我国公立医院绩效量化变革评估研究

绩效管理工作效果直接影响着医院员工的工作效率与质量,对医院的改革发展起着关键作用。利用RBRVS评估系统建立以工作量为核心的绩效考核体系,改革现行绩效奖金方案,利用薪酬分配杠杆激励员工的积极性和创造性,实现医院的可持续发展。     

我国公立医院绩效量化变革评估研究

绩效管理工作效果直接影响着医院员工的工作效率与质量,对医院的改革发展起着关键作用。利用RBRVS评估系统建立以工作量为核心的绩效考核体系,改革现行绩效奖金方案,利用薪酬分配杠杆激励员工的积极性和创造性,实现医院的可持续发展。     

全成本经济核算模式在医院绩效考核中应用的思考

医院绩效工资分配方式不仅对员工而言具有一定的重要性,对医院以及患者也具有极其重要的意义。医院对不同导向绩效工资分配方式的运用是否恰当关系到整个医院的未来发展,针对医院不同状况做出合理的选择才能保证医院的长期生存发展。随着社会经济体制的不断完善,医院的绩效考核方式呈现多样性,一些有效的考核方式受到医院的青睐,本文就全成本经济核算方式在医院绩效考核中的应用进行探究。     

医技科室绩效奖金二次分配的实践与思考——以超声医学科和放射科为例

新形势下探索科学合理的医技科室绩效奖金二次分配方案,切实调动医技科室工作人员的工作积极性和医技科室服务能力和水平,成为当下科室管理的重要内容.本文以超声医学医学科和放射科为例,探讨目前以工作量为主要导向的绩效奖金分配的做法、优点及思考.     

全成本核算下的绩效考核分配制度

随着当代医疗服务市场的不断扩大以及医院规模、医疗人员队伍的不断壮大，全面推行全成本核算、建立有效的绩效考核分配制度，加强财务管理工作对于医院来说具有重要的意义。本文首先阐述了全成本核算的具体含义，分析了其与绩效考核体系相结合的重要作用。然后探讨了医院在全成本核算下的如何进行绩效考核分配，提出了相应的发展思路和具体措施，以求进一步加强医疗成本核算，促进医院的可持续发展。     

医院绩效工资分配探讨

<正>近年来,医院分配制度改革的总体趋势是加强绩效考核,突出医疗质量、服务态度和职业道德,建立科学的激励机制。一套科学、容易操作的绩效评价体系直接关系到绩效考核结果的优劣。若指标设置模糊,评价起来弹性就大,很容易引发人为偏差或人情考核。在制定绩效评价体系的过程中,要从医院的实际出发,注重个性,分清重点,把握好度,准确设置关键业绩指标数量,使考核结果既体现科学性又具有好操作性。而如何进行绩效工资分配,一直是医院财务管理人员研究的主要课题。现与大家探讨一下绩效工资的分配。首先,有效的绩效考核分配方案,应贯彻社会效率第一的原则,贯彻按劳分配,多劳多得,效率优先、兼顾公平的原     

医院加强员工绩效考核刍议

本文分析了医院员工绩效考核现状,指出了其中存在的问题,从提高绩效考核重视程度、提升内部管理水平效果和完善绩效考核制度方式三个方面,提出了医院加强员工绩效考核措施,希望对提高医院员工绩效考核效果有所裨益。     

绩效考核在人员奖金分配管理中的应用解析

随着现代经济模式的快速发展和变化,大部分的企业管理者普遍只注重企业经济效益和利益,而忽略了对企业稳定发展具有重要影响作用的绩效考核。绩效考核不仅是现代企业管理的重要组成部分,也是企业人员奖金分配的重要组成部分。本文通过对绩效考核在奖金分配过程中的一般程序、存在的问题、目的及意义三方面进行论述和探讨,对绩效考核在人员奖金分配管理中的应用进行了详细的解析。     

新医改背景下医院的绩效评价与薪酬管理

在新医改下,一定要能够进一步加强医院绩效考核评价完善薪酬管理体系,促进医院的健康发展。本文将主要从绩效评价系统的实施以及薪酬分配两个方面来进行阐述。     

浅析医院绩效考核的难点与解决方法

医院绩效考核是医院绩效管理的重要组成部分,绩效考核工作主要包括对员工工作绩效的识别和评估等工作,是管理者与员工之间进行良好沟通的关键。随着经济的发展和社会体制的变化,医院也得到了一定的发展和进步,绩效考核工作作为医院发展和进步的关键,已经受到医院管理层及相关人员的关注和重视。就目前情况来看,在实际工作中医院的绩效考核工作依旧存在很多难点,本文对医院绩效考核工作的难点进行了分析,提出了切实可行的解决方法,并且对强化医院绩效考核工作的现实意义做了简单的概述。     

Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation

Research indicates that there is a positive association between accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation; however, evidence also suggests that this positive association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are related to both current and future firm performance. Our results indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation (particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.     

Risk-taking in new project selection: Additive effects of bonus incentives and past performance history

The goal of this study is to investigate how past project performance history and bonus incentive pay schemes affect managers' propensity to select more or less risky projects. Performance history is manipulated via past positive outcomes (i.e. beating a target profit rate) and negative outcomes (i.e. missing a target profit rate). Two types of bonus incentive pay schemes (hurdle bonus and graduated bonus) were employed in the study. The findings are consistent with prospect theory that predicts that prior bad outcomes (negative performance history) motivate greater risk-taking than prior good outcomes (positive performance history). In addition, we find evidence that hurdle and graduated bonus incentive schemes also affect risk taking. Overall, we find an additive effect of these two factors, such that the greatest (least) risk taking occurred when participants had negative (positive) prior experience coupled with a graduated (hurdle) bonus scheme.     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

Bonus schemes and trading activity

Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.     

The relevance of financial statement information for executive performance evaluation: Evidence from choice of bonus plan accounting performance measures

I explore whether the type of accounting performance measure used in the CEO bonus plan provides an indication of the informativeness of the firm's financial statements for purposes of performance evaluation. Using contingency table analysis and LOGIT regressions, I find firms with high levels of unrecorded intangible assets rely significantly less often on accounting rate-of-return measures (vs. earnings alone) in executive bonus plans.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Balancing difficulty of performance targets: theory and evidence

We examine how firms balance difficulty of performance targets in their annual bonus plans. We present an analytical model showing that managerial allocation of effort is a function of not only relative incentive weights but also the difficulty of performance targets. We find that relative incentive weights and target difficulty can either be complements or substitutes in motivating effort depending on the extent to which managers have alternative employment opportunities. To test the predictions of our model, we use survey data on performance targets in annual bonus plans. Our sample of 877 survey respondents consists primarily of financial executives in small- and medium-size private companies where annual bonuses are important both for motivation and retention. Consistent with our model, we find that relative incentive weights are negatively (positively) associated with perceived target difficulty when concerns about managerial retention are high (low). It follows that performance measures included in annual bonus plans have sometimes easy and other times challenging targets depending on their relative incentive weights and retention concerns.     

Evaluation of Subjectivity in Incentive Pay

The study aims to investigate the determinants of subjective bonus payouts in the UK financial industry. Bonuses are increasingly linked to wider business goals, such as quality and customer service, firm reputation and employee hiring and retention policies, thus replacing the traditional focus on output or profit measures. A new conceptual work on subjectivity is used to evaluate these bonus practices. Results indicate that a variety of contextual factors have influenced the firms to make greater use of subjectivity in bonus payouts. Of these, organizational interdependency appeared to be the most forceful factor, followed by management’s strategic focus, long-term investment in intangibles, economic constraints, performance target difficulty, and competition. The analysis suggests that subjectivity acts as a mechanism that aligns the interests of individual employees with the firm’s performance goals. The study also draws attention to the costs of subjectivity in performance evaluation.