Managerial ownership and the disposition effect

This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund managers’ ownership and the disposition effect. Using recently disclosed managerial ownership data required by new SEC rules, we document that a significant number of mutual funds exhibit the disposition effect. Funds with managerial ownership exhibit significantly less disposition effect than those without, and the disposition measure decreases with managers’ percentage ownership. We also find that the disposition effect is negatively related to the degree of board independence and fund performance. Our findings suggest that the disposition effect is significantly affected by fund governance and higher managerial ownership may help mitigate the problem.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.     

Size and investment performance: a research note

This article examines the performance of actively managed Australian equity funds and the extent to which both fund size and manager size are related to risk-adjusted returns. Larger investment managers, by definition, engage in higher trade volume. The literature documents that transaction costs and trade difficulty increase with trade size, given difficulties associated with 'large' trades and their potential market impact on security prices. Therefore, ceteris paribus , large orders are consistent with lower levels of efficiency in trade execution and higher transaction costs. While larger investment managers may experience material disadvantages relative to their smaller counterparts, the Australian literature to date has largely ignored the issues of asset size and the long run performance of investment offerings. This article, employing returns and fund size data that control for survivorship bias, documents that while large retail active equity funds earn higher risk-adjusted returns (after expenses) than small funds, the difference in mean performance is not significantly different. In the institutional sphere, the study also finds no statistically significant performance differences (net of expenses) between funds on the basis of portfolio size. These findings suggest the hypothesis that performance declines with fund size is not supported empirically.     

Board Independence and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

This paper studies the relationship between board independence and manager turnover in the mutual fund industry. Using the Lipper 2003 mutual fund board data, we find that manager turnover is more likely to happen to funds with poor prior performance and more independent boards. Consistent with previous studies such as Tufano and Sevick (1997), our research provides new evidence in support of the Securities and Exchange Commission's approach of improving fund governance by promoting board independence.     

Commonalities in investment strategy and the determinants of performance in mutual fund mergers

This paper examines the determinants of cross-sectional variation in post-merger mutual fund performance. Mergers between funds with similar management objectives, as reflected by average portfolio book-to-market ratio, price–earnings ratio, beta and market capitalization values, outperform mergers between funds with dissimilar strategies. This superior performance transcends lower portfolio rebalancing costs which might be realized between merging funds which hold more assets in common. These results suggest that mutual fund mergers create collaborative benefits between funds with similar strategies. We also examine if fund governance structures influence the fund pairing process, testing if stronger fund oversight mitigates pairing mismatches. We find that less independent boards of trustees and boards with higher compensation are related to greater strategic mismatches between funds. These results suggest that more entrenched boards are more tolerant of fund mismatches which benefit the investment company, yet are not in investor’s best interests.     

Equity fund ownership and the cross-regional diversification of household risk

We explore the link between portfolio home bias and consumption risk sharing among Italian regions using household-level information on consumption, income and portfolio holdings. Since equity funds are typically diversified at the national or international level, we use data on equity fund ownership to proxy for regional home bias. Cross-regional patterns of equity fund ownership are qualitatively consistent with simple portfolio theory: regions with more asymmetric business cycles are more diversified because they have higher fund participation rates (the extensive margin of diversification) and higher average holdings of equity funds (diversification’s intensive margin). Also, fund holdings increase with the exposure of non-tradable income components (such as labor or entrepreneurial income) to regional shocks. Finally, interregional consumption risk sharing increases with fund holdings and this effect seems strongest when participation is widespread. Increased equity market participation could substantially improve interregional risk sharing.     

The Predictability of Managerial Heterogeneities in Mutual Funds

Using a sample of Chinese mutual funds, we empirically assess how managerial heterogeneity affects mutual fund performance. We find that funds with higher manager fixed effects outperform those with lower manager fixed effects by 2% per year. We also note that fund performance improves after managers with higher fixed effects are hired. The results are consistent with the notion that manager fixed effects are associated with managerial innate ability. Finally, we find that investors pay attention to managerial attributes beyond the traditional performance measures, providing supporting evidence for the rational explanation of convex flow‐performance sensitivity in the literature.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

The performance of female hedge fund managers

Using data for the period 1994–2013, we examine the return and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds having at least one female portfolio manager and funds that have all female portfolio managers. Funds with all female managers perform no differently than all male-managed funds and have similar risk profiles. For single-style funds, those with mixed teams of both genders underperform male-only funds on both a raw and risk-adjusted basis, although mixed funds incur less risk and their Sharpe ratios do not differ. For funds of funds, both all-female and mixed funds have similar performance to male-managed funds. We then consider the failure rate across all fund styles. Funds with at least one female manager fail at higher rates, driven by difficulty in raising capital—these funds are smaller and are less likely to be closed to new investment. Surviving funds with at least one female manager have better performance than male-managed surviving funds, consistent with the idea that female managers need to perform better for their funds to survive. Yet, female-managed surviving funds have fewer assets under management than surviving male-managed funds. Using media mentions as a proxy for investor interest, female-managed funds receive proportionately less attention. Our results suggest that there are no inherent differences in skill between female and male managers, but that only the best performing female managers manage to survive.     

Hedge funds,managerial skill,and macroeconomic variables

This paper evaluates hedge fund performance through portfolio strategies that incorporate predictability based on macroeconomic variables. Incorporating predictability substantially improves out-of-sample performance for the entire universe of hedge funds as well as for various investment styles. While we also allow for predictability in fund risk loadings and benchmark returns, the major source of investment profitability is predictability in managerial skills. In particular, long-only strategies that incorporate predictability in managerial skills outperform their Fung and Hsieh (2004) benchmarks by over 17% per year. The economic value of predictability obtains for different rebalancing horizons and alternative benchmark models. It is also robust to adjustments for backfill bias, incubation bias, illiquidity, fund termination, and style composition.     

基金经理更换、股票联动与股票价格

基金经理更换打破了基金共同持股投资组合中股票的关联性,降低了股票收益率相关性,进而影响了股票价格。本文基于基金共同持股和基金经理更换构建了对冲投资组合,获得0.1%的日超额收益率。基金投资组合中股票收益率相关性能够解释这种超额收益率,本文发现基金更换经理后,新基金经理重建投资组合,打破了原投资组合中股票间的关联,股票收益率相关性减弱,基金共同持股程度高的股票价格受到了更大影响。基金的被动流动性冲击不能解释本文的发现。本文的研究表明基金经理变更等基金管理行为通过股票收益率相关性对股票价格产生了重要影响。     

Global equity fund performance, portfolio concentration, and the fundamental law of active management

This paper investigates the relation between portfolio concentration and the performance of global equity funds. Concentrated funds with higher levels of tracking error display better performance than their more broadly diversified counterparts. We show that the observed relation between portfolio concentration and performance is mostly driven by the breadth of the underlying fund strategies; not just by fund managers’ willingness to take big bets. Our results indicate that when investors strive to select the best-performing funds, they should not only consider fund managers’ tracking-error levels. More important is that they take into account the extent to which fund managers carefully allocate their risk budget across multiple investment strategies and have concentrated holdings in multiple market segments simultaneously.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

Shareholder activism of public pension funds: The political facet

This paper studies the political incentive of public pension funds in shareholder activism. Using a sample of shareholder proposals from 1993 to 2013 and a hand-collected data set of the political variables of public pension funds, we document evidence consistent with the “political attention hypothesis.” We find that the number of politicians on public pension fund boards is significantly positively related to the frequency with which portfolio firms are targeted. Moreover, the frequency of social-responsibility proposals by public pension funds increases significantly, as the funds have a greater number of board members running for election to public office. However the frequency of corporate governance proposals is not related to the number of board members running for elections to public office. Furthermore, we document that political connection between a portfolio firm and a public pension fund mitigates the firm’s likelihood of being targeted by the fund with social-responsibility proposals. This result supports the “political contribution hypothesis.” The paper provides direct evidence that public pension-fund board members employ shareholder proposals to enhance their political capital.     

Mutual fund skill and the performance of corporate acquirers

We show that the commonly observed correlation between institutional investor ownership and the success of mergers is partly driven by active stock picking. Several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-merger performance of corporate acquirers even after controlling for possible shareholder monitoring. These findings are stronger for funds with characteristics more indicative of active stock picking. Moreover, firms held by funds with higher stock selection skills are more likely to subsequently become acquirers, suggesting that the mutual fund skill set includes the ability to identify acquirers with value-enhancing acquisition opportunities.     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

Managerial ownership,board monitoring and firm performance in a family‐concentrated corporate environment

Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.