EXIT OPTIONS AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS

We introduce a post‐entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash flow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded off against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct effect of financial frictions is to impose inefficient exit, but there is also an indirect effect through higher equilibrium price that leads to inefficient survival.     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

Optimal penalty and accounting policy

This study considers risky investment projects under adverse selection and examines optimal penalties for erroneous auditing reports to maximize social welfare. These penalties give firms an incentive to choose accounting policies that maximize social welfare. We characterize the optimal penalties such that efficient firms choose an aggressive accounting policy and inefficient firms choose a conservative accounting policy.     

Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.     

Merger policy,entry, and entrepreneurship

We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.     

Beyond the need to boast: Cost concealment incentives and exit in Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it can exclude its competitors from the market. Hence, the rankings of expected profit and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the inefficient firms is possible. Although the efficient firm has stronger incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there remain cases in which the firm conceals information in equilibrium to induce exit.     

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

Local content requirement on foreign direct investment under exchange rate volatility

This paper analyzes the effects of exchange rate volatility of both the host country and the parent country on host-government policy related to local content requirement (LCR) on export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) in the context of an oligopolistic market in a third country. We, inter alia, find that an increase in the volatility foreign exchange rate decreases optimal LCR both under free entry and exit of foreign firms and when the number of foreign firms is fixed. We also find that the government uses a less strict LCR policy when the number of foreign firms is endogenous than when it is exogenous.     

A theory of competitive industry dynamics with innovation and imitation

Empirical evidence on industry life-cycle reveals a pattern in which innovation rates remain fairly stable or are perhaps even higher at early stages, while patenting increases sharply as the industry matures. This increase in patenting in later stages is accompanied by net exit and lower rates of output growth and price decline. In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of a competitive industry with innovation and imitation that is consistent with these stylized facts. We derive an equilibrium growth path, along which leading firms invest in increasing the stock of technological knowledge and choose not to prevent imitation by other firms as long as the industry remains relatively small. As the industry expands including new entry, the leaders' optimal amount of investment gradually declines. We show that under some rather general conditions, there would exist a scale of the industry where innovating firms would choose to start preventing free imitation, bringing further expansion of the industry through new entry to a halt and causing net exit.     

经济政策不确定性与企业退出决策:理论与实证研究

经济政策影响微观企业经营是现有研究的共识.在已有文献基础上,文章考察了经济政策不确定性对企业退出决策的影响.文章基于一个代表性企业最优退出决策的框架,构建了经济政策不确定性影响企业退出决策作用机制的理论模型,并利用1998?2011年中国工业企业微观数据对理论模型进行了实证检验.研究结果显示,经济政策不确定性通过增加市场预期收益的机制降低了企业的退出概率,即面对高水平的经济政策不确定性时,企业对未来市场形成了良好的预期,倾向于采取理性的"延迟退出"决策.进一步分析发现,企业退出决策的"延迟现象"在不同企业、行业和区域间呈现出异质性,经济政策不确定性更多地延迟了具有优越发展前景的企业、行业及区域的市场退出.从企业方面来看,这一现象在规模小、跨产业经营、出口、政府补贴的企业及创新企业中更加显著;从行业方面来看,这一现象在资金技术密集型的行业及生产率高的行业中更加显著;从区域来看,这一现象在市场化程度高的区域及经济增长快的区域更加显著.可见,政府的经济政策变动,不仅引导了企业制定理性的战略决策,而且激励了优势资源和市场的持续发展.     

Quality heterogeneity and global economic growth

This paper develops a fully endogenous, variety-expansion growth model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity, limit pricing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Firms with high-quality products engage in exporting, firms with intermediate-quality products serve the domestic market, and inefficient firms with low-quality products exit the market. Trade liberalization, measured by a reduction in trade costs or a decline in foreign market entry costs, generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality to high-quality products and exit of inefficient firms. However, it has ambiguous effects on the average global quality level, long-run growth, and welfare. An increase in the rate of population growth or in the intensity of trade-related knowledge spillovers accelerates economic growth. The laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient, and this leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.     

On Environmental Policy and Permitting

The literature on environmental policy under adverse selection usually assumes that firms' profit vary monotonically with a private information parameter. However, it is easy to demonstrate using standard production setups that regularity is not the rule. We show that policy requirements are very sensitive to this assumption. In particular, the optimal instrument resembles more an “adaptable” pollution standard than the economic instrument of an environmental tax. We also show that permitting, which results in some firms overinvesting in pollution‐control equipment, does not serve the objective of improving the environment but rather allows the agency to increase the proceeds of the policy.     

Entry into the electric power industry

Entry of new firms into the electric power industry is becoming commonplace. The entrants typically are unregulated firms that compete with regulated electric utilities only in the generation stage of the latter's vertically integrated structure. Because of the asymmetric regulatory treatment of the incumbents and entrants, there is the possibility of biases either against efficient entry or for inefficient entry. A model of a vertical integrated utility subject to rate-of-return regulation is used to illustrate the biases, and several implications for regulatory policy are discussed.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

Cross-Industry Emission Permits Trading

The present paper examines the effectiveness of emission permits trading across industries. We find that, while permits trading in a competitive environment minimizes costs of compliance, it also enhances product market imperfections. We also find that a standard-setting regulation yields superior welfare results if policy makers have able information. Standard setting allows policy makers the flexibility of taking into account the existing imperfections in each industry. Although not surprising, this result has important policy implications in situations in which policy makers consider establishing permits trading between publicly owned dominant polluters and other industrial polluters. Since policy makers have able information on publicly-owned firms, it might be welfare improving to directly control emissions of the dominant publicly-owned polluters. Given that many of the major polluters in the real world are large firms in heavily concentrated industries many of which are also regulated, our result warrants policy makers' attention.     

POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

The impact of product market regulation on productivity through firm churning: Evidence from European countries

Productivity performance in European countries has been a policy concern for several decades. This paper shows that productivity can be enhanced by product market policies which, by increasing competition and efficiency, facilitate higher rates of firms’ entry and exit (i.e. firm churning). Drawing on annual country-sector data for the period 2000–2014 across the EU countries, we find that: (i) competition-enhancing regulation is associated with a higher rate of firm churning; (ii) firm churning, in turn, appears to be positively related to higher total factor productivity at the sector level by facilitating the entry of new competitive firms and the exit of less productive ones. Overall, we conclude that stringent product market regulation can be indirectly associated, via its impact on business dynamism, with the somewhat weak productivity performance in a number of EU countries. Thus, our results point towards substantial productivity gains that could follow from the introduction of further competition-enhancing measures in product markets.     

Contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm

This paper extends the Coase notation of firms as intermediaries between consumers and input owners to incorporate asymmetric information. We show that in some cases it is optimal for consumers to pay a fixed price for a product and to ignore how the firm operates and the profit that it makes. If firms have private information that consumers cannot cheaply obtain, however, we demonstrate that the optimal contract may require constraints on firms internal operations and profits. Our work provides conditions under which cost-plus contracts are optimal, and demonstrates when nonprofit firms are the preferred organization structure.     

A Note on the Adverse Effect of Competition on Consumers

It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an industry with asymmetric cost firms. A rise in the number of more cost‐inefficient firms makes the consumers worse off in the presence of a welfare‐maximizing tax/subsidy policy. A rise in the number of more cost‐inefficient firms also reduces social welfare.