Analyzing Modes of Foreign Entry: Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition

This paper studies the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: greenfield investment versus acquisition. In contrast to existing approaches, the acquisition price and the profits under both entry modes are endogenously determined. Interestingly, we find that the optimal entry mode decision is affected by the competition intensity in the market in a nonmonotonic way. When markets are very much or very little competitive, greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for intermediate values it is acquisition.     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

The choice of market entry mode: Greenfield investment,M&A and joint venture

Multinationals may enter a host market by different modes of foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper examines the choice of FDI mode, and shows that the profitability of greenfield investment influences this choice not only directly, but also indirectly since it determines the outside option of potential acquisition targets and joint venture partners. In particular, even if greenfield investment is a viable option, the multinational may prefer a joint venture to M&A, and M&A to greenfield investment, provided that M&A and joint venture both involve sufficiently low fixed costs. The reason is that the profitability of greenfield investment both reduces the acquisition price in the case of M&A, and gives local firms an incentive to agree to a joint venture.     

Core competencies,matching and the structure of foreign direct investment

We develop a matching model of foreign direct investment to study how multinational firms choose between greenfield investment, acquisitions and joint ownership. Firms must invest in a continuum of tasks to bring a product to market. Each firm possesses a core competency in the task space, but the firms are otherwise identical. For acquisitions and joint ownership, a multinational enterprise (MNE) must match with a local partner that may provide complementary expertise within the task space. However, under joint ownership, investment in tasks is shared by multiple owners and, hence, is subject to a holdup problem that varies with contract intensity. In equilibrium, ex ante identical multinationals enter the local matching market, and, ex post, three different types of heterogeneous firms arise. Specifically, the worst matches are forgone and the MNEs invest greenfield; the middle matches operate under joint ownership; and the best matches integrate via full acquisition. We link the firm‐level model to cross‐country and industry predictions and find that a greater share of full acquisitions occur between more proximate markets, in hosts with greater revenue potential and within contract‐intensive industries. Using data on partial and full acquisitions across industries and countries, we find robust support for these predictions.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

The impact of multinational entry on domestic market structure and investment

We model the impact of different modes of multinational entry on the choices of domestic firms. Focusing on the competitive effects of foreign entry for the host country we demonstrate that greenfield investment will increase competition only if it is not countered by anti-competitive reactions on the part of the domestic firms. Together with cross-border mergers and acquisitions the model, thus, provides two alternative explanations for the increase in concentration ratios in industries with mostly horizontal foreign direct investment. Moreover, foreign presence is shown to raise total investment in the local industry at the cost of crowding out domestic investment.     

跨国公司的进入模式与技术转移

跨国公司对东道国进行直接投资主要有两种模式：绿地投资和并购。本文通过构建一个简单的理论模型对跨国公司如何在这两种进入模式之间进行选择，在不同的进入模式下跨国公司的技术转移水平有何不同。以及跨国公司进入模式的选择和技术转移水平受到哪些因素的影响等问题进行了研究。在理论研究的基础上并且结合中国的实际情况，本文提出了有关促进跨国公司提高对华技术转移水平的政策建议。     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

Foreign bank entry,bank efficiency and market power in Central and Eastern European Countries1

This article analyses the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as measured by equity ownership. We show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the post‐entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared with domestic and foreign‐acquired banks. The efficiency of foreign‐acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but improves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. Overall, the CEEC banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.     

Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.      

东道国舆论环境与海外进入模式选择 ——基于海量媒体数据的定量考察

逆全球化背景下日趋复杂的东道国舆论环境给我国国际化进程带来严峻挑战,对其如何影响跨国企业进入国际市场的关键决策还缺乏系统的实证检验。基于情感分析技术（NLP）和网络爬虫,对2015-2022年间830余万条媒体报道进行文本分析,构建涉华舆情指数,系统分析与检验了东道国舆论环境对我国企业海外进入模式选择的影响。研究发现,东道国舆论环境越差,相比于独资模式,中国企业更倾向于选择合资模式进入海外市场;相比于跨国并购,中国企业更倾向于选择绿地投资进入海外市场;跨国企业的产权性质和国际化经验起到正向调节作用。在影响机制方面,东道国舆论环境通过影响企业的规制、规范和认知合法性来影响跨国企业投资设立模式的选择。本文的研究结论为跨国企业恰当地选择海外市场进入模式、积极规避或弱化舆论风险,更好地在东道国投资布局与经营发展提供对策建议。     

Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export

While determinants of FDI patterns have received widespread attention, the timing of their surge remains largely unexplained. According to the proximity–concentration trade‐off argument, a surge in FDI in times of decaying international transportation costs seemingly represents a paradox. Besides transportation costs, other factors have contextually changed: in particular, the uncertainty that firms bear has increased. Enriching the classical choice problem of a multinational firm with insights from the literature on investment under uncertainty, we illustrate how different types of uncertainty determine the timing and optimal entry mode (i.e. FDI or export) of a multinational enterprise into a new market.     

跨国公司进入方式规制的理论与政策研究

跨国公司采取直接投资进入东道国有两种方式:跨国并购和新建投资。在进入方式的选择上,在不同的约束条件下跨国公司和东道国具有不同的收益和成本,但现有的跨国公司直接投资规制的理论研究和政策分析没有区分这两种进入方式。文章认为,东道国政府在制定跨国公司直接投资的规制政策时,要综合权衡各种进入方式的积极效应和负面影响,制定适宜的规制政策,从而在引资过程中获得最大利益。文章还对跨国公司在华直接投资规制的实践进行了回顾,并提出了进一步的政策取向的建议。     

Technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities

Abstract.  We examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment: de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology. The relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality. The clash between the foreign firm's choice and the local government's ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm.     

Acquisition vsus de novo entry: A theoretical appraisal

In this paper we generalize the approach developed in the context of banking competition by Gabszewicz et al. (2011). In an entry/acquisition game, we allow the potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market to offer a variant lying at any level of the quality ladder and playing a priori either the role of acquirer or acquired firm. This more general approach enables to give account of a wider set among the different types of acquisitions taking place worldwide. Not only does it constitute a natural toolbox for representing the choice between acquisition vsus greenfield considered in trade theory, but it also allows to capture the exchange of innovation's ownership via acquisition, as analyzed in the literature of innovation.     

Analysis of the Interaction between Regional R&D Productivity and the Investment Strategies of Multinational Enterprises

The aim of this article is to analyze the interaction between regional R&D productivity and the investment strategies of multinational enterprises. The discussion is based on the hypothesis that R&D investments cause a reduction in the production costs and an increase in firms’ market share; furthermore, R&D costs may be affected by national industrial policies. Supposing the existence of asymmetries in local research productivity, necessary and sufficient conditions for a geographical diversification of resources have been found. Suggestions with respect to the optimal allocation of R&D investment are finally derived.     

Foreign direct investment as a signal

This paper models oligopolistic competition among potential multinational firms in an environment of firm heterogeneity, incomplete information on costs, and strategic interactions. We show that foreign direct investment is more likely if it can serve as a signal of productivity in an environment of incomplete information as firms would like to avoid sending a low productivity signal. Our model shows that this effect is strong enough such that foreign direct investment can be an optimal foreign entry mode even if trade costs are zero.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North–South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection because it encourages a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology‐intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.     

Does policy reform promote FDI in developing economies? a firm-level simulation approach

How do policy reforms for foreign investors in developing economies affect inward foreign direct investment? Using a firm heterogeneity model calibrated to match data on Japanese multinational firms, we simulate how multinationals respond to a decline in investment procedure days. We find that such policy reforms in investment procedures significantly increase the aggregate entries and sales of multinational firms in developing economies, with the more pronounced impact at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin. At the firm level, declining entry costs encourage more productive firms to invest in a wider range of markets although such impacts are modest for the most productive firms that already penetrate many markets. The impacts on foreign sales per multinational firm are less clear-cut in magnitude across productivity levels in part because falling entry costs directly increase multinational entry to developing economies, but only indirectly encourage their existing production in these markets.     

跨国公司进入模式的结构决定:基于影响因素的一般框架

跨国公司的市场进入模式是近几十年来直接投资理论最为重要的领域之一。进入模式的基本问题主要有三个:所有权安排、产品策略和投资方式。文章以影响进入模式选择的三大因素(产业因素、企业因素和区位因素)为基础,构建了一个分析跨国公司市场进入决策的一般框架,探讨了进入模式的结构决定。