Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly

The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.     

Equity home bias,incomplete financial markets,and nominal rigidities

Abstract This paper analyzes optimal portfolio decisions in a monetary open‐economy framework. It is found that market completeness and the specific form of nominal rigidities, namely, nominal price vs. nominal wage rigidities, matter for justifying the observed structure of equity holdings. When markets are complete, sticky prices generate a negative correlation between the non‐diversifiable labour income and the profit of domestic firms with respect to the productivity shocks, which explains why households invest little abroad. In contrast, when markets are incomplete, rigidities in goods prices result in a counterfactual ‘super home bias’, because domestic equities provide a good hedge against not only the labour income risk but also the relative price risk. Wage rigidities, however, have the opposite effect. Therefore, nominal rigidities in both goods prices and wage rates are needed to address the empirical composition of gross equity positions under incomplete markets.     

A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY*

We model a spatial market in which the utility of each consumer is affected by the consumers who buy precisely the same product. The marginal contribution of consumers x's purchase on consumer y depends on |x–y|, which declines as |x–y| increases. Such modelling of preferences fits goods that signal a consumer's place in society—clothing styles, automobiles and jewellry are examples. For 2n + 1 firms we find the unique symmetric equilibrium and derive comparative statics on the optimal number of firms, the largest number of firms the market can support, and the behaviour of profits per firm as n increases.     

The Value Relevance of Earnings and Nonearnings Information in Regulated and Deregulated Markets: The Case of the Airline Industry

This paper examines the valuation effects of earnings and two nonearnings-based measurements (book values and operating cash flow) on security prices of airline companies under two different market structures: regulated and deregulated. The literature lacks empirical evidence in examining the relative importance of earnings and nonearnings accounting-based measurements in regulated and deregulated markets, especially in the airlines industry. We compare coefficient estimates of regressing stock prices on earnings, book value, and cash flow from operations of airline companies during regulated and deregulated times. A control sample of manufacturing companies is also used for supporting inferences from the airline sample’s findings. In a typical regulated market, using cost recovery plus an adequate rate of return on assets, security prices are highly aligned with nonearnings measurements such as the book value. In the airline industry, regulation took the form of guaranteed routes and subsidies to service rural areas, giving rise to a differential effect of both earnings and nonearnings measurements. Under deregulation, airline firms operate in highly competitive markets with large airline firms enjoying the benefits of economy of scale and service diversification. Thus, the asset capitalization (book value), cash flow, and operational efficiencies (earnings) would be major indicators in the market assessment of the firm’s future profitability and security price. This paper finds that nonearnings measures have higher explanatory power of security prices in regulated times for the airline firms. In deregulated times, although earnings have a stronger relationship with prices, nonearnings measures continued to influence stock price levels, reflecting airline specific economics.

PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING

We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home, multi-home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single-home and firms multi-home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi-homing and single-homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi-homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi-homing: agents find multi-homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.     

Price-Matching Policies and Entry

A price-matching policy is a commonly observed pricing practice in retailing markets. When firms use this policy they are publicly committing themselves to match the prices of their competitors. The aim of this analysis is to show that, in a spatial free-entry model, the effects of a price-matching policy are an increase in the number of sellers, an increase in prices and a decrease in consumer surplus and social welfare. Moreover, there is the striking result that in a price-matching equilibrium an increase in the number of firms entering the market raises prices.     

Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition

Firms make decisions under uncertainty and differ in their ability to collect and process information. As a result, in changing environments, firms have heterogeneous beliefs on the behaviour of other firms. This heterogeneity in beliefs can have important implications on market outcomes, efficiency and welfare. This paper studies the identification of firms’ beliefs using their observed actions—a revealed preference and beliefs approach. I consider a general structural model of market competition where firms have incomplete information and their beliefs and profits are nonparametric functions of decisions and state variables. Beliefs may be out of equilibrium. The framework applies both to continuous and discrete choice games and includes as particular cases models of competition in prices or quantities, auction models, entry games and dynamic games of investment decisions. I focus on identification results that exploit an exclusion restriction that naturally appears in models of competition: an observable variable that affects a firm's cost (or revenue) but does not have a direct effect on other firms’ profits. I present identification results under three scenarios—common in empirical industrial organization—on the data available to the researcher.     

Collusive outcomes in price competition

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for collusive outcomes in a single-shot game of simultaneous price choice in a homogeneous product market with symmetric firms and strictly convex costs. We also prove the counterintuitive result: if the second derivative of the cost function is nonincreasing in output, it is easier to sustain collusion when the number of firms increases.     

To outsource or not to outsource in an integrated world

This paper investigates outsourcing decision under certainty and uncertainty. When the production activity can be fragmented into two or more processes, an integrated firm must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. There are gains from outsourcing when factor prices differ between countries. When factor prices are not equalized internationally, a firm may outsource the process which uses its scarce source intensively. If the cost of outsourcing is lower in the foreign country, full outsourcing occurs under certainty. However, even if the outside supplier has a cost advantage, uncertainty in outsourcing cost ensures that partial outsourcing is optimal for risk-averse firms.     

FOREIGN ENTRY LIBERALIZATION AND EXPORT QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines the impact of foreign entry deregulation in China on the export price and quality of manufacturing firms through input–output linkage. We create a unique dataset describing the extent of regulatory control over foreign entry across approximately 900 industries covering all primary, manufacturing and services sectors. Results suggest foreign entry deregulation encourages firms to improve product quality and increase export prices. Deregulation in the manufacturing sectors has more impact on downstream export price and quality, compared with services sectors. Moreover, firms having larger imported inputs benefit more from foreign entry deregulation. These effects are robust to alternative specifications. (JEL F1, D2, O2)     

Price competition,free entry,and welfare in congested markets

In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.     

Does the stock market affect investment by Chinese firms? Some new evidence

During the 1990s, the Chinese government increasingly relied on the stock market as the major tool for state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform and for the allocation of investment resources. This paper investigates the impact of stock market development in China on firm‐level capital investment by using a panel data set constructed by the author of all Chinese listed firms for the period 1992 to 1999. The results show that stock market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q, has a highly independent, significant and positive influence on listed firms’ investment decisions, particularly during the stock market boom from 1996 to 1999. Given the sizable real effects of the stock market, deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have substantially negative consequences. As a result, this study suggests that sensible regulation of the Chinese stock market is needed in order to enhance the efficiency of stock prices and facilitate an effective channeling of investment funds.     

Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers

Carbon abatement policies in large open economies affect both the allocation of domestic resources and international market prices. A change in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all trading countries. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, we show that international spillovers have important welfare implications for carbon abatement policies designed to meet exogenous emission reduction targets. We present a decomposition of the total welfare effect of carbon abatement policies into a primary domestic market effect (at constant international prices) and a secondary international spillover impact as a result of changes in international prices. This decomposition reveals the extent to which domestic abatement costs are increased or decreased as a result of the impact of carbon abatement on international prices.     

Exchange-rate pass-through and market structure

We consider a situation in whichn firms located in market 1 andm firms located in market 2 each sell a commodity which is homogeneous within each market but may differ between markets. All firms sell on both markets. Each market has its own currency. The market demand functions differ. We give some basic results on the effects of exchange-rate changes and then show the following. When these markets are independent on the cost side (constant marginal costs) and demands are linear, a reduction in the number of firms (which might result from a merger) in market 1 increases the pass-through (of an appreciation of currency 2) in market 1 and decreases the pass-through in market 2. A similar occurrence in market 2 has the opposite effect. We give conditions under which, with identical economies of scope linking the markets, the sign of the price changes will be reversed when the number of foreign firms is small enough compared to the number of local firms. However, such sign reversals cannot occur in the two markets simultaneously.     

Using propensity matching estimators to evaluate the impact of privatization on wages

Whether the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector leads to a decline or increase in wage growth is theoretically ambiguous, given that the outcome depends on the uncertain interaction between firms and workers. Using propensity matching techniques, this article investigates the effects of privatization on wages in the Portuguese banking industry. The empirical results, obtained from Quadros de Pessoal for the period between 1989 and 1997, generally show a negative (positive) short-run (long-run) effect of privatization on relative wage growth for both men and women retained in the privatized firms. Moreover, the results show that the most educated and experienced (oldest) workers, as well as those in the high skill occupational categories, were more likely to experience a negative wage effect.     

Measuring environmental efficiency of industry: a case study of thermal power generation in India

Technical and environmental efficiency of some coal-fired thermal power plants in India is estimated using a methodology that accounts for firm’s efforts to increase the production of good output and reduce pollution with the given resources and technology. The methodology used is directional output distance function. Estimates of firm-specific shadow prices of pollutants (bad outputs), and elasticity of substitution between good and bad outputs are also obtained. The technical and environmental inefficiency of a representative firm is estimated as 0.06 implying that the thermal power generating industry in Andhra Pradesh state of India could increase production of electricity by 6/ while decreasing generation of pollution by 6%. This result shows that there are incentives or win–win opportunities for the firms to voluntarily comply with the environmental regulation. It is found that there is a significant variation in marginal cost of pollution abatement or shadow prices of bad outputs across the firms and an increasing marginal cost of pollution abatement with respect to pollution reduction by the firms. This result calls for the use of economic instruments like pollution taxes instead of command and control regulation used currently in India to reduce air pollution.

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria

Summary. This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity.Received: 20 March 2002, Revised: 5 August 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D41, L13.Correspondence to: Kunal SenguptaWe are deeply indebted to an anonymous referee for very helpful and incisive comments that led to substantial improvements in the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Department of Finance, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology where much of the work on this paper was carried out.     

Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.