts impair rather than improve market quality in markets that operate open electronic limit order books.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

Speed of convergence to market efficiency: The role of ECNs

Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005, CRS) estimate the speed of convergence to market efficiency based on short-horizon return predictability of the 150 largest NYSE firms. We extend CRS to a broad panel of NYSE stocks and are the first to examine the relation between electronic communication networks (ECNs) and the corresponding informational efficiency of prices. Overall, we confirm CRS's result that price adjustments to new information occur on average within 5–15 min for large NYSE stocks. We further show that it takes about 20 min longer for smaller firms to incorporate information into prices. Most importantly, we demonstrate that the speed of convergence to market efficiency is significantly related to the type of trading platform where orders are executed, even after controlling for relative order flows, trading costs, volatility, informational effects, trading conditions, market quality, institutional trading activity, and other firm-specific characteristics. Our findings provide direct answers and insights to issues raised in a recent SEC concept release document.     

Liquidity,volume and price efficiency: The impact of order vs. quote driven trading

As equity trading becomes predominantly electronic, is there still value to a traditional, intermediated dealer system? We address this question by comparing the impact of the organization of trading on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency in a quote-driven dealer market and in an order-driven limit order book. Small order price impacts are higher and large order price impacts are lower in a dealer market. Prices are more efficient in the limit order book, except when the level of informed trading is high. Volume is higher in a limit order market, making this system most attractive for trading venues.     

The informational effect and market quality impact of upstairs trading and fleeting orders on the Australian Securities Exchange

This paper investigates the informational effect of trading and market segmentation on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) paying particular attention to the recent phenomenon: fleeting orders.¹ Confirming theoretical predictions, this study finds that permanent price effect (PPE) is significantly greater in the central limit order book (LOB) than in the upstairs market and that less informed institutional trades are routed to the upstairs market. It also finds that a well functioning upstairs market often results in lower transaction cost, higher volatility and larger trade size on the ASX. In the context of fleeting orders specifically, it finds the informational effect and market quality impact of upstairs market to be weaker after removing fleeting orders, which subsequently leads to the conclusion that recently introduced execution algorithms, which leave a trace of fleeting orders, often result in lower PPE and are mostly used my uninformed liquidity traders.     

Market efficiency and learning in an artificial stock market: A perspective from Neo-Austrian economics

An agent-based artificial financial market (AFM) is used to study market efficiency and learning in the context of the Neo-Austrian economic paradigm. Efficiency is defined in terms of the “excess” profits associated with different trading strategies, where excess is defined relative to a dynamic buy and hold benchmark in order to make a clean separation between trading gains and market gains. We define an Inefficiency matrix that takes into account the difference in excess profits of one trading strategy versus another (signal) relative to the standard error of those profits (noise) and use this statistical measure to gauge the degree of market efficiency. A one-parameter family of trading strategies is considered, the value of the parameter measuring the relative informational advantage of one strategy versus another. Efficiency is then investigated in terms of the composition of the market defined in terms of the relative proportions of traders using a particular strategy and the parameter values associated with the strategies. We show that markets are more efficient when informational advantages are small (small signal) and when there are many coexisting signals. Learning is introduced by considering “copycat” traders that learn the relative values of the different strategies in the market and copy the most successful one. We show how such learning leads to a more informationally efficient market but can also lead to a less efficient market as measured in terms of excess profits. It is also shown how the presence of exogeneous information shocks that change trader expectations increases efficiency and complicates the inference problem of copycats.     

The Beauty Contest and Short‐Term Trading

Short‐termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when generating beauty contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two‐period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk‐averse, privately informed, short‐term investors and find that prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game's early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as empirical regularities.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.     

Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract:  Market structure affects the informational and real frictions faced by traders in equity markets. Using bid-ask spreads, we present evidence which suggests that while real frictions associated with the costs of supplying immediacy are less in order-driven systems, informational frictions resulting from increased adverse selection risk are considerably higher in these markets. Firm value, transaction size and order location are all major determinants of the trading costs borne by investors. Consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis of Barclay and Warner (1993) , we report that informational frictions are at their highest for medium size trades that go through the order book. Finally, while there is no doubt that the total costs of trading on order-driven systems are lower for very liquid securities, the inherent informational inefficiencies of the trading format should not be ignored. This is particularly true for the vast majority of small to mid-size stocks that experience infrequent trading and low transaction volume.     

The Market Quality of Dealer versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities

Abstract:  Over the last decade, electronic limit-order trading systems have been sweeping securities exchanges around the world. This paper studies a transitional case, namely, the commencement of trading of a group of moderately liquid stocks on SETS of the London Stock Exchange. The evidence reveals that the liquidity of those stocks dropped substantially after the introduction of the limit order book and the removal of the market makers' obligations. This transition provides an example that a hybrid market with a limit order book and voluntary dealers may not perform as well as a dealership market with obligatory market makers.     

Trading Volume and Transaction Costs in Specialist Markets

Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the “volume effects” of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.     

Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows: (1) the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; (2) the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; (3) the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; (4) If an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.     

Information diffusion in electronic and floor trading

The attractiveness of floor trading versus anonymous electronic trading systems for traders is analysed. We hypothesize that in times of low information intensity, the insight into the order book of the electronic trading system provides more valuable information than floor trading, but in times of high information intensity, this is not true. Thus, the electronic system's market share in trading volume should decline when information intensity increases. This hypothesis is tested by DTB and LIFFE data on Bund-Future trading in the period 1991 to 1995. In the first years of trading, the DTB's market share is inversely related to price volatility and trading volume as proxies for information intensity. In recent years, this relation fades away; this can be explained by the high frequency of transactions which implies a steady flow of information on transactions.     

Market structure and microstructure, in international interest rate futures markets

We examine the role of market structure in identifying microstructure features of the NYSE.Euronext-LIFFE STIR futures market by comparing the ability of two bid-ask spread component models to explain bid-ask spreads. These two models differ only in their assumptions about whether or not market makers are present. The period we analyze includes data from pit-based trading alongside electronic market data. We explore how market structure affects the way private information influences bid-ask spreads and return volatility. A second part of our study employs intraday correlation to investigate these links in greater depth, while a third part looks at how private information and trading noise contribute to price evolution.     

Fuzzy logic,trading uncertainty and technical trading

From the market microstructure perspective, technical analysis can be profitable when informed traders make systematic mistakes or when uninformed traders have predictable impacts on price. However, chartists face a considerable degree of trading uncertainty because technical indicators such as moving averages are essentially imperfect filters with a nonzero phase shift. Consequently, technical trading may result in erroneous trading recommendations and substantial losses. This paper presents an uncertainty reduction approach based on fuzzy logic that addresses two problems related to the uncertainty embedded in technical trading strategies: market timing and order size. The results of our high-frequency exercises show that ‘fuzzy technical indicators’ dominate standard moving average technical indicators and filter rules for the Euro-US dollar (EUR-USD) exchange rates, especially on high-volatility days.     

Lifting the Veil: An Analysis of Pre-trade Transparency at the NYSE

We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.     

The value of information in cross-listing

Until 2004, the London Stock Exchange allowed firms to be traded in the specialized SEAQ-I platform without the firm's involvement. Trading only required an application by one LSE trading member firm. Such an institutional arrangement, which made cross-listings possible without a firms' approval, allows for a direct test of different theories of foreign listing. In particular, we can differentiate between market segmentation and liquidity hypotheses, which rely on a firm trading in a foreign exchange and informational hypotheses, which assume that a firm makes the decision to trade in a foreign exchange. We identify a sample of international firms that are admitted to trading on London's SEAQ-I platform without their involvement. We estimate the valuation effects of this multi-market trading event and compare them to those enjoyed by firms that pursue a standard London Stock Exchange cross-listing. A cross-sectional abnormal returns analysis documents significant evidence in support of information-related hypotheses of cross-listing. An analysis of the firms' home market price volatility corroborates the results.     

Measuring the resiliency of an electronic limit order book

An electronic limit order book is resilient when it reverts to its normal shape promptly after large trades. This paper suggests a continuous-time impulse response function based on intensities, which formalizes resiliency in terms of a time-frame and probability of order book replenishment. This is then estimated for trading on an LSE order book, using an appropriate parametric model which views orders and cancellations as a mutually-exciting ten-variate Hawkes point process. Consistent with findings in the related literature, in over 60 per cent of cases, the order book does not replenish reliably after a large trade. However, if it does replenish, it does so with a fairly fast half life of around 20 s. Various other dynamics are quantified.     

Specialists as risk managers: The competition between intermediated and non-intermediated markets

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).     

Competition,signaling and non-walking through the book: Effects on order choice

We investigate the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and examine the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not allowed. Our results suggest that the variables capturing the cost of a large market order are not informative for an impatient trader under this market mechanism. We also document that the competition effect is not present only at the top of the book but persistent beyond the best quotes. Moreover, it dominates the signaling effect for both a limit order and a market order trader. Finally, we show that institutional investors’ order submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the limit order book information. This is consistent with informed traders placing orders based on their own private valuations rather than the state of the book.