澄清公告信息含量的实证研究

本文以深沪证券交易所2007-2008年间327个澄清公告为样本，分析了资本市场澄清公告的信息含量问题。研究发现澄清公告具有一定的信息含量，这表明澄清公告是有用和及时的，尤其是澄清公告清晰地进行肯定答复时，增量信息更加明显。实证分析还显示，影响澄清公告信息含量的因素主要有外部流传消息的性质以及澄清公告答复的方式。     

上市公司担保公告的信息含量

本文在国内外相关研究文献回顾及中国资本市场特殊环境分析的基础上,对我国上市公司担保公告的市场反应进行了实证研究。结果发现,上市公司发布担保公告日前后出现显著为负的累积非正常报酬。研究中我们按担保方式、担保对象对担保公告进行分类,发现不同的担保公告蕴含不同的信息含量:互保、单向信用担保、非关联方担保这三种担保的市场反应为负;而具有反担保措施的担保公告市场反应为正;对于关联方担保,市场没有显著的反应。     

事务所变更、信息隐藏及市场反应

采用事件研究法,利用2004—2011年我国A股上市公司会计师事务所变更数据,对事务所变更信息披露选择中存在的隐藏信息行为及由该行为所引起的市场反应进行实证分析。结果显示:对变更事项进行专项公告披露的公司比非专项公告披露的公司更易产生较差的市场反应;在专项公告披露的公司中,是否披露变更的具体原因及变更类型会导致市场反应的差异;然而,对于承载着特殊信息含量的换"所"不换"师"变更,投资者却未给予充分的关注。     

上市公司财务重述公告的市场反应研究

本文利用事件研究法对发布财务重述公告的上市公司在公告日前后的市场反应进行了检验，并对比分析了不同类型重述公告引发的市场反应的差异。研究发现，上市公司的财务重述具有显著的负面市场反应，且不同类型重述公告的市场反应各异。由收入确认问题引发的财务重述，其负面市场反应大于由其他问题导致的财务重述的市场反应；当重述公告涉及范围广、重述发起人为外部监管机构、重述涉及核心会计指标以及重述导致盈余调减时，其负面市场反应更为显著。     

上市公司减值计提披露与信息不对称关系考察北大核心

本文以沪、深两市2007~2014年计提资产减值的全部A股上市公司为研究样本,采用固定效应模型考察2006年企业会计准则实施后上市公司资产减值计提披露与信息不对称的关系。研究发现,上市公司减值公告前期的信息不对称程度越低,其计提的资产减值规模越大。上市公司资产减值公告的发布即资产减值信息的披露有助于降低资本市场信息不对称水平。披露资产减值计提比例越高的上市公司,股票换手率越高,相应的减值公告后的信息不对称程度越低。     

中国公司债发行的公告效应研究

本文运用事件研究法研究了中国上市公司宣布首次发行公司债时的公告效应,研究发现:把公告日前后整个事件窗口期作为一个整体来考虑,首次公司债的发行公告对股票价格并不会产生显著的影响;但如果以公告日为分界点,分别考察公告日前后的市场反应,公告日前后股票价格分别有正的市场反应和负的市场反应。公司债期限和相对发行规模对公告日前的CAR有显著影响;公司债券期限、市场价值与账面价值之比、长期负债比率与对公告日后的CAR有显著影响。     

中国公司债发行的公告效应研究

本文运用事件研究法研究了中国上市公司宣布首次发行公司债时的公告效应,研究发现:把公告日前后整个事件窗口期作为一个整体来考虑,首次公司债的发行公告对股票价格并不会产生显著的影响;但如果以公告日为分界点,分别考察公告日前后的市场反应,公告日前后股票价格分别有正的市场反应和负的市场反应。公司债期限和相对发行规模对公告日前的CAR有显著影响;公司债券期限、市场价值与账面价值之比、长期负债比率与对公告日后的CAR有显著影响。     

违法违规事件公告的信息传递效应研究

本文通过研究上市公司违法违规事件公告对行业内其他公司产生的影响来揭示违法违规事件公告的信息传递效应。以交易所披露的违法违规事件公告为样本,将公告公司行业内其他公司股票构建为投资组合,通过该投资组合的累积非正常收益来衡量违法违规事件公告的行业传递效应。结果发现,违法违规事件公告对行业内其他公司的影响是正面的,而且公告的披露存在内幕效应,细分后的违法违规公告引起的市场反应各异。     

定期报告预约披露日期的信息含量

沪深两交易所从2002年初开始对外公布上市公司向其预约的定期报告披露日期,本文研究了这一日期是否包含对投资者有用的信息。我们发现,在交易所公布预约日期时,公司的预约披露日期越早,则其异常回报越高,反之则低。市场的这种反应可以用随后公布的实际会计业绩好坏加以解释。我们还考察了市场的这种反应在横截面上的差异,对发布过”好消息”的预警公告及规模较大的公司,市场的反应程度较低;同时还发现预约披露日期的信息含量并未被”坏消息”的业绩预警公告所取代,这说明预约披露日期对“坏消息”的预警公司起到了进一步的证实作用。     

分析师行业专长、分析师盈余预测与盈余公告的信息溢出效应

盈余公告是资本市场的重要信息来源。通过研究A股市场年报发布先后顺序所产生的信息溢出现象发现，分析师会根据先公告公司的盈余消息，修正对同行业后公告公司的盈余预测。这种现象在同时跟踪两家公司的分析师中更加显著。进一步的研究表明，分析师行业专长可以增进这一机制。行业经验更丰富的分析师预测调整幅度更大，预测准确度的提升也更明显。分析师的决策过程受规模经济的影响。分析师在同一行业内，跟踪的企业越多，搜集和处理的行业信息越多，对行业内溢出信息的利用越充分。研究结果为分析师提高预测准确性以及投资者改进决策质量提供了依据，也为监管者完善信息披露制度提供了参考。     

Mandated Recognition of Employee Stock Option Expense – The Case of Canada

On December 18, 2003 the Accounting Standards Board of Canada announced that all firms registered in Canada would be required to expense stock options‐based compensation effective January 1, 2004. While a few firms had voluntarily opted to expense stock options prior to this date, the vast majority of firms had not. This study investigates the market reaction to this announcement by listed firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange that continued to disclose option expense rather than report it in the financial statement. We find no average market reaction by our sample firms affected by this mandate around the announcement date, but a significantly negative market reaction during the 5‐day window around the issuance date of the exposure draft. However, in cross‐sectional tests around the mandated expense announcement date, we find a significant negative relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and the Black–Scholes value (and number) of options outstanding and of options granted the previous year. These results suggest that the magnitude of the market reaction to the mandated expense announcement is related to the firm's usage of options. Our results provide further evidence that stock prices may not fully impound information disclosed in footnotes.     

The role of the seller’s stock performance in the market reaction to divestiture announcements

Divestitures have the potential to create shareholder value. However, the extent of the market reaction should depend on the likelihood of finding more valuable uses for the divested assets or the ability on the part of the seller to eliminate negative synergies. We hypothesize that strong performers have less scope to achieve substantial improvements compared to poorly performing firms. Using the seller’s stock return in excess of the market return in the 1-year and 2-year periods preceding the divestiture announcement to expose the divesting firm’s inefficient use of its assets, we show that the market reaction to divestiture announcements is significantly higher for underperforming firms. The difference in abnormal returns can be as high as 4 %. In contrast, none of the accounting-based variables that have been used in previous studies are found to be significantly related to the announcement returns. These results suggest that the firm’s stock performance is a more useful indicator of the wealth effect associated with divestitures.     

On the differential market reaction to dividend initiations

The finance literature documents substantial positive stock price reaction to dividend initiations. Most dividend initiation studies focus on the average positive reaction; however, 40 percent of the firms that initiate dividends experience negative abnormal returns at announcement. This paper focuses on the apparent heterogeneity in the stock price reaction to dividend initiation. I find that the observed negative market reaction reflects the market’s economic assessment of the impact of the event on these firms, and that it is not caused by anticipation or confounding events. The result is also supported by the fact that the market reaction to dividend initiation for these firms is negatively related to initial dividend yield. Both the positive and negative observed reactions are consistent with conventional arguments regarding the information content of dividends, and their role in mitigating agency problems.     

Market effects of private equity placement: Evidence from Chinese equity and bond markets

Research has provided empirical evidence for the stock market reaction toward private placement; however, similar research has not been conducted in terms of the bond market. Using the event study method, we empirically examine the explanatory power of the signaling, free cash flow, and wealth transfer hypotheses based on the reaction of the stock market, bond market, and firm abnormal returns to the private placement announcement. The results show that the stock market has a negative reaction toward private placement, whereas the bond market has a positive reaction. The results also show that the scale of private placement is correlated with the severity of the market reaction. Abnormal returns indicate no significant change both before and after the private placement, and they are unaffected by the scale of private placement. These results are consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis; however, the market reaction is not attributable to the signaling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. Extensive research shows that the abnormal returns of private placement change dramatically in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with low credit rating bonds, whereas the bond maturity has no significant impact on the abnormal returns—the wealth transfer effect of private placement is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with low credit rating bond.     

Market impact of international sporting and cultural events

We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We generalize previous results analyzing a large number and different types of mega-events, evaluate the effects for winning and losing countries, investigate the determinants of the observed market reaction and control for the ex ante probability of a country being a successful bidder. Average abnormal returns measured at the announcement date and around the event are not significantly different from zero. Further, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe positive significant effects. Yet, when we control for anticipation, the stock price reactions around the announcements are significant.     

Market reaction to uniform capital adequacy guidelines in the banking industry

In this paper the authors assess the stock market reaction to information on uniform capital requirements that was disseminated on four different dates: September 29, 1987; December 7, 1987; December 10, 1987; and July 11, 1988. The share prices of U.S. money center banks were adversely affected by the December 7, 1987, announcement regarding proposals to make regulatory standards more uniform. The share prices of U.S. superregional banks were not affected by this announcement. The difference in degree of response is attributed to disparate capital positions between the two groups of banks. In order to meet the new guidelines, U.S. money center banks may need to implement policies (such as issuing new stock) that are viewed unfavorably by the market.     

Between a rock and a hard place: managing diversity in a shareholder society

This study examines whether the appointment of racial/ethnic minorities into top management positions has a different impact on share price than the appointment of Caucasians into equivalent positions. Our dependent variable is the degree of change in share price following the announcement of racial/ethnic minority and Caucasian men into senior management positions. Market reaction to the naming of racial/ethnic minorities into corporate leadership positions is significant and negative, while the market's reaction to the naming of Caucasians is significant and positive. However, the negative market reaction to the appointment of racial/ethnic minorities into top management positions is mitigated in those firms that have explicitly incorporated diversity into their strategic growth plan. Our findings suggest that to successfully introduce diversity into upper management, firm decision makers must first signal the importance of diversity to market actors.     

定向增发公告效应在股市中的异化现象——关于中国证券市场的实证研究

本文以中国证券市场2006～2008年成功进行定向增发的上市公司为样本,研究了定向增发公告效应在牛市、熊市中的异化现象。研究发现在牛市周期中仅仅公告日当天存在显著的正公告效应,公告日前后都不存在显著的正公告效应;但是在熊市周期中不仅公告日当天存在显著正公告效应,而且从公告日前两天开始一直到公告日后10天都存在显著正公告效应。在不同市场态势下,公告效应与折扣的关系也不相同:在熊市周期中,随着定向增发折扣的增加,公告效应相应减弱,而在牛市周期中公告效应增强。最后,论文给出了基于投资者情绪的理论解释以及相应的启示。     

Analysis of the effects of settlement of interfirm lawsuits

This study examines the effects of news on settlement of interfirm lawsuits. We hypothesize that the defendant firms suffer damaged reputation as news on the interfirm lawsuit remains in the ‘public eye’, as such ending the litigation process through settlement is good news for the defendant firms. Thus, the stock market will react positively to the defendants when news of a settlement is announced. On the other hand, settlements end the free publicity that the plaintiffs enjoy. In addition the plaintiffs settle for less money than they initially seek. Thus, the implication of a reduced cash flow expectations that the announcement of settlements brings to the plaintiffs will cancel out the positive reputation effect. Therefore, there will be no significant stock market reaction to the plaintiffs when a settlement is announced. Furthermore, the stock market will show no significant reaction to the defendants who have been the subject of more than one lawsuit in a relatively short period of time prior to a settlement because their reputation is too severely damaged to be remedied through removal of their name from the limelight. The results of our analysis support the hypotheses and offer some insight for strategy development. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market reaction to equity offer reasons: What information do managers reveal?

Prior studies have had limited success explaining the negative market reaction to common stock announcements using firm and offer specific variables. We employ apiecewise linear model to test the relationship between announcement returns and firm and offer specific variables by specific offer reason as stated by management. We find evidence that managers are signalling the quality of the new investment when issuing equity for the offer-motive capital expenditures; this is support for the announcement of the equity issue being a signal of wasteful investment. We also find that the announcement of equity issues signals overvaluation when the equity offer is for general purposes.