新制度经济学的新发展与政治学新制度主义:比较与启示

新制度经济学和政治学新制度主义在发展中都因为缺乏现实性、历史性和社会性而受到批评.面对相似的问题,经济学领域兴起了以青木和格雷夫为代表的比较制度分析,政治学领域兴起了历史制度主义和社会学制度主义.本文从制度观、制度对行为的影响、制度的变迁、过去的制度对现在制度的影响、文化观念和意识形态在制度形成和发展中的作用等方面,对比较制度分析和历史制度主义、社会学制度主义进行了比较,就未来制度研究的发展趋势提出了看法.     

经济安全与制度变迁:理论与中国的现实

我国经济体制改革本质上属于强制性制度变迁,由此带来经济制度供给失衡,如产权制度、企业制度、经济服务制度和经济监管制度等,在制度输入后与我国的经济运行实际产生了制度冲突和制度风险,并且影响到国家经济安全,表现为我国参与国际竞争的制度劣势和外国资本凭借制度优势对我国实体经济的侵害.为维护国家制度安全和经济安全,我国应该一方面注重新建和完善经济制度,另一方面积极参与具有国际影响的经济制度的建设进程.     

经济全球化对发展中国家经济安全的影响

目前,经济全球化迅速发展.给发展中国家的经济安全带来了严峻的挑战。本文从金融、产业及信息三个方面分析了经济全球化对发展中国家经济安全产生的影响及其相应采取的措施。     

经济全球化下影响发展中国家经济安全的因素分析

发展中国家参与经济全球化的起始条件是决定其经济安全的内在因素 ;发达国家推行经济全球化的战略意图和政策举措是影响发展中国家经济安全的深层因素 ;经济全球化是影响发展中国家经济安全的环境因素。文章在此基础上对发展中国家经济安全的内涵进行探讨。     

新制度主义中国家理论的争论与发展

新制度主义内部有关国家理论的分化是相当明显的,不能一概而论。文章区分了历史制度主义、理性选择制度主义和社会学制度主义中国家理论的异同,分析了经济利益、社会风俗习惯、文化意识等因素对国家起源和发展的影响,并对政府经济制度的改革和变迁提供了更多的途径和方法。     

新制度主义中国家理论的争论与发展

谈到新制度主义的国家理论时 ,理论界往往会一概而论 ,但新制度主义内部的分化还是相当明显的 ,历史制度主义、理性选择制度主义和社会学制度主义中的国家理论既有共同之处 ,也有不同之处。独树一帜的理论家奥尔森的国家理论与理性制度主义的代表人物诺思的国家理论都有各自的贡献和不足。经济利益、社会风俗习惯、文化意识等因素对国家起源和发展都具有重要的影响。     

制度质量、制度稳定性与经济增长:一项实证研究

本文利用1995-2009年95个国家三个样本组平均每5年期的面板数据,设定跨国面板固定效应模型,检验了制度质量、制度稳定性对经济增长的影响,并对制度质量和制度稳定性对发达国家和发展中国家经济增长的不同作用进行了比较分析.研究结果表明高质量的制度促进经济增长,不稳定的制度阻碍经济增长;和发达国家相比,制度质量对发展中国家经济增长所发挥的作用相对较小,而制度不稳定对发展中国家经济增长所产生的阻碍作用却相对较大,这主要是因为发达国家更透明的市场信息,更完善的资本市场和保险市场减少了制度不稳定性所带来了短期危害.     

浅析新旧制度主义经济学的差异

新旧制度主义思想都把制度包括在经济学的研究中 ,但它们的哲学和方法论明显不同 ,在理论倾向和价值偏好等方面也有很大的差异 ,明确两者之间的差异 ,是正确考察和借鉴制度主义思想的重要前提。本文从理论结构、方法论、立论基础和发展趋势等四个方面展开讨论 ,提出看法。     

外国直接投资对发展中国家国民经济结构安全的影响

外国直接投资的进入会对发展中国家国民经济结构安全产生深远影响。从宏观和中观角度看,国民经济结构主要包括产业结构、国际贸易收支结构和市场结构,本文重点分析外国直接投资尤其是跨国公司对发展中国家产业结构和市场结构的影响,可看到外国直接投资对发展中国家国民经济结构安全既有正面影响,也存在负面效应。这就需要发展中国家政府提高制度供给能力,在利用外国直接投资中趋利避害。     

格鲁奇的新制度经济理论

本文主要介绍了格鲁奇的新制度经济理论,主要包括制度经济学的基本问题、新二元经济论、经济制度改革理论、比较经济制度理论等内容.     

Globalization and financial development

This paper argues that globalization is a key factor in stimulating institutional reforms in developing countries that promote financial development and economic growth. Advanced countries can help in this process by supporting the opening of their markets to goods and services from emerging-market countries. By encouraging these countries to increase their participation in global markets, advanced countries can create exactly the right incentives for developing countries to implement the reforms that will enable them to have high economic growth.     

我国经济安全风险的宏观审视

我国是一个成长中的大国,又正处于从传统计划经济体制向现代市场经济体制过渡的关键时期.集大国经济、转轨经济和发展中经济于一体的现实国情,使得全球化背景下,我国经济安全面临三大风险:经济增长中的"崛起风险"、经济成长中的"发展风险"以及制度变迁中的"改革风险".正确审视和妥善化解这三大风险,是维护我国经济安全,实现经济可持续发展的基本前提和迫切需要.     

Privatizations around the world: economic or political determinants?

The article examines economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization using a panel of 50 countries over the period of 1988–2006. Our sample includes developed, developing, and transition economies. Privatization activity is measured by the number of privatization deals as well as the revenue raised and analyzed using the negative binomial regression and Tobit regression respectively. Although more privatization activity is usually taking place in countries displaying satisfactory economic performance in some respect, the role of economic factors turns out to be limited. The results identify a number of political and institutional determinants but some effects are specific to a particular type of economy. For example, in developing countries, right‐wing governments are associated with privatizations while new, not necessarily right‐wing governments, are behind privatization in Eastern Europe. The role of financial development is also varied, with sound financial institutions related to successful privatization in developed and developing countries but not in transition economies.     

Institutional framework and economic development: international evidence

This paper examines the effect of ‘quality’ of the institutional framework on economic development. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that ‘good’ institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth. The positive effect of institutional ‘quality’ is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom. Our results also indicate that ‘good’ institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence. We infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation, but also freedom to choose and institutional support.     

Remittances and deforestation in developing countries: Is institutional quality paramount?

This study examines the impact of remittance inflows on deforestation in developing countries. We also investigate the role of institutional quality in enhancing remittances’ effect in reducing deforestation. Our results suggest that overall remittances reduce deforestation. We show that remittances’ reduction effect on deforestation is greater in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. Considering institutional quality, our findings suggest that, for the entire sample, and in low- and middle-income countries, control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law act to reduce deforestation. Moreover, institutional quality enhances the impact of remittances on reducing deforestation in the entire sample and in middle-income countries. In contrast, in low-income countries, institutional quality does not complement remittances to reduce deforestation.These results imply that, to reduce deforestation rates, the focus should not only be on economic development, but to an even greater extent, on institutional quality.     

Conditions For Successful Technology Policy In Developing Countries—Learning Rents,State Structures,And Institutions

The paper develops an analysis of the economic, political, and institutional conditions for successful design and implementation of technology policy in developing countries. After a brief introduction (Section I), we discuss contending economic theories of technological change and technology policy (Section 2). It is concluded that, despite many pro-market arguments, market imperfections inherent in the process of technological change make the creation of learning and innovation rents by the state potentially very beneficial, especially in developing countries. The next section (Section 3) analyses the political and institutional factors that determine how effectively such rents can be created and managed. After an assessment of technology policy record in developing countries (Section 4) we discuss how the scope of such policy is affected by the recent changes in domestic and international policy contexts such as domestic deregulation and the emergence of a ‘liberal’ world order represented by the WTO (Section 5). The paper ends with a brief conclusion (Section 6).     

对刘易斯二元经济发展模式的再认识

刘易斯二元经济发展模式给出了发展中国家经济发展的路径,但是,这个发展路径是有条件的。从资源环境的视角,对刘易斯二元经济发展模式的条件进行了分析,提出应通过大力发展产业链环上的产业破解中国二元经济发展中遇到的资源环境制约问题。     

Growth effects of FDI in 80 developing economies: the role of policy reforms and institutional constraints

Theoretical and empirical literatures have identified several channels through which foreign direct investment (FDI) influences economic growth. This paper examines the impact of FDI on economic output growth per worker using aggregate production function augmented with FDI inflows, economic policy reforms and institutional constraints. The paper covers 80 developing countries over the period 1980–2006. We use panel data and employ fixed, random effects and GMM methods for estimation. Our results highlight the importance of FDI, policy reforms and institutional development for growth in developing economies. Finally, we demonstrate that irrespective of reforms and institutions, an increase in FDI affects output growth positively.     

The political economy of legal titling

The libertarian case for legal titling is that formalization of the economic (de facto) rights of those who own land and buildings improves prospects for capitalism and, ultimately, development. Although all rich countries have private property rights, we argue that the success of legal titling depends on a certain kind of state—what we call a property-protecting state—that is often missing in developing countries. We use insights from Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to clarify the political basis for legal titling to improve land tenure security. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that legal titling has not worked because the country does not have a property-protecting state. We suggest focusing on improving political institutions before investing in legal titling. In the meantime, it makes more sense to register land ownership at the community level, without the state.

     

The long term impact of economic development in developed countries on developing countries since 1820

The linkages between the economic development of developed and developing countries are analyzed historically. The analysis is divided into epochs, distinguished by global trade regimes and by common characteristics of long term economic growth. The break throughs in long distance transport technology which occured during the industrial revolution created a global economy in which the rythm of economic activity in developing economies became linked to that of developed economies. The major transmission mechanisms were international trade, international migration and international capital flows. Exports were the main engine of growth in developing countries. But the effects of export expansion varied across countries. The speed of transmission of the industrial revolution to developing countries depended on their institutional readiness; countries with most developed capitalist institutions in factor markets were the first to develop. The extent of diffusion of the benefits of growth from export expansion within developing countries also depended on the nature of their institutions, both economic and political. Finally, policies with respect to international trade, investment and agriculture were also critical to the speed and diffusion of economic development.The research underlying this paper is the result of a twentyfive year collaboration with Professor Cynthia Taft Morris. She is indebted to the World Bank for financing the research in this paper as part of the background studies for the World Development Report 1991. She is also indebted to Sherman Robinson for his comments.