网络产业价格规制模式的多元化及其适用性分析

网络产业所具有的自然垄断特性使政府的价格规制成为必要,但价格规制的复杂性在于它不仅受到多重目标导向不一致的困扰,还必须在信息不对称条件下进行设计,使得这类制度安排难以达到理想的效果。针对这种情况,本文在对不同激励强度的价格规制进行比较分析的基础上,提出了如何在提高资源配置效率和减少企业信息租金之间进行权衡的协调模式,并对各种模式的适用性从影响因素的角度予以说明。     

信息、串谋与自然垄断产业规制

串谋现象的存在破坏了机制设计中的直接显示原理,使机制设计的信息空间维数增加从而使机制设计变得更为复杂。在转轨经济国家的自然垄断产业规制过程中,内部规制者对自然垄断厂商信息结构上的改进使规制政策的设计倾向于低激励强度的成本加成契约,而且串谋现象的存在使规制过程更带有规制掠夺的特征。同时,这一事实也成为转轨国家中多部门共同参与对自然垄断产业进行规制的重要原因。     

信息不对称和不确定条件下垄断产业成本转嫁研究

不同的规制结构赋予了被规制厂商不同的成本转嫁能力和激励水平。在信息不对称条件下,代表社会福利的规制者在规制结构设计时权衡激励效应和租金抽取,最优成本转嫁比率与厂商的信息优势、努力的边际成本以及规制者的租金抽取比例成正比。在不确定性条件下,消费者和厂商的风险规避偏好对最优成本转嫁比率有重要影响,规制者在提供激励和保险间进行权衡,确定最优成本转嫁比率。     

产业规制的配置效率与生产效率

世界各国政府针对自然垄断产业所实施的各种类型的规制及其效应,集中体现在配置效率与生产效率两个方面,其政策导向在配置效率与生产效率之间游离取舍的事实,显示了这两种效率及其关联的重要性。通过对这两种效率受政府产业规制影响的相关性分析,可以发现不同的政府规制模式影响或约束这两种效率出现不同组合的一般机理,在此基础上,结合我国政府对自然垄断产业规制的实际,对这两种效率的不同取舍进行了比较。     

环境规制与电力碳强度——基于门限面板数据的实证分析

利用中国2003—2013年电力碳强度数据,将环境规制细分为费用型环境规制与投资型环境规制,基于门限面板模型分别对其进行门限回归,探究两种类型的环境规制对电力碳强度的影响,并采用Kernel密度估计法估计环境规制的空间差异性。研究表明:投资型环境规制对电力碳强度具有单门限效应,且在不同投资额度范围内呈现正负相反的效应;费用型环境规制对电力碳强度具有双门限效应,且在不同费用额度范围内都是正向效应,但效应强度不同。两种环境规制在空间上都具有差异性,而这种差异性随时间的演变增强。针对实证结果,建议在制定环境规制政策时需要考虑不同环境规制及不同地区间效果的差异性,有所侧重地制定与实施。     

效率视角的盐业规制改革:从激励性规制到市场化

在详尽分析盐业专营效率损失的基础上,本文倡导盐业的市场化改革方向。并认为,作为市场化的过渡,以激励性规制为核心内容的政府特许经营应是盐业规制改革的现实选择。根据新规制理论建立的盐业激励性规制机制设计模型提示,为纾缓逆向选择及道德风险的困扰,规制契约菜单应为最佳规制模式,且其激励强度应与被规制者的能力类型相匹配。盐业政府特许经营的契约设计应借鉴理论模型的研究结论,以促进盐业效率的提升。审计体系、廉政制度、法制等现实制度环境对模型适用性的影响说明,理论上的最佳规制迫切需要制度环境的配合。而凭借社会性规制的市场化,是值得我们期待的盐业体制改革的远景目标。     

自然垄断产业政府规制的需求分析

传统理论认为,一个产业只要具有自然垄断的特性,就需要政府通过规制手段进行治理。然而,进一步的研究发现,对于自然垄断的规制设计,依赖于一个产业自然垄断的强度和进入市场的壁垒等因素,文章运用成本曲线分析了自然垄断行业的不同类型,对不同类型的自然垄断进行了政府规制的需求分析,得出了一些有借鉴意义的结论。     

浅析我国电力产业市场结构

自然垄断产业的规制问题一直是经济学界讨论的热点。作为关系国计民生的电力产业,其市场结构的状态是其进行规制改革的基础。本文介绍了我国电力产业市场结构的现状,运用实证的方法,对电力产业市场结构的指标进行度量,并重点分析了发电市场。     

我国电力产业市场结构分析

自然垄断产业的规制问题一直是经济学界讨论的热点。作为关系国计民生的电力产业,其市场结构的状态是其进行规制改革的基础。本文介绍了我国电力产业市场结构的现状,运用实证的方法,对电力产业市场结构的指标进行度量,并重点分析了发电市场。     

双向FDI、环境规制与绿色创新效率北大核心

开放经济中,双向FDI逐渐成为影响绿色创新的重要因素。在运用超效率SBM模型对30个省份2007—2017年的绿色创新效率进行测算的基础上,探究两类环境政策下双向FDI对绿色创新效率的影响。结果表明:在命令控制型环境规制下,IFDI有利于绿色创新,而在市场激励型下则恰恰相反。并且两类环境政策下,OFDI均存在正向影响。此外,命令控制型环境规制存在单一门限值0.189,当环境规制的强度高于该门限值时,IFDI阻碍了绿色创新效率,OFDI促进了绿色创新效率,双向FDI间存在互补性;而当环境规制的强度低于门限值时,IFDI和OFDI有利于绿色创新效率的提升,双向FDI间存在替代性。     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

经济转轨中自然垄断行业规制改革——竞争、所有制与激励机制选择

竞争与所有制改革是目前自然垄断行业规制改革的主要趋势.但原有的理论和经验都是针对发达国家而言,对于转轨国家如何协调经济转轨与自然垄断行业改革却没有现成的理论与经验.所以,本文从转轨国家自然垄断行业引入竞争可能性以及所有制改革模式的选择入手,研究在加入策略性激励机制后竞争与所有制模式的不同组合对自然垄断企业绩效的影响.研究发现,转轨国家自然垄断行业改革进程取决于转轨国家市场发育程度以及改革的初始条件;混合所有制的企业竞争模式比完全私有化的社会福利水平要高,也更适合于转轨国家自然垄断行业改革的所有制选择模式.     

Cost-Padding in Profit-Regulated Firms*

When entry into an industry is restricted, economic regulation of that industry is often directed at preventing existing firms from monopoly pricing behaviour. One form of such regulation is to set prices so as to control the level of profits earned by these firms. This paper briefly reviews the relevant economic literature and presents a model of the regulated firm in which such price-setting procedures provide an incentive to inflate costs above minimum levels. The welfare cost of this form of regulation can then exceed that occurring at the unconstrained monopoly outcome. The setting of air fares under the Two-Airline Policy and the regulation of natural gas in NSW are discussed in the context of this analysis.     

论港口业务领域的分类规制政策

港口产业是国民经济的战略性基础产业和自然垄断产业改革的重要对象。对港口产业经济特性的传统认识使之长期以政府规制和公共经营为主导发展特征,但这却导致港口服务低效率和高成本。以往研究港口产业经济特性时,一般是从整体的角度来描述其自然垄断性,并认为有必要由政府施加经济规制。但实际上,对港口业务应该做进一步细分,以更准确地认识其经济特性。根据对港口不同业务领域规制需求的分析,在港口产业规制改革的具体过程中应该实行分类规制政策。为保障港口民营化改革的成功实施,基于对港口各业务环节不同经济特性的分类识别,提出了港口规制改革政策的基本模式,即在仍具有自然垄断特征的基础设施环节保持内生规制和引进接入定价规制,在竞争性环节放松或取消规制、实行竞争强化战略,在中间领域引入激励性规制。     

Franchise Bidding Without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider

The idea of franchise bidding, as a governance structure for regulating natural monopoly, has remained dormant for the last twenty years, during which the technology and regulation of natural monopoly has changed considerably, both in theory and in practice. Meanwhile, auction theory has advanced significantly, independently of regulatory economics, which has moved in a different direction, namely price-cap regulation. We seek to combine the effects of the changes in the technology of network industries and the advances in bidding theory and in regulatory economics toward the development of a rigorous model of franchise bidding. The model presented in this paper, which develops conditions for efficient outcomes, provides a benchmark to begin a reconsideration of the potential of franchise bidding. In particular, for the first time, we complete Demsetz' (1968) proposal by specifying (second-price) rules for bidding and for transfer of assets when the incumbent loses the bid at re-auction. The scheme features one bid determining simultaneously output pricing and asset transfer pricing, to address concerns of hold-up and opportunistic behavior in the event of a change in franchisee.     

Evaluating the British Model of Electricity Deregulation

Abstract ** :  A key aspect of the 1990 reforms to the British electricity supply industry was the introduction of a formal system of regulation by an autonomous regulatory body. It was expected that replacement of monopolies in some areas by markets and price‐setting in monopoly areas using a simple incentive formula would mean that regulation of the industry would be 'light'. This article examines how regulation has turned out in practice. It concludes that the promise of 'light' regulation has not been fulfilled. Regulation of competitive markets is a major regulatory activity, incentive regulation has evolved into a complex and intrusive form of rate‐of‐return, while regulation of industry structure has allowed the industry to descend into a concentrated, vertically integrated structure, at odds with the aims of the reforms .     

Welfare Effects of Price Integration in Local Public Transport

Abstract ** :  In metropolitan areas collective transport is often supplied by many firms and in many modes. The paper focusses on the merging of decisions about prices in two market regimes: monopoly and benevolent regulation through Ramsey pricing. The results confirm that centralization entails efficiency gains under monopoly whenever a unique supplier substitutes many firms serving each link of a network. Under benevolent regulation, instead, centralization entails efficiency gains only under certain conditions. Moreover, efficiency improvements under Ramsey pricing involve the introduction of cross subsidies among previous regulatory jurisdictions. Hence some users gain while others lose. Both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that periphery residents are the main beneficiaries of centralization .     

Regulating oligopolistic industries: A generalized incentive scheme

This paper deals with the design of regulatory mechanisms for oligopolistic industries. The proposed incentive scheme consists of two parts: a subsidy depending upon a firm's contribution to an equilibrium price reduction, and a tax equal to the profit of the previous period. This mechanism is as effective in regulating oligopolies as the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme in a monopoly framework. The proposed scheme provides appropriate incentives to enforce competitive behavior in a Cournot oligopoly. The scheme is welfare improving even if firms collude.     

世界电力产业的发展趋势对我国的启示——研究电力产业自然垄断、竞争和管制的重要意义

近年来,以打破垄断、促进竞争、提高效益、降低电价、改进服务为基本取向的电力产业改革,已成为国际电力产业的发展趋势。本文总结了以竞争为出发点的各国电力产业改革的共同点,并且针对我国电力产业的特殊性,提出研究电力产业改革的战略思路,并分析了电力产业自然垄断、竞争和管制的关系,是非常必要的。     

Incentive regulation,service quality,and standards in U.S. electricity distribution

The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993–1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible endogeneity of the regulatory regime, the data and model indicate that incentive regulation is indeed associated with significantly longer duration of service outages, although not necessarily more frequent outages. Importantly, this quality reduction is offset in cases where regulation incorporates service quality standards. We also examine the causal chain connecting incentive regulation, cost expenditures, and service quality. We conclude that careful design of quality standards can allow incentive regulation to achieve cost savings without quality degradation.