上市公司盈余管理系列报道之六 弹性的边界

正能量盈余管理是CFO参与企业价值创造的阳光地带。根据管理层操控应计额进行盈余管理是出于机会主义动机,还是传递公司未来经营业绩的价值相关性信息,盈余管理属性可以划分两类:机会主义盈余管理和决策有用性盈余管理。其中,机会主义盈余管理的类型包括基于管理层收购、股票发行、股权激励、内部人交易及基于满足薪酬契约和债务契约的契约动机、规避政府行业监管和反托拉斯监管的监管动机盈余管理等;就决策有用性盈余管理动机来说,其目的是通过盈余管理正面传递价值相     

盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知研究

以2009~2013年沪深两市 A 股上市公司为样本,研究应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理对审计师风险感知的影响,研究结论表明,审计师既能感知到应计盈余管理行为带来的风险,同时还能感知到真实盈余管理行为的风险,并会从审计意见类型和审计费用两个方面采取风险应对措施。相较于有限责任制会计师事务所,特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所的审计师对盈余管理行为的风险感知更敏感。     

真实盈余管理与审计师认知

本文以2008-2013年A股上市公司为对象,考察审计师对真实盈余管理的认知。具体探讨:审计师能否识别真实盈余管理;审计师对真实盈余管理客户的辞聘或保留决策选择;以及审计师应对真实盈余管理带来风险的策略等三个问题。研究表明,审计师能够识别真实盈余管理,并将真实盈余管理作为风险因素在审计定价决策中加以考虑;会计师事务所对真实盈余管理带来的风险现阶段整体可控,事务所倾向于采取客户保留决策;事务所主要通过审计师付出额外的努力和更换审计团队两种策略来降低审计风险。本文的研究结果为理解审计师对真实盈余管理的认知提供了直接的经验证据,对于从审计角度强化真实盈余管理的监管提供了政策参考依据。     

盈余管理、信息风险与审计意见

盈余管理和信息风险是影响审计意见的两个重要因素。已有研究主要关注当期盈余管理与审计意见的关系,少有关注信息风险对审计意见的影响。本文运用我国上市公司的数据,同时研究盈余管理和信息风险对审计意见的影响。检验结果表明,公司的信息风险与审计师出具非标意见概率显著正相关,而当期盈余管理与审计师出具非标意见的概率无显著相关性。这表明,审计师出具审计意见时主要考虑信息风险,而没有证据表明审计师出具审计意见时考虑了盈余管理。本文的研究结论深化了已有审计意见和审计质量决定因素方面的研究。     

股份支付并购中存在不同的盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文从收购方的视角,以2008~2010年在并购过程中采用股份支付方式的中国上市公司为样本,实证考察了中国上市公司在股份支付并购中的盈余管理机会主义行为以及对并购绩效的影响。研究结果发现:收购方在并购前半年存在显著正向应计盈余管理机会主义行为;在并购当期存在显著正向真实盈余管理机会主义行为;并购后一年公司业绩的下降程度受到应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的交替影响;股份支付并购是促使公司管理层产生盈余管理的动机之一,并且对并购后一年绩效显著下降具有一定的解释力度。     

盈余管理方式与IPO定价效率

本文以1993-2015年我国A股IPO公司为样本,研究了IPO公司应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理对IPO定价效率的不同作用.研究结果发现:IPO公司的应计盈余管理会降低IPO定价效率,而真实盈余管理则对IPO定价效率没有显著的影响;进一步研究还发现,应计盈余管理对IPO定价效率的影响在市场化程度较高的地区和熊市期间表现的...     

约束条件、IPO盈余管理方式与公司业绩——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的研究

IPO盈余管理问题一直是资本市场研究的热点议题之一,本文考察了IPO企业的盈余管理方式及其对公司业绩的影响,并进一步探讨了在一定约束条件下,不同盈余管理方式对发行定价的作用。研究发现,IPO企业不仅实施了应计盈余管理,而且实施了真实盈余管理;IPO企业对盈余管理方式的选择是在发行价最大化原则下权衡的结果,当公司面临的法律保护水平较低、处于管制行业、审计师为非国际"四大"时,选择真实盈余管理更有利于提高股票发行价。此外,本文发现不同盈余管理方式对公司未来业绩的影响存在一定的差异,应计盈余管理主要影响公司的短期业绩,而真实盈余管理将会对公司的长期业绩产生较大影响。     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

内部控制、审计师行业专长、应计与真实盈余管理

本文以2008至2009年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,研究内部控制和审计师行业专长对应计和真实盈余管理的治理作用,并进一步探讨内部控制和审计师行业专长对应计和真实盈余管理的治理是以替代方式还是以互补方式来发挥作用。研究发现:首先,高质量的内部控制有助于抑制公司的应计盈余管理行为,但对真实盈余管理的抑制作用较小。事务所的行业专长能同时抑制公司的应计和真实盈余管理行为。其次,内部控制与审计师行业专长在抑制公司的盈余管理方面存在互补关系,而不是替代关系,即公司的内部控制越好,越有助于发挥审计师行业专长对应计和真实盈余管理的治理作用。     

供应商/客户关系型交易、盈余管理与审计师决策

本文基于2007—2013年A股上市公司披露的向前五名供应商、客户采销额占年度采销总额比例数据,实证检验了企业的供应商/客户关系型交易是否会影响其盈余管理程度,以及由供应商/客户关系型交易决定的那部分预期盈余管理是否会影响外部审计师的决策。研究发现,供应商/客户关系型交易能够在一定程度上解释企业的盈余管理行为。进一步的经验证据表明,由供应商/客户关系型交易决定的预期盈余管理显著影响了审计师关于审计意见、审计收费的决策。本文从一个独特的视角揭示了供应商/客户关系型交易对会计信息质量和审计师决策的影响机理和作用途径,为投资者、监管层和审计师从企业供应链关系的角度理解其财务会计行为的发生机理提供了有价值的参考,也为针对会计信息质量、审计师行为的深入研究开辟了崭新的视角。     

Earnings Management in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

We study the impact of earnings management prior to bankruptcy filing on the passage of firms through Chapter 11. Using data on public US firms, we construct three measures of earnings management: a real activities manipulation measure (abnormal operating cash flows) and two accounting manipulation measures (discretionary accruals and abnormal working capital accruals). We find that, controlling for the impact of factors known to influence earnings management and firm survival in bankruptcy, earnings management prior to bankruptcy significantly reduces the likelihood of Chapter 11 plan confirmation and emergence from Chapter 11. The results are driven primarily by extreme values of earnings management, characterized by one or two standard deviations above or below the mean. The findings are consistent with creditors reacting positively to unduly conservative earnings reports and negatively to overly optimistic earnings reports. We also find that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a higher incidence of confirmation and switching to a Big 4 auditor before filing increases the incidence of emergence.     

Earnings Management in Australian Corporations

This article surveys the literature examining the earnings management behaviour of Australian corporations. While numerous motivations for earnings management are proposed in this literature, current period CEO turnover is the only phenomenon for which there is consistent empirical support. A number of studies report discontinuities in the distribution of earnings around benchmarks such as the zero profit level. However, there is no evidence that these discontinuities are associated with abnormal accrual behaviour. Evidence regarding the ability of various governance mechanisms to constrain earnings management is also mixed. While several studies report a negative relation between auditor size and earnings management, no Australian studies attempt to control for the likely endogenous nature of this relationship. Papers report that board independence and audit committee independence constrain earnings management in Australian corporations, although evidence is not consistent across studies. The article shows that many Australian studies of earnings management use very noisy and, in some cases, biased measures of abnormal accruals which may partly explain the inconsistency of results across studies, adding further uncertainty regarding the implications of this field of research for standard setters, investors and scholars.     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

股权质押、盈余管理与审计师风险应对

基于2007—2018年我国A股1109家上市公司的数据,研究大股东股权质押、真实盈余管理与审计师风险应对之间的关系,探究真实盈余管理程度是否增强了大股东股权质押与审计师风险应对的正向关系。研究发现:大股东股权质押正向影响了审计费用和审计意见;真实盈余管理程度加剧了大股东股权质押后的负面效果,进而加强了大股东股权质押与审计费用间的正向关系,但对审计意见的影响不显著;进一步的研究发现:上期的审计费用反向助长了当期的股权质押率;存在大股东股权质押的上市公司,审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率会随审计费用的提高而加大。该结论扩展了审计师风险应对的研究范围及影响大股东股权质押的其他因素,对提高审计师风险应对及完善大股东股权质押政策具有一定的参考价值。     

Investor Attention and Earnings Management around the World

This study examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the limited investor attention model of Hirshleifer and Teoh ( 2003 ). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I use analyst following, institutional ownership, and Big N auditor choice to proxy for investor attention. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Second, I document that institutional block‐holdings curb earnings management across the world. Third, Big N auditors reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Fourth, I document that corporate governance mechanisms reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms.     

Earnings volatility and audit report lag

This study investigates whether earnings volatility influences audit report lag. If auditors view earnings volatility as affecting risk, and adjust effort in response to risk, we expect earnings volatility to impact audit report lag. Using a sample of 13,075 firm-year observations over the period 2004–2015, we find a negative relation between earnings volatility and audit report lag, consistent with auditors responding to less volatile earnings with increased effort. We also find that the association between earnings volatility and audit report lag is driven by non-industry-specialist auditors, auditors with short tenure, and small and medium sized auditor offices. Furthermore, we examine whether earnings management conducted by way of earnings smoothing affects our results. We find that low earnings volatility has a stronger impact on increasing audit report lag when there is a high degree of earnings smoothing