The Importance of Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market: Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitations

Analyzing unique data from multiple large‐scale randomized marketing trials of preapproved credit card solicitations by a large financial institution, we find that consumers responding to the lender's inferior solicitation offers have poorer credit quality attributes. This finding supports the argument that riskier type borrowers are liquidity or credit constrained and, thus, have higher reservation loan interest rates. We also find a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit quality of the booked accounts of inferior offer types relative to superior offers. After controlling for a cardholder's observable risk attributes, demographic characteristics, and adverse economic shocks, we find that cardholders who responded to the inferior credit card offers are significantly more likely to default ex post. Our results provide evidence on the importance of adverse selection effects in the credit card market.     

Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries

The Central European banking industry is dominated by foreign-owned banks. During the recent crisis, for the first time since the transition, foreign parent companies were frequently in a worse financial condition than their subsidiaries. This situation created a unique opportunity to study new aspects of market discipline exercised by non-financial depositors. Using a comprehensive data set, we find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures. We establish that depositors’ actions were more strongly influenced by negative press rumors concerning parent companies than by fundamentals. The impact of rumors was especially perceptible when rumors turned out ex post to be founded. Additionally, we document that public aid announcements were primarily interpreted by depositors as confirmation of a parent company’s financial distress. Our results indicate that depositors react rationally to sources of information other than financial statements; this discovery has policy implications, as depositor discipline is usually the only viable and universal source of market discipline for banks in emerging economies.     

The moderating role of board gender diversity on the relationship between firm opacity and stock returns

In this study, we examine the impact of board gender diversity on the association between firm opacity and stock price crash. We utilize the negative shock of the 2007–2008 financial crisis to capital markets to examine whether firms with gender-diverse boards witnessed lower stock price crashes due to their lower opacity ex ante. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms spanning the period 2005–2008, we employ a difference-in-differences research design and find that firms with high opacity ex ante witness more negative returns ex post. We also find that gender-diverse firms ex ante witness less negative returns ex post. Finally, our analysis reveals the moderating role that board gender diversity plays in the association between firm opacity and stock returns around the financial crisis. We subject our results to a range of robustness checks, including instrumental variable regressions, matched-sample analyses, and a set of falsification and placebo tests. Overall, we provide evidence that board gender diversity is associated with increased transparency in financial reporting, which pays off in times of crisis.     

Reducing the impact of real estate foreclosures with Amortizing Participation Mortgages

We employ Amortizing Participation Mortgage (APM) to offer a novel ex post renegotiation method of a foreclosure. APM belongs to the family of home loan credit facilities advocated in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010. In our framework, APMs reduce the endemic agency costs of debt by improving affordability. These benefits increase the demand for real estate in bust times and reduce fragility of the financial system thereby preventing foreclosures. We evaluate APMs in a stochastic control framework and provide solutions for an optimal amortization schedule. We generalize our approach to partially amortizing and commercial mortgages which encompass balloon payments. Finally, we provide concrete numerical examples of home loan modifications. We also offer detailed sensitivity analysis to market parameters such as house price volatility and interest rates.     

Catastrophic Losses and Insurer Profitability: Evidence From 9/11

We examine the effects of 9/11 on the insurance industry, hypothesizing a short‐run claim effect, resulting from insufficient premium ex ante for catastrophic losses, and a long‐run growth effect, resulting from ex post insurance supply reductions and risk updating. Following Yoon and Starks (1995) we use short‐ and long‐run abnormal forecast revisions to measure both effects, analyzing them as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that firm type, loss estimates, reinsurance use, and tax position are important determinants of the short‐run position. Firm type, loss estimates, financial strength, underwriting risk, and reinsurance are key determinants of the firm's long‐run position.     

Search and herding effects in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from prosper.com

I examine loan data from Prosper.com—a website which allows borrowers to post loans and for lenders to bid on those loans. The Prosper market somewhat resembles the theoretical model of search, herding, and crowding in a large market described in Berkovich and Tayon (Phd. dissertation—Essays on search and herding. University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, 2009). That model predicts that assets with high and low prices have high variance in the difference between price and true value. These extreme price regions of the asset-space are where private information provides excess returns. In the Prosper market, I find some evidence for the model since loans with low ex post returns show higher variance of the difference between price and ex post return. I also find that high-priced loans provide excess returns even after accounting for risk-aversion.     

Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank pricing-to-market decisions and their impact on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to adopt market price accounting the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that adopted market price accounting.     

The Cascade Effect on Lending Conditions: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market

This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how interactions among potential lenders may influence contract terms via informational cascade in the syndicated loan market. Our model shows that the ex‐post observed interest rate is higher and the probability of syndication failure is lower when potential lenders can only observe the decisions of their predecessors versus when they can freely communicate with each other. Empirical tests confirm the model's predictions and the existence of a cascade effect on lending conditions. Using relational distance to proxy for the segmentation of communication, we find that relational distance is positively related to the loan spread and the requirements for collateral and guarantees, but negatively related to the probability of syndication failure.     

The Political Economy of Government-Issued Longevity Bonds

This article explores the trade‐offs associated with government issuance of longevity bonds as a way of stimulating private annuity supply in the presence of aggregate mortality risk. We provide new calculations suggesting a 5 percent chance that aggregate mortality risk could ex post raise annuity costs for private insurers by as much as 5–10 percentage points, with the most likely effect based on historical patterns toward the lower end of that range. While we suspect that aggregate mortality risk does exert some upward pressure on annuity prices, evidence from private market pricing suggests that, to the extent that private insurers are accurately pricing this risk, the effect is less than 5 percentage points. We discuss ways that the private market can spread this risk, while emphasizing that the government has the unique ability to spread aggregate risk across generations. We note factors that might hamper such an efficient allocation of risk, including potential political incentives for the government to shift more than the optimal amount of risk onto future generations, and the possibility that government fiscal policy might allocate risk less efficiently within each generation than would private markets. We also discuss how large‐scale longevity bond issuance might affect government borrowing costs, as well as political economy aspects of how the proceeds from such a bond issuance might be used.     

Market discipline in international banking regulation: Keeping the playing field level

The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks’ market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional and financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.     

Ex ante performance from ex post models of global equity market correlations

Analysis of ex post returns reveals the time series properties of correlations, but ex ante correlations are required for efficient diversification. We find that a time-varying parameter model offers the best fit to ex post global equity market correlations, suggesting changing mean correlations and changing rates of adjustment back to the means. Nevertheless, we do not find improved forecast performance from time-varying parameter models in holdout periods. The added complexity of time-varying models does not translate into lower forecast errors.     

Optimal Regulation Under Uncertainty

This paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain. Uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm's owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return. We argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors. The deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement-return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach. We present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty. ¹ 1 A recent paper by Baron 1 furnishes an excellent review of a host of diverse issues involving the behavior of the firm under uncertainty and the role of financial markets.
In our approach, the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors' perceptions and preferences over riskreturn characteristics. We portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value, given the prices set by regulators. Within this framework, it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors. We also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm.     

Creditor control rights and firm investment policy

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.     

Anticipated information releases reflected in call option prices

This study captures the ex ante information content of a financial reporting event (the annual earnings announcement) by examining the behavior of call option prices on dates leading up to and passing through the disclosure date. This approach differs from most previous empirical security price research which has been ex post in nature. The hypothesis that investors anticipate that the future release of annual earnings numbers will affect security prices is empirically confirmed. In particular, systematic changes in variance rates implied by the Black-Scholes option pricing model are demonstrated.     

Bank risk and real estate: An asset pricing perspective

While a number of papers have investigated the time-series behavior ofex post bank stock returns and real estate returns, no study has comprehensively studied the relationship betweenex ante risk premiums on both assetsand the time-varying nature of such premiums in relationship to economic and real estate market conditions. In this study, we investigate how the changing nature of bank risk taking, especially in the real estate market, has affected theex ante pricing of risk in the market for bank stocks. We find that the time variation in bank risk premiums are partly determined by interest rate and real estate market conditions. We also discover that the real estate factor has been important for banks in the 1980s.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity

Investors rely heavily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of corporate information to provide liquidity to the capital markets. We find that the rash of financial scandals caused a severe deterioration in market liquidity in the form of wider spreads, lower depths, and a higher adverse selection component of spreads vis‐à‐vis their benchmark levels. Regulatory responses including the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had inconsequential short‐term liquidity effects but highly significant and positive long‐term liquidity effects. These liquidity improvements are positively associated with the improved quality of financial reports, several firm‐specific variables (e.g., size), and market factors (e.g., price, volatility, volume).     

Enforceability and the effectiveness of laws and regulations

A major threat to the development of financial markets in emerging markets is “tunneling.” In China, this took on the form of controlling shareholders diverting assets from listed firms or coercing firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. A new set of rules enacted in 2005 prohibited asset diversion for “non-operational” purposes. Firms complying with these rules have experienced a reduction in related party transactions, an increase in investment, and better performance. In contrast, another set of contemporary rules, which aimed to standardize the practice of firms providing loan guarantees, has had very little impact. We attribute the contrasting design, implementation, and effectiveness of these two sets of rules to the difference in enforcement costs of the two types of tunneling activities. Relative to loan guarantees, it is much easier for a third party to determine (ex ante) whether a particular form of diversion destroys firm value, and to verify (ex post) that the losses to the firm resulted from the diversion. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability—laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are more likely to succeed, especially in countries with underdeveloped formal institutions.     

Corporate Financial Policy,Information, and Market Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of Dividends

This paper documents a relationship between announcements of unexpected changes in financial policy and unexpected changes in performance of the firm. Using a new methodology that combines analysis of stock price movements and earnings forecast data, the authors provide evidence that analysts revise their earnings forecasts following the announcement of an unexpected dividend change by an amount positively related to the size of the unexpected dividend change. They also provide evidence that these revisions are positively related to the change in equity value surrounding the announcement. Further, they find that these revisions are consistent with rationality. Their results therefore provide direct evidence consistent with the hypothesis that unexpected dividend changes signal information about firm performance to market participants.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Interest Rate Caps “Smile” Too! But Can the LIBOR Market Models Capture the Smile?

Using 3 years of interest rate caps price data, we provide a comprehensive documentation of volatility smiles in the caps market. To capture the volatility smiles, we develop a multifactor term structure model with stochastic volatility and jumps that yields a closed‐form formula for cap prices. We show that although a three‐factor stochastic volatility model can price at‐the‐money caps well, significant negative jumps in interest rates are needed to capture the smile. The volatility smile contains information that is not available using only at‐the‐money caps, and this information is important for understanding term structure models.