Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

Earnings Warnings and CEO Welfare

Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation committees take warnings into account in setting CEO compensation. We find that warnings are significantly negatively (positively) associated with CEO bonus (option grants), suggesting that compensation committees adjust CEO compensation towards a more high‐powered structure after warnings. However, the sensitivity of bonus or option grants to earnings and stock returns is not affected except for bonus sensitivity to stock returns. We also find weak evidence of an increase in forced CEO turnover after warnings, accompanied by a significant increase in its sensitivity to stock returns. This benefits CEOs with higher ability but imposes more risk on other CEOs. These findings provide a partial explanation of why not every CEO facing a negative surprise decides to issue a warning. Our results are robust to various specifications. In particular, the impact of warnings on compensation appears invariant to the timing or the number of warnings. Overall, these findings suggest that the signal from warnings is used in determining CEO compensation and retention.     

Auditor independence, executive pay and firm performance

This paper investigates whether compensation committees actively intervene to adjust accounting performance‐based incentive schemes for the real, or perceived, reduced earnings credibility signalled by the purchase of non‐audit services. Using a nonlinear, two‐stage least‐squares method that accounts for the simultaneity of executive pay, firm performance and non‐audit fees, we find a significant negative relationship between non‐audit fees and the sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay to firm performance. Point estimates suggest that the reduced weight applied to accounting performance lowers the incentive component of executive pay between roughly 5 and 8 per cent for the CEO of the ‘average firm’.     

The executive compensation implications of the tax component of earnings

We extend prior research by examining the weight applied to earnings generated by changes in ETRs (i.e., the tax component of earnings) in determining CEO and CFO compensation. We examine both bonus and total compensation and find that the predicted relationships between compensation and the tax component of earnings are largely limited to bonus compensation. This is not surprising since bonus compensation represents an unambiguous link between contemporaneous performance and compensation, while equity compensation is in part determined by agency considerations. Our evidence suggests that both CEOs and CFOs are compensated for the tax component of earnings. We find that CEOs are rewarded equally for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings, while CFOs are rewarded more for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings. Additionally, the weight applied to the tax component of earnings when determining CFO bonus compensation is greater when; (1) the tax component of earnings does not appear to be related to earnings management; (2) ETRs decrease rather than increase, (3) the firm pays bonus based on after-tax earnings rather than pre-tax earnings, and (4) the firm is tax aggressive rather than non-tax aggressive. The variations in the weighting of the tax component of earnings for CFO bonus compensation noted above in combination with evidence that CEO bonus compensation is indifferent to ETR-related earnings versus other components of earnings, suggests that the tax component of earnings is a contractual component of CFO bonus compensation.     

The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation

Since SOX 404 disclosures are informative about earnings, and due to the widespread practice of using earnings-based measures in executive compensation, this study examines whether reports of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) under SOX 404 influence firms' reliance on earnings in tying executive pay to performance. Using 391 (366) firm-year observations with reported ICMW and 3648 (3138) firm-year observations for CEOs (CFOs) reporting NOMW under SOX 404, we find a decreased strength in the association between earnings and executives' (CEO and CFO) compensation when the firm reports an ICMW, and as the number of reported ICMW increases. In addition, we find this decreased weight on earnings for the more severe Company-Level than Account- Specific material weaknesses. Our study suggests that the ICMW report under SOX 404 provides incremental information for executive compensation beyond that contained in reported earnings.     

CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation

This study investigates the impact of CEO compensation structure on post‐acquisition purchase price allocation, an accounting procedure that involves fair value estimation of various assets and liabilities. We find that CEOs whose compensation packages rely more on earnings‐based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill, the largest asset recorded post‐acquisition. Because goodwill is not amortized, the overallocation likely increases post‐acquisition earnings and bonuses. We also find that, when the acquirer's CEO bonus plan includes performance measures that are not affected, or are less affected, by the overstatement of goodwill, such as cash flows, sales, or earnings growth, the overallocation to goodwill motivated by bonus plans diminishes.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

The timing of changes in CEO compensation from cash bonus to equity-based compensation: Determinants and performance consequences

This study examines the determinants and performance consequences of changes in CEO compensation structure. The study uses the unique setting when Australian companies have changed from cash bonus to equity-based compensation. While most US CEOs receive some form of equity-based compensation, Australian CEOs have not always been paid equity-based compensation. According to efficient contracting theories, we argue that the change to equity-based compensation is driven by changes in firm characteristics and by the occurrence of CEO turnover, the latter of which provides a less costly opportunity for such change. Our results are consistent with the above arguments. We also document a significant negative association between changes in compensation structure and subsequent firm performance in the following year, even after controlling for CEO turnover and poor governance environments. Overall, our results suggest that the initial change to equity-based compensation is part of an error learning process made by firms that leads them towards efficient CEO compensation contracts.     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

CEO incentives-its not how much you pay, but how

The arrival of spring means yet another round in the national debate over executive compensation. But the critics have it wrong. The relentless attention on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem-how CEOs are paid. The authors present an in-depth statistical analysis of executive compensation. The study incorporates data on thousands of CEOs spanning five decades. Their surprising conclusions are at odds with the prevailing wisdom on CEO pay: Despite the headlines, top executives are not receiving record salaries and bonuses. Cash compensation has increased over the past 15 years, but CEO pay levels are just now catching up to where they were 50 years ago. Annual changes in executive compensation do not reflect changes in corporate performance. For the median CEO in the 250 largest public companies, a $1,000 change in shareholder value corresponds to a change of just 6.7 cents in salary and bonus over a two-year period. With respect to pay for performance, CEO compensation is getting worse rather than better. CEO stock ownership-the best link between shareholder wealth and executive well-being-was ten times greater in the 1930s than in the 1980s. Compensation policy is one of the most important factors in an organization's success. Not only does it shape how top executives behave but it also helps determine what kind of executives an organization attracts. That's why it's so urgent that boards of directors reform their compensation practices and adopt systems that reward outstanding performance and penalize poor performance.     

The impact of accounting restatements on CFO turnover and bonus compensation: Does securities litigation matter?

This paper examines the association between accounting restatements, class-action securities litigation and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover and bonus compensation. We identify income-decreasing earnings restatements that were the result of aggressive accounting policies, and hypothesize that these restatements will result in higher CFO turnover rates, and lower bonus compensation, especially when the firm is the target of a restatement-related class-action securities lawsuit. Our results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compensation are affected by restatements, but only when the restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. When we expand the analyses to consider other types of executives (e.g., CEOs and COOs), we continue to find that turnover only occurs in the presence of a class-action suit. However, bonus compensation penalties to other types of executives are not limited to litigation-related restatements.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?

This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.     

Star CEOs or Political Connections? Evidence from China's Publicly Traded Firms

This paper studies China's “star CEOs” defined as members of the National People's Congress (NPC) or the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and “politically connected” CEOs who have previous government or military experience. We evaluate the effect of “star CEOs” and “politically connected” CEOs on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find that announcement date returns, CEO compensation and incentives are all higher in firms that appoint “star CEOs”. However, the mechanism explaining these various premiums is largely political connectedness of these star CEOs. Our study finds only modest evidence that star‐CEO status directly determines firm performance. Our analysis strongly suggests that compensation and performance premiums are mostly driven by CEO political connections, as opposed to CEO talent/star effects.     

CEO DIRECTORS,EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES,AND CORPORATE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

I study how directors who are chief executive officers (CEOs) of other firms affect board effectiveness. I find that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve as directors. This is not an employment risk premium because CEO directors are not associated with higher turnover‐performance sensitivity. Also, CEO directors have no effect on corporate innovation but are associated with higher acquisition returns, especially for complex deals. My results suggest that the advisory benefits of CEO directors must be balanced against the distortions in executive incentives associated with their board service.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

Executive compensation and corporate governance in China

We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.