B2C交易模式下的闭环供应链模型研究

整合传统的正向供应链与退货回收的逆向供应链，在集中式决策和分散式决策条件下对模型进行求解，计算出不同决策条件下新产品和再制品的最优零售价、闭环供应链或者制造商和电子商务企业的最优利润。在整个模型的求解和分析过程中，探究不同决策条件下退货回收价、退货量、退货回购价等对最优零售价或者最优批发价的影响，并将集中式决策条件下最优零售价和闭环供应链总利润与分散式决策条件下相应的最优零售价和制造商与电子商务企业的最优利润之和进行比较，研究发现集中式决策的利润优于分散式决策。     

退货：变危机成商机

对于中国的消费者来说,退货难是公开的秘密,真的遇到无理由、无条件的退货,反而觉得自己麻烦了商家。但是,可能退货成为新购买的开端。因此,聪明的商家在顾客寻找各种理由要求退货时,不应把其看成是危机,因为处理得当,这些退货的顾客很可能就成为企业的忠实客户。     

B2C交易模式下的闭环供应链模型研究

整合传统的正向供应链与退货回收的逆向供应链,在集中式决策和分散式决策条件下对模型进行求解,计算出不同决策条件下新产品和再制品的最优零售价、闭环供应链或者制造商和电子商务企业的最优利润。在整个模型的求解和分析过程中,探究不同决策条件下退货回收价、退货量、退货回购价等对最优零售价或者最优批发价的影响,并将集中式决策条件下最优零售价和闭环供应链总利润与分散式决策条件下相应的最优零售价和制造商与电子商务企业的最优利润之和进行比较,研究发现集中式决策的利润优于分散式决策。     

退货营销的必胜术

国内一家大型商场为了和同行竞争,效仿国外商家打出无理由退货广告,一时吸引了众多的顾客。时隔几个星期,一位顾客怒气冲冲地要求商场退换刚买不久的皮鞋,理由是鞋面磨损,鞋底开     

闭环供应链回收渠道的选择——以价格为决策变量的博弈分析

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的闭环供应链系统，以产品批发价和回收转移价格为制造商的决策变量，市场回收价为回收方的决策变量，对不同回收模型进行了博弈分析，得到闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和最终利润，并进一步对不同回收成本下制造商的最优选择进行了分析。     

缺货惩罚分担机制下考虑顾客退货的易逝品供应链优化策略

在简单二级易逝品供应链中考虑了顾客退货、缺货惩罚成本分担,针对制造商两阶段生产且给予零售商一次订货的前提下,建立并分析引入期权契约的决策模型,得出了零售商初始订购量和期权购买量。研究表明,通过引入期权机制,使分散决策的供应链得到优化,增加供应链效益,数值算例验证了结论的有效性。     

电子商务逆向物流定价策略研究

运用需求博弈模型证明在当今以顾客价值为导向的电子商务市场中实施逆向物流的必要性;利用利润最大化模型,研究电子商务市场逆向物流退货政策中的最优价格制定策略,最后,针对电子商务环境下几种典型的商品定价提出了几点可行性的建议。     

制造商应对再制造商进入的定价策略研究

研究了消费者对新产品和再制造产品不同偏好的差异,制造商应对再制造商进入的定价策略.首先分析独立再制造商不存在时制造商的最优决策,在此基础上,构建制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析再制造商存在时制造商的动态定价策略;最后通过模型分析和数值仿真分析了再制造商进入市场的条件以及再制造商存在产生的影响.研究表明:再制造商进入市场难易程度与新产品生产成本、消费者对新产品估值和再制造产品估价的差异程度有关.制造商采取的动态定价策略会提高再制造商的进入壁垒,从而降低其市场需求和利润.     

电子商务环境下供应链的最优销售渠道策略

在电子商务环境下,考虑了网络直销和传统零售两种销售渠道,建立了同时考虑价格和服务水平的双渠道供应链模型,研究了集中式和分散式供应链的最优销售渠道策略,探讨了双渠道供应链成员的销售价格和服务水平决策、制造商和零售商的利润分配以及销售渠道的选择等,并应用Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了占优制造商的最优销售渠道选择策略。     

供应链管理的履约策略研究

供应链企业间的合作能力、高价值顾客等是影响供应链管理的主要因素。通过对合作企业特点及运行环境、顾客关系资产管理进行比较分析，提出了限制例外、建立退货等履约策略。     

Decision analysis and coordination of dual supply chain with retailer's offline return service and online reviews

Based on the centralized and decentralized decision-making cases, this study constructs a dual-channel supply chain game model that considers offline return service and online reviews, and explores the pricing decisions and benefits of supply chains under the dual influence of return service level and online reviews. The impact of return rate, return service level and perceived quality of online reviews on optimal supply chain decisions and profits are further analyzed. Finally, considering the phenomenon of double marginalization in the supply chain, this study coordinates the supply chain based on the benefit-sharing contract coordination model to achieve Pareto improvement. The research shows that: The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online selling price and the retailer's optimal offline price are positively correlated with the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service. Compared with the return service level, the perceived quality of online reviews has a greater impact on the overall profit of the supply chain. Under the dual influence of the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service, the supply chain profit in the centralized model is better than that in the decentralized model. The coordination model can effectively coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, when the sharing ratio of manufacturers is obviously lower than that of retailers, the coordination effect is better at this time.     

生产商回购合同与需求不确定

生产商回购合同已经被广泛看成一种渠道间成员共担风险的一种方式。在生产商回购合同中,生产商决定最优的批发价格ω和回购价格s。在给定ω,s的条件下,零售商决定向生产商最优的订货量Q,本文通过对生产商回购合同的分析,从而得出零售商的最优订货量以及生产商所采取的最优策略。同时给出了生产商使用回购合同的的条件以及分析了市场需求不确定对生产商和零售商的影响。     

基于信息共享的供应链定价策略及利润增值研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链系统,在非线性市场需求的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出信息共享时的博弈均衡解和信息不共享时的博弈均衡解;进一步分析了信息共享程度的大小与批发价、零售价以及双方利润之间的关系,得出信息共享程度越高,制造商和零售商的利润越大,信息共享实现了帕累托改进。最后,通过实例对结论进行了验证。     

基于多项Logit选择模型的在线渠道价格促销效应实证研究

在线渠道下,不同品牌的价格折扣促销的差异性会引起在线消费者品牌选择行为变化。同时,在线的价格比较机制也增加了消费者价格敏感度,如果不分离出这一重要的促销效应,那么会产生估计偏差,影响模型的预测能力。本文首先回顾品牌选择的离散模型中价格促销的研究脉络;然后构建在线渠道消费者品牌选择离散Logit模型;接着在对中国某电子商务公司的消费者实际购买可乐的面板数据分析的基础上,研究价格折扣对于该公司消费者品牌选择行为的影响效应,研究发现：（1）如果不引入价格折扣促销因素,将会过高估计价格的影响;（2）价格折扣促销对于消费者网上品牌选择有显著的影响,且影响为正效应。文章最后剖析价格折扣对在线渠道的消费者品牌选择的行为影响机理,并提出未来的研究方向。     

基于策略型消费者的预售策略研究

季节性易逝品的销售期短,并且残值低,这类产品可以采用预售策略.考虑消费者估价不确定性及消费者的策略性行为,对预售策略的定价及库存进行了研究.同时优化了预售价格及实物销售价格,得到了当消费者的估值分布满足一定的条件时的最优价格,并通过建立报童模型,得到了最优的产量及利润.通过预售与不预售两种策略的比较,得到了销售商采取预售策略的充分条件.最后,对模型进行了数值分析.     

不对称信息的供应链激励机制研究

研究由单个制造商和单个零售商组成二级供应链,基于市场需求是线性的,且受价格与销售努力的影响。首先,研究在对称信息下,集中模式和分散模式两种情况下的供应链,求出制造商和零售商使得利润达到最优时的最优批发价及销售价;其次,研究了在信息不对称情况下,制造商的机制设计问题,得到了制造商激励批发价的表达式以及零售商的最优零售价的公式;最后利用实例仿真对模型进行分析,结果表明该激励机制对整个供应链的收益有改善作用。     

Pricing policy and coordination for a two-layer supply chain of duopolistic retailers and socially responsible manufacturer

This paper explores channel coordination and profit distribution in a two-layer socially responsible supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting, the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility and the retailers play Cournot and Collusion games. Besides comparing the optimal decisions of the retailers two game behaviours, the paper analyses the effects of social responsibility on the optimal decisions. It is found that two-part tariff contract resolves channel conflict and provides win–win outcome for a specific range of the franchise fee and it is always possible to find a particular profit split using Nash bargaining product. With increasing social responsibility of the manufacturer, the coordinated wholesale prices of the manufacturer may be both decreasing or ‘U’ shaped and decreasing when the market potentials of the retailers are almost the same or significantly different. Also, at least one coordinated wholesale price is less than the manufacturer's marginal cost. The proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example.     

Online advance selling or not: Pricing strategy of new product entry in a supply chain

Considering consumers' strategic behavior and loss averseness of the deposit, this paper establishes a two-period Stackelberg game model in a supply chain system, in which a manufacturer cooperates with an e-retailer to perform advance selling to consumers. The optimal pricing decisions are obtained, and the impacts of the e-retailer's advance selling activities on the profits of both parties are discussed. Studies have shown that advance selling activities always benefit the manufacturer, but they can hurt the e-retailer. Within some specific conditions, the advance selling model can achieve Pareto improvement to both parties and benefit the performance of the supply chain.     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.