Democracy,inequality and the environment when citizens can mitigate health consequences of pollution privately or act collectively

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately as well as control pollution collectively through public policies. We consider a small open economy with comparative advantage in dirty goods. With costly private mitigation, income inequality leads to an unequal distribution of the burdens of pollution (in accordance with the evidence). We show that the eco-friendliness ranking of political regime types varies with the cost of private mitigation and that increased inequality has non-monotonous effects on equilibrium pollution levels. In weak democracies, the political equilibrium may be characterized by low environmental standards but highly restricted trade, thus leading to ambiguous outcomes regarding pollution levels.     

International Process Standards and North–South Trade

This paper examines the choice between alternative trade-based approaches to reducing global environmental damage, such as trade-related process standards and tariff-based approaches. Estimates of the effects of alternative policies are presented, using a calibrated global trade model with pollution externalities. It is found that both trade-related process standards and tariff-based policies are rather ineffective at reducing global emissions. The adoption of general process standards, however, might be exceedingly costly to developing countries.     

Trade agreements,domestic environmental regulation,and transboundary pollution

This paper investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries that takes the distortion arising from their non-coordinated environmental policies into consideration. In a reciprocal-markets model with bidirectional transboundary pollution, we find that if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, the second-best trade agreement requires that both countries subsidize the imported goods whose consumption gives rise to pollution. We also find that a bilateral tariff reduction is beneficial to the global environment.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

环境所有权、贸易结构变迁与污染分布——基于超边际经济学框架的分析

文章引入环境所有权概念,运用新兴古典经济学的超边际分析方法,研究了贸易结构变迁与相应的污染分布和转移,旨在揭示大国污染效应、工业化路径的环境效应、贸易结构变迁的环境所有权因素以及环保政策失效的原因。研究推导出不同国家间环境所有权模糊程度和交易效率变化对贸易结构变迁与污染分布变化的作用机理。研究命题可用于解释现实贸易发展中存在的环境污染现象。     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

A study of environmental impact on manufacturing products trade in Shandong,China

Based on the situation that the trade of manufactured goods takes the main position in Shandong Province,this paper identifies Shandong industrial pollutant discharge by three indices,which are industrial effluent discharge,industrial SO2 emission,and solid waste disposal.Furthermore,it conducts an empirical analysis of the trade terms of pollution content transfer on nine identified industrial sectors.The conclusion is that the increase in industrial effluent discharge,industrial SO2 emission,and solid waste disposal has paralleled the growth of the GDP in Shandong.The rapid economic growth brings obvious negative impact on the environment.Compared with that in 1998,the increase in the pollution content of exports in 2007 indicated that more environmental costs were generated with the economic development in Shandong.There is a need for optimization of foreign trade structure in Shandong,especially the need for increasing import of the pollution intensive products and decreasing the export of the pollution intensive products.The research on the relationship between manufactured goods trade and the environmental impact will make a contribution to the adjustment of foreign trade and environmental policies.     

Market Integration and Competition in Environmental and Trade Policies

Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of ??trade and the environment,?? we develop a two-stage game model where governments choose environmental and trade policies and firms play a Cournot-Nash game. We show that reductions in transport costs lead to lower emission taxes and higher tariffs. And, we find that the degree of pollution damage plays a central role in whether market integration is welfare-improving relative to autarky.     

Trade and Global Pollution in Dynamic Oligopoly with Corporate Environmentalism

This paper examines the effects of international trade in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where the stock of global pollution has a negative welfare effect and the oligopolists' objectives may include society's pollution damage as well as private profits. In a symmetric case where the number of firms, emission coefficient, and firms' environmental consciousness are the same in two countries, an opening of trade unambiguously improves each country's welfare in the short run. In the long run, however, trade increases the stock of global pollution and hence, whether opening of trade is beneficial depends on the parameters of the economy. If there are asymmetries between countries, the short‐run gains from trade in both countries are not necessarily guaranteed, because trade liberalization may increase output in one country and reduce it in the other. Moreover, free trade may result in lower pollution stock than under autarky.     

The Environmental Conundrum of Rare Earth Elements

Clean technologies, such as solar panels and wind turbines, help to curb global emissions, but they require dirty inputs for their production—i.e., mining rare earth elements (REEs) pollutes local environments. REEs are also the object of rent-shifting strategic trade policies, as highlighted by a recent WTO ruling against China’s quotas and tariffs on exports of REEs. We construct a three-country trade model with an environmental damage function, in order to examine the effects of three policies with different implications for the equilibrium quantities of dirty inputs and clean technologies: a downstream subsidy, an upstream export tariff, and an upstream pollution tax. We relate the welfare implications of the policies to the parameters of the damage function and to the number of downstream competitors. The effects of a unilateral policy switch from an export tariff to a domestic pollution tax, as suggested by China’s reaction to the WTO challenge, are also examined.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

World Trade and the Environment: Issues and Policies

This paper provides an overview of trade, environmental and related public issues and policies. It discusses the pollution problem, the recent global warming trend, the attempts of various institutions, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, regional, national and other organizations, to solve the global trade and environmental issues. The paper also discusses a number of basic theoretical issues and empirical findings, such as the free‐rider problem, the tragedy of the commons, the theory of second best, the relative efficacy of price and quantity control, carbon leakage, border carbon adjustments, the cap‐and‐trade system, the pollution haven hypothesis, the optimal social discount rate and the environmental Kuznets curve. Some computable general equilibrium models are reviewed and several notable World Trade Organization environmental and health‐related trade dispute cases are analysed, including the tuna–dolphin, shrimp–turtle, eco‐labelling, beef‐hormone and genetically modified organism cases.     

Optimal Volume of Environmentally Damaging Trade

It is controversial whether international trade enhances or degrades the global environment. In this model, environmental quality, as measured by biodiversity, is damaged by the consequences of trade, which include the commercialization of natural habitat, pollution and bioinvasion. However, there are also benefits of trade. When both countries internalize the external costs of production and trade, measures of environmental quality may be higher or lower as a consequence of trade, but there is always, unambiguously, less trade the more environmentally damaging it is.     

Environmental tariffs on polluting imports

This paper examines the implications for the use of trade measures as weapons to address global environmental concerns. There are already proposals in the U.S. senate to impose an environmental tariff against foreign nations whose cost advantages stem from less stringent environmental standards than the U.S. The paper argues that trade policy measures typically are not the first best instruments for achieving environmental objectives. Even theoretically they could be shown to be welfare improving only under a very narrow range of circumstances. Their use in place of more efficient policy instruments may not only end up distorting the patterns of world trade but also may worsen the overall patterns of environmental quality. Simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that it is highly unlikely that countries would alter their environmental behavior because of the imposition of the proposed U.S. tariff. Hence the proposed legislation has very uncertain environmental consequences. Even if the policy has been mainly designed to protect domestic industries, it would only provide a minor margin of protection because the costs of complying with the environmental standards represent a relatively small element in the total costs. The analysis suggests that trade policy introduced in this fashion will have no significant impact on the patterns of world trade and pollution.     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

Will Trade Liberalization Harm the Environment? The Case of Indonesia to 2020

Most-favoured-nation (MFN) trade liberalizations willalways improve global economic welfare providedglobally optimal environmental and other policies arein place. But since the latter proviso is not met inpractice, empirical studies of the environmental andresource depletion effects of such reforms are neededto determine whether trade reform is still worthwhile.This paper provides a methodology for doing that. Itis illustrated with a case study of Indonesia, a largenewly industrializing country that is rich in naturalresources and committed to taking part in majormultilateral and regional trade liberalizations overthe next two decades. A modified version of theglobal CGE model known as GTAP is used to project theworld economy to 2010 and 2020 without and with thosereforms. An environmental module is attached to theIndonesian part of that global CGE model so as tomeasure the effects of changes in economic activity onair and water pollution. The proportionalcontributions to environmental indicators of changesin the level and composition of output, and changes inproduction techniques, are identified. A base caseprojection without trade reform is compared withalternative scenarios involving full globalimplementation of Uruguay Round commitments by 2010,and the additional move to MFN free trade by APECcountries by 2020. The study suggests that, at leastwith respect to air and water, trade policy reformsslated for the next two decades would in many casesimprove the environment and reduce the depletion ofnatural resources and in the worst cases would addonly slightly to environmental degradation – evenwithout toughening the enforcement of existingenvironmental regulations or adding new ones, and evenif the reforms stimulate a faster rate of economicgrowth.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies

This paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large-country Grossman–Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political-support effects can offset terms-of-trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation.     

Strategic Environmental Policies and the Gains from Trade Liberalization

The literature on strategic environmental policy has not fully addressed welfare effects of trade liberalization from autarky. In a reciprocal market model of duopoly with transboundary pollution, we study how reductions in transport costs and import tariffs affect the Nash‐equilibrium welfare of an environmental policy game as compared to any initial state including autarky. We show three patterns of gainfulness of trade depending on the interaction between marginal damage from pollution and the degree of transboundary pollution.     

Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard.