国际投资项目折现率的确定与影响因素

在国际投资项目的评估中,我们一般都假定国际投资项目的折现率已知,以便将预期现金流量折成现值,然后与原始投资支出比较,从而作出正确的投资决策。本文将讨论作为折现率的跨国公司资本成本的确定以及国际性影响因素。 一、资本成本的确定 在市场完全的条件下,跨国公司资本成本的确定方法,与国内企业资本成本的确定方法相同,等于最佳资本结构下,权益资本和债务资本的加权平均成本,即:     

上市公司资本结构优化研究

资本结构及其优化是公司理财中的重要问题。资本结构是反映企业过去选择的内部资金与财务索取权的结构,是各种利益权衡的结果。资本结构与企业价值紧密相联,它不仅涉及了企业的金融目标、筹资方式、筹资成本和现金流量等重大财务问题,更重要的是资本结构对企业的治理结构、激励结构等产     

论企业资本结构安排的税务筹划

<正>资本结构指在企业长期财务结构中,负债与权益的相关混合比例。严格地指与企业经营所需的永久性或长期性资本相关。现代财务理论的资本结构之谜主要研究两个问题:1.能否通过改变负债与权益结构的比率来增加或减少该企业有价证券的市值;2.什么因素决定了最佳资本结构,从而使企业市场价值最大化和资本成本最小化。这里政府是筹投资双方市场交易中不请自来的第三者,利用税收来改变双方的利益分配格局。本文首先介绍负债的税收抵减价值,即M&M公司税模型,再通过权衡模型对负债运用限制做些分析,讨论影响负债融资的各种因素。一、负债的税收抵减价值现代资本结构理论以莫迪格利安尼和米勒的M&M资本结     

信息技市产业资本结构的动态调整与影响因素分析

1.引言 企业对投融资的选择,及它与最优风险的关系,是企业经济运行的核心问题.自Modiglini和Miller(1958)提出资本成本或企业价值与资本结构无关的命题以来,研究者们纷纷放宽MM定理中的理论假设,试图从权衡理论、代理理论、信息不对称理论等来研究资本结构的影响因素.由于影响公司资本结构的各因素与公司所处的行业紧密相关,从上世纪80年代开始,国内外学者开始关注行业与资本结构的关系.     

基于企业经营预期下的资本结构调整——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据

作为企业财务战略之一的资本结构决策必须要考虑未来经营预期的影响。本文利用上市公司的财务数据研究发现,当企业预期盈余下降时,将会变卖资产偿还债务并通过降低股利支付率的方式降低负债率。该结论与认为预期盈利能力和负债率正相关的资本结构权衡理论一致。进一步的分析表明,预期盈余对资本结构的作用机制是通过负债的税收利益和财务困境成本变动来调整最佳资本结构。     

基于权衡视角下的资本流动与资本账户管制文献综述北大核心

本文从权衡（Trade-Offs）的视角出发，对国内外学者关于资本流动与资本账户管制相关文献进行了系统梳理。研究发现，资本流动和资本账户管制与其他要素是一个权衡至总体动态均衡的关系，注重短期与长期、政府与企业、国际与国内、常态与危机、各类资产与各类货币等的权衡非常必要。与发达经济体相比，新兴经济体金融脆弱性问题更为突出，金融市场深度不够，权衡的程度更高、难度更大。提升市场深度有利于降低权衡的难度，实现更好的总体动态均衡。本文提出了统筹金融发展改革与监管，着力提升金融市场深度，着力提升实际管制能力等建议。     

管理者能力与资本结构调整成本研究——基于薪酬落差和人情机制的调节效应

本文在动态权衡理论的分析框架下,以深沪两市上市公司为样本,研究管理者能力对资本结构调整成本的影响以及薪酬落差和人情机制的调节效应.研究发现:管理者能力与资本结构调整成本负相关;在管理者能力影响资本结构调整成本中,薪酬落差和人情机制均起着负向调节作用.考察产权性质后发现,无论是薪酬落差,还是人情机制在非国有企业中负向调节作用更为明显.这些研究结论为激发管理者能力实现目标资本结构提供了理论依据,同时对深化国有企业产权改革具有一定的启示意义.     

规模经济与股权融资约束下的企业高负债融资行为研究

本文考虑规模经济的情形,提出了一个我国企业高负债融资的动因和权衡模型,以分析我国企业高负债融资行为的合理性。研究表明,在竞争日益激烈且股权融资受约束的背景下,企业外部融资权衡的因素不是传统资本结构理论中的资本成本,而是股权融资增加机会成本（经营风险）和高负债融资增加财务危机成本（财务风险）之间的均衡。模型进一步表明,当新项目确实对公司未来的竞争地位有利,且收益率和成功率都较高时,为了及时把握市场机遇,企业往往愿意承受高负债融资可能新增的财务风险。     

现代资本结构理论

自Modigliani和Miller提出MM理论以来,资本结构问题一直是理论界和实务界关注的焦点.本文从MM理论及其修正--基于税差的分析、基于权衡理论的资本结构理论、信息不对称条件下的资本结构理论、资本结构的实证研究四个方面阐述了自20世纪50年代以来资本结构理论的发展和研究成果,试图为我国学者开展资本结构研究提供借鉴.     

资本结构与企业生命周期的理论探析

每一个企业在不同的发展阶段,其经营管理重点、资金需求都是不同的,在日益复杂的竞争和不确定的市场环境下,企业需要根据自身的发展阶段,采用科学的资本结构,合理地进行资本成本与资本收益间的权衡,有利于企业的可持续健康发展。本文首先分析了资本结构理论的发展演化和影响资本结构的因素,其次简单阐述了企业生命周期理论,在此基础上探析资本结构和企业生命周期之间的关系。     

Credit Ratings and Capital Structure

This paper examines to what extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The paper outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit rating level differences and tests whether concerns for these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. This behavior is consistent with discrete costs (benefits) of rating changes but is not explained by traditional capital structure theories. The results persist within previous empirical tests of the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure theories.     

Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics

This paper provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital structure and industry dynamics. In the model, firms make financing, investment, entry, and exit decisions subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice reflects the tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. The interaction between financing and production decisions influences the stationary distribution of firms and their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium output price has an important feedback effect. This effect has a number of testable implications. For example, high growth industries have relatively lower leverage and turnover rates.     

Multinationality and capital structure dynamics: A corporate governance explanation

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure dynamics. Using ordinary least squares regressions on 17,496 firm-year observations for 2,294 US multinational companies (MNCs) over the period 1990–2018, we find that MNCs with strong corporate governance use more debt than those with weak governance. Furthermore, strong corporate governance is associated with a faster speed of adjustment to capital structure. This relationship is more pronounced for MNCs than domestic companies, particularly for overlevered firms. We also use the two-part zero-inflated fractional regression model, instrumental variable, and structural equation model estimations to deal with any endogeneity concerns associated with the explanatory variables. Overall, our findings, which withstand a battery of robustness checks, suggest that improvements in corporate governance reduce the costs of monitoring for bondholders, resulting in increased debt financing.     

利率政策、金融结构与资本跨国流动——基于拓展的利率平价模型

利率政策和金融结构对资本跨国流动的影响力较强。在引入交易成本变量和放松风险中性假定的前提下,利用拓展的利率平价模型分析利率政策和金融结构对资本跨国流动及汇率波动造成的影响进行分析,结果得出,中国利率政策的顺周期性、粘性和单向惯性特征尽管不会导致资本跨国流动的边界发生位移,但是会使汇率的不稳定性加剧,并且持续的时间延长;中国现有金融结构的金融交易效率低和交易风险大的特征会导致资本净流入量减少,因此汇率面临着持续的、较大的贬值压力。     

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.     

Capital Allocation and Risk Performance Measurement In a Financial Institution

This paper provides an analytical and practical framework, consistent with maximizing the wealth of existing shareholders, to address the following questions: What are the costs associated with economic capital? What is the tradeoff between the probability of default and the costs of economic capital? How do we take into account the time profile of economic capital when assessing the performance of a business? What is the appropriate measure of profitability, keeping the probability of default constant? It is shown that the capital budgeting decision depends not only on the covariance of the return of a project with the market portfolio, but also on the covariance with the bank's existing assets. This dependency arises from the simple fact that the economic capital is not additive.     

Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms

This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6951 firm–year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988–1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on the firm's long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations (MNCs) are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

外部治理机制缺失下制度创新的代价——基于阿里巴巴“合伙人制度”的案例研究

本文以阿里巴巴"合伙人制度"为例,研究双重股权制度这一创新的控制权结构安排在外部治理环境变化时的成本收益权衡。研究发现,"合伙人制度"使阿里管理层获得了相比现金流量权的超额投票权,在登陆美国资本市场前,阿里管理层利用该制度攫取了大量控制权私有收益;登陆美国资本市场后,阿里则因"白皮书事件"受到资本市场严厉惩罚。阿里在美国上市前后的外部治理环境变化直接导致阿里管理层攫取控制权私有收益的成本大大增加。研究表明,在外部治理机制缺失的环境下,"合伙人制度"这一制度创新反而会成为管理层攫取控制权私有收益的工具,严重损害外部投资者利益。