Ratings Competition in the CMBS Market

We consider the relationship between competition among credit rating agencies and the ratings of commercial mortgage‐backed securities (CMBS) using data from 2002 to 2007. We characterize competition using Fitch's aggregate share of CMBS ratings and a measure of Fitch's deal‐specific market share constructed as the probability of Fitch being hired for a specific transaction. Controlling for deal characteristics, we find that subordination levels were lower when Fitch's aggregate and deal‐specific market shares were higher, which suggests that ratings competition yielded less stringent ratings when Fitch was a more significant competitor, although this effect dissipates when Fitch's market shares were high.     

Trustee reputation in securitization: When does it matter?

We consider the role of trustees–who are nominated to protect the interests of investors–in securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage‐backed security (MBS) issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that trustees’ reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became more challenging.     

The rise of China's securitization market

We study the development of asset securitization markets in China. We manually collect all asset securitization projects and securities data from 2005 to 2015. Inspection of this sample combined with related policy changes reveals distinct characteristics and some potential problems. At the macro level, asset securitization market in China is policy driven, regulation‐segmented, and highly illiquid. At the micro level, the underlying assets are mainly corporate loans or assets, rather than mortgage or consumption loans as in the US and European markets. State owned commercial banks and enterprises enjoy significantly lower interest rates when issuing securitization bonds. Finally, risk‐isolation and credit enhancing techniques significantly improve the rating of asset‐backed securities.     

Did investors outsource their risk analysis to rating agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs

Based on a sample of 3254 floating rate tranches from 617 ABS-CDOs (collateralized debt obligations backed by asset-backed securities), this paper tests the “rating overdependence” hypothesis – i.e., that ratings of structured products are a sufficient statistic (in terms of predicting future credit performance) for yield spreads at origination. The paper’s findings are fourfold. First, yield spreads at issuance predict future performance of ABS-CDO tranches even after controlling for the information contained in ratings. Second, the ability of yield spreads to predict future performance, however, is driven exclusively by ratings below AAA (and, to a lesser extent, also by the lowest priority AAA tranches), whereas spreads of super senior AAA tranches show no information content. Third, the predictive ability of yield spreads is lower for tranches from later vintages and for tranches from deals with more complex collateral pools. Fourth, the conditional correlation between ratings and spreads, in turn, is increasing in time and higher for tranches from complex deals. In sum, the evidence indicates that investors in (especially AAA) tranches from later and more complex deals have avoided performing costly due diligence on the securities they bought.     

Do asset backed securities ratings matter on average?

This paper assesses the impact of asset backed ratings on the Merrill Lynch US Asset Backed Securities and Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Index (CABs index) over a period January 1998 through to February 2010. In particular, we examine the relationship between ratings changes of the asset backed securities and the CABS index return. We further investigate how macroeconomic variables affect the relation between change in ratings and the CABS index return. We find that on their own, ratings of assets backed securities do matter to the CABS index return. However, controlling for economic factors appears to reduce the impact of the ratings changes on the CABS index return.     

Timeliness of Spread Implied Ratings

Rating agencies are known to be prudent in their approach to rating revisions, which results in delayed rating adjustments. For a large set of eurobonds we derive credit spread implied ratings and compare them with agency ratings. Our results indicate that spread implied ratings often anticipate the future movement of agency ratings and hence can help track credit risk in a more timely manner. This finding has important implications for risk managers in banks who, under the new Basel 2 regulations, have to rely more on credit ratings for capital allocation purposes, and for portfolio managers who face rating‐related investment restrictions.     

Rating agencies in the face of regulation

This paper develops a theoretical framework to shed light on variation in credit rating standards over time and across asset classes. Ratings issued by credit rating agencies serve a dual role: they provide information to investors and are used to regulate institutional investors. We show that introducing rating-contingent regulation that favors highly rated securities may increase or decrease rating informativeness, but unambiguously increases the volume of highly rated securities. If the regulatory advantage of highly rated securities is sufficiently large, delegated information acquisition is unsustainable, since the rating agency prefers to facilitate regulatory arbitrage by inflating ratings. Our model relates rating informativeness to the quality distribution of issuers, the complexity of assets, and issuers' outside options. We reconcile our results with the existing empirical literature and highlight new, testable implications, such as repercussions of the Dodd-Frank Act.     

Modeling of CPDOs – Identifying optimal and implied leverage

When the subprime crisis started to emerge, collateralized products based on credit default swap (CDS) exposures combined with security features seemed to be a more rational alternative to classic asset backed securities. Constant Proportion Collateralized Debt Obligations (CPDOs) are a mixture of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and CPPIs with inverse mechanism. This new asset aims at meeting the investors’ demand for credit derivatives with security enhancements, but to our knowledge quantitative approaches for pricing other than simulation algorithms do not exist yet. CPDOs became famous notably by Standard & Poor’s rating model error which illustrated that closed-form analytical pricing is necessary in order to evaluate and understand complex derivatives. This article aims to shed a light on CPDOs’ specific structural enhancements and mechanisms. We quantify inherent risks and provide a dynamic closed-form pricing formula.     

From Wall Street to Main Street: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Consumer Credit Supply

How did the collapse of the asset‐backed securities (ABS) market during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis affect the supply of credit to the broader economy? Using new data on the U.S. credit union industry, we find that ABS‐related losses are associated with a large contraction in the supply of credit to consumers, especially among those credit unions that began the crisis with weaker capitalization. We also find that this credit supply shock restricted the availability of mortgage and automobile credit. These results show how movements in the prices of financial assets can affect the real economy.     

Recognition versus disclosure of finance leases: Evidence from Japan

This study examines whether credit market participants—bond investors and credit rating agencies—treat recognized and disclosed finance leases differently when assessing firms’ credit risk in Japan. I use firms’ credit risk, measured by bond spreads and credit ratings, to investigate the relations between recognized versus disclosed finance lease obligations and firms’ credit risk following the adoption of Statement No. 13, Accounting Standard for Lease Transactions. For a sample of firms issuing new bonds, I find that, unlike recognized finance leases, disclosed finance leases are not associated with bond spreads. Moreover, the associations between recognized versus disclosed finance leases and bond spreads are substantially different. Conversely, recognized and disclosed finance leases are associated with credit ratings and are processed similarly when credit ratings are determined. Taken together, my results suggest that the sophistication of capital market participants influences their credit risk assessments of recognized versus disclosed finance leases.     

Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

CMBS Subordination,Ratings Inflation,and Regulatory‐Capital Arbitrage

Using detailed origination and performance data on a comprehensive sample of commercial mortgage‐backed security (CMBS) deals, along with their underlying loans and a set of similarly rated residential mortgage‐backed securities (RMBS), we apply reduced‐form and structural modeling strategies to test for regulatory‐capital arbitrage and ratings inflation in the CMBS market. We find that the spread between CMBS and corporate‐bond yields fell significantly for ratings AA and AAA after a loosening of capital requirements for highly rated CMBS in 2002, whereas no comparable drop occurred for lower rated bonds (which experienced no similar regulatory change). We also find that CMBS rated below AA upgraded to AA or AAA significantly faster than comparable RMBS (for which there was no change in risk‐based capital requirements). We use a structural model to investigate these results in more detail and find that little else changed in the CMBS market over this period except for the rating agencies' persistent reductions in subordination levels between 1997 and late 2007. Indeed, had the 2005 vintage CMBS used the subordination levels from 2000, there would have been no losses to the senior bonds in most CMBS structures.     

Are covered bonds different from securitization bonds? A comparative analysis of credit spreads

This study compares credit spreads and pricing determinants of securitization vis-à-vis covered bonds. Our analysis reveals that although ratings are the most important pricing determinant for asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) investors place relatively more importance on contractual, macroeconomic and banks' characteristics rather than ratings in pricing covered bonds. We find evidence of a mispricing effect in structured finance markets: ABS and MBS have higher credit spreads than similarly rated public-covered bonds and mortgage-covered bonds and security prices reflect information beyond credit ratings. We find no evidence of borrowing costs affecting banks' choice between securitization and covered bonds.     

A comparative analysis of ex ante credit spreads: Structured finance versus straight debt finance

This paper examines the pricing of structured finance (SF) – asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) – and straight debt finance transactions. Using a cross-section of 24,525 European bonds issued by financial and nonfinancial firms in the 2000–2016 period, we show that although ratings are the most important pricing determinant for SF and corporate bonds (CB) at issuance, investors rely on other contractual, macroeconomic, and firms’ characteristics beyond these ratings. We find that CDO tranches have, on average, higher credit spreads than similarly rated CB, while investors are not compensated for facing higher systematic risk components in relation to investment-grade ABS and MBS. Our results also support the hypothesis of SF transactions as mechanisms of reducing funding costs: SF transactions’ weighted average spread is lower than that of comparable CB and originating firms’ creditworthiness does not deteriorate when compared to a sample of matched firms.     

An Empirical Study of International Spillover of Sovereign Risk to Bank Credit Risk

The severity and complexity of the recent financial crisis has motivated the need for understanding the relationships between sovereign ratings and bank credit ratings. This is the first study to examine the impact of the “international” spillover of sovereign risk to bank credit risk through both a ratings channel and an asset holdings channel. In the first case, the downgrade of sovereign ratings in GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) countries leads to rating downgrades of banks in the peripheral countries. The second channel indicates that larger asset holdings of GIIPS debt increases the credit risk of cross‐border banks, and hence, the probabilities of downgrade.     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

The information content of three credit ratings: the case of European residential mortgage-backed securities

We assess the information content of three credit ratings for tranches of newly issued European residential mortgage-backed securities. We find that tranches rated by three credit rating agencies where the rating by Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Ratings Service or Fitch is inferior to Moody's lead to higher funding costs and reflects what we refer to as rating risk. Our results suggest that market participants do not view credit ratings by Fitch and S&P's as redundant despite the fact that both employ the same rating approach.     

Competition in the credit rating Industry: Benefits for investors and issuers

We empirically investigate the benefits of multiple ratings not only at issuance of debt instruments but also during the subsequent monitoring phase. Using a record of monthly credit rating migration data on all U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch between 1985 and 2012 (154,600 tranches), our results provide empirical evidence that rating agencies put more effort in rating and outlook revisions when tranches have assigned multiple ratings. Furthermore, we see that in the case of multiple ratings, agencies do a better job in discriminating tranches with respect to default risk. On the downside, we observe a shift in collateral towards senior tranches and incentives for issuers to engage in rating shopping activities, but find no evidence that rating agencies exploit such behavior to attract more rating business. Our results contribute to the literature on information production of credit ratings and extend the perspective to the monitoring period after issuance.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Credit ratings and structured finance

The poor performance of credit ratings of structured finance products in the financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in designing and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model in which a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold both to investors who are constrained to purchase highly rated securities and investors who are unconstrained. Assets are pooled and senior and junior tranches are issued with a waterfall structure. When the rating constraint is lax, the CRA will include only risky assets in the securitization pool, serving both types of investors without any rating inflation. Rating inflation is decreasing in the tightness of the rating constraint locally. But rating inflation may be non-monotonic in the rating constraint globally, with no rating inflation when the constraint is lax or tight.