Association for Social Economics ASE newsletter

Bill Waters’ dissertation “Entrepreneurship, Dualism, and Causality: An Appreciation of the Work of Joseph A. Schumpeter” completed at Georgetown University in 1952 is significant for two reasons. The first is clear enough from the very beginning: Schumpeter and the entrepreneur. The other comes to light through hindsight: Bill brings to bear an understanding of economic affairs which is personalist rather than individualist or collectivist in nature. In short, Bill sees as the main activating force in economic affairs not the impersonal forces of the market, not the central planning board, but the person who innovates, who acts bolding in economic affairs, the banker who creates credit, and the capitalist who supplies old funds. Thus the Waters’ dissertation says much not only about Schumpeter but also about Bill himself. His dissertation is his only book-length publication.     

Emil Lederer and Joseph Schumpeter on Economic Growth,Technology and Business Cycles

This paper compares Joseph Schumpeter and Emil Lederer with respect to their visions concerning the notions of economic growth, technology and business cycles. Their theoretical investigations in a number of thematic areas seem to converge to similar views. More precisely, both Schumpeter and Lederer regard the capitalist economy as a dynamic system where the introduction of innovations is its distinctive characteristic. In such a system, static analysis based on the concept of equilibrium is useful as an expository device to describe the adjustment mechanisms of the economic system. They also paid attention to the emergence of large oligopolistic firms and considered this development as being interwoven with technological progress. Both economists used similar arguments to emphasize the link between economic development and technological change. In their analyses, Schumpeter and Lederer referred to psychological factors motivating the entrepreneur, in order to explain the forces that set in motion the process of innovation and thus economic development. The concept of technological unemployment is also described in a similar manner by both of them. Regarding the issue of business cycles, Schumpeter and Lederer considered them to be a result of endogenous processes within a capitalist economy. Lederer in his late works, argued in a way analogous to Schumpeter, that economic fluctuations are caused from the disruptions created by innovations, which are introduced discontinuously into the economic system. Conclusively, Schumpeter and Lederer delivered theses which are similar in scope and conclusions probably because they were developed in the same social, political, theoretical and ideological environment and were also well acquainted with each other’s ideas.     

Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness

Schumpeter formulated a ‘conduct model’ of entrepreneurial behaviour. Received wisdom has emphasised the economic functions of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, neglecting behavioural aspects. Schumpeter’s model is examined; it posits a continuum of behaviours which are ‘entrepreneurial’, that rely on socially situated, tacit knowledge and are expressions of conscious, subjective rationality. Schumpeter’s model excluded unconscious optimisation and decision rules derived from bounded rationality. Comparisons are drawn with modern neoclassical, Austrian, and the older behavioural characterisations of entrepreneurial behaviour. The newer ‘effectuation’ model of entrepreneurial behaviour is also contrasted with Schumpeter’s approach. We find, among other things, that modern Schumpeterian economics associated with Nelson and Winter is not a natural continuation of Schumpeter’s model. However, some developments in neo-Schumpeterian economics, including the effectuation model deriving from the older behavioural tradition, are congruent with both the original ‘conduct model’ and Schumpeter’s directions for further research.     

Evolutionary macroeconomics: a research agenda

In this article, the goal is to offer a new research agenda for evolutionary macroeconomics. The article commences with a broad review of the main ideas in the history of thought concerning the determinants of economic growth and an introduction to the evolutionary perspective. This is followed by a selective review of recent evolutionary approaches to macroeconomics. These approaches are found to be somewhat disconnected. It is argued that the ‘micro-meso-macro’ approach to economic evolution is capable of resolving this problem by offering an analytical framework in which macroeconomics can be built upon ‘meso-foundations’, not micro-foundations, as asserted in the mainstream. It is also stressed that the economic system and its components are complex adaptive systems and that this complexity must not be assumed away through the imposition of simplistic assumptions made for analytical convenience. It is explained that complex economic systems are, at base, energetic in character but differ from biological complex systems in the way that they collect, store and apply knowledge. It is argued that a focus upon stocks and flows of energy and knowledge in complex economic systems can yield an appropriate analytical framework for macroeconomics. It is explained how such a framework can be connected with key insights of both Schumpeter and Keynes that have been eliminated in modern macroeconomics. A macroeconomic framework that cannot be operationalized empirically is of limited usefulness so, in the last part of the article, an appropriate methodology for evolutionary macroeconomics is discussed.     

Sociology of economics or sociology of economy? theoretical-methodological arguments for sociological economics

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life. There is nothing surprising in the habit of economists to invade the sociological field. A major part of their work—practically the whole of what they have to say on institutions and on the…[social] forces which shape economic behavior—inevitably overlaps the sociologist’s preserves. In consequence, a no man’s land or everyman’s land has developed that might conveniently be called economic sociology … [or sociological economics] (Schumpeter 1956:134). The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Neuroeconomics: two camps gradually converging: what can economics gain from it?

Neuroeconomics started off as a hybrid project. Two camps, behavioral economics in the scanner (BES) and Glimcher’s economics of neural activity (ENA), could be clearly distinguished. The camps disagreed not only about substantive issues but also about what neuroeconomics ultimately aims to accomplish. Recent developments suggest that the gap between the two camps is closing, however. There is a growing consensus, it seems, about the brain areas in which the final stages of individual decision-making occur and about relevant features of brain activity in these areas. BES and Glimcher’s ENA also seem to converge on the view that the neuroeconomics’ ultimate aim is to contribute to the construction of a new utility theory with stronger predictive power than standard expected utility theory. While the potential importance of an improved utility theory for economic theory cannot be denied, however, it remains to be seen whether an improved utility theory is something economic theory needs most badly or most urgently. Especially if economic theory is not ultimately interested in individual decisions, but in how aggregate behavior responds to incentives, attention should not be limited to what happens inside the skulls of individuals. What happens outside the individuals’ skulls, in the environments of individuals and in their interactions patterns, should also receive due attention.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II. Mayo Research Institute In the field of scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision. It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of reference, are in danger of putting at the centre of their concerns something other than the human person and the entirety of the person's life. Further still, some of these, sensing the opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human being [John Paul II, 1998, sect. 46].     

Where Schumpeter was nearly right – the Swedish model and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy<--RID="*"-->

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Joseph A. Schumpeter concluded that socialism would eventually displace capitalism in Western democracies. This would come about as a result of the superior performance of capitalism. We extract six “stylized” propositions that are essential elements of Schumpeter's prediction about the fate of capitalism. These propositions are confronted with the development of the Swedish economy. The three main results of the analysis are: (1) The evolution of the Swedish economy closely followed Schumpeter's predictions until about 1980: Large firms became increasingly predominant in production and innovative activity, ownership of firms became more and more concentrated, individual entrepreneurship waned in importance, the general public grew increasingly hostile towards capitalism, and by the late 1970s explicit proposals for a gradual transfer of ownership of firms from private hands were launched. (2) Design of tax and industrial policies fueled a development of the economy along the lines predicted by Schumpeter. In general, the policies discouraged private wealth accumulation. In particular, the policies favored concentration of firms and concentration of private ownership. (3) The turning point away from the path to socialism coincides with real world developments that disclosed two major flaws in Schumpeter's analysis. First, the ever more obvious failure of socialism in Eastern Europe went against Schumpeter's assertion that socialism can work. Second, Schumpeter, who thought that modern technology would make the giant corporation increasingly predominant, did not foresee the revival of entrepreneurship that took place in the Western countries around 1980.     

Exactly what happens after the Anscombe–Aumann race?

This paper derives a representation of preferences for a choice theory with vague environments; vague in the sense that the agent does not know the precise lotteries over outcomes conditional on states. Instead, he knows only a possible set of these lotteries for each state. Thus, this paper’s main departure from the standard subjective expected utility model is to relax an assumption about the environment, rather than weakening the axiomatic structure. My model is consistent with the behavior observed in the Ellsberg experiment. It can capture the same type of behavior as the multiple priors models, but can also result in behavior that is different from both the behavior implied by standard subjective expected utility models and the behavior implied by the multiple priors models. This paper is a revised chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at Cornell University. I am very grateful to David Easley for extensive comments and suggestions. I also thank Larry Blume, Ani Guerdjikova, Edi Karni, Ted O’Donoghue, Maureen O’Hara, Jacob Sagi, seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen, Cornell University, ESEM 2006, Fuqua—Duke University, FUR 2006, Johns Hopkins University, Purdue University, Queen’s University, the University of Warwick, the associate editor, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions.     

Bad Eggs,Learning-by-doing,and the Choice of Technology

We model long-run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects. There are four possible long-run equilibria in a socially planned economy: ‘High-growth’, adopt rapidly, but abandon damaging technologies once revealed (DDT, CFCs); ‘Cautious’, brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes (genetically modified organisms); ‘No-growth’, halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge; and ‘Collapse’, adopt rapidly without ever abandoning damaging technologies. In the base parameterization a short-sighted social planner chooses the cautious strategy. A far-sighted planner chooses the high-growth strategy, unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious strategy again dominates. Regulatory options in the market economy are investigated. Pollution taxes do not affect the firm’s level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits; however, they do encourage the abandonment of damaging technologies. Liability rules do affect precaution, but may lead to excessive caution, or even a no-growth trap.     

Weber, Schumpeter and Knight on entrepreneurship and economic development

This paper interprets the discussion on entrepreneurship and economic development that started off with Weber's papers on the Protestant Ethic. Weber sought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of the Occident in the rational, Calvinist attitude to life. Calvinism – in his view – exactly suited a society of free labourers, who were not tied to master and soil by extra-economic considerations as in tribal and feudal societies. Schumpeter gave an alternative explanation, emphasizing the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship. Knight, who stressed neither rationality nor innovation but uncertainty and perceptiveness as the sole source of progress and profits, followed up German language writing on this subject. Only the investor who can detect hitherto hidden qualities in people can gain. The paper demonstrates how these three authors influenced each other. The debate between these three authors has raised many issues of governance and organization that feature contemporary thinking.     

Stolper on Schumpeter

This article is a review essay on Stolper’s recent book, Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The Public Life of a Private Man. The author recommends the book for a broad readership, although he raises a few critical observations.     

Schumpeter on unemployment

Joseph Alois Schumpeter’s approach to the phenomenon of unemployment differs strongly from the traditional classification with its strict distinctions between frictional, cyclical and structural unemployment. By relating these three categories to his theory of creative destruction, Schumpeter collapsed them all into one: technological unemployment. In our paper, we provide a systematic overview and discussion of Schumpeter’s varied writings on unemployment, from 1908 to 1954. We compare his view with the positions of some of his contemporaries, such as Wicksell, Hicks, Beveridge and Keynes. Finally, we discuss to what extent recent writers, such as Aghion, Howitt and Caballero, have integrated Schumpeter’s approach into modern macroeconomics.     

The characteristics of a monetary economy: a Keynes-Schumpeter approach

Mainstream monetary theory considers money only as an instrumentmeant to facilitate trading without having any effect on incomeor on the evolution of the economic system. The aim of thispaper is to elaborate a monetary theory capable of supportingthe thesis of money non-neutrality based on the arguments developedby Keynes and Schumpeter. The synthesis of the theories of thesetwo great economists will be formulated starting from the twopoints which are common in the views of Keynes and Schumpeter.First, in contrast with mainstream theory, Keynes and Schumpeterstate that the diffusion of a fiat money induces a radical modificationinto the way in which the economic system works. Second, whenKeynes and Schumpeter describe the reasons why money and financialaggregates are not neutral, they highlight the fundamental roleof the credit market and of banks; in contrast with the mainstreamtheory, they do not consider the credit market as the mirrorimage of the goods market.     

Contributions of German and American jesuits to economics: The last 100 years

This article focuses on the contributions of six economists schooled in the Jesuit tradition. Four are Jesuit priests: Heinrich Pesch and Oswald von Nell-Breuning who are German, and Bernard Dempsey and Joseph Becker who are American. Two others, Goetz Briefs and William Waters, are lay persons who are referred to as “Jesuits without collars.” Five have direct ties to one another. Von Nell Breuning was a student of Pesch, as was Briefs. Waters was a student of Briefs, and Dempsey was influenced by Pesch and von Nell-Breuning. All five are solidarist economists who think about economics and economic affairs in a distinct way which originates with Pesch. Today they would be called personalist economists. The distinctive work of these six Jesuits is barely visible in the ranks of academic economists. Their contributions should be highlighted before they are lost forever to those who sense there is something inadequate about mainstream economics.     

You are not in my boat: common fate and discrimination against outgroup members

Sharing a common fate with some people but not others may affect how economic agents behave in economic transactions, quite independently of strategic incentives. We present an experimental test of the effect of perceptions of common fate on the inducement of economic discrimination in bilateral settings. In settings where the bargaining power was all with one subject (the dictator game and a ‘unilateral power game’), about half of the subjects engaged in negative discrimination: insiders were not treated better relative to control sessions, but outsiders were treated worse. Discrimination may be induced by a more conflictual perception of the decision problem.     

Biased procurement auctions

In a complex procurement a buyer may consider biasing the auction rules in order to account for differences in product characteristics offered by the sellers. This paper studies the gathering, disclosure and use of information about this bias. While we also describe the optimal procurement auction in our setting, the main focus of the paper is on the case where the buyer does not have commitment power. We find that without commitment full disclosure of the buyer’s preferences is optimal. Furthermore, lack of commitment distorts the buyer’s incentives to learn about its preferences: unlike the commitment case, without commitment the value of this information can be negative. Based on Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. dissertation at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a John M. Olin Dissertation Fellowship and a Melvin and Joan Lane Stanford Graduate Fellowship. Thanks to Pat Bajari, Tim Bresnahan, Vinicius Carrasco, George Deltas, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.     

江浙模式及民营经济在全国的发展

Along with the implementation of reform and open up policy in China, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, two provinces have got rapid economic development and greatly contributed to China’s market transition. Jiangsu, Zhejiang together with Shanghai, have shaped China’s economic heartland—the Yangtze River Delta Economic Region. Undoubtedly, the private sector is the driving force for the tremendous economic development in the Yangtze River Delta, particularly for facilitating institutional transition and economic development. Fortunately, this kind of economic development driven by the private sector was not only restricted in the Yangtze River Delta Region, but also across the country as it has been gradually extended nationwide. This paper is to look at the development of the private sector in Jiangsu and Zhejiang areas and particularly trace its fantastic effects on nationwide economic development and market transition.      

Towards a Disequilibrium Theory of Endogenous Economic Growth

This paper discusses the need for a new approach to economic growth theory. The standard theory of growth-in-equilibrium driven by exogenous, uncaused, productivity gains has an implication that is both unjustified and perverse from a policy perspective: that government intervention of any kind can only introduce constraints and reduce option space, thus decreasing potential growth. It is argued that growth theory should (1) acknowledge the importance of natural resources, especially fossil fuels, as a driver of past and present economic growth, (2) incorporate an explicit recognition that growth is a consequence of technological innovation, especially radical innovation, that often responds to natural resource scarcities or other societal needs and (3) explicitly reflect the fact that the important (i.e. scarce) factors of production in economics can and do change over time, i.e. from a rural ‘cowboy’ economy of the past to an urbanized ‘spaceship’ economy of the future. In short, it should reflect the fact that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’. The first and third of these modifications have been proposed before, but not in combination. The third seems to be new.