Elements of a talent strategy for effective relationship building: A study among bank sales and service providers

This study considers equity sensitivity, emotional labor and organizational commitment as three important variables that play a critical role among sales and service providers at a bank and the effect these variables ultimately have on corporate performance. Using an equity theory perspective, research hypotheses linking the various constructs are formulated. Data are collected from sales and service managers at a community bank and partial aggregation followed by structural equation modeling is used to test the hypotheses. Results are reported, implications to a bank’s talent strategy are drawn, limitations are noted and directions for future research are indicated.     

管理层权力对企业绩效的影响研究——基于企业内部治理机制视角

以我国主板上市企业数据为基础,实证检验了上市企业管理层权力对企业绩效的影响,内部治理机制对管理层权力——企业绩效敏感性的影响。实证结果表明,内部治理机制影响管理层权力与企业绩效之间关系的敏感性,当不考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量在1%水平上显著正相关,具有较高教育背景和持有企业股权的管理层,能为企业带来更好的业绩。当考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量仅在10%水平上正相关。管理层权力综合变量对股权制衡度较低和独立董事比重较高的企业的绩效具有显著正向影响。     

The impact of reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes,information asymmetry and organisational commitment on managerial performance

This study examines the effects of information asymmetry and organisational commitment on the relation between the extent of reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes and managerial performance. The responses of 109 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey, were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results provide evidence of higher managerial performance for managers with low organisational commitment and a high reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes in high information asymmetry situations. On the other hand, the results show that the performance level of managers with high organisational commitment is unaffected regardless of the degree of information asymmetry and the extent of reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes.     

A note on work-related values, budget emphasis and managers’ organisational commitment

Managers’ work-related values (WRVs) have important implications for designing appropriate management accounting systems (MAS) in organisations. This paper examines the effect of the interaction between managers’ WRV for innovation and budget emphasis (an integral part of MAS) on their organisational commitment. The sample consisted of 109 managers from production, marketing and support departments within Australian manufacturing firms. Hypotheses were tested using both quantitative and qualitative data collected by a questionnaire survey and post-survey interviews. The results indicate that the adoption of low budget emphasis led to high organisational commitment when managers’ WRV for innovation was high, but not when managers’ WRV for innovation was low. The results also indicate that marketing managers held higher WRV for innovation than production managers. The post-survey interviews provide further insight into how a more customer- and competitor-focused subculture of marketing managers and a more technical- and efficiency-focused subculture of production managers may promote the difference in their WRV for innovation, and affect their attitudes towards budget emphasis. The findings of the study have implications for design of performance evaluation systems for managers in functionally differentiated organisations.     

ORGANISATIONAL COMMITMENT IN THE POLICE SERVICE: EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES,PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST

This study aims to investigate whether, and how, the use of performance measures, procedural justice, and interpersonal trust interact to affect organisational commitment of police officers. Drawing on a survey based on a sample of 57 senior officers within a single police force, we find that the use of performance measures, procedural justice, and interpersonal trust are positively associated with organisational commitment. Further analysis reveals that trust between officer and superior mediates the relationship between the use of non‐financial measures and organisational commitment, but procedural justice does not have a mediating effect on commitment. These findings are further explored through selected interviews with respondents.     

中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效:基于随机前沿生产函数的分析

本文通过构建深圳中小企业板上市公司股权结构影响企业绩效的复合随机前沿生产函数,利用2006—2008年面板数据对中小企业的股权结构和企业绩效的关系进行了经验研究,结果表明中小企业的股权集中度与企业绩效之间显著正相关,这与国内文献中对大公司的经验研究结果一致,表明当前上市公司的股权集中有利于公司治理改善和企业绩效的提高。但是第一大股东持股比率却与绩效负相关,这与对大公司的研究结论相反,表明在中小企业中存在较为明显的"隧道挖掘"现象,"一股独大"在中小企业中并不利于公司治理。研究结果还表明,国家、法人、外资或个人对公司治理的绩效无显著差异;流通股比重、高管持股、研发人员投入等都与企业绩效不相关;中小企业具有较强的股权融资倾向,不符合"啄食顺序"的资本结构理论。     

Financial experts on the top management team: Do they reduce investment inefficiency?

We examine the effect of the top management team (TMT) professional finance experience on firm investment efficiency. Top managers with a career background in finance help reduce deviations of investment from the level warranted by firm fundamentals. Reductions in investment inefficiencies are achieved by financial expert managers using project-specific rather than company-wide, discount rates for project evaluation and facilitating debt and equity issuance at lower costs. Greater investment efficiency due to the financial expertise of TMT improves firm performance. We demonstrate that these improvements are driven by the collective expertise of the TMT rather than solely by chief executive officers.     

Organisational and professional commitment of early career accountants: do mentoring and organisational ethical climate matter?

This study assesses the effects of mentoring and organisational ethical climate (OEC) on the organisational and professional commitment (PC) of early career accountants (ECAs) (i.e. accounting graduate recruits with three or less years of working experience). The empirical data are based on a questionnaire survey from 86 ECAs in Australian public accounting firms, and hypothesis testing utilises partial least squares analysis. Our results indicate when a career development style of mentoring is adopted there is greater organisational as well as PC. By contrast, a social support mentoring style has no significant impact on organisational commitment (OC) and a negative effect on PC. Further, our data also reveal OEC to be positively associated with OC, and OC in turn having a positive impact on PC. The results imply that fostering a career‐focused mentoring environment and an OEC can increase an ECA's OC and PC. These results have various implications for human resource management at both the accounting firm and professional levels.     

Fairness in performance evaluation and its behavioural consequences

A recent paper in Accounting and Business Research by Lau et al. (2008) offers systematic evidence to explain whether managers’ perceptions on fairness of performance evaluation procedures affect attitudes such as job satisfaction; and if it does, the different behavioural processes involved. Our paper re‐examines Lau et al.’s model and hypotheses to assess the external validity of their findings, based on a very different sample of managers. Drawing on recent organisational justice literature, it further develops the model and examines the potential interaction effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures and other variables on job satisfaction. Finally, it extends the outcome variable to include manager performance. Using survey responses from 165 managers, supported by 24 interviews, drawn from three major organisations in the manufacturing and financial services sectors, we find that Lau et al.’s results on the indirect effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures on job satisfaction are generalisable to other organisational settings and managerial levels. However, using their model we do not find support for the outcome‐based effects through distributive fairness. Developing a revised model we observe that the effects of distributive fairness on job satisfaction are indirect via organisational commitment. When the model is further developed to incorporate performance as the outcome variable, we observe similar findings.     

The dynamics of CEO equity vs. inside debt and firm performance

This paper provides new evidence on the comparative dynamic effects of CEO inside debt and equity compensation on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. In contrast to the extant literature, we find significant empirical evidence supporting the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) premise that managers should receive debt vs. equity compensation in proportion to the capital structure of the firm. We also provide new evidence showing that the effects of the CEO compensation structure on firm performance are dependent on the CEO’s time horizon, as measured by the expected period of employment to retirement. We show that the incremental benefits of equity compensation to performance increase with the CEO’s projected time to retirement. A similar, but insignificant relationship is observed for CEO inside debt compensation. Cash compensation is more beneficial to the firm when concentrated near the end of the CEO’s tenure.     

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

Managerial personal diversification and portfolio equity incentives

This paper examines the diversification choices of top managers and their implications for the levels of portfolio equity incentives as well as for firms' financial policies. Standard portfolio theory should also apply to corporate managers and therefore excessive risk exposures to the firm should create portfolio diversification incentives for the managers. We use a unique dataset from the Taiwan tax data center and construct the measures of the degree of diversification in a manager's equity portfolio that is made up of equities of other firms to capture his motives for diversifying his risk exposure to his own firm. We provide empirical evidence supporting the view that managers have a risk-reduction motive when they trade in the equities of other firms besides their own. Moreover, we document evidence that the degree of diversification in such equity portfolios also significantly affects managerial equity incentives as well as firms' financial policies. Overall, our findings confirm that managers' personal diversification can help make up for the diversification that the managers would otherwise have lost, thereby reducing the agency cost of equity incentive contracts.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

The impact of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices on public sector managers’ motivation

We conduct an explorative study to investigate the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices on managerial motivation in public sector organisations. Increased subjectivity can enhance motivation if supervisors are able to provide better informational feedback. However, subjectivity is likely to reduce motivation if it reduces perceived mission clarity or negatively affects relations between supervisors and subordinates. Our analysis is based on a survey among 94 public sector managers in the Netherlands. We predict and find that subjectivity in performance evaluation practices reduces perceived mission clarity, which in turn decreases motivation. We also find that subjectivity negatively affects subordinate managers’ trust in their supervisor, which also reduces motivation. Jointly, these results indicate that the negative effects of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices outweigh its potential positive consequences, suggesting that New Public Management's focus on more objective performance measures can indeed be beneficial. By itself, however, this does not automatically imply that more objective systems in general are optimal in all public sector organisations as such systems may have dysfunctional side effects such as distortion of performance measures, gaming or manipulation. In addition, we find that the effects of subjectivity are moderated by organisational characteristics.     

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.     

Managerial Preference,Asymmetric Information,and Financial Structure

If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high-quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin.     

Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity–debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977–1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However, among firms with main bank equity stakes, the equity–debt structure of claims has a positive effect on firm performance. The positive effect of the main bank's equity–debt structure is found to be greater in group-affiliated firms than in independent firms. The main bank maximizes its own interests by charging a higher interest rate when its equity stakes are relatively less than its debt claims and by prompting firms to pay more dividends when its equity stakes are relatively high.     

Unexpected Inflation,Capital Structure,and Real Risk‐adjusted Firm Performance

Managers can improve real risk‐adjusted firm performance by matching nominal assets with nominal liabilities, thereby reducing the sensitivity of real risk‐adjusted returns to unexpected inflation. The net asset value of US equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) serves as a good proxy for nominal assets and, accordingly, we use a sample of US REITs to test our hypothesis. We find that for the firms in our sample: (i) their real risk‐adjusted performance, and (ii) their inflation‐hedging qualities are inversely related to deviations from this ‘matching‐nominals’ argument. In addition to providing managers with a vehicle to maximize real risk‐adjusted performance, our findings also provide investors with the tools to infer inflation‐hedging qualities of equity investments.     

股权制衡对上市公司绩效的非线性影响——基于股权制衡度的新测算

测算股权制衡度时不考虑股东间的关联关系可能引致偏差。鉴此,重新测算了股权制衡度,以2003~2013年927家 A 股主板上市公司为样本研究其与公司绩效的关系。结果表明：“新股权制衡度”与公司绩效为非线性的 U 型关系,而“旧股权制衡度”与公司绩效为线性关系;[1,2]为股权制衡度对公司绩效影响的灰色区间;股权制衡度与公司绩效的关系受股东持股模式和外部环境影响。研究结果支持条件有效论,适度的股权制衡才能发挥积极作用。