Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Estimation risk and auditor conservatism

Estimation risk occurs when individuals form beliefs about parameters that are unknown. We examine how auditors respond to the estimation risk that arises when they form beliefs about the likelihood of client bankruptcy. We argue that auditors are likely to become more conservative when facing higher estimation risk because they are risk-averse. We find that estimation risk is of first-order importance in explaining auditor behavior. In particular, auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions, are more likely to resign, and charge higher audit fees when the standard errors surrounding the point estimates of bankruptcy are larger. To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify estimation risk using the variance-covariance matrix of coefficient estimates taken from a statistical prediction model.     

Model Predictions and Auditor Assessments of Going Concern Status

This paper compares the predictions of a bankruptcy prediction model and the assessments of auditors on the going concern status of a sample of 165 bankrupt companies and 165 matched non-bankrupt companies. Data from US companies for the period 1978 to 1985 were used. Probit analysis (with the weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood procedure) was applied to estimate the model parameters. The Lachenbruch U method hold-out accuracy rates of the model are 85.45% for bankrupt firms, 100.00% for non-bankrupt firms, and 99.91% overall. The corresponding accuracy rates of the auditors based on their audit reports are 54.37% for bankrupt firms, 100.00% for non-bankrupt firms, and 99.73% overall. The sensitivity of optimal cut-off points to misclassification costs of Type I and Type II errors was also considered. Results of the study suggest that bankruptcy prediction models can be useful to auditors in making going concern assessments. Further, such models can serve as analytical tools and defensive devices.     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.     

Regulatory risk and auditors’ reporting conservatism: Evidence from Chinese comment letters

We study how auditors respond to regulatory risk that arises when their clients receive comment letters from Chinese stock exchanges. Our results show that auditors are more likely to issue modified or conservative—but not excessively conservative—audit opinions to the recipients of comment letters. This reporting conservatism is especially pronounced when the regulatory risk perceived by auditors rises, such as when comment letters contain more questions, when more comment letters are issued, when the auditors must give opinions on specific issues, or when comment letters involve more auditor issues. Comment letters have been issued in China since 2013, but did not have to be disclosed until 2015. We find no significant difference in the impact of comment letters on auditor conservatism between pre- and post-disclosure periods. Further, the size of auditor firms has no significant effect on the impact of comment letters in post-disclosure periods. We interpret our results as supporting the regulation risk hypothesis.     

The endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination: evidence on private firms in a non-litigious environment

This study provides evidence on the relationship between audit-report type and subsequent business termination for private companies in a non-litigious environment. The results show that an endogenous relationship exists between bankruptcy and audit-report type, and between voluntary liquidation and audit-report type. A non-clean opinion is typically issued when firms face financial difficulties, which in turn become more severe after the receipt of a non-clean audit opinion. We find evidence that, even without a litigation deterrent in Belgium, financial performance has a similar impact on audit-report type as in litigious environments. We find that the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis holds for bankruptcy but not for voluntary liquidation. Our study also provides some evidence on audit reporting differences between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the Belgian audit market. When financial difficulties are obvious, as is the case when a company is about to go bankrupt, both Big 6 and non- Big 6 auditors are as competent and/or independent to assess and report going-concern problems. However, when financial difficulties are less apparent, as is the case for firms that voluntarily decide to liquidate, our results indicate that Big 6 auditors are more likely to issue a non-clean audit opinion than non-Big 6 auditors.     

A re-evaluation of auditors’ opinions versus statistical models in bankruptcy prediction

Existent empirical evidence on the relative performance of auditors’ going concern opinions versus statistical models in predicting bankruptcy is mixed. This study attempts to add new reliable evidence on this important issue by conducting the comparison based upon an improved statistical model. The improved statistical model incorporates some new developments advocated by recent bankruptcy prediction research (e.g., Shumway, 2001). First, the following non-traditional variables are added: a composite measure of financial distress, industry failure rate, abnormal stock returns, and market capitalization. Secondly, a hazard model is employed. The prediction ability of the hazard model with incorporation of non-financial-ratio variables is superior to that of auditors’ going concern opinions in the holdout sample. This suggests that a well-developed statistical model could serve as a decision aid for auditors to better make going-concern judgments. Further analyses reveal some evidence that industry failure rate does not have a significant impact upon auditors’ going concern judgments as it should be; auditors could improve their going concern judgments by considering industry-level information in addition to firm-specific information. Finally, we find that auditors’ opinions do have incremental contribution beyond stock-market information and industry failure rate in predicting bankruptcy.

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy

This paper investigates the consequences of liquidation and reorganization on the allocation and subsequent utilization of assets in bankruptcy. Using the random assignment of judges to bankruptcy cases as a natural experiment that forces some firms into liquidation, we find that the long‐run utilization of assets of liquidated firms is lower relative to assets of reorganized firms. These effects are concentrated in thin markets with few potential users and in areas with low access to finance. These findings suggest that when search frictions are large, liquidation can lead to inefficient allocation of assets in bankruptcy.     

Asset specificity and conditional accounting conservatism

Asset specificity, the redeployability of an asset to alternative uses, is a key determinant of an asset's resale value. Asset specificity has a direct impact on a firm's ongoing fair value determination, bankruptcy risk, liquidation value, and abandonment option. We document a significant negative association between asset specificity and conditional conservatism. Further tests reveal that this inverse relation manifests as bad news being less quickly incorporated in earnings as asset specificity increases. We find no difference in the extent to which good news is delayed in earnings for firms conditional on asset specificity. In addition, the documented association is stronger when asset specificity arises from lower within‐industry acquisition activity. The association is also more pronounced for firms that are in less competitive industries, have institutional investors, have limited access to the public debt market, and/or have more unsecured debt. Our findings are noteworthy for regulators and researchers given the recent interest in the determinants of conservatism.     

Do Expert Informational Intermediaries Add Value? Evidence from Auditors in Microcap Initial Public Offerings

Do expert informational intermediaries add value? We address this question by examining the informativeness of the audit report contained in the prospectus associated with a firm's initial public offering (IPO). At the time of the IPO, there is a relative lack of information to facilitate the establishment of equity values, suggesting that the information provided by outside “experts” (e.g., auditors, underwriters) is particularly important. In this article we study small, non‐venture‐backed IPOs, a segment of the market with the poorest long‐run performance and where the prestigious audit firm is often the sole (if any) expert present. We find that the pre‐IPO opinions of larger auditors are more predictive of post‐IPO negative stock delistings. Of particular note, the opinions of the national‐tiered firms are comparably predictive to those of the Big 6, though this finding emerges only after we consider the selectivity‐based differences in the clients that hire these national firms. Our findings also indicate that, for larger auditors the presence of a pre‐IPO going‐concern opinion is more strongly associated with first‐year stock returns and that larger auditors are more likely to give such opinions to their distressed clients. Overall, we address a deficiency in the literature relating to “the paucity of evidence on the value of auditor opinions to investors” (Healy and Palepu [ 2001 p. 415]).     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

Do corporate payouts signal going-concern risk for auditors? Evidence from audit reports for companies in financial distress

We examine the association between payout policy changes and going-concern decisions for financially distressed clients. Extant auditing standards indicate that payout reductions, which offer a prospect of short-term cash relief, can potentially mitigate going-concern uncertainty, whereas economic theory suggests payout decreases (increases) convey mixed but mostly negative (positive) signals about a company’s future financial status. We find that, compared with a bankruptcy prediction model over short (not to exceed 1 year) and long (2–3 years) horizons, auditors seem to significantly underreact to payout decreases (i.e., negative signals) but react appropriately to payout increases (i.e., positive signals) in their going-concern decisions. Moreover, auditors are three times more likely to make Type II misclassification errors in payout-decreasing firms than in payout-increasing and no-change firms. We also find that auditors take longer to determine the appropriate opinion for clients with payout changes, especially for those who cut their payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors respond differently to positive and negative signals about companies’ future prospects, reflecting the mixed nature of payout decreases relative to payout increases and the professional standards’ emphasis on the prospect of short-term cash relief from payout reductions.     

The impact of political pressure on novice decision makers: are auditors qualified to make going concern judgements?

Over the past decade, the public accountancy profession has been the subject of broad criticism for its failure to adequately prepare third parties for the impending failure of client organizations. Many potential causes of auditors’ failure to issue opinions reflecting client organization’s ability to remain a going concern have been put forth, including primarily poor judgement and/or client pressures to issue a clean opinion. In this paper, we argue that the uncertainty in the decision-making process may be compounded by a relatively low level of knowledge, making the auditor’s end decision more susceptible to socio-political pressure. The paper is divided into five sections. The introductory section of the paper focuses on the widespread criticism of the accountancy profession for its inability to issue going concern opinions for questionable clients who fail shortly after the audit report is issued. In the second section of the paper, we provide an overview of extant studies that have examined how auditors accumulate and process data used to make going concern judgements in a politically sensitive environment. In the third section, we contrast this environment and the approach used by auditors in making going concern judgements with the environment and approach used by insolvency practitioners in dealing with companies in financial distress. A multi-year study in building and using a computerized model of insolvency decision processes is used as the basis for understanding the approach used by insolvency practitioners. Even though the nature of the problems faced in going concern judgements and insolvency practice are very similar, striking differences in the environment, evidence and decision processes used by the two groups of accounting experts are noted. The fourth section reports the results of a field study conducted with insolvency novices and specialists in an effort to elicit the differences in their respective decision processes. The interaction with insolvency specialists from 10 different discussion sessions reveals that senior insolvency practitioners perceive that the decision strategies of auditors is very similar to junior (novice) insolvency practitioners and that the going concern decision, as currently made, fails to include the specialized knowledge of expert decision makers. The fifth and concluding sections discuss implications of these results on auditors’ susceptibility to socio-political pressures and explores the difficulties in addressing the problems identified.