Do Incentive Rates Provide Consumer Value? An Empirical Assessment from Ontario’s Electricity Distribution Sector

Abstract:

This article discusses empirical evidence regarding the theoretical claims that Incentive Rate regulation for electricity distribution creates greater consumer value than Cost of Service in terms of consumer rates. Institutional economists have identified a problem with IR in that it gives an incentive not to reduce consumer costs but to reduce adequate spending on asset maintenance. The Ontario electricity distribution sector combines both forms of regulation which creates an unusual opportunity to test the claims of increased consumer value by comparing the unit average revenues in years in which rates were set by CoS with those in which they were set by IR. The application of a t-test to data from 2011 to 2015 results in the acceptance of the null hypothesis at a 95% confidence level. The analysis concludes that there is no support for the claim that IR results in lower revenues collected from consumers.     

Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price-cap regulation: an example

A monopolist in a simple two-period model knows that a price cap will be imposed on a Laspeyres index of the firm's prices in the second period. (Tariff basket regulation is relevant to some UK utilities.) A simple example is developed to study the welfare changes that result from strategic weight manipulation by the firm as a consequence of its ability to adjust first-period revenue shares and interperiod price relatives. Uniform regulation requiring an equal percentage reduction in all of the regulated firm's prices provides a natural standard for comparison. One particular configuration of parameters induces identical pricing and welfare under the two forms of regulation in the example. Otherwise, compared with uniform regulation in the example, Laspeyres index regulation raises producer welfare but reduces consumer welfare in the first period and may also reduce consumer welfare in the second period. A numerical illustration shows that total welfare may also be lower under Laspeyres regulation.     

Regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity of reliability differentiated service

This paper investigates the effects of alternative forms of regulation on the market penetration and capacity that are determined by a profit-maximizing monopolist providing reliability differentiated service to consumers. Both price cap and rate of return regulation lead to larger capacity and market penetration than in the absence of regulation. These forms of regulation also lead to larger consumer surplus than in the absence of regulation. A minimum reliability standard reduces market penetration, and this reduction may lead to a decrease in consumer surplus.      

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

Measuring market response to regulation of the cable TV industry

During the 1988–1990 period, the cable television industry was subject to a number of regulatory events. These centered on possible reregulation of rates for basic service and reduction of entry barriers for potential competitors. Using the event study methodology on a portfolio of cable firms, we find evidence that news of no reregulation caused significant positive abnormal returns. News of reregulation caused insignificant negative abnormal returns. These findings provide some support for the traditional consumer protection theory of regulation. News related to entry barriers generally had no significant effect on returns, which suggests that elements of natural monopoly may exist in the industry.     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation

This paper aims to explain the behavior of certain religious organizations in countries with severe regulation that limits the religious market, such as those under communist rule. Religious organizations in those countries sometimes choose to operate both legally and illegally. The model proposed here shows that such behavior may increase the consumer welfare of religionists compared to solely legal or illegal provision of religious services. It assumes that religious organizations maximize the consumer surplus of their adherents. The choice of a religious organization between legal and illegal provision of religious services depends on the costs of religious participation imposed by the government and the set-up costs of dual operation. As an illustration, the paper accounts for the different response of the Catholic Church to restrictions imposed by the communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia.     

Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges

The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent??s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy.     

Upstream regulation in mature network industry: evidence from Nordic mobile telecommunications markets

This article investigates the effects of upstream regulation that aims to create niches and attract new type of entrants on the competitive environment of downstream markets. Using unique cross-country data of Nordic mobile telecommunications markets, we show that upstream regulation leads to (i) increases in both number and aggregate market share of service-based providers in the downstream market, (ii) an increase in the number of service-based providers, thus increasing their aggregate market share, but no opposite direction of results and (iii) a lower retail price level, proxied by average revenue per user. Our findings imply that upstream regulation may be able to achieve better outcomes when the policy objectives are to revitalize mature network industries and to enhance consumer welfare.     

Fiscal devaluation and real exchange rates in the Euro area: Some econometric insights

We explore whether a fiscal devaluation, that is, a reduction in employers’ social security contributions and an increase in value added tax, affects two indicators of bilateral real exchange rates in the euro area: one based on unit labor costs, and another based on consumer prices. We find that, in the short term, cuts in employers’ contributions depreciate real exchange rates based on unit labor costs, while value added tax hikes appreciate real exchange rates based on consumer prices. In the long run, a value added tax increase also appreciates the real exchange rates based on unit labor costs.     

政府管制模型研究:基于消费者参与的理论视角

委托一代理理论被广泛应用于激励性管制模型研究,但其约束条件并不总能得到满足。本文放宽管制模型的约束条件,并将消费者作为信息传递者引入管制模型,探讨了立法者利用消费者信息来提高社会福利水平的条件以及对消费者的最优转移支付水平。     

沿海地区建筑企业安全管理绩效评价研究

对我国沿海地区的建筑企业安全绩效进行调查研究,利用数据包络分析(DEA)中的C2R模型和SE-C2R模型对建筑企业的安全管理绩效进行评价,结果表明:安全管理绩效有效的建筑企业表现出“低投入、低事故率”,相反无效的建筑企业表现出“高投入、高事故率”,证明了高安全管理投入并不一定能够带来低事故发生率;安全管理绩效无效的建筑企业具有提高安全管理绩效的潜质和改善空间,关键在于如何科学地配置安全管理投入资源;同时也表明DEA是评价建筑企业安全管理绩效的一种有效方法.     

中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的调查分析

价格听证是实现有效公用事业价格管制的重要内容,科学的价格听证要求消费者充分有效的参与。信息、能力和制度模型能系统解释公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与。调查数据显示,中国公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与在这三个方面都存在问题,这也是完善未来中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的重点所在。     

Innovation and the precautionary principle

Recent environmental policies favour the polluter pays principle. This principle points out the pollutant financial liability for the eventual incidents induced by his activities. In this context, we analyse the decision of an agent to invest in new industrial activities, the consequences of which on human health and the environment are initially unknown. It is not possible for him to delay investing, but the agent has the opportunity to acquire information and to reduce the cost of an accident. This allows the agent to reduce uncertainty regarding dangers associated with the project and to limit potential damages that it might cause. However, the agent's chosen level of these actions may be considered as insufficient and not acceptable by society as response in the face of a possible danger. Precautionary state regulation may then be introduced. We appreciate that this regulation may slow down innovation and may favour innovation in countries with less safety requirements. We find that the agent may get around the goal of the regulation by ignoring the information on the dangerousness of its project. We then propose some policy tools which stimulate innovation and impose a certain level of risk considered as acceptable for society to the agent. Finally, we use a numerical analysis based on the Monsanto Company for studying the agent's behaviour with different regulatory frameworks.     

Income inequality,consumer debt,and prudential regulation: An agent-based approach to study the emergence of crises and financial instability

The paper presents an agent-based model to study the interaction between income inequality and prudential regulations in a macroeconomic framework characterized by consumer debt. Simulation results show that income inequality is detrimental to both macro and financial stability as it leads to higher credit demands, higher unemployment rates, economic volatility, and financial fragility. Besides the importance of consumers' leveraging, deleveraging externalities are found to be equally important for the emergence of crises and financial fragility because of the liquidity risk they entail. Minsky moments are also observed; they are related to consumers' prudential behavior and their beliefs about the macroeconomic conditions. Concerning the policy relevance of our investigation, simulations allow us to highlight that the effectiveness of prudential regulation depends on the phase of the business cycle and that there is not a “one-size-fits-all” regulation. This study emphasizes that regulatory constraints should take into account the features of the economic agents, such as the distribution of income and their willingness to borrow, in addition to the features of the financial sector.     

Warranty markets and public policy

Search equilibrium models in the Economics of Information concern themselves exclusively with consumer ignorance of the prices that different firms charge. Legal regulation dealing with information, on the other hand, concerns itself primarily with contact terms. In particular, firms are often required to warrant against product related defects on the supposed ground that firms respond to consumer ignorance only by degrading contract quality. This paper is the beginning of an attempt to make the Economics of Information useful to policymakers. It models a market for warranties under imperfect information and shows that firms are more likely to respond to consumer ignorance by raising prices for the warranties that consumers prefer rather than deleting warranties from consumer contracts. Hence, policymakers should be concerned more with reducing supracompetitive prices than with “improving” contract quality.     

CALCULATING A PRICE INDEX FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEASURING TRENDS IN CHILD POVERTY RATES

This paper investigates the effects of varying consumption patterns for families with and without children on measured trends in child poverty. We first use data from consumer expenditure surveys to calculate price indices by family type. We next examine the effect of using these group-specific price indices on measured trends in child poverty. Although we find that, all else equal, children increase the cost of living, our calculations indicate that on average families with children experienced relatively lower inflation rates than families without children during the 1968 to 1987 period. While this result suggests that estimates of child poverty rates calculated using an average price index may have over-stated secular increases in child poverty, we find that child poverty rates calculated using a price index specific lo families with children are not substantively different from those calculated using an average index for all families.     

质疑食品价格管制 ——兼论政府管制职能定位

由于信息严重不对称,食品安全市场存在不同程度失灵。消费者对食品安全的需求是通过对食品安全的支付意愿向企业传递信号的,并以此激励企业提高食品安全水平。部分食品价格上涨是消费者增加食品安全需求的反应。借助案例研究发现,政府对食品价格管制将增加市场的不确定性,食品价格管制与食品安全管制目标间存在冲突。食品安全危机重重,政府应慎用价格管制。在经济转型过程中政府应明确管制职能定位,放松食品价格管制,切实有效地加强食品安全管制。     

我国流转税收入分配效应的实证分析

对2002-2009年我国增值税、消费税和营业税在不同收入户城镇居民间的分布及其对收入分配的影响进行综合分析,可得出三点基本判断:一是增值税表现出明显的累退性,且累退的症结在于适用低税率商品的消费需求缺乏收入弹性;二是不同消费品的调节效果相互抵消,消费税对收入分配的整体影响并不明显,但呈逐步向累进性发展的趋势;三是营业税表现出稳定的累进性。全部流转税呈现非常轻微的累退性,决定流转税收入调节效果的主导因素是消费品的需求收入弹性。通过恰当选择课税对象和实施差别税率,特定流转税完全有可能起到缩小收入分配差距的作用。