A note on internal and external reference in efficiency wage models

According to Bewley, a workers’ morale depends on being treated fairly within firms. This implies that the internal comparison of the own wage with wages paid to other workers within the firm affects individual effort determination. By contrast, the standard efficiency wage models only consider a comparison of the own wage with external income opportunities as the only determinant for individual effort. We provide a simple efficiency wage framework in which both the internal and external perspectives can affect individual effort determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the existence of real wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-sloping wage-setting curve.      

ENDOGENOUS GROWTH, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND INDUSTRY WAGES

Lucas' model (1988) of external effects of human capital formation is taken as a starting point for looking at the impact of human capital on wages. Even though most empirical tests of New Growth Theory are made using time-series and cross-sections of countries — with good reasons — I suggest a microeconometric approach in order to test Lucas' basic assumption of external effects of human capital. As a first step, internal effects of education are filtered out by using wage functions for individuals in Austria. In the second step, resulting industry wage premiums are regressed on industry-specific characteristics and, above all, on average human capital in the industry to account for external effects of human capital.     

TAXATION AND CENTRALISED WAGE SETTING: THE CASE OF ENDOGENOUS LABOUR SUPPLY

The implications of centralised wage setting for the relationship between taxation, wages and employment are studied allowing for endogenous adjustment in work hours. We show that centralisation promotes wage moderation, makes wages and employment less sensitive to changes in wage taxation and reduces the hours worked. With an individual supply of working hours, a wage tax can even improve employment if wage setting is centralised and marginal utility from a public good is sufficiently high. Moreover, if a profit tax is used to finance public expenditure, higher tax reduces wages and improves employment.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

SHIRKING,STANDARDS AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION

By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non‐shirkers, we show that the uniformly positive (negative) supply‐side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance) and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

Wages,selectivity, and vacancies: Evaluating the short-term and long-term impact of the minimum wage on unemployment

Using a circular matching model (Marimon R, Zilibotti F. Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal 1999;109; 266–291), where the wage setting is similar to Weiss (Weiss A. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. Journal of Political Economy 1980; 88; 526–538), we reexamine Card and Krueger's (Card, D., Krueger, A. Myth and Measurement, the New Economics of the Minimum Wage. Princeton University Press; 1995) intuition on the impact of the minimum wage on unemployment. In the short term, a rise in the minimum wage increases the employment level by making firms less selective. In the long term, numerical simulations show that, despite the reduction of job creation, introducing a minimum wage may lower unemployment as soon as workers and jobs are sufficiently differentiated. However, beyond some limit, the wage increase raises unemployment whatever the degree of differentiation is.     

Staggered wages,unanticipated shocks and firms’ adjustments

This paper empirically investigates the employment and wage effects of contract staggering, i.e., the asynchronous and infrequent way in which wages adjust to changes in the economic environment. Using an identification strategy based on exogenous start dates of collective agreements around the Great Recession, we estimate the effect of increases in base wages on firms’ labor cost adjustments. Our analysis is based on a large employers-employees dataset merged to collective agreements in the Netherlands, a country in which collective bargaining is dominant and contract staggering is relatively pervasive. The main result is that staggered wage setting has no real effect on employment. We find significant employment losses only in sectors covered by contracts with much longer durations than those normally assumed in macroeconomic models featuring staggered wages. Instead, we show that firms adjust labor costs by curbing other pay components such as bonuses and benefits and incidental pay. The overall result supports the idea that wage rigidities are not the main source of employment fluctuations.     

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations*

We develop and analyze a structural model of efficiency wages founded on reciprocity. Workers are assumed to face an explicit trade‐off between the disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of a wage offer above some reference level. The model provides a rationale for rent sharing—a feature that is very much present in the data but absent from previous formulations of the efficiency wage hypothesis. This firm‐internal perspective on efficiency wages has potentially important macroeconomic consequences: rent‐sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal amplification and differential responses to technology and demand shocks.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

Union coverage and sectoral wages: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper investigates the impact of union coverage on sectoral wages in the Netherlands. The semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to union coverage appears to be around 0.05; it is higher in the industrial than in the other sectors. The impact of union coverage on wages appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in the US and the UK. Union coverage increases the weight of internal (sector-specific) factors in wage determination and decreases the weight of external (labour market) factors. Apparently, unions increase the role of rent sharing in wage formation and stabilize employment.     

Gift Exchange and the Business Cycle: The Fair Wage Strikes Back

We extend the benchmark real business cycle model amending technology for fair wage considerations. Effort depends on current, alternative, and past wages. Past wages are treated as the worker's past wages (personal norm) or as the past wages of the society (social norm). This last model reproduces the high variability of employment, the low variability of wages, and the low wage–employment correlation without requiring a second source of impulsions. Wages and employment dynamics are adequately captured when norms adjust slowly to the environment. Fair wages are thus useful to solve the business cycle puzzle when we allow for intertemporal wage comparisons. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E24     

THE MINIMUM WAGE, WAGE SUBSIDIES, AND POVERTY

In an attempt to augment the lowest wages, the United States and several other countries utilize legal minimum wages. However, the minimum wage has potentially adverse employment effects. The analysis here suggests that an alternative policy that combines a minimum wage and a wage subsidy is superior to either by itself. Such a combination can assist the low wage worker, avoid disemployment effects, and maximize market efficiency.     

Commodity Taxes, Wage Determination, and Profits

We examine the effects of two different types of commodity taxation, specific and ad valorem, on wages and profits. We analyze two models of wage determination, one with efficiency wage setting and one with union-firm bargaining. In the former, a (locally) revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to an increase in both employment and wages and a reduction in profitability. In the latter, the effect on wages and profits may be reversed: predominantly ad valorem taxation raises employment but lowers wages, and under certain circumstances, the net effect is an increase in profits.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality and offshore outsourcing with asymmetric adjustment costs

We present a model that can capture the effects of offshore outsourcing on the wedge between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers when costs of adjustment are asymmetric. We identify conditions under which offshore outsourcing activities widen the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs. We show how a higher cost of adjustment in the import-competing sector can magnify the offshore outsourcing induced gap between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of the effects of offshore outsourcing, on the skilled–unskilled wage gap, to asymmetries in the costs of adjustment.     

Realitic and Analytic Syntheses of Macro- and Microeconomics

We study the impact of employer's opportunism on wage rigidity in capitalist companies by arguing that the need to fix wages is crucially influenced by the asymmetric distribution of decision-making power and information in favor of the stronger contractual party — the employer, and against the weaker contractual party — employees. The capitalist entrepreneur can make decisions, whose negative consequences are borne by workers in terms of lower wages and more intense work pace. Excessive wage reductions in the face of negative exogenous shocks or too risky investment decisions represent the main instances of such opportunistic behavior. Fixed wages can represent workers' best response to the emerging risk of the employer moral hazard, but this implies a heightened risk of layoffs since wages and employment levels cannot be fixed at the same time. Besides discussing piece rate contracts, profit-sharing and codetermination as counterexamples, we observe worker cooperatives which depart from the presence of contrasting interests and private information in the principal-agent framework. Indeed, several empirical studies have shown greater employment stability and wage flexibility in worker cooperatives vis-à-vis the capitalist firm.     

The Gender Wage Gap in Offered,Observed, and Reservation Wages for Spain

The literature on the gender wage gap and wage discrimination has exclusively analyzed observed wage differences, ignoring inactive or unemployed individuals. In order to obtain a more complete overview of gender wage differences, this paper analyzed inactive or unemployed individuals in terms of offered and reservation wages in Spain in the years 1994, 2000, and 2006. The results show that the observed wages give a more positive perspective of the gender wage gap than offered ones. Furthermore, the existence of an important gender wage gap for reservation wages has been noted, which is possibly because women take charge of household and family caregiving tasks to a greater degree than men. The results show that Spanish women had higher reservation wages and lower offered wages than men, which explains their lower participation in the labor market.     

Wage spillovers across sectors in Eastern Europe

This paper studies the interactions between wages in the public sector and the private traded and non-traded sector in ten transition countries which are members of the European Union, during the period 2000–2011. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers, as well as the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis, suggests that the internationally traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with sheltered and public sector wages adjusting. Using a cointegrated VAR approach we show that a large heterogeneity across countries is present, and non-traded and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination or at least affect traded sector wages in the short run. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector and thus the catching-up process may be accompanied by accumulation of large international imbalances.     

Wage Rigidity,Inflation, and Institutions

We study the possible existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) at wage growth rates different from zero in aggregate data. Even if DNWR prevails at zero for individual workers, compositional effects might lead to falling aggregate wages, while changes in relative wages combined with DNWR might lead to positive aggregate wage growth. We explore industry data for 19 OECD countries, over the 1971–2006 period. We find evidence for a floor on nominal wage growth at 6 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, at 1 percent in the 1990s, and at 0.5 percent in the 2000s. Furthermore, we find that DNWR is stronger in country‐years with strict employment protection legislation, high union density, centralized wage setting, and high inflation.     

Wage setting actors and sticky wages: Implications for the business cycle and optimal monetary policy

Two sticky-wage models are introduced in this paper to examine the implications of having either households or firms as wage setting actors. The rate of wage inflation depends positively on the output gap if households set wages whereas such a relationship is of negative sign when firms set wages. Moreover, impulse–response functions and the statistical comparison with US data show different business cycle properties depending upon wage setting actors. Finally, optimal monetary policy is derived for each case, and compared with a Taylor-type monetary policy rule.