Impact of peer comparisons and firm heterogeneity on nonpoint source water pollution: An experimental study

Greg Poe was a pioneer in using experimental economics to test theories and potential policies for controlling ambient pollution. His foundational work showed that, in some settings, policies could induce groups to reduce their nonpoint source (NPS) pollution to socially-efficient levels. Poe’s earlier studies assumed firms were homogeneous, which laid the groundwork for subsequent research to investigate the effect of firm heterogeneity on policy outcomes. We build on the research foundation laid by Poe and his colleagues by using an economic experiment to test the effects of four types of firm heterogeneity and three social norm information treatments on the performance of an ambient tax/subsidy policy. Our experimental results show that heterogeneity reduces the effectiveness of the ambient tax/subsidy policy, but that information nudges can improve outcomes even when there is considerable heterogeneity in the policy environment. Participants were also better able to find and retain their dominant strategies when they were provided with information about similar firms, suggesting that individually-targeted information is more effective than information about aggregate group-level decisions.     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass‐through

This paper investigates effects of exchange rate on optimal trade policies and market prices within a standard export subsidy model. Shifts in exchange rate change relative efficiencies of firms in different countries. We show that depreciation of own currency increases subsidy levels when marginal cost is constant. Import dependency weakens this relationship, decreasing sensitivity of subsidy levels to depreciation. In general, subsidies reduce exchange rate pass‐through. Additionally, perverse exchange rate pass‐through effect arises with sufficiently intensive subsidies.     

Renewable energy subsidies: Second-best policy or fatal aberration for mitigation?

This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare and energy prices in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. The imperfectness of the carbon price is motivated by political concerns regarding distributional effects of increased energy prices. Hence, carbon prices are considered to be temporarily or permanently absent or endogenously constrained by their effect on energy prices. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource sector and calculate intertemporally optimal policies from a broad set of policy instruments including carbon taxes, renewable energy subsidies and feed-in-tariffs, among others. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy – a new version of the green paradox. Smart combinations of carbon prices and renewable energy subsidies, however, can achieve ambitious mitigation targets at moderate additional costs without leading to high energy price increases.     

PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Various arguments extol public encouragement of profit sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Generally, advocates of public intervention cite externalities (market failure), provision of merit goods, or social transformation as bases for their arguments. To the extent that profit sharing and ESOPs increase productivity or reduce employer costs, no case exists for public intervention, since such advantages are internalized. Although Congress views retirement saving as a merit good, deferred profit sharing and ESOPs are no more deserving of public subsidy on that basis than are other forms of saving, such as pensions. Finally, the notion that ESOPs promote a social transformation by redistributing equity is untenable. One can make a case for government efforts to spread data and information about these plans. The potential macro stabilizing effects of profit sharing—but not ESOPs—provide a rationale for a tax subsidy to the former.     

Agricultural subsidy policies fail to deal with child labour under agricultural dualism: What could be the alternative policies?

We provide a theoretical explanation why agricultural subsidy policies are likely to fail to ensure simultaneous eradication of the incidence of child labour and improvement in the well-being of the poor working families in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. We identify both demand and supply side effects of any policy intervention on child labour. We also suggest two alternative policies, a scheme of direct cash transfer to poor people and economic growth through foreign direct investment (FDI), both of which would be effective in achieving these twin objectives of a welfare government.     

Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications

Open access policies in telecommunications, including interconnection and unbundling, are implemented by regulators in an effort to increase competition in the sector. Lack of cooperation from incumbents is pervasive, given their incentives to engage in non-price discrimination and the moral hazard resulting from the inability of regulators to monitor the contract. We build a relationship between the access price and non-price discrimination, neither assuming a pre-determined market strategic interdependence or a specific demand function format. When the access charge is liberalized, the incentive for non-price discrimination disappears. It may be optimal for the regulator to set a second-best regulated access price to avoid non-price discrimination.     

The Phillips Curve and Optimal Policy in a Structural Signal Extraction Model

We study a monetary economy subject to “signal extraction” problems, and investigate within that framework the positive and normative aspects of monetary policy. As in Lucas (1972, Journal of Economic Theory,4, 103–124; 1973, American Economic Review, 63, 326–334), imperfect signal perception generates macroeconomic correlations similar to those found in the “Phillips curve” literature. Moving to normative aspects, we find that, when aggregate shocks are present, traditional nonactivist policies do not permit reaching the first best, and that an intelligent activist policy always leads to better outcomes. The specific characteristics and effectiveness of this optimal policy also depend crucially on the problem of signal extraction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E5.     

Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption

A calibrated model is used to determine the welfare impacts of various regulatory instruments for improving health. The results of a lab experiment are integrated in a partial equilibrium model representing demands for two kinds of fish, one with higher nutritional benefits (canned sardines) and one with higher contamination risks (canned tuna) in France. In the laboratory, information about health effects leads to a statistically significant decrease (increase) in the willingness to pay for tuna (sardines). Simulations with the laboratory results show that, for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without any information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy directly internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information.      

提高我国科技经费使用效益的创新政策研究

政府、依托单位和课题组围绕科技经费进行的博弈,主要体现在课题预算、管理费、人员费、课题决算、课题结余经费5个方面。根据市场机制和博弈论,提出了应从全面实施全额成本核算制的资助方式、同一课题唯一渠道制、增设依托单位的科研一般管理费用政策、适度提高人员费支出比例、开发与政策配套的管理工具、建设专业化科技经费管理队伍、注意政策间的相互配套7个方面进一步完善我国现行科技经费管理政策的建议。     

不完全竞争、非对称信息下的最优进口贸易政策和产业政策

本文讨论了不完全竞争和非对称信息情况下 ,如何运用进口贸易政策和产业政策增进本国福利的问题。本文发现 ,(1 )在Cournot同质产品竞争的情况下 ,制定可以诱使本国企业显示真实成本的政策规则可以实现与完全信息情况相同的配置结果 ;并且 ,本国企业的生产成本越低 ,政策规则规定的最优关税越低 ;在某些成本结构下 ,甚至应该执行零关税政策。 (2 )在圆形城市空间竞争 (SpatialCompetitioninCircularCity)的情况下 ,生产补贴和关税的作用完全等价 ;不存在可以实现事后效率的政策规则 ,并且 ,约束最优结果不是一个PBE均衡结果 ,本国政府的最优政策是制定等于单位运输成本的关税。上述结论蕴含 ,最优政策干预以及它能否消除非对称信息可能带来的效率损失依赖于竞争类型 ,而不依赖于信息结构 ,因此 ,它不会发生扭曲     

Information design,externalities, and government interventions

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.     

粮食补贴政策对农户种植决策行为影响的实证分析——基于安徽省17个地市421户农户的调查数据

粮食补贴政策旨在提高农民种粮积极性,促进粮食增产和农民增收。粮食补贴政策对激励农户增加粮食播种面积具有显著的正面效应,粮食补贴政策在动态趋势上表现出显著的＂土地投入＂激励效应。     

Real Estate Market Policy and Household Demand for Housing

This paper used an estimated mixed multinomial logit model of household housing demand to examine the impact of four housing market‐related policies on a stated preference survey sample. The estimated demand probability function suggested that household choice behaviour does show huge heterogeneity. The estimated results were then employed to examine the effects of the policies. We estimated the potential disequilibrium between demand and supply under the construction‐size‐limitation policy, demonstrated that the efficient movers' subsidy increases along with the household income, and simulated the changes in housing demand when tax policy is changed. We demonstrate the potential usefulness of our modelling framework in assisting policy‐making decisions. Our model also partially explains the failures and controversies of the latest real‐estate intervention policies in China.     

战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如LeahyandNeary(2001)分析的稳健。     

战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如Leahyand Neary(2001)分析的稳健。     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

Tax on emissions or subsidy to renewables? Evaluating the effects on the economy and on the environment

We examine the relationship between the economy and the environment in a model where production uses nonpolluting renewable and polluting nonrenewable resources. There is policy intervention through a tax on emissions and a subsidy to renewables extraction/production. Results show that both instruments are able to decrease emissions intensity of output. However, when used together, the desired effect is higher. Empirically it is shown that the subsidy achieves higher renewables intensity and although present emissions per output are similar for both instruments, the subsidy achieves lower future levels.     

INFORMATIONAL CASCADES ELICIT PRIVATE INFORMATION*

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truth‐telling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only exists for high‐surplus projects. Both an investment subsidy and an investment tax can increase welfare. The more precise the sender's information, the higher her incentives to truthfully reveal her private information.     

R&D补贴与商前采购:互补还是互替——创新政策过程视角的比较研究

科技创新体系绩效不仅取决于单项政策效果，更取决于政策间的组合效应。运用两组案例，从政策过程视角对R&D补贴与商前采购（PCP）的项目筛选机制和项目管理机制进行比较分析，结果表明，PCP与R&D补贴同时存在互补和互替关系。作为一种新兴创新政策工具，PCP不仅同样具备缓解研发融资约束的功能，还存在两个方面的潜在优势：一是有利于采购方发挥需求信息和应用环境信息方面的优势；二是在政策执行机制上更加精准，特别适用于实现“点的突破”。积极引入新工具扩充创新政策“工具箱”，在认清工具属性基础上，发挥各种工具的独特优势，对优化创新政策组合设计，提升科技创新体系绩效具有重要价值。