Optimal access pricing with interconnection obligation

In view of the recent regulatory trend that the incumbent is mandated to provide its own bottleneck facilities to entrants when requested, it is more reasonable to take an entrant than the incumbent as the one who plays a leader role. Given this regulatory framework, the present paper examines under what conditions the ECPR or marginal cost pricing is socially optimal.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Access to an Essential Facility: Efficient Component Pricing Rule or Unrestricted Private Property Rights?

In this paper, we compare the access to an essential facility in two different property rights regimes. In the first, the owner of the facility has an unrestricted private property right of the essential facility. In the second, access is regulated according to the efficient component pricing rule. Proponents of the second regime claim that this rule is efficient, for it forecloses the complementary market only to inefficient producers. We prove that, as far as entry is concerned, the two legal frameworks are equivalent if we do not consider the possibility of the transfer of the property right, and that if this is allowed the efficient component pricing rule might exclude efficient suppliers.     

Access pricing and investment: a real options approach

This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the overall welfare generated by this decision. In a regulated environment, we consider a vertically integrated network provider that is required to provide access to downstream competitors and compare two distinct access pricing methodologies: the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR). We identify the welfare-maximizing access prices using the unregulated market output as a benchmark and show that optimal access regulation depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of demand) with two possible outcomes: (i) access prices that provide a positive payoff to the incumbent, that is, provide a positive compensation to account for the option to delay; and (ii) access prices that yield a zero payoff to the incumbent. Moreover, unlike the earlier literature that argues in favor of an ECPR-type methodology to account for the interaction between irreversibility and demand uncertainty, we find that, except under very specific conditions, an access price that accounts for the option to delay value is welfare-superior to the ECPR.      

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

Transfer Pricing Rules,OECD Guidelines,and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility in a two‐country monopolistic competition model with source‐based profit taxes. Firms can either be multinationals and serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate, or be exporters and serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. The use of the OECD's comparable uncontrolled transfer price (CUP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions, because the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors—which serve as the benchmark—are not efficient. We show that the CUP rule is detrimental to consumers in the low‐tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high‐tax country when compared to the benchmark of unconstrained profit shifting. Using the OECD rule increases tax revenue at the expense of consumer surplus. Those results also hold under the alternative cost‐plus transfer pricing rule.     

INFLATION,OUTPUT, AND WELFARE*

We study the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search‐theoretic framework. We consider two pricing mechanisms: ex post bargaining and a notion of competitive pricing. Under bargaining, the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers' search intensities, output, and welfare. If prices are posted and buyers can direct their search, search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates. The Friedman rule achieves the efficient allocation, and inflation always reduces welfare, although it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates.     

Second best pricing of publicly produced inputs: The case of downstream imperfect competition

Efficient second best pricing is examined for a public enterprise facing two distortions: a profit constraint and imperfect competition among some customer industries. We suggest a measure of downstream industry distortion for the purpose of efficient pricing. The pricing rule contains two opposing elements: the shadow value of public profit and this measure of the downstream distortion, whose sum determines whether the efficient second best input price is above or below marginal cost. Efficient pricing normally implies relative subsidization of imperfectly competitive downstream firms.     

Economic Significance of the Predictable Movements in Futures Returns

This paper tests whether the variation in expected futures returns reflects rational pricing in an efficient market or weak-form market inefficiency. The issue is investigated by looking at the abnormal performance of a trading rule based on available information. Once one allows for time-varying risk and time-varying risk premia, the investment strategy can be used consistently to generate abnormal returns in seven out of 26 markets. With relatively few exceptions therefore, the predictable movements in futures returns reflect weak-form market efficiency. The paper also shows that wrongly assuming constant expected returns may lead to incorrect inferences regarding market efficiency.
(J.E.L.: G14, G12).     

有限理性监管、初步询价和IPO定价效率

在询价机制中加入初步询价阶段是我国累计投标询价机制区别于国际通行做法的主要特征。作为定价源头,初步询价为定价提供了最重要信息。本文从询价规则本身合理性出发,研究了初步询价在定价程序中的关键作用。研究发现,监管者的有限理性导致询价规则本身存在缺陷;由初步询价得到的初始价格区间主要受到询价家数、筹资额和市场整体回报影响,研究结果不同于成熟市场的结论;由于询价规则存在歧视性分配机制缺失、发行价受到控制和初步询价报价无有效约束等缺陷,初步询价没有改善定价效率。     

Second-Best Road Taxes in Polycentric Networks with Distorted Labor Markets*

This paper examines the interaction of road taxes with spatially invariant labor taxation in a polycentric network. It derives analytical expressions for the network counterparts of the traditional double-dividend effects (i.e., Pigouvian, tax-interaction, and revenue-recycling effects), and computes them under different policy regimes. The analysis reveals a series of conditions under which a system of cordons around the major nodes of a network might be more efficient than marginal external cost pricing. With a high elasticity of labor supply and limited public transport coverage, it is shown that the Pigouvian tax rule might reduce welfare even when the generated revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts.     

Pricing inputs to induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. Necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient Make-or-Buy decisions are derived. The necessary condition shows that input prices are relevant for Make-or-Buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient Make-or-Buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost provided changes in the entrant’s cost have a “normal” effect on the entrant’s profit. The conditions also show that pricing the incumbent’s input at the entrant’s marginal cost always ensures efficient Make- or-Buy decisions. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient Make-or-Buy decisions increases with the efficiency differential between the incumbent and entrant and with the demand displacement ratio.      

On the Characterization of Efficient Production Vectors

In this paper we study the efficient points of a closed production set with free disposal. We first provide a condition on the boundary of the production set, which is equivalent to the fact that all boundary points are efficient. When the production set is convex, we also give an alternative characterization of efficiency around a given production vector in terms of the profit maximization rule. In the non-convex case, this condition expressed with the marginal pricing rule is sufficient for efficiency. Then we study the Luenberger’s shortage function. We first provide basic properties on it. Then, we prove that the above necessary condition at a production vector implies that the shortage function is locally Lipschitz continuous and the efficient points in a neighborhood are the zeros of it and conversely.     

Optimal card payment systems

This paper presents a model of a card payment system to address the pricing and rules that govern such systems. It evaluates the social optimality of privately set interchange fees and the adoption of a rule by payment systems to prevent merchants surcharging for card transactions using two extremes of merchant pricing—monopolistic pricing and perfect competition. Both types of merchant pricing constrain the ability of card schemes to use interchange fees and the no-surcharge rule in anticompetitive ways, although for quite different reasons. The positive role of the no-surcharge rule in preventing excessive merchant surcharging is also highlighted.     

Decentralized pricing in minimum cost spanning trees

In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pricing rules, i.e., rules that cover at least the efficient cost while the price charged to each user only depends upon his own connection costs. We define a canonical pricing rule and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either superadditive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.     

Why equity cannot be separated from efficiency: the welfare economics of progressive social pricing

Applied neoclassical microeconomists maintain that when profits are constrained, and average costs are higher than marginal costs, Ramsey “inverse elasticity” pricing optimizes static consumer welfare. However, when weighted, instead of unweighted, consumer surplus aggregation is used, the Ramsey pricing rule becomes a “progressive social pricing rule,” which suggests that under plausible conditions “direct-elasticity” rather than “inverse-elasticity” pricing is consumer welfare optimal.     

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

WAGE BARGAINING WITH A PRICE-SETTING FIRM

This paper examines the introduction of monopolistic competition into wage bargaining models: in addition to capital-labour substitution, we also consider a cost-push effect. The right-to-manage model requires strong restrictions on the objective functions and leads to problematic conclusions because the wage claims of the union are generally not compatible with the mark-up requirement contained in the firm's price equation. In the efficient bargaining model, the union negotiates also the employment level, which gives it a way of extracting part of the monopoly rent: the firm's commitment to an efficient wage-employment combination forces it to follow a pricing rule such that part of the surplus is transferred to the union.     

Network Interconnection in Telecommunications

This paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dominant, regulated incumbent. In the first, provided there is sufficient product differentiation, it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit-maximising outcome. In the second a formula for the welfare-maximizing interconnection charge is derived. Relations with the 'efficient component pricing rule' are discussed     

Noxious Facilities, Environmental Damages, and Efficient Randomized Siting

This paper considers the efficient siting of a noxious facility that causes environmental damages (for example, increased pollution) in the host community. The analysis shows that there can be multiple efficient locations without transfers, and that an efficient location need not have the smallest WTA or WTP. In general, there exist randomized outcomes that are ex ante efficient and that Pareto dominate efficient outcomes. The analysis also shows that a community’s most preferred lottery never provides full insurance. Under some conditions, lotteries with no host compensation are Pareto superior to those with compensation.