Reform of the regulations on marginal employment lacks cohesion

Conclusion If the federal government is concerned to avoid restricting labour market dynamics in the low-income segment, it should seek a solution that tears down the ‘wall’ represented by the ceiling on marginal employment. This is not achieved by the envisaged reform concept. In fact the way forward was set out in the new government’s coalition agreement. There the government’s intention is expressed to incorporate all forms of paid employment, i.e. including self-employed activities, into the social insurance system. This would tear down the wall consisting of a high marginal tax and contribution burden that still blocks the transition from marginal work to regular part-time employment. Yet this would also require the courage to abolish flat-rate taxation in favour of an extension of individual income taxation. It seems that such a reform—as is the case with a comprehensive concept for a re-regulation of the labour market and a reform of social security—cannot be implemented in the short run. Consequently, the reform of marginal employment should be placed on the agenda of the ‘Alliance for Jobs’: these tripartite talks between employers, unions and the government, that are to be chaired by the Chancellor personally, should serve not only to bring about a reduction in German unemployment in the short-term, but also to find new, sustainable regulations for the labour market and social security. One advantage, at least, of the proposed reform of marginal employment is that it is in fact so marginal that it will not constitute an obstacle to a more comprehensive reform.     

No significant service gap between west Germany and the USA

Conclusions The analyses show that a significant “services gap” does not exist between west Germany and the USA. Such a gap is not even evident in the area of low-skill service activities, such as in catering, once the marginal employment relations — the importance of which is understated by the official statistics — are included. This finding invalidates the empirical basis for economic policy proposals for an expansion of employment in service branches as a way out of the employment crisis. It is evident that a solution to Germany's current employment problems can only be found in a strategy that increases the scope for employment at the macro-economic level, i.e. irrespective of sectoral developments and whatever the implications of this for the distribution of the various types of activity. Having said this, the heavy bias in the output structure of the German economy in favour of industrial output suggests that an additional employment potential does exist in services, especially personal services.     

Bringing Back the Jobs Lost to Covid-19: The Role of Fiscal Policy

Covid-19 induced job losses occurred predominantly in industries with intensive worker–client interaction as well as in pink-collar and blue-collar occupations. We study the ability of fiscal policy to stabilize employment by occupation and industry during the Covid-19 crisis. We use a multisector, multioccupation macro-economic model and investigate different fiscal-policy instruments that help the economy recover faster. We show that fiscal stimuli foster job growth for hard-hit pink-collar workers, whereas stimulating blue-collar job creation is more challenging. Only a cut in labor income taxes generates a substantial number of blue-collar jobs.     

Apply with Caution: Introducing UK‐Style In‐Work Support in Germany*

Estimates of the labour supply effects of recent UK reforms in the area of direct taxes and benefits show that policy can have significant influence on the level of employment. We confirm this in a simulation of an in‐work support system introduced into the German tax and benefit system. Our simulation results suggest that introducing in‐work tax credits in Germany would increase the employment of single individuals by over 105,000 but would result in a reduction of labour supply among individuals living in couples by about 70,000, among both women and men. The result found for men is especially important as it is markedly different from all results for the UK, where the net response among men has always been found to be positive. Our estimation results call for a high degree of caution as far as ‘importing’ UK‐style tax credits to Germany is concerned. In‐work support based on family income would reinforce the existing work disincentives for secondary earners, reducing the employment levels of both men and women living in couples.     

The Netherlands: An employment policy role model?

Conclusion While in recent years the level of social security benefits in the Netherlands has been reduced somewhat —whereby to some extent this involved the employers shouldering additional costs (e.g. for disability pensions) —the benefits for unemployment and other social bene-fits remain high in international comparative terms. Despite a slight decline in social benefits as a share of GDP, public sector spending as a whole is, at around 50%, slightly higher than in Germany, although the Netherlands has not had to cope with extraordinary burdens such as have resulted from German unification. The successes achieved by the Netherlands on the labour market have been exaggerated. Firstly, the real level of unemployment is likely to be actually rather high in international terms, at least once one dispenses with a narrow definition and takes account, in particular, of the large number of occupationally disabled. Secondly, the fall in the unemployment rate is far from spectacular. Although the increase in the number of wage and salary earners has been substantially higher in the Netherlands than in west Germany, this in no way represents a comparable increase in the volume of employment—measured in working hours—as the incidence of part-time employment has increased far faster there than in west Germany. The Netherlands has achieved-slightly-higher growth than west Germany. This success is largely due to a very moderate growth of wages and salaries, amounting to a real depreciation of the guilder against the D-Mark, an economic policy strategy that can be successful in a small country, but one which, if applied by a large country such as Germany, would merely initiate a beggar-thy-neighbour race to lower real exchange rates.     

Fiscal Policy and Occupational Employment Dynamics

We document substantial heterogeneity in occupational employment dynamics in response to government spending shocks in the United States. Employment rises most strongly in service, sales, and office (“pink-collar”) occupations. By contrast, employment in blue-collar occupations is hardly affected by fiscal policy. We provide evidence that occupation-specific changes in labor demand are key for understanding these findings. We develop a business-cycle model that explains the heterogeneous occupational employment dynamics as a consequence of composition effects due to heterogeneous employment changes across industries and occupation-specific within-industry employment shifts due to differences in the short-run substitutability between labor and capital services across occupations.     

Markups and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles: A Reappraisal

Gali, Gertler, and Lopez‐Salido (2007) recently show quantitatively that fluctuations in the efficiency of resource allocation do not generate sizable welfare costs. In their economy, which is distorted by monopolistic competition in the steady state, we show that they underestimate the welfare cost of these fluctuations by ignoring the negative effect of aggregate volatility on average consumption and leisure. As monopolistic suppliers, both firms and workers aim to preserve their expected markups; the interaction between aggregate fluctuations and price‐setting behavior results in average consumption and employment levels that are lower than their counterparts in the flexible‐price economy. This level effect increases the efficiency cost of business cycles. It is all the more sizable with the degree of inefficiency in the steady state, lower labor–supply elasticities, and when prices instead of wages are rigid.     

The social organization of time

If all social life has been structured around a single model of employment founded on standard working hours, the reduction in working time, and in particular the diversification of working hours, is likely to effect radical transformation from both the economic and social points of view. This diversification will continue, it is argued, because of the new economic imperatives as much as sociocultural developments. It is forecasted that the old standard model is being replaced by much more flexible management of working hours and, hence, free time. What is not so clear is whether this flexibility in working conditions, which will bring with it a revolution at the individual, company and societal levels, will be equally benign for all.     

Unit labour costs still higher in east than in west Germany

Conclusion The rapid wage growth in east Germany during the early years of German unification are a millstone around the neck of medium-term economic development in the new federal states. Because labour costs have raced ahead of productivity, unit labour costs have risen to a level substantially higher than that prevailing in the old federal states: there has been no improvement in the relationship between east and west German unit labour costs in recent years. Comparatively high wages at low productivity have led to an unfavourable profitability situation for many east German firms, which, in turn, has reduced investmen and slowed productivity growth. If firms in the new federal states are to break out of this vicious circle “it is essential that the level of collectively agreed wages does not rise for a number of years. Productivity growth would then create the scope for an improvement in profitability, which, in turn, is a necessary precondition for investment and the creation of competitive jobs… Only if a fundamental correction towards a relation (between labour costs and productivity) corresponding to that in west Germany is realised in east Germany can a self-sustained growth process be expected.”⁷ Yet in 1997 there is again no chance of a change of course of this nature.     

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

Comparative advantage and unemployment

Worker heterogeneity in productivity and labor supply is introduced into a matching model. Workers who earn high wages and work high-hours are identified as those with strong market comparative advantage—high rents from being employed. The model is calibrated to match separation, job finding, and employment in the SIPP data. The model predicts a big drop in employment for workers with weak comparative advantage during recessions. But the data show that workers with strong comparative advantage also display sizable employment fluctuations, implying that aggregate employment fluctuations are not explained by the responses of workers with small rents to employment.     

Trade Liberalization and Industry Wage Structure: Evidence from Brazil

Industry affiliation provides an important channel through whichtrade liberalization can affect worker earnings and wage inequalitybetween skilled and unskilled workers. This empirical studyof the impact of the 1988–94 trade liberalization in Brazilon the industry wage structure suggests that although industryaffiliation is an important component of worker earnings, thestructure of industry wage premiums is relatively stable overtime. There is no statistical association between changes inindustry wage premiums and changes in trade policy or betweenindustry-specific skill premiums to university graduates andtrade policy. Thus trade liberalization in Brazil did not significantlycontribute to increased wage inequality between skilled andunskilled workers through changes in industry wage premiums.The difference between these results and those obtained forother countries (such as Colombia and Mexico) provides fruitfulground for studying the conditions under which trade reformsdo not have an adverse effect on industry wage differentials.     

Employment and wage effects of a payroll-tax cut—evidence from a regional experiment

In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll taxes by 3–6 percentage points for 3 years in northern Finland. We match each firm in the target region with a similar firm in a comparison region and estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction by comparing employment and wage changes within the matched pairs before and after the start of the experiment. According to our results, the reduction in the payroll taxes led to an increase in wages in the target region. The point estimates indicate that the increase in wages offset roughly half of the impact of the payroll tax cut on the labor costs. The remaining labor cost reduction had no significant effects on employment.     

Assessing the Social Impact of Corporations: Evidence from Management Control Interventions in the Supply Chain to Increase Worker Wages

This study examines an initiative by a large multinational garment retailer (H&M Group) to increase wages at its supplier factories by intervening in their wage-related management practices. Difference-in-differences estimates based on eight years of data from over 1,800 factories show that the interventions were associated with an average real wage increase of approximately 5% by the third year of implementation. Our estimates suggest that the intervention-associated wage increase was many times greater than if the retailer's cost for the program was instead paid directly to affected workers. We find that the wage effects were driven by factories with relatively poorer supplier ratings and do not find significantly different wage effects depending on the presence of trade unions. We also examine several nonwage outcomes such as factory orders, supplier price competitiveness, overtime pay, and total employment to probe the mechanisms underlying the wage increases. These findings offer new evidence on corporate social impact in global supply chains.     

Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to Education, Experience, and Gender in Slovenia

This article, using an unusually rich data set on Slovenianworkers over the 1987–91 period, explores changes in thestructure of wages and employment produced by transition toa market economy. Employment and real wages fell dramaticallyover the period, but the losses were borne disproportionatelyby the least skilled. Across all sectors of the economy, relativewages and employment rose for the most-educated workers. Womengained in comparison with men, primarily because women occupiedsectors less adversely affected by the transition. Pension policies,which encouraged retirement, are shown to have drastically reducedemployment of experienced workers and helped contribute to risingreturns to skill. Increases in returns to education and experiencecontributed to rising wage inequality, but the variance of wagesincreased for workers with identical skills as well.     

Gap in relative importance of service activities closed

Conclusion Overall it is evident that the relative importance of services and service activity trends in the USA and west Germany is very similar. In other words the activity structure in Germany is indeed “modern”. Also in highly productive areas of production, value adding largely takes the form of service activities. Thus the employment problem in Germany results not from outdated activity structures; the causes are rather those macroeconomic reasons to which the DIW has repeatedly drawn attention⁷. German economic policy must ensure that the framework of macroeconomic conditions is changed to allow jobs to be created. Whether these jobs are created in certain branches or activities is of secondary importance. Having said this, in Germany, too, it is to be expected that more than two out of every three new jobs created will be service jobs. Even so, a quarter of new jobs will be created in industry.     

Accountancy as Computational Casuistics

If a company's share price rises when it sacks workers, or when it makes money from polluting the environment, it would seem that the accounting is not being done correctly, since real costs are not being paid. This article argues for a synthesis of ethics with accountancy's tradition of quantification, which would allow ethical rights to become legally enforceable.     

Lost Generations: Long-Term Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Job Losers and Labour Market Entrants,and Options for Policy*

This paper discusses the potential long-run effects of large-scale unemployment during the COVID-19 crisis in the labour market on vulnerable job losers and labour market entrants in the United States. The paper begins by contrasting measures of the scale of job loss during the crisis. These measures are paired with estimates from past recessions indicating that the costs of job loss and unemployment can reduce workers’ earnings and raise their mortality for several decades. Focusing only on a subset of vulnerable job losers, the potential lifetime earnings losses from job loss related to the COVID-19 pandemic are predicted to be up to $2 trillion. Related losses in employment could imply a lasting reduction in the overall employment–population ratio. For these workers, losses in potential life years could be up to 24 million. Even at the low range, the resulting estimates are substantially larger than losses in potential life years from deaths directly due to COVID-19. New labour market entrants are at risk to suffer long-term losses in earnings and mortality as well. Based partly on experiences in other countries, the paper discusses potential reforms to short-time compensation programmes and unemployment insurance, which could help limit the short- and long-term harm from layoffs going forward.     

Fixed‐Rate Mortgages,Labor Markets,and Efficiency

The paper studies the effects of mortgage choices between fixed‐rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable‐rate mortgages (ARMs) on labor market efficiency. FRMs provide insurance for risk‐averse borrowers in the sense that they pay the same rate over time and are not subject to uncertain spot market rates. FRMs, however, discourage borrowers from moving to other regions despite better employment opportunities, as they terminate the FRM contracts in order to move and their new loan interests may be higher. As FRM‐borrowers do not move to other regions due to the interest lock‐ins, entrepreneurs in other regions lose the potential surpluses from productive matches that would have occurred between borrowers‐workers and entrepreneurs. Borrowers ignore this negative externality they impose on the entrepreneurs when choosing their mortgages, and too many borrowers choose FRMs relative to the efficient level. If FRMs are eliminated and ARM‐insurance (that protects ARM‐borrowers against uncertain adjustable interest rates) is created, it will improve efficiency. The paper also assesses quantitatively the welfare effects of eliminating FRMs and providing ARM‐insurance.     

The global threat of deflation calls for swift interest rate cuts in Europe

Conclusions Given the serious crisis in Asia and evidence of its spreading to other developing and transition countries, the attempt by German economic policymakers to achieve faster economic growth and higher employment almost exclusively by means of successes on export markets appears likely to fail sooner than had been expected by the DIW⁵. The significance of domestic demand has been systematically underestimated in recent years. With the help of extremely low pay settlements, the D-Mark was devalued in real terms; this promoted exports, but at the same time led to growth losses in private consumption and investment that more than offset the gains in exports. On top of this German fiscal policy—as documented in the following report in this issue—has weakened domestic demand and investment activity. This strategy might have worked if a symmetrically oriented monetary policy had reacted to the deflationary trend inherent in pay settlements and the fiscal-policy stance by swiftly and significantly reducing interest rates. This did not happen. It was therefore inevitable that the crisis in sales markets made its full effects felt on economic growth. More seriously still, if cost deflation in Germany is not brought to an end in the coming year by a return to productivity-oriented wage settlements, it will pose a major threat to the European Monetary Union.⁶ If Germany pursues a beggar-thyneighbour policy in a Europe without exchange rates, this can only result in deflation and a downward economic spiral.⁷