Overlapping Generations or Infinitely-Lived Agents: Intergenerational Altruism and the Economics of Global Warming

Do we need an overlapping generations model for the economics of global warming? To answer this question, an infinitely-lived agent (ILA) approach and an overlapping generations (OLG) model are contrasted. ILA and OLG can be viewed as polar representations of intergenerational altruism. With ILA an immortal agent acts through his investment/savings decisions as trustee on the behalf of the future generations. With OLG, agents need not behave altruistic. They simply save during working years and dissave completely during retirement. Nevertheless, ILA and OLG must not differ in their implication for greenhouse policy. Greenhouse gas abatement is a straightforward alternative to physical capital formation and, even without altruism, each age cohort has an incentive to provide current abatement in order to reduce future damages attributable to climate change. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions and parameter values, our simulations reveal such an invariance result. Provided carbon taxes are the only policy tool and tax revenues are recycled through socially mandated rules, projections of economic growth, climate change and energy consumption are only insignificantly affected by the choice of approach.     

THE BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY OF INCOME AND CONSUMPTION TAXES IN NEW ZEALAND

This paper provides estimates of individual and aggregate revenue elasticities of income and consumption taxes in New Zealand, based on the 2001 tax structure and expenditure patterns. Using analytical expressions for revenue elasticities at the individual and aggregate levels, together with a simulated income distribution, values for New Zealand were obtained. Results using equi-proportional income changes suggest that the aggregate income and consumption tax revenue elasticities are both fairly constant as mean income increases, at around 1.3 and 0.95 respectively. This latter estimate assumes that increases in disposable income are accompanied by approximately proportional increases in total expenditure. If there is a tendency for the savings proportion to increase as disposable income increases, a somewhat lower total consumption tax revenue elasticity, of around 0.9, is obtained for 2001 income levels. However, non-equiproportional income changes are more realistic. Allowing for regression towards the geometric mean income reduces these elasticities, giving an elasticity for income and consumption taxes combined that is only slightly above unity. Examination of the tax-share weighted expenditure elasticities for various goods also revealed that, despite the adoption of a broad based GST at a uniform rate in New Zealand, the persistence of various excises has an important effect on the overall consumption tax revenue elasticity, especially for individuals at relatively low income levels.     

Reserve Requirements,Liquidity Risk,and Bank Lending Behavior

Although reserve requirements (RR) have been used in emerging markets to smooth credit cycles, the transmission mechanism remains blurry. Using bank‐level data, we unveil the interaction of RR with bank lending. We identify a new channel that works through a decline in banks’ liquid assets and loan supply due to an increase in RR. “Quantitative tightening” through RR raises the short‐term funding needs of the banking system, which is met by collateralized central bank lending, thus depleting banks’ unencumbered liquid assets. Our results suggest that such a shift in bank liquidity is associated with a significant change in lending.     

Persistent mispricing in a recently opened emerging index futures market: Arbitrageurs invited

The purpose of this study is to analyze the persistent, typically negative, mispricing in the new stock index futures market in Turkey, which has amounted to 5–8%, several multiples of transaction costs. The observations suggest that it is the outcome of a combination of practical difficulties of shorting in the spot stock market, behavioral effects, and insufficient arbitrage. The magnitude of the mispricing and the absence of arbitrage make behavioral effects more visible and provide a unique opportunity to examine extant behavioral hypotheses. Results confirm effects such as disposition and/or conservatism with the mispricing negatively related to past returns, but unrelated to future returns. Finally, an orderly weakening of the negative relation to past returns and behavioral effects is observed, suggesting that such effects will diminish as the market matures. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:218–243, 2009     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

Growth and Welfare Maximization in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth

This paper evaluates the trade‐off between growth and welfare maximization from two perspectives. First, it synthesizes and extends endogenous growth models with public finance to compare the growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates. Second, it examines the distinct model outcomes in terms of the growth rates and welfare levels. This comparison highlights the range of trade‐offs: the growth‐maximizing tax rate can lie above, below, or on the welfare‐maximizing equivalent. We find however that even relatively large differences in growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates translate into relatively small differences in growth rates, and, in some cases, welfare levels.     

Restructuring of the Hungarian Electricity Industry

Restructuring the monopolistic, state-owned, obsolete and polluting utility industries of post-socialist economies poses a challenge for the utility deregulation wave travelling around the world. Utility restructuring in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is unique from several perspectives, including the domination of foreign capital vs. national resources as the only feasible vehicle for a drastic change in the industry and the ambitious goals of harmonisation with the EU liberalisation schedule to accelerate accession. It is also widely expected that deregulation will help bring down world-record high energy intensities in these economies. Hungary has been the pioneer among economies in transition in unbundling, deregulating and privatising the utility industries and taking the first steps towards EU-conforming market liberalisation within less than half a decade. The first stages of privatisation and restructuring have been declared a success story in the Western media. However, what is a success story from a foreign perspective may be seen differently from other viewpoints. The article describes the process of utility restructuring in Hungary and examines its impact from the economic, environmental and policy perspectives. The article also compares the pioneer Hungarian deregulation with other CEE countries' restructuring of their energy sectors. However, the lessons to be learned from the Hungarian electricity industry restructuring are not only vital for other economies in transition but are often universally applicable.     

R&D Project Selection Models: An Assessment

Abstract— The R&D project selection decision is described as a process by which an intermittent stream of changes are made to lists of currently active and proposed projects. It includes generating alternatives, determining when a decision is required, collecting data, specifying constraints and criteria, and recycling. The decision is viewed as imbedded within a hierarchical, diffuse budgeting and planning process. Process characteristics such as multiple criteria whose relative importance varies over time, inherent uncertainty, and parameter interrelationships result in a highly complex decision problem. The existing normative R&D benefit measurement and project selection literature is assessed and the limitations inherent in the proposed models are determined. A number of research opportunities are identified for both methodological and empirical studies.     

Trust Me! I am a European Central Banker

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross‐country data set that includes a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country's macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socioeconomic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust‐building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust‐building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long run.     

The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.