Outcome effect, controllability and performance evaluation of managers: some field evidence from multi-outlet businesses

This field study provides evidence of the outcome effect in performance evaluations of managers in an organization. Specifically, in a retail chain, subjective evaluations of store managers by their supervisors were negatively impacted by unfavorable outcome knowledge. As expected, outcome determinants over which the managers have control influence their performance evaluations and environmental determinants of outcome over which they have no control do not influence their evaluations. However, unexpectedly, central management determinants of outcome over which the managers have no control also influence their evaluations. After these outcome determinants are considered, we find evidence of an outcome effect since failure of the store to meet its target outcome results in a more negative performance evaluation of the managers. Also, the extent to which store managers' evaluations are prone to the outcome effect is not contingent on the measure of the outcome used.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Synthesizing enterprise data through digital dashboards to strategically align performance: Why do operational managers use dashboards?

Based on a cross-sectional field study, Reinking et al. (2019) propose a complex theoretical model for understanding the characteristics of dashboards that promote use and lead to individual and organizational performance gains. This study tests the theoretical model using survey data collected from 323 middle and upper level managers with experience using corporate dashboards. The data were analyzed using components based structural equation modeling, and the results provide strong support for the external validity of the Reinking et al. (2019) theoretical model. The results show that two primary constructs, strategy alignment and interactive management control, are important factors impacting the extent of dashboard use, perceived managerial performance, and perceived organizational performance. Prior research has expressed concerns over the tendency of managers to lose sight of strategic objectives (i.e., strategy surrogation) and focus solely on performance measures. However, our results indicate that operational managers perceive that dashboards focused on specifically tailored KPIs lead to both improved managerial and organizational performance. This study contributes to management control and strategy research in two important ways. While prior research has examined strategy in the executive level context through evaluations, changes, or initiative implementations, this study investigates strategy alignment at the operational levels of the organization. Second, the results suggest that intentional strategy surrogation may have beneficial effects at the lower operational levels in an organization.     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

Quality circles after the fad

On the face of it, it makes sense, If you want to involve your employees more in decision making and shift the organization toward a more participative culture, starting suggestion groups called quality circles seems to be a risk-free way to begin. Having studied many quality circles in different organizations, the authors of this article conclude that quality circles have their distinct advantages but that they have inherent in their design numbers of factors that often lead them to self-destruct. Quality circles are also said to be a poor forerunner for more participative approaches to management. Changing a quality circle into an institutionalized participative structure involves making many changes in important features of the organization that do not naturally flow from the implementation of a circle program. The authors describe the stages that quality circles go through, discuss the various threats they must survive, and then outline the most effective uses that managers can make of them.     

How to have an honest conversation about your business strategy

Too many organizations descend into underperformance because they can't confront the painful gap between their strategy and the reality of their capabilities, their behaviors, and their markets. That's because senior managers don't know how to engage in truthful conversations about the problems that threaten the business--and because lower-level managers are afraid to speak up. These factors lie behind many failures to implement strategy. Indeed, the dynamics in almost any organization are such that it's extremely difficult for senior people to hear the unfiltered truth from managers lower down. Beer and Eisenstat present the methodology they've developed for getting the truth about an organization's problems (and the truth is always embedded within the organization) onto the table in a way that allows senior management to do something useful with it. By assembling a task force of the most effective managers to collect data about strategic and organizational problems, the senior team sends a clear message that it is serious about uncovering the truth. Task force members present their findings to the senior team in the form of a discussion. This conversation needs to move back and forth between advocacy and inquiry; it has to be about the issues that matter most; it has to be collective and public; it has to allow employees to be honest without risking their jobs; and it has to be structured. This direct feedback from a handful of their best people moves senior teams to make changes they otherwise might not have. Senior teams that have engaged in this process have made dramatic changes in how their businesses are organized and managed--and in their bottom-line results. Success that begins with honest conversations begets future conversations that further improve performance.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

Bhattacharyya (2007 ) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high‐quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low‐quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone.     

Determinants of accounting innovation implementation

Accounting innovations are often not successfully implemented or diffused throughout the organization. This study seeks to explain this phenomenon. One of the major impediments to the successful implementation of accounting innovation is that management accounting systems are generally used to serve the decision control needs of top management while at the same time purportedly supporting the decision management needs of lower level managers. To the extent that the accounting system is used for decision control, innovation creates the potential for wealth effects to occur. This prompts managers, whose wealth will be negatively affected, to resist accounting innovation. We present conditions where it is likely for negative wealth effects to occur. Under these conditions the system will fail to achieve its intended objectives. Our theoretical model examines how decentralization choices influence resistance to accounting innovation. We argue that delegation of decision rights can limit the potential for resistance in two ways—(a) by creating the environment which allows managers to ensure that their subunits are able to adapt to the new signals provided by accounting innovations and (b) by enabling subunit managers to become involved in the design of these systems. Our model also enables us to assess the consequences on organizational outcomes when subunit managers resist accounting innovations. Based on data collected from production managers, our results demonstrate the importance of decentralization choices on the effective implementation of accounting innovations.     

Appraisal rights and corporate disclosure during mergers and acquisitions

Target shareholders have the right to ask for a higher merger price if good news emerges after a merger agreement. This “appraisal right” varies with state law and was substantially strengthened in Delaware in 2007. I examine how target managers respond to changes in this right. If target managers represent target shareholders, the managers would be more likely to release good news, but I find they are more likely to withhold good news when appraisal rights are higher. This suggests agency problems and collusion on the part of target managers, and thus my paper adds to the larger literature that considers agency problems on the part of managers.     

The role of performance measurement and evaluation in building organizational capabilities and performance

This study examines the processes through which the availability of broad-based strategically relevant performance information impacts on the performance outcomes of organizations. We explore the role of evaluation mechanisms in influencing managers’ use of broad-based performance measurement information for feedback and feed-forward control. We hypothesize that these resultant decision-making patterns impact the exploitation and identification of strategic capabilities within an organization and in turn organizational performance. Using a structural equation model, we find support for a model in which the degree of commonality between measures identified as decision-facilitating and decision-influencing is significantly associated with the use of decision-facilitating measures for both feedback and feed-forward control. In turn, the extent to which decision-facilitating measures are actually used by strategic business unit managers impacts on the strategic capabilities of the organization and subsequently its performance. Overall the results suggest that to encourage managers to use the multiple financial and non-financial performance indicators increasingly incorporated in contemporary performance measurement systems it is imperative that performance evaluation schemes are also designed to reflect these measures. To the extent performance evaluation schemes do not reflect such decision-facilitating measures it is less likely managers will use these indicators to effectively manage performance. The resultant performance implications for the organization arise from the impact of these decision effects on the exploitation of existing capabilities and the search for and identification of new strategic opportunities.     

Leadership and control system design

Little attention has been given to the role of leadership characteristics in the organization design literature despite significant evidence of its importance in explaining firm behavior. This study develops and tests a model to assess the effects of leadership style on three control choices that are considered integral elements of a firm's management control system; namely the delegation choice, the use of planning and control systems and the performance measurement system. Our results, based on data collected from 128 profit center managers, indicate that leadership style is a significant predictor of senior management's use of the planning and control system and their use of the performance measurement system for rewarding lower-level managers. After controlling for operating contextual factors (namely, subunit interdependencies and knowledge asymmetries) we find no effect of leadership style on delegation choices but do find that leadership style influences the use of planning and control systems as predicted.     

Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives

In this paper, I examine the sensitivity of promotion and demotion decisions for lower‐level managers to financial and nonfinancial measures of their performance and investigate the extent to which the behavior of lower‐level managers reflects promotion‐based incentives. Additionally, I test for learning versus effort‐allocation effects of promotion‐based incentives. I find that promotion and demotion decisions for store managers of a major U.S.‐based fast‐food retailer (QSR) are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures of service quality and employee retention after controlling for financial performance. The likelihood of demotion in this organization is also sensitive to nonfinancial performance on the dimension of service quality, while the probability of exit is primarily sensitive to financial performance measures rather than nonfinancial performance measures. I also find evidence that the behavior of lower‐level managers is consistent with the incentives created by the weighting of nonfinancial performance measures in promotion decisions. Managers in locations where there is a higher ex ante probability of promotion and a higher potential reward upon promotion demonstrate significantly higher levels and rates of performance improvement in service quality. Finally, consistent with promotion‐based incentives inducing both effort‐allocation and learning effects, I find that performance‐improvement rates for service quality: (1) are higher in prepromotion periods in markets where promotions occur, (2) decrease immediately after the occurrence of a promotion in the same market area, and (3) remain higher than in markets where promotions do not occur. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on an alternative to the explicit weighting of nonfinancial metrics in compensation contracts as a mechanism for generating improvements in nonfinancial dimensions of performance.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Do Firms Strategically Internalize Disclosure Spillovers? Evidence from Cash-Financed M&As

We investigate whether managers internalize the spillover effects of their disclosure on the stock price of related firms and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on firm-initiated disclosures during all-cash acquisitions, we find evidence consistent with acquirers strategically generating news that they expect will depress the target's stock price. Our results suggest the disclosure strategy leads to lower target returns during the negotiation period when the takeover price is being determined and results in a lower target premium. These findings are robust to a battery of specifications and falsification tests. Our results are consistent with expected spillovers influencing the timing and content of firms’ disclosures in M&A transactions.     

Effects of female directors on gender diversity at lower organization levels and CSR performance: Evidence in Japan

This paper examines the effects of board gender diversity on female representation at lower organization levels and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Using a panel data set of more than 1000 Japanese listed firms from 2005 to 2014, we focus on firms that introduced female directors to their male-dominant boards for the first time and find that the first-introduced female directors are positively associated with a greater number of female officers and managers. The introduction of the first female director is also associated with better CSR performance. Our results are statistically significant and suggest that board gender diversity has an effect on promoting gender diversity at lower levels and CSR performance in listed firms.     

THE INTERVENING EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Prior studies have suggested that the subordinates’ perception of fairness in their organizations’ procedures is related to improvements in the subordinates’ performance. However, the positive relationship between perception of justice and performance may not be a direct one, but is indirect via the intervening variable of participation. It is likely that the importance of maintaining procedural fairness in the organization will lead senior managers (superiors) to select procedures that allow their subordinates more participation privileges in the organization’s affairs because high participative procedures are perceived to be fair. This increase in participation, in turn, is likely to improve the subordinates’ performance. The results, based on a path analytical model and a sample of 83 senior managers, indicate that procedural justice has an indirect effect on performance via participation. On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that the importance of procedural fairness in the organization leads to the selection of procedures with high subordinates’ participation, which, in turn, leads to high managerial performance.     

Aggregate Dividend Behavior and Permanent Earnings Hypothesis

The study examines the aggregate dividend behavior of U.S. corporations based on the permanent earnings hypothesis. Using annual data of aggregate earnings and dividends from 1871–1993, I find that although managers change dividends proportional to permanent earnings changes, they make revisions with a larger percentage change in dividends than in permanent earnings. The results from the post‐war data show that firms follow a partial adjustment policy with a long‐term dividend payout target in mind and make revisions with a delay. The quarterly data analysis yields results similar to those of the post‐war annual data.     

Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data

The corporate finance literature argues that overconfident managers tend to hold less cash, and this leads to a significant deviation from optimal cash levels. We analyse the impact of executive overconfidence on the corporate cash holdings of listed Vietnamese firms. To quantify managerial overconfidence, a novel core measure used in our analyses is voice pitch, which is obtained from interviews with top-line managers. Other measures of managerial overconfidence are also used to support the results and confirm the validity of the voice pitch measure. Our empirical evidence, with economically significant results, reveals that higher levels of overconfidence amongst managers are associated with lower cash holdings. Surprisingly, the findings show that overconfident managers tend to be associated with a low level of deviation from optimal cash holding levels. In addition, our findings also provide evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase cash levels and deviations from target cash holdings for overinvesting firms.     

PREPARING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

This paper examines performance information and reporting issues through a survey of the views of public sector managers in Australia regarding the importance of selected performance information in achieving the objectives of an organization, the extent of information development, usefulness for reporting in annual reports, and actual reporting. The results reveal the existence of a gap between information considered important, the extent of development, and information considered useful for annual reporting. Most non‐financial performance information is still being developed and less frequently reported, particularly output quality information.     

The interactive effect of budgetary participation and budget favorability on attitudes toward budgetary decision makers: A research note

Referent cognitions theory predicts that employees who receive unfavorable budgets will have less negative attitudes toward budgetary decision makers if they participated in the budgetary process than if they did not participate. Questionnaire data from international managers were analyzed with regression to test for this predicted interaction between budgetary participation and budgetary outcome favorability. The results indicated that budgetary participation and budget favorability had the predicted interactive effect on the managers' attitudes toward their supervisor and their organization.