Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.     

The hidden dragons

Most multinational corporations are fascinated with China. Carried away by the number of potential customers and the relatively cheap labor, firms seeking a presence in China have traditionally focused on selling products, setting up manufacturing facilities, or both. But they've ignored an important development: the emergence of Chinese firms as powerful rivals--in China and also in the global market. In this article, Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson describe how Chinese companies like Haier, Legend, and Pearl River Piano have quietly managed to grab market share from older, bigger, and financially stronger rivals in Asia, Europe, and the United States. Global managers tend to offer the usual explanations for why Chinese companies don't pose a threat: They aren't big enough or profitable enough to compete overseas, the managers say, and these primarily state-owned companies are ill-financed and ill-equipped for global competition. As the government's policies about the private ownership of companies changed from forbidding the practice to encouraging it, a new breed of Chinese companies evolved. The authors outline the four types of hybrid Chinese companies that are simultaneously tackling the global market. China's national champions are using their advantages as domestic leaders to build global brands. The dedicated exporters are entering foreign markets on the strength of their economies of scale. The competitive networks have taken on world markets by bringing together small, specialized companies that operate in close proximity. And the technology upstarts are using innovations developed by China's government-owned research institutes to enter emerging sectors such as biotechnology. Zeng and Williamson identify these budding multinationals, analyze their strategies, and evaluate their weaknesses.     

Manage customer-centric innovation--systematically

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Since so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is absolutely essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.     

Blue ocean strategy

Despite a long-term decline in the circus industry, Cirque du Soleil profitably increased revenue 22-fold over the last ten years by reinventing the circus. Rather than competing within the confines of the existing industry or trying to steal customers from rivals, Cirque developed uncontested market space that made the competition irrelevant. Cirque created what the authors call a blue ocean, a previously unknown market space. In blue oceans, demand is created rather than fought over. There is ample opportunity for growth that is both profitable and rapid. In red oceans--that is, in all the industries already existing--companies compete by grabbing for a greater share of limited demand. As the market space gets more crowded, prospects for profits and growth decline. Products turn into commodities, and increasing competition turns the water bloody. There are two ways to create blue oceans. One is to launch completely new industries, as eBay did with online auctions. But it's much more common for a blue ocean to be created from within a red ocean when a company expands the boundaries of an existing industry. In studying more than 150 blue ocean creations in over 30 industries, the authors observed that the traditional units of strategic analysis--company and industry--are of limited use in explaining how and why blue oceans are created. The most appropriate unit of analysis is the strategic move, the set of managerial actions and decisions involved in making a major market-creating business offering. Creating blue oceans builds brands. So powerful is blue ocean strategy, in fact, that a blue ocean strategic move can create brand equity that lasts for decades.     

Formation of monopolies in a bipartite market

We study the formation of monopolies in a simplified economic model where two brands compete in the market, using an agent based model. Each agent represents a company that uses one of the two available brands and interacts with other companies. The brands continually improve their product in order to compete for market share. In the innovation process companies can decide to change to the other brand if the move is beneficial. There is a cost for the company if it decides to switch to the other brand, and another cost if it stays with its current brand but only upgrades to a new enhanced version of the product. Our simulations show that the system always reaches a state when all companies end using a single brand, which is equivalent to a monopoly. We study the time span needed to reach the single brand final state for different parameters of the model.     

Stock Option Expensing: The Role of Corporate Governance

Analysis of the corporate stock option expensing decision (before the practice became mandatory in 2006) continues to be of interest because it provides insight into the underlying factors affecting not only expense recognition, but the overall corporate decision‐making process. Using a sample of 207 companies that volunteered to expense options and more than 1,000 non‐expensing firms, the authors found that companies that provide more disclosure and appeared to have a stronger alignment of managerial and shareholder interests were also more likely to expense stock options—a finding that the authors view as indirect evidence that voluntary expensing was more likely to occur in companies that practiced effective corporate governance. And consistent with the prediction of efficient market theorists, the study also found no significant market reaction to announcements of these decisions to expense options. The study also found that companies that were the heaviest users of options—notably, smaller, high—growth, and less‐profitable firms—were least likely to expense them. And while this finding adds to the weight of evidence suggesting that companies often make accounting decisions designed to boost reported earnings, the authors also recognize that the possibility that the decision by other companies not to expense may have been a strategy designed primarily to preserve access to capital markets.     

外资保险公司在我国经营绩效分析

中国加入WTO后,对外资保险公司的限制逐渐取消,大量外资保险公司以独资、合资和战略投资等方式先后进入我国保险市场,对我国保险行业产生了深远的影响。其在中国的业务范围和经营区域不断地扩大,但经营近10年来,市场份额止步不前,经营也鲜有盈利。本文在对外资保险公司进入我国的经营基本状况及特点予以阐述的基础上,通过分析其在华经营的多项业绩指标,试图寻找其在华经营中存在的问题,进而提出提高外资保险公司经营绩效的发展策略。     

Companies and the customers who hate them

Why do companies bind customers with contracts, bleed them with fees, and baffle them with fine print? Because bewildered customers, who often make bad purchasing decisions, can be highly profitable. Most firms that profit from customers' confusion are on a slippery slope. Over time, their customer-centric strategies for delivering value have evolved into company-centric strategies for extracting it. Not surprisingly, when a rival comes along with a friendlier alternative, customers defect. Adversarial value-extracting strategies are common in such industries as cell phone service, retail banking, and health clubs. Overly complex product and pricing options, for example, may have been designed to serve various segments. But in fact they take advantage of how difficult it is for customers to predict their needs (such as how many cell phone minutes they'll use each month) and make it hard for them to choose the right product. Similarly, penalties and fees, which may have been instituted to offset the costs of undesirable customer behavior, like bouncing checks, turn out to be very profitable. As a result, companies have no incentive to help customers avoid them. Tactics like these generate bad publicity and fuel customer defections, creating opportunities for competitors. Virgin Mobile USA, for example, has lured millions of angry cell phone customers away from the incumbents by offering a straightforward plan with no hidden fees, no time-of-day restrictions, and no contracts. ING Direct, now the fourth-largest thrift bank in the United States, offers accounts with no fees, no tiered interest rates, and no minimums. In industries where squeezing value from customers is commonplace, companies that dismantle these harmful practices and design a transparent, value-creating offer can head off customer retaliation and spur rapid growth.     

The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis

This study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. Our results document strong performance improvements, achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security. Specifically, after being privatized, firms increase real sales, become more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, improve their operating efficiency, and increase their work forces. Furthermore, these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout. Finally, we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization.     

Ad spending: maintaining market share

Accuracy in manufacturers' advertising budgeting is hampered by reliance on the case rate system, which ties budgets to sales. A better measure is a brand's market share compared with its share of voice (the brand's share of the total value of the main media exposure in that product category). New brands are often "investing" in the market: speaking in a louder voice than their market shares would justify. Popular brands are often "profit taking"--keeping their voices low but enjoying a disproportionately large market share. The interrelationship between market share and share of voice, with either "investing" or "profit taking" the desired result, is not usually considered when determining ad budgets. But as advertisers realize how market share can respond to advertising pressure through switches in the share of voice, this method of market testing should gain in importance.     

The Beta Dilemma in Emerging Markets

In principle, emerging markets analysts employ the same analytical framework when estimating the value of businesses as their counterparts in developed economies: they forecast future cash flows and discount those to the present with appropriate costs of capital that are estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. But in practice, emerging market analysts have a more complicated job because the task of estimating costs of equity in emerging markets is more difficult. Whereas developed economies have an abundance of historical data on overall stock market movements, industry share price behavior, and many individual share price histories, emerging market economies often do not. There may be no comparable local firms that are publicly traded—or if there are, their CAPM betas may be unreliable. And if analysts instead use the beta of a U.S. competitor as a surrogate for the emerging market beta, they face the question of whether domestic betas are equivalent across borders. As a consequence, appraisers of emerging market companies confront a “beta dilemma.” Part of this is a data problem stemming from shorter share price histories in emerging markets and the absence of publicly traded companies in some industries. In such cases, analysts may be inclined to use industry betas calculated with U.S. share prices as a substitute. But this creates an equivalence problem—the possibility, as confirmed by the author's research, that domestic U.S. and emerging market betas are not statistically equivalent for most industries. The author proposes a solution to this problem that involves grouping emerging markets into a single, distinctive asset class that allows for reliable calculations of industry betas. He also suggests ways of testing emerging market industry betas to determine whether they are statistically comparable.     

Discovering new points of differentiation

Most profitable strategies are built on differentiation: offering customers something they value that competitors don't have. But most companies concentrate only on their products or services. In fact, a company can differentiate itself every point where it comes in contact with its customers--from the moment customers realize they need a product or service to the time when they dispose of it. The authors believe that if companies open up their thinking to their customer's entire experience with a product or service--the consumption chain--they can uncover opportunities to position their offerings in ways that neither they nor their competitors though possible. The authors show how even a mundane product such as candles can be successfully differentiated. By analyzing its customers' experiences and exploring various options, Blyth Industries, for example, has grown from a $2 million U.S. candle manufacturer into a global candle and accessory business with nearly $500 million in sales and a market value of $1.2 billion. Finding ways to differentiate one's company is a skill that can be nurtured, the authors contend. In this Manager's Tool Kit, they have designed a two-part approach that can help companies continually identify new points of differentiation and develop the ability to generate successful differentiation strategies. "Mapping the Consumption Chain" captures the customer's total experience with a product or service. "Analyzing Your Customer's Experience" shows managers how directed brainstorming about each step in the consumption chain can elicit numerous ways to differentiate any offering.     

Building brands without mass media

Costs, market fragmentation, and new media channels that let customers bypass advertisements seem to be in league against the old ways of marketing. Relying on mass media campaigns to build strong brands may be a thing of the past. Several companies in Europe, making a virtue of necessity, have come up with alternative brand-building approaches and are blazing a trail in the post-mass-media age. In England, Nestlé's Buitoni brand grew through programs that taught the English how to cook Italian food. The Body Shop garnered loyalty with its support of environmental and social causes. Cadbury funded a theme park tied to its history in the chocolate business. H?agen-Dazs opened posh ice-cream parlors and got itself featured by name on the menus of fine restaurants. Hugo Boss and Swatch backed athletic or cultural events that became associated with their brands. The various campaigns shared characteristics that could serve as guidelines for any company hoping to build a successful brand: senior managers were closely involved with brand-building efforts; the companies recognized the importance of clarifying their core brand identity; and they made sure that all their efforts to gain visibility were tied to that core identity. Studying the methods of companies outside one's own industry and country can be instructive for managers. Pilot testing and the use of a single and continuous measure of brand equity also help managers get the most out of novel approaches in their ever more competitive world.     

Do government-linked companies underperform?

Our comprehensive study of 30 Singapore government-linked companies (GLCs) covering the period 1964 to1998 shows that share issue privatization has some positive impacts on their performance. However, there was no evidence that the GLCs were less profitable than a selected group of non-GLCs that match by size and industry. Taking a buy-and-hold strategy, we found that GLC stocks provide statistically equivalent returns relative to market or other control sample returns over various investment horizons of up to four years. Given that GLCs also perform as well as averages for the market and industry up to five years before their listing, we argue that Singapore's government-owned enterprises are comparable to privately run enterprises in efficiency.     

MarketBusting: strategies for exceptional business growth

If company leaders were granted a single wish, it would surely be for a reliable way to create new growth businesses. Business practitioners'overwhelming interest in this subject prompted the authors to conduct a three-year study of organizational growth--specifically, to find out which growth strategies were most successful. They discovered, somewhat to their surprise, that even companies in mature industries found rich new sources of growth when they reconfigured their unit of business (what they bill customers for) or their key metrics (how they measure success). In this article, the authors outline these and other moves companies can make to redefine their profit drivers and realize low-risk growth. They offer plenty of real-world examples. For instance: CHANGING YOUR UNIT OF BUSINESS: Once a conventional printing house, Madden Communications not only prints promotional materials for customers but also manages the distribution and installation of those materials on-site. Its revenues grew from dollars 1o million in 1990 to dollars 133 million in 2004, in an industry that many had come to regard as hopelessly mature. IMPROVING YOUR KEY METRICS-PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVITY: Lamons Gasket, with dollars 80 million in revenues, built a Web site that radically improved its customers' ability to find, order, and pay for goods. The firm's market share rose along with its customer retention rate. The authors also suggest ways to identify your unit of business and associated key metrics and recognize the obstacles to changing them; review the key customer segments you serve; assess the need for new capabilities and the potential for internal resistance to change; and communicate to internal and external constituencies the changes you wish to make in your unit of business or key metrics.     

The Effect of Cum- to Ex-Dividend Changes on UK Share Prices

The price behaviour of a share at the time of its going ex-dividend presents an intriguing observable. Previous authors have argued that the statistic is indicative of ‘shareholder rationality’. This is to say, if shareholders ‘rationally' capitalise their dividends received on an after personal tax basis, the change in the price of a share on its going ex-dividend should be a well-defined function of shareholders’ assessment of their own personal tax brackets. In turn this would substantiate the ‘clientele effect’ hypothesis whereby shareholders with high income/low capital gain tax brackets hold shares with high growth companies, and shareholders with low income/high capital gain tax brackets hold shares with low-growth companies. Our statistical analysis provides evidence of the clientele effect in the UK stock market.     

Moving upward in a downturn.

As the recent bursting of the new economy bubble has shown, business cycles are still wih us. The question, then, is, what executives should do to help their companies weather these downturns. As in so many instances, there are conventional approaches that appear to make sense in the short term. But while these approaches seem reasonable in the heat of the moment, they can eventually damage competitive positions and financial performance. Drawing on extensive research of Fortune 500 companies that have lived through industry downturns and economic recessions over the past two decades, Darrell Rigby, a director of Bain & Company, reveals how companies need to go against the grain of convention and exploit industry downturns to harness their unique opportunities for upward mobility. The author explains that every downturn goes through three phases. He examines each phase and shows how successful players navigate the huge waves of a downturn. Smart executives, he says, don't panic: they look bad news in the eye and institutionalize an approach to detecting storms. Rather than hedge their bets through diversification, they focus on their core businesses and spend to gain market share. They manage costs relentlessly during good times and bad. They keep a long-term view and strive to maintain the loyalty of employees, suppliers, and customers. And coming out of the downturn, they maintain momentum in their businesses to stay ahead of the competition they've already surpassed. Every industry will face periodic downturns of varying severity, says Rigby. But executives with the vision and ingenuity to take unconventional approaches can buoy their companies to new heights.     

IPO waves, product market competition, and the going public decision: Theory and evidence

We develop a new rationale for initial public offering (IPO) waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.     

Capturing the real value in high-tech acquisitions

Eager to stay ahead of fast-changing markets, more and more high-tech companies are going outside for competitive advantage. Last year in the United States alone, there were 5,000 high-tech acquisitions, but many of them yielded disappointing results. The reason, the authors contend, is that most managers have a shortsighted view of strategic acquisitions--they focus on the specific products or market share. That focus might make sense in some industries, where those assets can confer substantial advantages, but in high tech, full-fledged technological capabilities--tied to skilled people--are the key to long-term success. Instead of simply following the "buzz," successful acquires systematically assess their own capability needs. They create product road maps to identify holes in their product line. While the business group determines if it can do the work in-house, the business development office scouts for opportunities to buy it. Once business development locates a candidate, it conducts an expanded due diligence, which goes beyond strategic, financial, and legal checks. Successful acquires are focused on long-term capabilities, so they make sure that the target's products reflect a real expertise. They also look to see if key people would be comfortable in the new environment and if they have incentives to stay on board. The final stage of a successful acquisition focuses on retaining the new people--making sure their transition goes smoothly and their energies stay focused. Acquisitions can cause great uncertainty, and skilled people can always go elsewhere. In short, the authors argue, high-tech acquisitions need a new orientation around people, not products.     

Getting the attention you need

Employees have an enormous amount of business information at their fingertips--more specifically, at their desktops. The floodgates are open; profitable possibilities abound. But having to handle all that information has pushed downsized staffs to the brink of an acute attention deficit disorder. To achieve corporate goals, business leaders need their employees' full attention--and that attention is in short supply. Authors Thomas Davenport and John Beck have studied how companies manage the attention of their employees and their site visitors. In this article, they analyze the components of attention management through three lenses--economic, psychobiological, and technological--and offer guidelines for keeping employees focused on crucial corporate tasks. Their lessons are drawn from the best practices employed by today's stickiest Web sites and by traditional attention industries such as advertising, film, and television. The authors say executives must manage attention knowing that it's a zero-sum game (there's only so much to go around). Managers should also consider capitalizing on the basic survival and competitive instincts we all have that help determine how much attention we pay to certain things. For instance, the threat of corporate demise--and the consequent loss of jobs and livelihoods--undoubtedly focuses workers' attention on the need to change. Likewise, internal competition among business units may give employees added incentive to pay attention to a profit or sales goal. Leaders today need to pay more attention to attention because it's widely misunderstood and widely mismanaged, the authors conclude.