Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters, who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers.     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

Product Market Integration and Wages in Unionized Countries

This paper addresses the effects of product market integration on wages. We develop a two–country general equilibrium model of international trade with imperfectly competitive product markets and unionized labor markets. Integration is modelled as either a fall in fixed or variable trade costs. A reduction in fixed trade costs leads to an unambiguous decrease in wages, whereas a reduction in variable trade costs has an ambiguous effect on wages.
JEL classification : F 15; J 5; L 13     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Labor Mobility, Trade, and Social Capital

Labor market integration raises welfare in the absence of distortions. This paper examines labor and goods market integration in a general‐equilibrium model with social capital. The findings are: (i) labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare, and raises it if the goods and labor skills are sufficiently different; (ii) compared to Pareto optimum, labor mobility (social capital) is excessively large (depleted); (iii) trade is superior to labor market integration if trading costs are no higher than private migration costs, otherwise the outcome is ambiguous; and (iv) the creation of new institutions in response to labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare.     

市场一体化、非对称性贸易成本与制造业集聚*

国内市场一体化将会对中国制造业的空间分布造成何种影响？本文通过构建统一的理论分析框架验证了国内市场一体化影响制造业集聚的两种机制：其一是贸易成本总体水平的调节效应,其二是贸易成本非对称性的直接效应,而调节效应的方向则取决于模型理论范式选择。此外,本文基于中国区域间投入产出数据,系统地测算了中国地区间的非对称双边贸易成本,并基于测算结果进行回归分析。实证结果表明,在中国制造业发展初期,市场结构总体符合IRS MC范式设定,此时贸易成本的调节效应倾向于促进制造业在东部沿海区域集聚。伴随着制造业生产技术的成熟,制造业市场结构开始呈现CRS PC范式特征,此时市场一体化对制造业集聚的调节效应不再显著。     

Extensive and intensive margins and exchange rate regimes

This paper studies the costs and benefits of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in the presence of endogenous intensive and extensive margins of trade. The net benefit depends on the levels and volatilities of those margins as well as on their correlation with consumers’ preferences. A fixed exchange rate regime is preferred for sufficiently high labour supply elasticities and lower love for product diversity. Delays between entry and production make fixed exchange rate regimes less attractive.     

Market integration and tariff cooperation between asymmetric countries

This study explores the relationship between market integration—specifically a reduction in trade costs—and the sustainability of tariff cooperation, using a repeated game approach. We explore the property of noncooperative and cooperative tariffs about trade costs and the size of the domestic industry. We find that market integration does not induce the tariff rates to be lowered bilaterally in the noncooperative policy regime. By contrast, the cooperative regime brings about a bilateral tariff reduction when the market becomes integrated. Furthermore, by using the repeated game approach, we demonstrate that market integration facilitates cooperation between asymmetric countries.     

Industrial organization implications of QR trade regimes: Evidence and welfare costs

Evidence of the relationship between trade regimes, concentration and profitability in semi-industrial countries' manufacturing sectors is reviewed. This evidence is used to justify the formulation and simulation of a three sector general equilibrium model in which the manufacturing sectors's behavior is linked to the degree of restrictiveness of the QR regime. Simulations are conducted with several variants of the model to ascertain separately the effects of introducing economies of scale, firm entry/exit, departures from competitive pricing, and interactions between entry and pricing rules. Numerical results suggest that a 20 percent rationing rate of intermediates and consumption goods can have welfare costs of about 2.0 percent of national income in the absence of economies of scale and industrial organization interactions with the trade regime. When industrial organization features are included, the costs of the same 20 percent rationing quadruples.     

Vertical separation versus vertical integration in a macroeconomic model with imperfect competition

This paper develops a monopolistic competition macroeconomic model, and uses it to discuss the determination of relevant macro variables under both vertical separation and vertical integration regimes. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in the market equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the vertical integration regime are greater than under the vertical separation regime, while the product price index under the vertical integration regime is lower than that under the vertical separation regime. Secondly, the level of real aggregate profits under the vertical integration regime will be higher (lower) than that under the vertical separation regime if the degree of monopoly power is relatively large (small). Third, the welfare level under the vertical integration regime will be higher than that under the vertical separation regime regardless of the degree of monopoly power.     

Does North–South Integration Affect Multinational Firms’ Strategies?

This paper aims to develop a theoretical model that shows how a firm's decision to make a foreign direct investment is influenced by a North–South regional economic integration. Our results suggest that tariff‐jumping and export‐platform strategies depend on a tradeoff between variable trade costs and fixed costs, in addition to wage differences. Furthermore, insiders may affect the strategic location of outsiders by dampening the market accessibility advantages induced by the trade liberalization process, which results in an eviction of the outsiders from the area. This effect, however, depends heavily on the level of fixed costs. Indeed, a decrease in the costs of implanting in the low‐wage country gives the insiders a first‐mover advantage that allows them to later evict their competitors.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

A model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common-pool resource stock and welfare through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock. The model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a Markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare. Thus, opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines. Experimental results show that under certain conditions, subjects briefly follow a Markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects.     

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market. For compliance, they can also engage in abatement activity at a quadratic cost. Under the assumptions of the model, in equilibrium all polluters are successful in the auction. In the secondary market the low-cost emitters are net sellers and the high-cost emitters are net buyers. Moreover, the high-cost emitters are worse off as a result of the strategic behavior. In addition, the secondary market price is unambiguously above the auction clearing price. I find that the aggregate compliance cost when polluters act strategically increases in the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions, but there exists a threshold of the fixed supply of permits above which strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters. Finally, for a low enough variance of the marginal abatement cost at the business-as-usual emissions, strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters, regardless of the level of the available supply of permits.     

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS

The United States imports around 25% of its merchandise under some form of preferential trade regime. This paper examines both the origins and the consequences of U.S. trade preferences in the context of the gravity model of international trade. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, it provides estimates of the impact of preferential trade regimes in terms of access to U.S. markets while controlling for geostrategic interests that determine the countries that are offered commercial preferences. Second, we consider not only country eligibility but also the extent of utilization of these programs. Third, we provide new estimates of the impact of transport and transactions costs beyond distance. In the standard gravity estimation, we find that beneficiaries of these preferences, except GSP, export between two and three times more than the excluded countries, after controlling for country and product characteristics. Nonetheless, the estimated effects of these programs are lower when controlling for utilization ratios and selection biases due to the correlation between geopolitical interests and the standard explanatory variables used in the gravity model of trade, such as countries' geographic distance from the United States.     

本地市场效应:理论和经验研究的新近进展

本地市场效应是指,在一个存在报酬递增和贸易成本的世界中,那些拥有相对较大国内市场需求的国家将成为净出口国。它源自新古典贸易理论解释复杂贸易实践的理论局限和新贸易理论经验证据匮乏的困境,在探寻两种理论范式相对解释力的过程中应运而生,并随着空间经济学的迅猛崛起而成为新经济地理范式(New Economic Geography Paradigm)的核心特征之一。本文在回顾本地市场效应的理论背景和基本理论模型的基础上,对其理论模型和经验证据的新近发展作了系统的梳理并进行了简要的评论。     

The true story of wine and cloth, or: building blocks of an evolutionary political economy of international trade

Standard trade theory is a theory about the structure of international production which emerges from an international arbitrage equilibrium. It is not a theory about the activity of trading which is simply taken for granted or which is treated implicitly in the concept of exogenous trade costs. This paper proposes an alternative evolutionary framework based on networks as structures of non-price interactions into which price/quantity-interactions are embedded. These networks manifest different levels with specific problems of coordination and communication, i.e. levels of market transactions, of transaction-enabling transactions, of markets for market access rights, and of the respective transaction-enabling transactions. Furthermore, the theory is based on the analysis of capabilities to trade, resting upon competitive advantage, which cannot be imitated. The exploitation of competitive advantage presupposes the capability to control network interactions, identified as social capital. Finally, the security of market access reflects power balances among countries.